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ABSTRACT
During the past twenty years there have been sharply contrasting policies towards the
regulation of public utilities in France and the United Kingdom. In the UK there has
been a policy of deregulation where private ownership abounds, encouraging market
forces vis-a-vis political forces. In France by contrast a policy of'public service' is still
paramount with many of the utilities remaining in government hands and enjoying
monopoly rights. This research explores a third dynamic in the regulation of utilities,
that of technological innovation. In particular this thesis examines the development of
metering technology in relation to the regulation of four utility sectors; electricity; gas;
water and telecommunications in France and the UK. Using a case study methodology
it examines five theoretical approaches that can be used to analyse the role of
innovation in regulatory change. These are the Techno-Economic Paradigm; Systems
Theory, Sociotechnical Constituencies', Techno-Economic Networks and Evolutionary
Theory. The analysis is then used to illuminate and guide future policy making towards
public utility regulation and innovation.
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DEFINITIONS
Regulation:
Regulation is the term used to describe homeostatic systems that are determined by a
set of rules. The regulation of blood sugar level in the human body will be taken as an
example to illustrate this. When carbohydrate foods containing sugar and starches are
digested, they are absorbed into the bloodstream as glucose. Insulin, a hormone
produced by the pancreas, is released into the bloodstream when the level of glucose
rises, and the hormone enables glucose to be stored in the fat tissues. Similarly when
the glucose level in the bloodstream drops, less insulin is produced, and sugars which
are laid down in the fat tissues are used up (Vander et al. 1994: pp.602-623). This
definition becomes clearer when the word 'regulation' is translated into French. The
translation provides two words each with different meanings (Mansion, 1945 and
Aglietta, 1979: p.316). Regulation means a 'balancing mechanism' or 'equilibrium' and
reglementation means 'the implementation of rules'. Thus this thesis considers that
regulation is a two-part process. First there is a system of balancing that is required for
a stable world {regulation). Second a set of social and/or scientific rules that are
implemented to maintain this balance {reglementation). Just as in the human body has
many systems of regulation (e.g. the concentration of blood sugar, salts, etc.); there are
many systems of regulation within social systems. Such factors as the laws of supply
and demand, the need for social equality, asymmetries in knowledge and environmental
impacts are important and often conflicting regulatory systems. A regulator is one who
(e.g. an individual or organisation), or that which (e.g. a controlling device for the
speed of a machine or the laws of supply and demand in a market economy) governs a
system of regulation. This thesis examines the role that innovation has on the
regulatory systems acting on public utilities.
Deregulation:
Deregulation is the term used to describe the process of converting vertically integrated
public utilities, which were previously owned and operated by the State, into their
xxii
'naturally monopolistic' and competitive components (Beesley 1992). In other words it
is the process of changing the regime of regulation (the social and economic
environment) that is governed by political devices to one that is governed by market
mechanisms. Moreover in some cases the deregulatory process has been coupled with
privatisation where the production, transportation and supply functions have been
transferred from the public to the private sector. The term deregulation is considered to
be somewhat of a misnomer in that the process of creating markets inevitably involves
the creation of regulatory institutions in order to maintain a competitive environment.
Public Utility:
Public utilities are industries that are subject to economies of scale resulting in their
'natural monopoly' position. For example there are cost savings in having only one
water main in the street, and similarly this is the case with other large infrastructure
industries such as electricity, telecommunications and gas. There is also a body of legal
and historical precedent to support the view that an industry must be of some public or
social significance to be considered a public utility. The strategic and political
importance of the gas, electricity, telephone and water industries have always been
present in the management of utilities. Moreover, the concept of universal access at
equal cost has been a particular theme in the supply of utilities as a social right, rather
than chosen luxury, over the past fifty years.
Innovation:
Innovation is considered to be the act of making novel changes (technical or
procedural) that enhance the wellbeing and efficiency of an organisation and society.
Meter:
A meter is a device for measuring the consumption and/or demand of a product. Meters
become increasing important in public utility networks that require to be built to cater
for the peak demand. It follows that during times of slack demand the system is
xxiii
running inefficiently. Metering allows differential pricing, where the price is more
expensive during peak times and cheaper during off-peak times. It is the development
of this technology that is studied in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
Since the social and economic reconstruction that was required after Word War II, it
has been argued that the electricity, gas, water and telecommunications industries
should be managed on mixed 'neo-classical' principles (Helm, 1995). In these terms a
high degree of public operation and ownership (or strict private regulation) was widely
accepted by a variety of Governments and academics world-wide (Lee, 1969; Turvey
& Anderson, 1977; Littlechild, 1979 and Helm, 1995). Today, there is a fundamental
shift in the principles of public utility regulation. Now it is suggested by many that an
increased role for market forces is desirable where private sector ownership is seen as
the most efficient mechanism to achieve economic optimality. Meanwhile such factors
as social equality and the environment are thought to be more effectively dealt with by
making companies legally liable for these provisions (Littlechild, 1986 and Beesley,
1992). Thus, competition is now recognised as a key dynamic in the process of
discovery and co-ordination that is important for an efficient operation of a network
infrastructure. Consequently vertically integrated public utilities, which were
previously owned and operated by the State, have in some cases been broken up into
their 'naturally monopolistic' and competitive components. Moreover in some cases the
production, transportation and supply functions have been transferred from the public
to the private sector (Harper, 1989; Henney, 1994; O'Neill, 1996 and Surrey, 1996).
The role that technological innovation has played in this revolution is unclear and it is
this dynamic which is investigated in this thesis.
Over the past twenty years there have been, concurrent with the deregulation process,
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new developments in data processing and telecommunications which have allowed the
introduction of such technology as 'solid state' (or electronic) metering and
communications systems which can transfer data at the speed of light. This has meant
that information about pricing, product quality and load management can be
manipulated on a 'real-time' basis and this has arguably facilitated the introduction of
deregulation (Soishansi, 1991). The United Kingdom (UK) has been in the vanguard of
this change process. During the nineteen-eighties and nineties the UK's
telecommunications, gas, electricity and water suppliers have been floated on the Stock
Exchange and competition has been introduced into electricity generation, electricity
supply, gas supply and long distance telecommunications supply (Harper, 1989;
Henney, 1994; O'Neill 1996 and Surrey, 1996).
One would have thought that France, as a major trading nation, would inherently be in
favour of free trade and throw itself into the oncoming tide of market liberalisation as
was occurring in the UK and elsewhere. Yet Woods (1996) suggests that the country
has a basic distrust of unbridled capitalism, which it regards as being essentially Anglo-
Saxon in its nature. Neither does he suggest that the French share, to anything like the
same extent, the UK's fear of becoming uncompetitive due to high personnel costs and
a somewhat rigid labour market. Also Woods (1996) adds that, despite its acclaimed
elan, social order is in fact a quality that is much admired in France. As Charles de
Gaulle once comically put it "how can one govern a country that has two hundred
cheeses?" As a result the public owned and operated utility monopolies have remained
intact until recently. The French position however has increasingly come under threat
not least from the European Union where many of its laws run contrary, at least in
spirit, to the single European market. As the market liberalisation policy of the
European Commission is implemented across the Continent, the French Government
has started to pass (rather grudgingly) reforms designed to curb potentially anti¬
competitive practices in its utilities (Cameron, 1995 and Woods, 1996). The
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in 1998 can be cited as an example of
this. The French position is summarised by Bouttes & Leban (1995). They consider
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that the utilities' role of 'public service' should not be compromised by the introduction
of competition. So although it may be technically feasible to unbundle (split up) the
production activity from the transport and supply functions to allow the trading of
services across the infrastructure, this may not be in the best interests of France.
Bouttes & Leban (1995) suggest that the role that technology plays in maintaining this
position is great, in that it is regarded to be of key importance in deciding the form of
regulation best suited to each industry and each country. Thus the analysis of regulation
depends on the precise identification of a combination of the sector's economic, social,
geopolitical and technical specifications. One purpose of this thesis is to examine what
the specifications may be.
1.2 AIM
The aim of the thesis is to evaluate and develop theoretical frameworks that can explain
and evaluate regulatory and technical change in public utilities. This approach differs
from many studies of utility industries in that it is concerned with the management of
change in well-established infrastructure networks rather than with the creation of new
networks (Hughes, 1983). In this way it builds from the approach of Thomas Hughes
and works within the spirit of his study of the development of the electricity
infrastructure in Networks ofPower (Hughes, 1983). In fact this study can be seen as
looking at the next phase in network systems, in particular studying the change taking
place in a network once it has become firmly established.
The approach is also significantly different from ones adopted in many textbooks on
the management of change within firms. Change in these contexts is seen as a matter of
how firms react to external factors either in the competitive (Pettigrew & Whipp,
1991), social or technological environment (Woodward, 1965 and Zuboff, 1988). In
this study change is viewed in terms of the differing factors that determine the regimes
of regulation which work out-with the firm. Thus it is an inter-sectoral study rather
3
than an inter-firm or intra-firm study.
It also differs from many mainstream commentators on regulation, who see socio¬
political factors (Aglietta, 1979; Reagan, 1987; Boyer, 1988a and Boyer, 1988b), and
market discipline (Littlechild, 1986 and Beesley, 1992) as the prime factors in
regulation. Instead, it explores in detail by means of empirical evidence presented in
eight case studies, the mutual shaping of information technology (more precisely
metering technology) and regulation in UK and French utilities over the past twenty
years.
1.3 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
The thesis consists of three parts: Part I presents a literature review and outlines the
research method; Part II discusses the eight case studies; and Part III consolidates the
literature and case studies in presenting an analysis and conclusions.
The research design is presented in chapter 2. The methodology adopted is an
'emergent grounded' approach where the research is founded on multiple case studies
that take a logical progression from exploration and descriptive phases in Parts I and II
(the literature review and case studies), to an explanatory phase in Part III (the
analysis). The understanding of the role that theory plays in this thesis is crucial. A
'theory' is argued to be a method of explaining phenomena, in this case the interrelation
of technology and regulation. Thus theory is argued to be more than a metaphor in that
it is a useful heuristic device. So theory is used as a framework for conceptualising the
phenomena that are being studied. This means that the theoretical frameworks that are
explored may have significant differences (logical, empirical, rhetorical and
metaphysical) and that may be helpful in the illumination of the different aspects of the
management of the technology/regulatory interface in public utilities.
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The literature review covers three distinct fields: regulation; public utility management;
and technological innovation. Regulation can be regarded as a negative feedback
system in which asymmetries, whether due to social, economic or technological factors
are balanced by rules which may (or may not) be codified in legal statutes. Chapter 3
presents three approaches to regulation: market theories of regulation; a political
scientist's formulation of regulation; and a technology and innovation perspective to
regulation. It is this latter approach and in particular the Techno-Economic Paradigm
which is explored in further detail later in the thesis. This chapter also gives an account
of various regulatory institutions. Chapter 4 then presents the role of metering
technology in public utility management. This chapter argues that public utility
regulation needs to call on not only economic but also social and technical knowledge.
It also addresses the specific role of metering in the industries being studied, namely
the electricity, gas, water and telecommunications industries. The chapter concludes
with an outline of the Principal-Agent model of regulation and a discussion of the
different methods of regulation found in public utilities today. As a technological
perspective on regulation is being considered, a review of the literature on
technological innovation is presented in chapter 5. In this chapter technology is initially
viewed through its many different perspectives. It then explains and justifies the
methods of analysing technical change used in evaluating the interaction of metering
and regulation that are presented later in the thesis. These theoretical frameworks are
Systems Theory, Sociotechnical Constituencies, Techno-Economic Networks and
Evolutionary Theory.
Part II then presents the eight case studies with a chapter assigned to each case study.
This exploratory stage of the thesis consists of: chapter 6, electricity in the UK; chapter
7, electricity in France; chapter 8, gas in the UK; chapter 9, gas in France; chapter 10
water in the UK; chapter 11 water in France; chapter 12 telecommunications in the UK;
and chapter 13 telecommunications in France. Each case study takes a similar format:
there is a brief introduction; there is then a description of the network infrastructure;
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this is followed by an exploration of the role of metering technology; and finally a
summary of the findings is presented. The only exception to this format can be found in
the case studies concerning telecommunications, in chapters 12 and 13. In these
telecommunications chapters, the metering of telephony and telecommunications in
energy (electricity and gas) and water metering, are dealt with in separate sections.
Part III consists of the descriptive and explanatory phases of this thesis. The analysis
consists of four chapters. Chapter 14 examines the role that information technology has
played in the changes that have occurred in the regulation of public utilities over the
past twenty years. Here, the applicability of the Techno-Economic Paradigm for
explaining this change is evaluated. The role that regulation plays in the shaping of
metering technology is then considered in chapter 15. This provides a more detailed
analysis of the texture of innovation than is presented in chapter 14 since it addresses
specifically the factors shaping metering technology. The theoretical frameworks
discussed here are Systems Theory, Sociotechnical Constituencies and Evolutionary
Theory. Also within the same Systems Theory framework, chapter 16 then considers
how regulation has been shaped by socio-technical factors. In this analysis,
Evolutionary Theory again is applied as an explanatory tool together with Techno-
Economic Networks. Chapters 15 and 16 both conclude with a discussion and
recommendations on technology and regulatory policy respectively. The findings of the
thesis and the implications for public utility management in the future are presented in
the conclusions in chapter 17. In the conclusions, there is a discussion of the validity of
the theoretical frameworks used in the thesis and recommendations are made for further
research.
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PARTI
THE METHODOLOGY AND
LITERATURE REVIEW
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Before embarking on a study of this sort one must not only consider the research design
but also the personal motivation behind the project. This enables one both to reflect the
inbuilt biases in the project, the theoretical approach that one wishes to adopt and also
inform the reader of the academic and commercial background of the author. Thus the
methodology departs from grounded theory described by Glaser & Strauss (1967) in
that this thesis uses theoretical descriptive frameworks to analyse qualitative data (Yin,
1994). In saying this the methodology takes an exploratory approach in the case studies
(chapters 6 to 13) and an explanatory approach in the analysis (chapters 14 to 16). This
in many ways may appear similar to an inductive grounded theory approach. Yet the
study commences with clear theoretical propositions (chapters 3 to 5), moves into an
exploratory phase (chapters 6 to 13) which is relevant to the hypothesis-generating
approach developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), and finishes with an explanatory
phase related to the hypothesis-testing approach described by Yin (1994). This is
described as an 'emergent grounded' approach by Saunders et al. (1997: p.350) and is
the methodology used in this study.
The first section of this chapter considers the author's (my own) background and
motivations for the project. This is written unlike the rest of the thesis in the first person
and is formatted as a personal biography. The second section then discuss the research
design (Yin, 1994: p.20). This is essentially the blueprint for the research, which takes
a case study format. The method of conducting the case study and collecting the
evidence is described in the third section. This involves a description of the sources of
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evidence, the generation of primary and secondary research data, and the creation of a
study programme. The chapter concludes with a description of the analytical
procedures used in the thesis.
2.2 PROJECT MOTIVATION
In October 1995 I began work on this PhD, studying the interrelation between the
deregulation of public utilities and the development of information and communication
technologies. Prior to this I had gained a BSc in geology at Aberdeen University and
went on to work in the oil and minerals industry. During my time working as an
exploration geologist, with amongst other companies, British Petroleum, it became
clear that various social scientific skills (in my case business skills) as well as scientific
skills, were required to be a successful geologist. So in order to develop this area I took
an MBA at Edinburgh University in 1987.1 then joined British Gas and embarked on a
career in general management. At this time British industry was undergoing a sea
change in philosophy on how businesses should be run. British Gas had been privatised
in 1986 and competition was beginning to develop. This first-hand experience of
deregulation kindled the embers of the fire that was eventually realised in my PhD
studies. In 1989, in order to widen my experience of public utility management, I
joined Scottish Hydro-Electric and this was where my knowledge of the UK electricity
industry is founded. In my role as Marketing Systems Manager I participated in the
transfer of the publicly owned North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board to the privately
listed Scottish Hydro-Electric pic in 1991. Also I was responsible for the development
of the company's new information and communications systems which were needed for
operation in the deregulated environment. In particular, I was involved in the
management of the development of remote metering systems. It was during this period
that the framework of my PhD thesis began to take shape. I felt that the deregulation
that I was participating in had a close relationship with innovations occurring in
information, communications and metering technologies. By 1994 I was ready to
pursue this question further, both in the academic and commercial sphere. To this end I
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joined Ian Pope Associates (IPA) as an Associate Consultant, and at the same time
revived contacts with my academic mentors at Edinburgh University. IPA is an
independent consultancy established in 1989 and its business covers a wide range of
strategic and commercial issues including regulatory issues in the energy utilities. IPA's
clients include Governments, international lending agencies and regulatory bodies as
well as commercial companies. By June 1995, my mentors at both IPA and Edinburgh
University had succeeded in gaining an Industrial Collaborative Studentship between
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and IPA. The fruits of that
studentship are presented in this thesis.
From this brief biography some notable features stand out. The project is primarily self
motivated, and is grounded in questions that arose at first hand, from my experience
while working in both operational and management roles in public utilities. For better
or worse (I would sincerely hope for the better) my thesis is influenced from this
experience and the knowledge which has been gained from my past work. This is
considered to be an integral part of the project methodology. From the academic point
of view, my foundations are in science (geology) and applied social science (MBA)
which form a robust empirical and logical epistemological background to my research.
This has been further supported by courses undertaken at The Graduate School for
Social Sciences at The University of Edinburgh. These courses provided a valuable
insight into research design and technology studies, as well as qualitative and
quantitative methods of data generation and analysis. Moreover, this training provided
a basis for a phenornenologica! approach to the research, which (as will be discussed in
the next section) is manifest by a case study rather than an experimental research
design. In saying this many remnants of my positivistic background remain. The
fundamental hypotheses: 'does technology have an influence on regulation?'; and vice
versa 'does regulation effect technology?' have empirical flavours to them. Yet, I
consider that regulation and technology are phenomena, which cannot only be studied
by logical and empirical epistemology alone. Moreover, I consider a phenomenon to be
anything that can be observed by our senses and it is my firm belief that my senses are
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grounded in both social and non-social processes. The real interest for me is studying
phenomenologically the interaction of these two components: the social and the
scientific. My epistemological position will be justified further, not only in this chapter,
but also throughout the thesis as is consistent with an 'emergent grounded'
methodology. Evidence of my scientific background also comes in my form of prose
which, apart from this section, is written in the third person. This is not for any
philosophical reason but merely that the third person is the form that I have written all
my previous work, both in the academic and commercial world, and it is the one in
which I feel most expressive and comfortable.
2.3 THE RESEARCH DESIGN
2.3.1 The Project Aims
The project has two distinct aims: to describe the interaction of technological and
regulatory development; and to provide a theoretical basis on which technology and
regulatory policy can be constructed. There have been a number of important
developments in various countries in recent years in the way public utilities (electricity,
gas, water and telecommunications) are organised. These constitutional changes have
involved three major activities. Firstly, the ownership of utilities has shifted from
Government to the private sector. Secondly, monolithic monopolies have been broken
up both horizontally and vertically to varying extents. Thirdly, competition, at least in
principle, has been introduced to encourage efficiency and stimulate new technology
while maintaining a satisfactory quality of service (Harper, 1989; Henney, 1994;
O'Neill, 1996 and Surrey, 1996). The purpose of this piece of post graduate research is
to study how technology has been affected by these changes and to examine what
influence technology has had in stimulating this move towards deregulation.
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In considering a research methodology two designs come to mind, the quasi-
experiment and the case study. The research could at first sight be seen to be somewhat
quasi-experimental (Cook & Campbell, 1979). For example, over the past twenty years
utilities in the UK have been privatised, increasing the role of market forces. Indeed
titles such as Surrey's The British Electricity Experiment. Privatization: the Record, the
Issues, the Lessons (1996) would suggest that such a methodology would be valid. This
is not the case. A quasi-experiment is effectively meant to mimic the scientific
experimental method and as explained in section 2.3.3 this thesis is dealing with
phenomena. The results from this study can neither be logically deduced as in a
mathematical proof or falsified as in a scientific experiment. In addition, the conducting
of an experiment needs very tight constraints on comparison and control and such
factors as external and internal validity cannot be fully achieved in this study. Yin
(1994) explains that the case study is most useful when it investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real life context especially when the boundaries of the
phenomenon are not clearly evident. In addition, the case study enquiry copes with the
technically distinct situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than
data points and more than one result. The data presented for analysis rely on multiple
sources of evidence and analysis benefits from prior data collection and analysis. Cook
& Campbell (1979: p.96) also explain that the case study is not just a subset of a quasi-
experimental design but also a methodology in its own right:
"Certainly the case study as normally practised should not be demeaned by
identification with the one-group post-test design."
Thus the methodology of this research falls clearly within the realms of the case study
approach.
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2.3.2 The Units ofAnalysis
As with any fundamental idea on which research designs are made, this research is
based on a comparison of a number of units of analysis (Hakim, 1987). Section 3.4
describes a theory, the Techno-Economic Paradigm, that suggests that technology has a
direct effect on regimes of regulation (Perez, 1983; Freeman & Perez, 1988; and
Freeman & Soete, 1993). In addition there are also suggestions that the regime of
regulation can have a direct bearing on the speed and trajectory of technological
development (Offer, 1995). Nevertheless there is continuing debate on the precise
nature of these effects. In order to study these effects it is important to examine
contrasts between regulatory environments that are as extreme as possible, subject to
practical constraints. The greatest contrasts may be expected between a command
economy of say China, or a developing economy such as India, and compare that to the
supposedly developed market economy of the UK. However the logistical problems
that would be involved in accessing data and conducting research in command and
developing economies preclude their consideration. Accordingly, to provide ease of
access to information the project is comparing two Western economies who have
pursued contrasting policies in utility regulation, namely the UK and France. The
concept of a free market, which is displayed in utility deregulation, has been a
significant feature of UK Government policy over the past twenty years. This is
contrasted with an economy based on mixed 'neo-classical' principles which has been
pursued by the various administrations in France.
The research broadly works within a Systems Theory framework (Hughes, 1983) but it
can also be split into two levels of scale. On a macro scale it considers how regulation
(usually maintained by legal statutes) and technology interact. On a meso level the
interactions between public utilities (gas, electricity, water and telecommunications)
and metering technology, are studied. More precisely the Sociotechnical Constituencies
approach as described by Molina (1996) is used to construct a technical dimension in
network infrastructure development. In addition, Techno-Economic Networks (Callon,
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1992) are used to study the shaping and remoulding of actors (including technology) in
the creation of new regulatory regimes. Also Evolutionary Theory (see Cziko, 1995:
ch.10) is used both in a meso and macro scale to map technological and regulatory
infrastructure changes (see sections 5.3, 15.3 and 16.3 for further details of these
approaches).
Another method of control is achieved by comparing as many industries and
technologies as practicable. The research has been chosen to cover all utilities that use
metering technology, namely, energy (electricity and gas), water and
telecommunications. This allows the physical, technological and social constraints of
each industry to be taken into account when considering the shaping of the
infrastructure terrain.
Another important unit used to bound the case study is that of time. This case study
enquiry copes with the period of study running from the twenty years of 1978 to 1998.
The object of choosing this period is to capture the change that has occurred in these
infrastructure technologies during this time. In saying this, an account is also given in
each of the case studies from the period of the industry's creation up to 1978 to provide
a historical context.
To summarise, the research is an interactive study of three dimensions, namely
regulation, technology and an industrial sector (public utilities). Specifically these
dimensions are being represented by a set of variables. Governance is being represented
by the contrasting regulatory regimes operating in France and the United Kingdom
over the past twenty years. The technology dimension is being represented by
regulatory implications of innovations in metering and associated electronic data
interchange (EDI) over this time period. The industrial dimension is represented by the
specific regulations pertaining to the electricity, gas, water and telecommunications
industries. Table 1 shows how the thesis consists of eight comparative case studies in
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total (4 utilities x 2 countries).
Table 1: The Cases Studies: The Development of Metering Technology in Electricity,
Gas, Water and Telecommunications Utilities
Electricity Gas Water Telecoms
UK Case Study 1
(Chapter 6)
Case Study 3
(Chapter 8)
Case Study 5
(Chapter 10)
Case Study 7
(Chapter 12)
France Case Study 2
(Chapter 7)
Case Study 4
(Chapter 9)
Case Study 6
(Chapter 11)
Case Study 8
(Chapter 13)
Although the quasi-experimental form ofmethodology has been rejected in this study,
the rigours of the scientific method are still useful. One of the points of weakness, in
the case study format, is the inability to obtain validity by comparison and control. In
an attempt to achieve as much construct validity as possible the methodological
framework has been tightly defined. Yet within that tight framework as much variation
as possible is sought. This is achieved by the selection of distinct phenomena (utilities,
regulation and metering), taking as extreme regulatory regimes as practicable (France
and the UK) and taking as wide a number of utilities as possible (gas, electricity, water
and telecoms). This ensures internal validity, at least to some extent, is maintained
within the case study format. This attempt to maintain internal validity is also made in
the data generation procedures described in section 2.4. External validity is a little more
difficult to achieve. Throughout the thesis comparisons are made with other industries
and other innovations and in turn it is hoped that this will reveal new and innovative
thoughts about the regulatory and technological process which can be applied to other
fields.
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2.3.3 The Epistemological Position
Another area where representativeness may be compromised is in the use of theory. In
much of the literature, such as in ethnography and grounded theory, the role of theory
development prior to the conduct of case studies is criticised (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
Typically, these positions deliberately avoid specifying any theoretical propositions at
the outset of any inquiry. Yin (1994) suggests that this can be misleading and suggests
that before conducting research there needs to be an "understanding or theory ofwhat is
being studied." This also gives a clue as to the status of theory in phenomenological
research, that is, it is a way (which can be just one ofmany ways) of conceptualising an
issue. For this reason the word 'theory' is often replaced by 'programme' in this form of
research, as in the Empirical Programme ofRelativism (EPOR; Collins, 1981) and the
Social Construction of Technology (The SCOT Programme; Pinch & Bijker, 1990).
Thus 'theories', in this piece of work, are considered to be useful instrumental
frameworks that can provide a common language to describe phenomena. These
'theories' are then verified and refined in an iterative process of rigorous empirical
testing. This thesis is not studying one specific 'theory' in depth rather is comparing a
number of 'theoretical frameworks' and studying their philosophical foundations to
illustrate their continuities and differences. Appropriate 'theoretical frameworks' are
then applied to empirical case studies to provide descriptive insights into the role of
technological innovation in regulatory development in the differing sectors of public
utility management. The qualified 'theoretical frameworks' are then further used in a
prescriptive form as a tool to aid the development of regulation and technology policy.
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2.4 DATA GENERATION
2.4.1 The Documentation and Archival Records
Before conducting any primary research it is important to exhaust all the secondary
material pertaining to the topic. It would be counter productive, for example, to carry
out a survey only to find at some later date that the information sought in the survey is
already published. Besides overcoming this, one has also to fully familiarise oneself
with the subject so that the primary research is done in the most efficient manner. The
first year of this three year project was spent doing this. This involved completion of
training courses as well as conducting a substantive literary review.
There are four main sources from which data can be generated in the study of
regulation. These are: the legal statutes which define the regulatory mechanisms; the
regulatory commission who monitor procedures to enforce quality; the public utility;
and the consumers of utility products. The foundation of this research is built on a
comprehensive review of these secondary data sources.
The procedural frameworks are set out in Acts of Parliament. In France, some of the
key Acts for this study are: The Act of April 1946 which nationalised both gas and
electricity industries; a resolution adopted in June 1993 to liberalise the provision of
voice telephony services by the beginning of 1998; the French Government's decision
that France Telecom (the State telecommunications supplier) should be gradually
privatised in September 1993; and the Water acts of 1898, 1935, 1964 and 1992. In the
UK the many key sources include: the Electricity Acts of 1947, 1957 and 1989; the Gas
Acts of 1948, 1972, 1986, and 1995; the Gas Enterprise Act 1982; the Post Office Acts
of 1961 and 1969, the British Telecommunications Act 1981; the Water Acts of 1945,
1973, 1983 and 1989; and the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992. Both
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countries are also governed by legislation at European level. Some of the most
interesting sources come from the European Commission's plans for a liberalisation of
European telecommunications and energy markets as well as environmental legislation
relevant to the electricity and water industries. These industries are in practice usually
the responsibility of the respective Ministries of Industry, Environment and Finance in
the UK and France. However, in some instances the day to day management is
delegated to a quasi-autonomous regulator or consumers' committee. For example in
the UK, The Directors General of telecommunications, ofwater services, of gas supply,
and of electricity supply are statutory appointments. The Acts of Parliament define the
Directors' General broad powers and duties, including those of enforcing licence
conditions, modifying them, and monitoring them, as well as the period of their
appointment. There is a vast amount of data collected and published by both the
Government Ministries and regulators. These are housed in libraries both in the UK and
France and proved to be valuable resources. The legislation also defines the existence
of a public telecommunications, water, gas or electricity 'utility' that often has certain
monopoly rights and obligations. Utility companies' metering records are some of the
best secondary data sources available to start researching utility metering. With the
assistance of the utilities this can be achieved at very little cost. Their customer account
files provide information on whether customers have prepayment (slot or card meters)
or not, their method of payment (banker's order, direct debit etc.) and whether
customers are in arrears with their payments. In practice these files are commercially
confidential and are usually presented in consolidated form in published reports for
general public consumption.
The information obtained from utilities' records can be combined with surveys that are
regularly carried out with utility consumers. An example of this is the Audit ofGreat
Britain (AGB), which is carried out on behalf of retailers of domestic goods in the UK,
and has some information about metering. Meanwhile, publications from the
Government Statistical Office such as Social Trends give an insight into the changing
consumer attitudes. The press, and even census data, also proved to be useful secondary
18
sources. In addition to these sources, the weekly and monthly journals such as The
Utilities Journal, Telecoms Markets and Utility Week as well as newspapers, which
analyse and digest the data that is produced from Government, regulators and utilities
are invaluable resources to the researcher. The final mode of secondary data generation
was through the Internet. This was particularly useful with regard to information on
companies from whom primary data was not generated, either because access was not
obtained, or time did not permit an in-depth interview.
2.4.2 The Interviews
Due to the different regulatory frameworks in France and the UK, separate approaches
in each of the countries were adopted to obtain access to relevant interviewees. The
research aimed to obtain data from as many different sources as possible, and these
included regulators, meter manufacturers, public utilities, trade associations and
communications service companies. A full list of participants is provided in
Appendices I and II.
In France, the Government wholly owns and operates the energy utilities as monopolies
and it is a large shareholder in France Telecom (the monopoly telecommunications
supplier). The primary research sources were the monopoly suppliers themselves,
namely; Electricite de France (EdF) for electricity; Gaz de France (GdF) for Gas; and
France Telecom (FT) for telecommunications. The supply of water in France is
somewhat more complex. Some two-thirds of water supply is provided by the Local
Authorities setting up franchises with private operators to supply every site (see section
11.2.3). This may include financing investment and collecting charges. Thus the
contacts in this case were made with private operators such as Compagnie Generale des
Eaux (CGE) and Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux (SLE). Many of the contacts were obtained
by le Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation de l'Ecole Nationale Superieure des Mines
de Paris (CSI). Through an overseas fieldwork allowance and an ERASMUS-
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SOCRATES student exchange, the CSI also provided library and office facilities at
their location on le Boulevard Saint Michel in Paris during the nine months' fieldwork
period in France (September 1996 - June 1997). Working at the CSI also provided
valuable first hand experience of many different theoretical perspectives, in particular
the concept of Techno-Economic Networks (see section 5.3.3). Other library facilities
were made available at France Telecom, Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux and l'Association
Technique de l'lndustrie du Gaz en France (ATG).
In total, sixteen interviews took place in eight different organisations covering the
electricity, gas, water and telecommunications industries in France, A non-scheduled
standard interview technique as outlined by Richardson et al. (1965: pp.45-53) was
used. This technique utilised about a dozen questions that provided a framework for a
discussion, which lasted on average for an hour, depending on the loquaciousness of
the interviewee. The interviews covered three major topics: the regulatory structure of
each industry in France; metering policy; and the relationship between metering policy
and regulation. The interview data was recorded through the medium of a tape recorder
and written notes. The exception to this was Gaz de France who wished to correspond
remotely through post, fax and e-mail.
In the UK public utility management is more disaggregated. For example, there are a
number individual regulators who have an interest in metering for each industry. This
includes the Office of Electricity Regulation (Offer) for electricity, the Office of Gas
Supply (Ofgas) for gas and the Office of Telecommunications Licensing (Oftel) for
telecommunications. For water there are a number of regulators, Office of Water
Services (Ofwat) for economics, the Environmental Authority for the environment and
HM Directorate for Drinking Water for public health. There are also numerous
privately owned utilities with an active interest in developing metering technology, and
each have diverging views and objectives. In the UK, electricity has fifteen distribution
companies while England and Wales alone have twenty-one water supply companies.
Then there are meter manufacturers such as Siemens and Schlumberger, who act as
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suppliers to all of the utilities and are crucial in development of technological
standards. There are also the communications and software companies who are
involved in developing the communications infrastructure, such as Logica, Itron,
Ramar and Pilot Systems all of whom contribute to the innovation process. It is
noteworthy to point out here that both the meter manufacturers and the software
companies are often multi-national, working in both the UK and France. So although
the interviews with these parties were carried out in the UK, they did provide valuable
insight into their operations in France.
Due to the unbundled nature of public utility management in the UK it was decided to
use one contact, namely, The United Kingdom Automatic Meter Reading Association
(UKAMRA) as a vehicle for the primary research in the UK. This involved a two-stage
process. First an introductory letter accompanied by a brief questionnaire were sent to
all members ofUKAMRA as well as a number of other interested parties who were not
members of UKAMRA. The aim of the questionnaire was primarily to build a
framework for the in-depth interviews that followed and also to provide an opportunity
to gamer opinions from sources who were not selected for interview. A number of
respondents also sent in papers and articles that they had written, which added greatly
to the source material. After one reminding letter, there were forty-eight replies from
ninety-three letters sent out. These questionnaires were followed up by some twenty-
four in-depth interviews that were again recorded through the medium of tape
recordings and written notes. The interviewees were selected to cover as wide a range
ofmetering issues as possible, including representatives from the electricity, gas, water
and telecommunications industries as well as meter manufactures, software companies,
consultants and trade associations. Also a range of administrative and management
grades were selected. A stratified sample (Cochran, 1977: ch.5 and Ffoinville, 1983:
pp.58-89) was taken to account for the variation in population. Before both mailing the
questionnaire and conducting the interviews a series of pilot studies were undertaken.
Six questionnaires were sent out to 'tame' academic and industrial sources who
provided comments, criticisms and suggestions. Also interviews were conducted with
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personal contacts in order to fashion an efficient and robust interview technique before
conducting the interviews.
The primary research was concluded with a set of seminars that presented the results of
both the primary and secondary research. The seminars took the form of an oral
presentation accompanied by a written paper (which in some instances was published)
and concluded with a plenary discussion. There were three seminars in total. The first,
sponsored by, among others, Electricite de France and ABB (a meter manufacturer)
was held on behalf of IPA at the Helsinki University of Technology, Power Systems
Laboratory, Espoo, Finland on 19th November 1997. The second was conducted in
collaboration with Pilot Systems (a metering communications company) and IPA as
part of IIR's (a conference management company) 2nd Metering In The Utilities
Conference, on 25th March 1998, London, England. The third was held at the
UKAMRA seminar entitled 'Automatic Meter Reading the Business Case', conducted
at the University of Warwick, England, on 8th May 1998. Participants at these seminars
are shown in Appendix III. Other opportunities to present aspects on both the
operational and theoretical basis of the research arose at The Epistemology Group's
seminar on 'The Evolution of Knowledge and Invention' at the University of Sussex on
10th June 1997, and annual seminar presentations to The Department of Business
Studies at The University of Edinburgh.
2.4.3 The Physical Artefacts
The final area of primary data was generated from the study of the technological
artefacts themselves. This was done by observing the continuities and differences
between metering and communications technologies in the industry sectors. Analysis of
the technological innovations in these instruments give a clue to their changing role
within the larger public utility systems infrastructure. Thus a dossier of meter designs
and specifications was compiled.
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2.4.4 The Direct and Participant Observations
In addition to the formal generation of data from primary and secondary sources, much
of the insight in the project has been gained from prior experience of working in the
public utility sector. Much of this is outlined in section 2.2, and this has laid the
grounding to not only the formulation of the project, but also the understanding of the
principles behind the economics, human resource, financial and engineering issues
which contribute to public utility management.
During the time of the project, fieldwork has not only been confined to the aforesaid
activities. There has also been work done in conjunction with IPA. This has included
the appraisal of short term price forecasting computer software for the England and
Wales Electricity Pool (a half hourly electricity spot market, see sections 6.2.1 and
6.2.2). Work has also been carried out on the evaluation of the pumped storage
business of the National Grid Company (Dinorwig & Ffestiniog, North Wales, see
section 6.2.3). This has meant that a direct participative component is incorporated in
the project methodology.
2.4.5 The Project Management
The research work has been monitored by standard project management techniques a
GANTT chart of which is shown in figure 1. Milestones included completing; the
project proposal (March 1995), the training (June 1996), the literature review (October
1996), the French fieldwork (June 1997), the UK fieldwork (March 1998) and the first
draft of the thesis (September 1998). The project was monitored by means of regular
work in progress meetings with both company and academic supervisors. In addition to
the regular project management procedures, a diary was kept to account for the work
23
undertaken in the project. This diary together with the taped interviews, written
transcripts, notes made from secondary research sources and bibliography of
references, make up the database for the project.
Figure 1: Project GANTT Chart
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2.5 THE ANALYSIS
2.5.1 The Mode ofAnalysis
The analysis of the project was conducted in three stages. The first involved evaluating
all of the secondary material that was gathered during the project and this was
combined with the direct experience gained from working in public utilities for
previous working experience. The second process involved combining the primary
interviews with the secondary material to present the exploratory case studies presented
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in chapters 6 to 13 (Part II). The third was the application of the theoretical perspectives
discussed in chapters 3 to 5, to the case studies to produce cross-case study
comparisons which describe and explain the phenomena as well as prescribe a
technology and regulation policy in chapters 14 to 17 (Part III). There is a clear
delineation in the thesis between the explorative nature of the case studies ofPart II and
the descriptive, explanatory and prescriptive nature of Part III. Although it may be
possible, in principle, to combine description, explanation and theory it requires
immense skill, and in this thesis that was thought impractical. The major concern was
that since this is an academic piece of work the audience for the research would not
necessarily be familiar with the industries being described in the case studies.
Moreover, the explanatory and prescriptive analysis was constructed through the
perspective of not just one but a number of theoretical approaches. This makes the
format of the analysis phase simpler to understand and clearer for the reader who is not
familiar with either the industries being discussed or the theoretical perspectives taken.
2.5.2 The Analysis of Secondary Material
The collection of secondary data provided the foundations of the case studies and
provided a basis to construct interview questions in the primary research. As described
in section 2.4.1, a considerable amount of secondary research was required prior to the
interview stage of the project. Nonetheless this was taken forward to provide the
exploratory framework for the eight case studies. A general format was used to
maintain continuity between case studies but there were also differences. Each case
study has unique features in that different issues pertain to different industries in the
two countries studied. Archive material is used to place historical evidence into its
contemporary setting. A description is then made of the network and regulatory
infrastructure, exploring how it has altered during the twenty-year case study period.
The role that metering has played in the development each utility infrastructure is then
considered. The exception to this format is in the both of the telecommunications case
studies (chapters 12 and 13). Since modem metering is an integrated data processing
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and a communications device, in the telecommunications case studies not only is the
metering of telephony analysed, but also the communications technology used in
energy and water metering.
2.5.3 The Analysis of Primary Material
The process of analysing the primary material including the questionnaire survey, the
interviews, the participative research and evidence from the artefacts (the meters and
communications media) themselves, involved a process of transcription and blending
with the secondary material, to create the case studies. The multiple sources of
evidence were first of all transcribed into a written format and stored on the project
database. For example, it took about eight hours to transcribe forty-five minutes' worth
of interview. The material then was indexed according to the relevance it had to each of
the eight case studies. This was followed by a number of sub-indexing routines. These
sub-indexes roughly corresponded to the sections and subsections of the case studies.
For example, the first sub-indexes were on issues such as industry history, regulatory
infrastructure and metering. These were then further subdivided in the indexing tree
shown stylised in figure 2.
At this point in the analysis it was thought that it might have been useful to use a
computer package to undertake the indexing. In the event it was done manually. Since
all the data generation, analysis and presentation was conducted by one person (myself)
it was felt that there were textures in the interviews which could only be gained from a
combination of the written transcriptions and personal recall together, which would be
lost in a qualitative research package. Moreover, as analysis of the primary material
was made manually, more insights were revealed and an iterative method of indexing
developed. This valuable process would not have been achieved if indexing parameters
had been defined prior to the analysis, and programmed into a software package. Once
the indexing of the transcribed material had been completed the process began to
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combine the primary and secondary research into the final case study. The formats of
the case studies are split into a commentary and vignettes. The commentary is
composed from a mixture of secondary and primary material while the vignettes are
composed mostly from primary material. In the vignettes direct quotes are enclosed in
inverted commas and paraphrasing is not enclosed in inverted commas. In this way the
continuity of the case study description is maintained while the reader can see which
statements were generated from personal interviews. Each vignette is coded to specific
interviews, the transcriptions ofwhich are given in Appendix IV.
Figure 2: Indexing of the Primary Material
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2.5.4 The Descriptive, Explanatory and Policy Analysis
The final part of the thesis takes the theory described in Part I and combines it with the
exploratory case studies in Part II to produce pattern matching, build explanations and
recommend policy. The pattern matching is achieved through cross-case study
comparisons at three levels. First, at the macro scale level the role of information
technology is considered. In particular the validity of Techno-Economic Paradigm is
tested. The analysis then considers the changes in network infrastructure caused by
technology and regulatory change. Here a number of approaches are taken to describe
and explain the phenomena explored in the case studies and their merits discussed.
Finally, using the insights gained from the explanation building, policies are
determined both for regulation and metering on the energy, water and
telecommunications sectors.
2.6 SUMMARY
The methodology described in this chapter is founded on multiple case studies that take
the logical progression of exploratory, descriptive and explanatory form that can be
described as an 'emergent grounded' approach. This holistic research design includes
documentary sources, archival records, questionnaires, interviews, direct observations,
participative observations and evidence taken from the physical artefacts (the meters
themselves). This case study research design is aimed at satisfying the internal,
external and construct validity that are recognised to be the criteria that are needed to
judge a robust research design. The research also relies on direct experience that the
author has in operational and management roles in public utilities. The analysis departs
from grounded theory in that the research is founded on questions that were formulated
during this period of employment. This grounding was further crystallised in the study
of regulation, technology and methodological theory during the literature review that
took place prior to the fieldwork in the first year of the research. In saying this, the
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fieldwork design followed in principle the guidelines ofgrounded theory. Although the
questionnaire and interview questions were based on extensive preparatory reading
they were as unstructured as practicable to allow the inquiry to be as free from 'grand
theory' as possible. In this sense the case study accounts are theory free. 'Theories' in
the study are used in a phenomenological sense. They are also considered to be
important evaluation mechanisms in that they provide a common framework from
which a phenomenon can be examined. In other words a 'theory' is seen as an approach
of conceptualising the world which is constructed from assumptions that are in turn
derived by empirical testing and logic. Thus the independent analysis of a number of
'theories' provides different and contrasting insights into the phenomena being studied.
These insights can then in turn be used to guide policy making.
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CHAPTER 3
REGULATION THEORY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Regulation is defined (see the definitions page at the start of the thesis) to be a
homeostatic system or a number of interacting systems (Regulation) which are
equilibrated by a set of rules (reglementation) that involve a complex of 'social' and
'non-social' processes. This first section of this chapter will outline some of the systems
of regulation that are relevant to public utilities and the rules that are used to account
for imbalances or asymmetries with these systems. The regulatory systems considered
are market theories of regulation, social theories of regulation and technical theories of
regulation. This way of approaching regulatory theory is known as 'public-interest'
theories of regulation (Crew & Kleindorfer, 1986). They stem from the notion that
regulation aims to discharge the 'public interest' (e.g. justice, safety etc.). In order to
implement these systems some form of institution or bureaucracy is required, and it is
this subject which will be addressed in the second section. In relation to public utilities
these institutions may be conducted by Government (local, national or international)
headed by politicians or delegated to quasi-independent regulators run by experts. The
areas of responsibility of institutions include national and strategic systems of
innovation to those institutions that are responsible for the overseeing of economic and
social well being. One of the issues that arises with the creation of regulatory
institutions who work in the 'public interest' is their accountability. Bonbright (1961)
suggests that the term 'public interest' is itself vague and that it "is more often assumed
rather than articulated." Accordingly, in place of the public-interest theories, several
'private-interest' theories have been proposed and they will be discussed in the third
section of this chapter. 'Private-interest' theories seek to explain the origins of
regulation for those who see themselves ex ante as beneficiaries of the regulatory
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system.
3.2 PUBLIC INTEREST THEORIES OF REGULATION
3.2.1 Market Theories ofRegulation
One branch of regulatory theory espouses the works of Adam Smith, in The Wealth of
Nations (1776: summarised in Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1985) who recognised a system
of regulation in economics and proclaimed it in the principle of the 'invisible hand'. It
states that every individual is selfishly pursuing only their personal good, which is
dictated by the rules of supply and demand. Despite some short-run inequalities, it is
argued that in the long-run this system will prove to provide the best good of all and
any intervention would almost certainly be injurious.
Some of the modern advocates of the philosophy are the Chicago and Austrian
Schools. The Chicago School believes that a fixed growth rate in money (say 3 or 4 per
cent per annum) and a free market are all that is required to produce a sustainable
economy (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1985). The Austrian School (Littlechild, 1986) sees
competition as a dynamic process of discovery and co-ordination, instead of a static
state of general equilibrium. In these philosophies entrepreneurial profit plays a vital
role in stimulating alertness to new opportunities. Market devices such as product
differentiation and advertising are fully consistent with the competitive market process.
Austrian economics casts doubt on the ability of any human being, Government or
private organisation to acquire the knowledge necessary to improve upon the market.
Effective Government policies are considered to be the reduction of entry barriers and
development of private property rights. It is also claimed that consumers also benefit
from less extensive patent and copyright laws as well as inhibiting the development of
private monopolies or cartels, and by abolishing the monopoly of many nationalised
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industries. Privatisation is seen to increase the role of market forces vis-a-vis political
forces. Factors like the environment, health, safety, geography and demography are
therefore more effectively dealt with by making producers legally liable for them, and
by creating property rights to be traded on markets, rather than by cost-benefit analysis
or 'externality taxes'.
Two concepts have dogged this market view of regulation, namely, imperfect
competition and exclusion of social externalities.
Imperfect competition is particularly pertinent in public utilities and arises when only a
few firms are able to supply a specific product at the going price. This may be caused
by, amongst other reasons, barriers to competition such as patents, collusion in cartels,
monopolistic competition due to product differentiation, or significant economies of
scale. Externalities on the other hand, are spillover effects when production or
consumption inflicts incidental costs or benefits on others. This is often known as the
'tar baby effect', that is, that a cost (or benefit) due to regulation may have a benefit (or
cost) elsewhere in the economy (Crew & Kleindorfer, 1986: pp203-209).
Another crucial argument against considering regulation in a perfectly competitive
mode of thinking is that 'supply and demand' in many cases does not act in a smooth
fashion and is often 'sticky'. This was most notably illustrated by John Maynard
Keynes's magnum opus, the General Theory ofEmployment Interest and Money (1936;
summarised in Ekelund & Hebert, 1975: p.409). According to Keynes, wages and
prices do not react flexibly to price supply and demand and are constrained by social
factors distorting the aggregate supply curve. It was this policy that has encouraged the
use of instruments other than money, such as the fiscal policy ofGovernment spending
and taxation, to stimulate growth, particularly when the economy is stuck in recession.
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Also, the presence of social castes is one of the major concerns of J.K. Galbraith in The
Affluent Society (1970: chs.7 & 12). In his analysis he argues that the negative effects
of inequalities, incumbent advantage and vested interests in society, should be factored-
in to any policy. Social regulations are consequently required to counter these
imbalances in society, in addition to counter imperfections in competition and
externalities.
3.2.2 Social Formulations ofRegulation
Taking into account the imperfect nature of competition, regulation cannot be left to
market processes alone. Indeed, in a classic study of business regulation, M.H.
Bernstein wrote that the:
"Determination of regulatory goals does not result inevitably from the logical analysis
of certain economic facts, nor is it automatically deduced from a set of propositions
concerning the nature of the political state and the proper boundaries of political action
in a democratic society." (Bernstein, 1955: p.258)
Reagan (1987: ch.2) adds that regulatory goals cannot be deduced from specific
principles, either. He suggests that it is not that economics, political science, and the
physical sciences are irrelevant to regulatory policy-making, rather that they are not
decisive in themselves, but they merely illuminate choices, not decide them. Reagan
then concludes that:
"Economic activity is not always channelled to the optimal satisfaction of public needs
by very imperfect competition among industrial giants, or by the narrow incentives that
press on marginal firms in the most competitive sectors; and a free society will
therefore sometimes find it advisable to turn to Government as the instrument for
making the economy serve us as whole persons, not only as 'economic man (or
woman)'."
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Therefore, Reagan argues that regulatory agencies should be accountable to the
electorate through the active participation of interested citizens as advocates of their
preferred policies.
Nikolai Bukharin developed a scientific analysis of a socially ideal (but not democratic)
State in his general sociological work on Historical Materialism (1969). He treats
society as a system of unstable equilibrium inside which the State functions as a
'regulator' and attempts to manage or absorb contradictions between the productive
forces and production relations and/or between the economic base as a whole and the
various elements of the superstructure (Jessop, 1982: p. 18). This Marxist regulatory
structure is developed further by Elmar Altvater who specifies four social preconditions
of capitalism that cannot be secured through competition among particular capitals, and
must therefore be guaranteed through the actions of the State as an 'ideal collective
capitalist'. These social conditions are: the implementation of the general material
conditions of production (or infrastructure); the creation and enforcement of the
bourgeois legal order; the regulation of the conflict between capital and wage labour;
and the promotion of the total national capital in the capitalist world market (Jessop,
1982: p.91).
One of the notable theories of regulation within this tradition is the Paris or French
School of Regulation. In A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, Michel Aglietta (1979)
describes how regulation theory is founded on the scientific principle of equilibrium
and balance between production and consumption (see also Boyer 1988a and Boyer
1988b). The factors influencing this balance are driven by social change, which are in
turn determined primarily by the wage/labour relationship. This creates a new regime
of regulation defined by new rules, in the shape of different social norms and working
practices. Using this hypothesis and taking as an example the United States economy,
he describes how the economy has gone through four phases of evolution since the end
of The American Civil War. Each phase lasted about fifty years and was characterised
by an economic cycle of growth and collapse, due to a specific wage/labour
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relationship:
Phase I
Aglietta argues that the extensive accumulation governed by the competitive mode of
regulation seen between 1850 and 1900 was driven by rapid industrialisation
supplemented by immigrant labour in the United States. Growth was founded on the
expansion of markets, the opening up of the 'West' in the case of the United States, and
colonial possessions in the case of European States.
Phase II
In the period 1900 to 1950 he suggests the relation between labour and production
changed significantly. This was the period of intensive accumulation governed by
competitive regulation. The supply of labour through immigration slowed, while the
power and expectations of the labour force grew. The production process responded by
the introduction of 'Taylorisf and 'Fordisf methods of working, that resulted in large
intensive industries such as steel, automobile and textile manufacture.
Phase III
The Great Depression and finally World War Two heralded the end of Phase II of
regulation that was to be replaced by intensive accumulation governed by monopoly
regulation. This is characterised by an increase of accumulation in consumption, paid
for by Government investment and driven by health care, welfare, education and
technological initiatives.
Phase IV
Due to a series of recessions during the nineteen-seventies and nineteen-eighties, the
Paris or French School believes the economy needs to develop a new 'Post-Fordist'
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approach to the interplay between labour and production, where flexible lean
production is combined with a more flexible workforce. This vision is most clearly
represented by Alain Lipietz (1992) in his definition of a new economic order (or
'habitus') combining 'Post-Fordism' with many of the modern social concerns such as
the environment.
Not surprisingly, since the Paris or French School has its roots in Marxist thought, it
does not accept the principle of the 'marginal efficiency of capital', (Aglietta, 1979:
p.357) which contrasts it with neo-classical market economics. Moreover, the rights of
the collective are paramount, leaving no room for individual and private property
rights, which is intrinsic to the Austrian theory of regulation previously described. In
addition, its primary emphasis is on the wage/labour relationship at the expense of
innovation (Boyer, 1988a pp.3-25) and the imperfect and asymmetric nature of
knowledge (Irwin, 1984 and Mayer, 1995: pp. 138-159).
3.2,3 Technology in Regulation Theory
Expertise and knowledge is the topic of interest for Fincham et al. (1994) in the
widening scope and use of information technology in the financial services sector.
Their argument hinges on the need to manage knowledge and expertise, particularly the
ability to integrate detailed technological expertise that equates with the new industrial
order that is tempered by the knowledge base. Thus constructed, knowledge, whether it
be of processes or technological artefacts themselves can result in a disequilibrium
which requires compensation by new regulation. Probably the most developed theory
in this philosophy is the Techno-Economic Paradigm that has been proposed by the
Venezuelan economist Carlota Perez (1983). In introducing this concept, she wished to
draw attention to the fact that some changes in technology are so far-reaching that they
affect almost every industry and service throughout the system, and change the design
and management functions everywhere in the economy.
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The origin of the Techno-Economic Paradigm derives from Joseph Schumpeter's later
theories developed in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Schumpeter, 1943) and
the identification of business cycles or KondratiejfLong Waves in which the economy
runs in approximately fifty year cycles of economic growth and recession (Freeman &
Soete, 1997: ch.3). Nonetheless, Samuelson & Nordhaus (1985: pp.793-800) point out
that there are many factors both internal and external to the economy, which explain the
major cycles including investment, technological innovation, dynamic changes in
population etc. However, Freeman & Perez (1988) believe that most theories of
economic growth fail to take account of the specifics of technology in each historical
period. They divide patterns of innovation into four definitive groups:
First, incremental innovations occur from continuous activity which have a significant
cumulative effect on growth and result from redesigned products or processes usually
involving existing products or services. They often do not occur as deliberate research
and development but are improvements suggested by users or consumers. Second,
radical innovations are discontinuous events often as a result of formal research and
development. These are usually industry specific innovations such as nuclear power in
electricity generation or the manufacture of nylon in the chemicals industry. Third, new
technology systems occur when clusters of innovations (both incremental and radical)
occur together, leading to the rise of several whole new industries such as petro¬
chemicals and synthetic materials. Finally, changes in the Techno-Economic Paradigm
occur when technology systems are so fundamental in their effects that they alter the
organisation and structure of the whole economy. By paradigm they mean:
"A radical transformation of the prevailing engineering and managerial common sense
for best productivity and most profitable practice."
The process of computerisation, it is claimed by Freeman (1993), is based on one of
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these order-of-magnitude changes. He argues that the costs and ease of processing,
storing and transmitting information, is associated with fundamental changes in the
organisation of production, design, distribution and administration. At the technical
level, there is a cluster of still-continuing radical and incremental innovations in semi¬
conductors, integrated circuits, optical fibres, telecommunications, computer hardware
and software as well as many related products and services. In some ways it is
analogous to previous waves of technical change that have affected numerous
industries and services throughout the economy, such as steam power, electric power or
oil-based mass-production systems. It is thus concluded that the interdependencies
between clusters of technical innovations, between technical and organisational
innovations and between organisational innovations and wider institutional changes
cannot be ignored. Freeman & Perez (1988) go on to suggest that there have been five
waves of upswing and downswing.
The first wave was from the seventeen-seventies to the eighteen-forties with the early
mechanisation of textiles and iron working, driven by water transportation and power.
The second wave was from the eighteen-forties to the eighteen-nineties when steam
power took over and this was manifest by rapid industrialisation due to a growth in the
coal and transport industries. The third wave was from the eighteen-nineties to the
nineteen-forties when the reduced cost of steel production resulted in developments in
heavy industry such as shipbuilding, electricity distribution and the chemicals industry.
The fourth wave was from nineteen-forties to the nineteen-eighties where the
combination of new types of 'Fordist' mass production and abundant low cost energy
(oil, gas, and electricity) resulted in the mass consumer goods of automobiles,
refrigerators and synthetic materials. The fifth wave from nineteen-eighties onwards is
driven by microprocessor electronics, which is delivering us into the information and
communications age.
Perez (1983) has pointed out that the social and institutional framework that is
hospitable to one set of technologies will not be suitable for a radically new technology.
38
Whereas incremental innovations can be easily accommodated, this may not be the
case with radical innovations, which by definition involve an element of creative
destruction. When we are talking about large clusters of radical innovations combined
with the rapid progress of incremental innovation, then the problems of structural and
social adjustment can be very great. This is quite obvious when such aspects as the
changes in management techniques and skill-mix which are called for, but it also
applies to many other types of institutional change in standards, patents, new services,
new infrastructure, Government policies and public organisations.
Figure 3: A Diagrammatic Representation Showing the Different Levels of
Technological Analysis. The Macro Levels are Addressed by The Techno-Economic
Paradigm. The More Meso Level is Addressed by Approaches Described in Chapter
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they as a result tend to be techno-centric. They argue other approaches incorporating
social and economic as well as technical factors are also required to study what is
referred to as the 'meso-level techno-economic'. This view is summarised by Rip &
Kemp (1998) who visualise these linkages in figure 3. At the micro level there are
artefacts, at the meso level there are technical regimes and at the macro level there are
patterns in transformations in society such as the Techno-Economic Paradigm. The
technical regime is considered to be the surrounding environment that affects the take
up of a technology. Some of the more meso approaches are examined further through
the notions of Techno-Economic Networks, Sociotechnical Constituencies and
Evolutionary Theory in chapter 5.
Freeman and Perez's hypothesis has features of the Paris or French School in its
attempt to account for cyclical waves of economic growth, and with the Austrian
School (somewhat surprisingly) in its interests in the dynamics of knowledge.
However, there are significant differences. The growing recognition of the importance
of organisational and managerial change ('multi-skilling', 'lean production systems',
'just-in-time' stock control, worker participation in technical change, quality circles and
continuous learning, etc., etc.) can only be brought about by competition and the rites
of the individual, according to Austrian theory. This same process on the other hand is
seen as an overtly political process according to the Paris or French School and the
Techno-Economic Paradigm. Social well being and the understanding of organisation
dynamics are key factors in the case of the Paris or French School while competition
and technology are the key factors in the Austrian and Techno-Economic Paradigm
respectively. Freeman (1988: pp.11-12) and Boyer (1988b: pp.89-90) suggest that the
Paris or French School and the Techno-Economic Paradigm are sufficiently
complimentary for an original thesis. Yet the Paris or French School's preoccupation
with the wage/labour relationship at the expense of the technology, and their different
treatment of the dynamics of knowledge lead to the conclusion in this thesis that
Techno-Economic Paradigm and the Paris or French School address differing
regulatory regimes. Table 2 outlines the continuities and differences of the three
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theories.
Table 2: A Comparison between the Regulatory Schools
School of Regulation Societal Emphasis Major Asymmetries
Affecting Regulation
State of
Knowledge
Austrian Individual Market Mechanisms Imperfect
Paris or French Collective Wage/Labour Relationship Perfect
Techno-Economic
Paradigm
Collective Technology and Innovation Imperfect
3.3 REGULATORY INSTUTIONS
One of the key components to the notion of 'public interest' theories of regulation
described in the previous section is that institutions require to be created to take into
account a number of constraints. These constraints include social welfare (e.g. health
and equality), physical constraints (e.g. geography, resources), knowledge asymmetries
and technology as well as consumers' and workers' rights. In a market orientated
environment, regulatory institutions also require to develop rules to maintain a
competitive environment and monitor monopolies and cartels. The rules that maintain
these regulatory systems are found in legal documents such as Acts of Parliament,
company licences, patents, standards and protocois.
Social welfare has historically been the responsibility of Central Government or
publicly run companies (Henney, 1994). One of the key issues involved in the
liberalisation of public utilities is to ensure that there is no regulatory deficit in this
matter. Garret (1998) highlights that such issues as customer service standards and
universal access at equal cost, either require to be incorporated in company licences or
taxes required to be raised to account for social welfare that may be compromised by
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privatisation. Also the exploration and production of energy resources involves the
issuing of licences usually by the national government. This ensures that natural
resources are not over exploited and environmental pollution is minimised (Cameron,
1995). Meanwhile workers' rights are enshrined in employment legislation that must
ensure a balance between exploitation of the workforce and economic efficiency that is
at the core of the Paris or French School of regulation.
Some of the forms of regulatory institutions can be distinguished by using Boyer's
(1999) definitions of the varieties of capitalism that he divides into four categories:
market led capitalism, company led capitalism, socio-democratic regimes and State led
capitalism. Each of these forms of capitalism creates it own and very characteristic
institutions.
Market led capitalism, which Boyer (1999) suggests is popular in the English speaking
countries, is characterised by a faith in private ownership and competition. Elere
institutions need to be formed to regulate free trade. The Office of Fair Trading and the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission in the UK are examples of these semi-
autonomous bodies (appointed by, but acting independently from, the government). It
is ironic that as 'deregulation' takes place regulatory institutions require to be created
(see Harper, 1989; Henney, 1994; O'Neill 1996, Surrey, 1996 and Chapters 6, 8, 10 and
12).
In company led capitalism there is a central role for the large corporation. This, it is
argued by Boyer (1999), characterises the Japanese economy and is dominated by a
close interrelation between different industries and government. Therefore this system
is strong in co-ordinating complex production processes but weak in the service
industries and industries which are driven by scientific innovation.
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In the Nordic countries, Boyer (1999) argues that the pursuit of the public interest and
social justice means that socio-democratic regimes permeate nearly all political
institutions. The institutions such as education, social services and trade have a
complimentary architecture. In these countries there is less interest in private ownership
and large corporate institutions.
In State led capitalism the 'laisser-faire' is not accepted and public intervention is
common in all sectors of industry. Boyer (1999) gives France as an example of this
form of capitalism and it is characterised by large nationally run systems that define
industrial and technological systems of innovation.
Freeman (1995) and Freeman & Soete (1997: ch.12) argue that national and regional
innovation systems are essential in that they derive the networks of relationships for
innovation. Chesnais (1993) describes how this is characterised in France by:
• the organisation and funding of the largest part of fundamental research by the State
(The National Centre for Scientific Research, CNRS);
• an administrative elite of engineers, managers and politicians educated through the
Grandes Ecoles\
• and a pervasive element of State involvement in its industrial, scientific and
technological processes known as dirigisme.
Mustar (1994) and Oakley (1990) describe how the dirigisme of the French State has
evolved from Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1643-1715) who founded the French Academie
Royale des Sciences in 1676. This interventionist policy was particularly manifest in
the years after World War II up until the late nineteen-seventies with the development
of Grandes Projects. In the utility sector this involved the formation of the CNRS, the
Centre for the Study of Telecommunications (CNET) and Commissariat a l'Energie
(CEA). These years saw remarkable achievements in, for example, avionics (Concorde)
43
and nuclear power generation. Mustar also suggests that this Colberstist policy,
although still present, has gone through a change in emphasis during the nineteen-
eighties. These reforms have been driven by increased international trading, European
Union harmonisation and the maintenance of international competitiveness. Chesnais
(1995: p. 193) concludes that despite the French system's numerous achievements, this
cannot hide serious weaknesses such as its strong rigidity that finds it difficult to cope
with contemporary requirements for technological change and a lack of co-ordination
between science and industry.
In the UK a different approach has been adopted. Walker (1995) describes that in the
period from the end of World War II until the nineteen-eighties, there was the
promotion of State sponsored support in industry (including public utilities) and
research and development. The position however changed during the nineteen eighties
with a number of reforms which encouraged a market economy based on competition,
such as, private ownership, the foundation ofmonetary instruments as the foundation of
macroeconomic policy, constraints in public expenditure and restrictions on trade union
power. These changes in policies were seen as a response to the perceived failure of the
previous interventionist policies and the increasing international dimension of national
economies. Freeman (1995) and Freeman & Soete (1997: pp.306-312) while
acknowledging that international connections are of growing importance, stress that
National Systems of Innovation are still relevant. In particular they see the influence of
education, industrial relations, research, cultural traditions and geopolitical policies are
still fundamental. Indeed they go further and suggest that because of these factors they
consider that National Systems of Innovation are more crucial today in defining
regulatory policy.
3.4 PRIVATE-INTEREST THEORIES OF REGULATION
The major area of criticism of'public-interest' theories of regulation and the institutions
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that are created is, as stated earlier, their accountability. As a result 'private-interest'
theories of regulation have arisen in regulation theory to explain those who see
themselves as ex ante beneficiaries of the regulatory regime. The best known of the
'private-interest' theories is the 'capture' theory Peltzman (1976). Here regulation is
viewed as a product in that it provides an individual or organisation with the
opportunity to impose their own private interests. Proponents of the theory would cite
examples of how industries have lobbied to be privatised as monopolies to avoid the
rigours of competition. 'Capture' can also be seen from the academic point of view in
that the proponents of the Austrian (market processes), Paris or French School (social
process) and the Techno-Economic Paradigm (technical process) provide different
insights into the regulatory process. However if one approach is considered on its own
(or 'captures' the academic process) this in turn can give an unbalanced appraisal of
regulatory process.
Niskanen (1971 and 1973) studies regulatory 'capture' in terms of the behaviour of
bureaucracies or hierarchies. He defines a bureau as being an institution that does not
depend upon the success of the organisation. This is crucial when considering the
accountability of regulatory institutions or publicly run organisations. Lindsay (1976)
argues that an institution of regulation is based upon the output that is measurable and
this may include social aims that are difficult to account for. Thus a bureaucratic theory
implies that an institution may be 'captured' by bureaucrats (companies, tycoons, trade
unions, academics, civil servants, politicians etc.) to serve the ends of the bureaucracy
which may not be consistent with the original intentions, behind the institution's
creation.
3.5 CONCLUSION
Regulation is the term used to describe the systems and rules involved in maintaining a
social equality, the maintenance of the market mechanisms, knowledge asymmetries,
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technological innovation and so on. It is concluded that by its inherent nature one
approach alone (Austrian, Paris or French School, or Techno-Economic Paradigm) is
unable to provide a comprehensive appraisal of the regulatory process. Rather they are
studying separate but interacting and overlapping regimes of regulation. Since this
thesis is studying the interrelation of innovation on regulation, it is the role of the
Techno-Economic Paradigm and other sociotechnical techniques1 that are examined
further in later chapters. This chapter has also examined some of the regulatory
institutions that are created in the 'public interest'. During the nineteen-eighties there
has been a divergence on policy towards regulation in France and the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom has placed greater faith in market mechanisms and private
property rights. In France meanwhile a policy of State intervention and collective
control has largely been maintained. Either way regulatory institutions are required to
oversee economic, social and technical concerns. These institutions range from
watchdogs to monitor such issues as 'fair trading', 'social obligations' to National
Systems of Innovation and direct Government intervention. In addition it has been
found that although necessary, these regulatory institutions have limitations. 'Private-
interest' theories of regulation act to counterbalance the fact that regulatory institutions
require some form of accountability since the regulatory process can be 'captured' by
(often well meaning) individuals or organisations for their own gain. The following
chapter will now go on to focus more closely on the regulatory institutions that are
pertinent to public utilities.
1
See chapter 5 for an analysis of Techno-Economic Networks, Sociotechnical Constituencies and
Evolutionary Approaches.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ROLE OF METERING TECHNOLOGY IN PUBLIC UTILITY
MANAGEMENT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The features defining a public utility are those that give rise to economies of scale
resulting in their 'natural monopoly' position. The point is intuitively obvious. There are
definite cost savings in having only one water main in the street, and similarly with
other utilities such as electricity, telecommunications and gas. Such economies of scale
lead to the fundamental problem of public utility economics: how to establish
institutional arrangements that will take advantage of these economies of scale but will
not involve monopolistic excesses. This problem is not typically left to the operation of
unregulated markets, although several innovative proposals have been made for at least
the partial deregulation of utilities in recent years (Crew & Kleindorfer, 1986: p.3).
There is also a body of legal and historical precedent to support the view that an
industry must be of some public or social significance to be considered a public utility
(Brown & Sibley, 1986: p.6). The strategic and political importance of gas, electricity,
telephone and water have always been present in the management of utilities (Headrick,
1991). Moreover, the concept of universal access at equal cost has been a particular
theme in the supply of utilities as a social right, rather than chosen luxury, over the past
fifty years.
Crew & Kleindorfer (1986) also suggest that one of the features that give rise to the
'natural monopoly' position of utilities is technology. The large capital investment in
generating, storage, transmission and distribution facilities that need to be built may
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last up to one hundred years in some cases (Lee, 1969). These special technological
features of the system therefore require harmonisation with the economic and social
factors.
The first section of this chapter will examine the role that metering has in the
management of public utilities. This will be followed by an outline of the social and
technical constraints on utility regulation in the electricity, gas, water and
telecommunications industries. It will then go on to outline some of various forms that
utility regulation can take. This is described within the framework of the Principal-
Agent model. The chapter concludes by suggesting that information technology and
metering have key roles in changing the system of regulation.
4.2 METERING AND PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
Like any integrated system, utility networks require to be built to cater for the peak
demand. It follows that during times of slack demand the system is running
inefficiently. Moreover, the bigger the difference between the peak demand and the off-
peak demand, the more inefficient the system. Differential pricing, where the price is
more expensive during peak times and cheaper during off-peak times is generally seen
as the best way of overcoming this problem. However, this requires the metering
mechanism to have some form of timeclock to measure cheap and expensive periods.
This technology, while ubiquitous in telecommunications, is rare in electricity and non¬
existent in gas and water. As a consequence of the difficulty of allocating costs in this
stochastic system a traditional average-cost approach has several defects when deriving
utility prices. Since the demand and time, as well as volume, are crucial factors in the
cost of supplying utility products, there is no scope for average-costs to reflect this. It is
evident that such allocation of costs on an average basis involves valued
approximations and the neglect of the incentive effects for customers to consume
efficiently. This has resulted in the widespread use of marginal-cost pricing in utilities
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(Turvey & Anderson, 1977 and Littlechild, 1979).
Energy Utilities (1995) explains how the concept of marginal-cost pricing is
particularly relevant to the debate on the most efficient pricing system for utility
networks. Since these are often 'natural monopolies', where duplication of all, or part of
the network, is not economically viable. A 'natural monopoly' is subject to increasing
returns to scale where average costs decrease with increasing size - a doubling of output
requires less than a doubling of inputs. Under these circumstances, marginal cost
pricing has the implication that the company will make losses, as average costs are
greater then the marginal cost. This is illustrated in figure 4 below. The shaded area
shows the size of the firm's losses.
Figure 4: Marginal Costs Under Increasing Returns to Scale
Price /
Cost
Demand
Average Cost
Marginal Cost
Quantity
Source: Energy Utilities (1995)
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Marginal-cost and average-cost pricing are not the only principles that can be used.
There are numerous other alternatives, most notably Ramsey Pricing, which has been
advocated as possible ways to recover the fixed costs of providing the network
(Baumol et al. 1977 and Utility Finance, 1996: p.23). Ramsey Pricing calculates the
mark-up according to the inverse of the price-elasticity of demand for each group of
customers and products. In this way customers with a demand which is relatively
insensitive to price, pay a higher mark-up.
Soishansi (1991) describes that in response to the peak demand issue there is a growing
development of meters with 'time-of-use' (TOU) capabilities. Another more
fundamental approach is to develop a new generation of 'solid-state' meters with no
mechanical moving parts and with additional capabilities such as marginal cost pricing,
data-collection and retrieval. Soishansi adds that the transition from electro-mechanical
meters, to electro-mechanical meters with electronic features and then to 'solid state'
meters is a significant one, not so much in cost, but in terms of the added functions and
capabilities of the meters. Also Soishansi suggests that a modern well designed, 'solid
state' meter is essentially a small computer with software-definable capabilities that can
be reprogramed. This increased versatility and capabilities of more sophisticated
hardware allows the utility companies to offer additional services. The prospect of new
facilities of gas, water and electricity supply are now beginning to be realised, where
separate public utilities can combine their metering services. The information
technology industry also sees a potential of using metering facilities as a route into
every household (Ofgas, 1997). This in turn will bring the possibility of combining
public utility services with multimedia and home banking.
Advances in metering technology however, are calling into question whether some
areas of public utilities are indeed 'natural monopolies'. Moreover if this is the case, the
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market would be able to define prices rather than the traditional methods of public
utility pricing (Beesley & Littlechild, 1992). Soishansi (1991) explains that
sophisticated metering coupled with improved communication facilities, allow utility
companies to better manage and control their customers' consumption. Some
customers, particularly large industrial customers, and residential customers with large
loads should benefit from more sophisticated pricing schemes; and in turn utility
companies would greatly benefit from their active participation in such schemes. With
'real-time' pricing (RTP) Soishansi argues that prices could vary from half hour to half
hour, usually with some advanced notice. The advantage of RTP is that the utility can
inform customers of pending high prices, whether they are caused by external factors,
such as unusual weather conditions or high winter demand, or internal factors, such as
availability or unavailability of inexpensive energy sources. By doing so, these
customers who have the ability and inclination to modify their energy consumption can
reduce the utilities' operating costs.
Even more significantly, 'real-time' pricing through sophisticated metering allows a
spot market to be created where commodities such as electricity and gas can be traded
on an open market (Henney, 1994; O'Neill, 1996 and Surrey, 1996). This in turn
questions the integrated and natural monopoly nature of public utilities. The principle
of separating the monopoly portions of utility from the potentially competitive ones, is
known as 'unbundling'. This involves separating out the production and supply
functions (which are potentially competitive) from the transportation functions
(monopolistic). This principle is now widely used in the gas, electricity and
telecommunications industry where a service provider pays a Third Party Access
charge to the distributor.
However Soishansi (1991) explains that there is a rub; the energy company must now
have the capability to communicate with a large number of customers, spread over a
wide geographical area in 'real-time', or close to it. And the utility's meter must be
capable of switching from one price to another. This is fine for the telecommunications
industry but is more problematic for the energy and water utilities. The simple, stand¬
alone mechanical meter or an unread meter with a clock and two or three registers will
no longer suffice. The meter must have up to forty-eight registers (one for each half-
hour) and should be capable of keeping track of time accurately. In addition, the
company should have the facilities to update the prices daily and inform the customers
in advance if it expects to modify their load. To implement RTP on a large scale, the
company must not only upgrade its metering apparatus, but must also install a
communications network to get the pricing information to customers in near 'real-time'.
Current RTP experiments depend on a variety of communication media to get the price
information to tens of thousands of customers expeditiously, reliably, and
inexpensively. Current RTP experiments rely on dedicated phone lines, microwaves
and electricity mains-borne carriers. There are however inherent conflicting
requirements, for example, fast, reliable and error-free communications systems tend to
be expensive.
These views of pricing, in general, hold efficiency paramount in defining the net social
worth of a particular policy. This net social worth is traditionally defined as the sum of
consumers' and producers' surpluses, generated from the policy in question. Another
approach termed the 'new institutional' approach to public utility problems, places less
emphasis on efficiency maximisation.
According to Zajac (1978 and 1982), efficiency objectives are not the sole focus of
price regulation. He contends that the regulation of a 'natural monopoly' is principally
concerned with equity rather than efficiency. Williamson (1966) for example, has
argued that macroeconomic instruments, like subsidies and taxes, are more effective in
bringing about distributive justice than microeconomic policy instruments such as
public utility prices. In explaining the nature of economic justice (Okun, 1975)
developed the concept of 'economic' rights, similar to civil rights. Typically however,
economic rights, like public education, use up more resources than civil rights but have
similar public good characteristics to civil rights. Because of this, Okun argues that
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basic economic rights should be kept out of the market, the market having the role of
promoting efficient allocation after basic needs (and rights) have been taken care of.
The new institutional economics was formalised by Williamson (1975) and examines
issues such as legal control, contracting and co-operation. Ronald Coase (1937)
pioneered the development of an analytical framework for transactions costs, which
was a crucial antecedent to the new institutional economics. Coase examined the issue
of whether a given set of transactions would be best performed with a single
organisation (a firm) or by several economic agents interacting through the market. The
new institutional economics also draws on von Hayek's (1945) institutional analysis of
markets as well as the literature addressing the ineffectiveness of markets due to; risk
(Arrow, 1971), public goods (Samuelson, 1954), information symmetries (Akerlof,
1970), and the contractual approach to the theory of the firm (Alchain & Demsetz,
1972). These foundations were synthesised by Williamson (1975 and 1979) into the
transactional cost framework for comparative institutional design, which has become
the bulwark of the new institutional economics. Central to Williamson's analysis are the
notions of bounded rationality and opportunities. Bounded rationality originated with
Simon (1962), who used the concept to refer to human behaviour which is 'intendedly
rational but only limitedly so'. In other words, there are definite limits on the ability of
the human mind to process information and to reason logically. These are seen as a
constraint on decision-makers. In small numbers and in situations where information
asymmetries exist (one party has information not available to the other party) the first
party has an incentive to behave opportunistically. Opportunism refers to self-interest
"seeking with guile" (Williamson 1975, p.26). As a result, information may be
impacted, i.e. not made available completely to the second party. These problems may
be overcome through markets when a large-number of interactions is possible. In other
contexts, a hierarchy (e.g. a firm) may be the more efficient institution to mediate the
transactions question.
It is precisely this question of efficient institutional design (e.g. markets versus
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hierarchies) which has become the central issue in the new institutional economics.
This issue is normally referred to as the comparative analysis of governance structures,
where a governance structure is simply the institutional framework in which
transactions take place. An efficient governance structure would be one that
economises on bounded rationality and attenuates opportunism. Hierarchical
governance rather than market governance will be preferred when contracting or
frequent recontracting is not feasible, and where divergent expectations, small numbers
and the potential for opportunism exist.
4.3 REGULATING ENERGY, WATER AND TELECOMMUNICATION
INDUSTRIES
4.3.1 Electricity
To produce electricity in a form that is usable by the consumer requires four basic
processes: generation, transmission, distribution and supply (Turvey & Anderson, 1977
and Crew & Kleindorfer, 1986). Generation is the process of converting other forms of
energy into electricity. It is usually performed by power stations on a very large scale
relative to the usage of individual customers. This large scale means that generation
occurs in a centralised fashion, normally a considerable distance from the consumer
necessitating the other two processes of transmission and distribution. Transmission
consists of sending the electricity generated at power stations through wires on high
voltage lines to substations. At the substation it is transformed down ready for
distribution through low voltage lines to individual meters (customers). Supply consists
of the costs that are incurred in metering and administration such as billing and
customer service. The ownership of the four elements of the supply chain for electricity
can vary considerably from complete vertical integration to separate ownership at each
linkage in the chain.
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Figure 5: A Stylised Load Profile and Load Duration Curve Showing Variation in
Electricity Demand and Increasing Merit Order of Electricity Generation
Generation Merit Order
Most Flexible
Hydro Plant used at Times
of Peak Demand
Can be Switched on
Thermal and off, Used as
Mid-Merit Plant
The Least Flexible
Nuclear Used as Base Load
Mid Priced
Thermal Plant
Cheapest Plant
Nuclear Used Most
Time of Day 24 00
Most Expensive
Plant Used Least
Source: Turvey & Anderson (1977: p.288)
Along with the large transmission and distribution infrastructure, the key constraint of
the electricity supply chain outlined by Turvey & Anderson (1977) and Crew &
Kleindorfer (1986) is that electricity must be consumed as soon as it is generated.
Storage is expensive and is limited to batteries (on a small scale) and specialised hydro¬
electric schemes (pumped storage). The aim of the electricity network they claim is to
generate, transmit and distribute a given quantity of electricity at a minimum cost. To
meet demand at any moment at minimum cost requires that plant to be operated in
ascending order of running costs. Thus as demand increases, plants of higher and
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higher running costs for are brought into operation.2 Above this short run analysis
underlies long term decisions like the nature of the plant type to be installed for the
replacement of existing plants or to extend the system. Such problems are solved
typically by engineers and are known as system planners. System planning is a problem
in dynamic analysis, for demand may be growing over time, technology may be
changing, and relative fuel costs may be changing. Figure 5 shows a stylised load
profile and load duration curve, illustrating how more costly (and flexible) forms of
generation are required as demand increases.
Turvey & Anderson (1977) explain that pricing and metering has evolved in electricity
to reflect the demand constraints on the generation as well as the transmission and
distribution constraints in the system. The aim of this is to flatten the load curve in
order to optimise the load profile. This has entailed separating costs into three
categories: customer-related; unit-related; and demand-related charges. Turvey &
Anderson go on to outline that customer-related costs are those costs that are incurred
no matter how large or how small the number of units consumed, for example billing,
collection, connection and consumer service. They describe how two-part and block
tariffs would normally recover these costs in the fixed-charge of the first block of the
tariff. Unit-related costs are those which vary directly with the number of units used.
Such costs are mainly fuel, but a small part of distribution costs, and certain other work
costs of generation and transmission. Demand-related costs are capacity related costs
for generation, transmission and distribution and vary with the speed and time with
which users consume electricity. Having divided up costs into these three categories,
the rate analyst then divides the consumers into classes, the aim being that each class of
consumer pays the total cost of supplying it, as defined in terms of the above
categories. The idea behind this is an attempt to be fair to consumers as a class.
2 This can include: coal, oil, gas, nuclear, hydro-electric, solar, wind, tidal, geothermal power etc.
4.3.2 Gas
The gas industry covers activities in the production, transmission, storage and
distribution of gaseous fuels (Peebles, 1992 and Crew & Kleindorfer, 1986). The
gaseous fuels include natural gases, gases manufactured from coal (methane) and
liquefied petroleum gasses or LPG (butane and propane). Depending on the nature of
the gases and the economic and geographical circumstances, transmission and
distribution call for either pipelines or transportation in pressurised tanks. This thesis
only considers the natural gas (methane) industry that is delivered either by pipeline or
in tanker form as cryogenic liquefied natural gas (LNG).
Crew & Kleindorfer explain that the natural gas industry possesses most of the features
of 'natural monopolies' such as large transaction-specific investments, low variable
costs, and scale economies. Although there is variation in demand, both seasonally and
daily, peak demand is less of an issue than in electricity. Gas can be stored in
gasometers adjacent to the network, underground in the cavities of porous rock
formations and in high pressure pipelines (line packing). This means that 'time-of-use'
pricing regimes are less widespread in the gas industry than in electricity and as a
consequence complex metering is less widespread. Most gas pipeline companies buy
their gas directly from producers, with only a small proportion of their gas coming
from their own production subsidiaries. Thus the pipelines buy the gas from the gas
producers and then resell it to customers, most of whom are unaffiliated distribution
companies. The pipeline function is in the business of selling, storage and
transportation services, although recently the issue has arisen as to whether it should
take on common carrier status, which would require that it transports gas owned by
others (Third Party Access).
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4.3.3 Telecommunications
Unlike gas and electricity, telecommunications has no production function. It consists
of the transportation of electronic information either in analogue or digital form
through a fixed medium (e.g. copper wire over optic fibre or a mobile medium such as
radio waves). This requires an extensive integrated transportation network, which up
until recent years has been viewed as a 'natural monopoly' (Harper, 1989 and Headrick,
1991). Harper also shows that the considerable development of information technology
over the past twenty years has increased demand and the competing communications
media has called into question the 'natural monopoly' status of this industry. Mansell
(1993) in her analysis of the new telecommunications market, suggests that instead of
an 'idealistic' competitive market developing where a large number of communications
companies are competing with each other a 'strategic' market is emerging. This
'strategic' market is being dominated by national and increasingly multi-national
companies. As this market develops, Mansell suggests that new forms of innovative
regulation are required to maintain the principles of'public service'.
An 'added value' service provider network is also blossoming (Haddon, 1997). Third
parties are increasingly using the telecommunications to not only use the network for
telephony but also for telematics, video on demand and other multimedia services. One
of these services is automated energy and water utility meter reading. Thus the
functionality of the utility meter is increasingly coming within the realm of the
information and communications industry rather than the energy and water industry.
Littlechild (1979) describes that metering telephony itself is carried out centrally on
telephone exchanges and not at the customers' premises. Harper (1989) explains that
this is now a highly automated process. The metering data is collected via electronic
data collectors from the telephone exchanges and in turn transferred electronically to
the billing systems. As such, it is fundamentally different to the energy and water
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utilities. The metering arrangements in the past were largely governed by technical
considerations. Charges were imposed by meter pulses applied to the customer's meter
by electro-mechanical equipment as the call proceeded. At the time of the call the
equipment simply recorded its duration and destination. This information was
processed separately later, to calculate the monetary charge of the call. But on Stored
Programmed Control (SPC) these costs do not arise.3 As SPC systems are introduced
such charging systems have superseded electro-mechanical periodic metering where
this had been used. There is thus now no technical constraint equivalent to the speed of
periodic meter pulsing. This means that on telephony metering systems the cost of all
the calls can be very closely tailored to their duration by using short charging intervals
with a low monetary value per unit (Harper, 1989: ch.6).
4.3.4 Water
Unlike telecommunications, electricity and gas, where the industry is dominated by
large companies, water is often supplied by many small companies (Lee, 1969 and
Crew & Kleindorfer, 1986). This is mainly due to the physical and technical constraints
in supplying water. Lee and Crew & Kleindorfer, explain that the technology of water
supply involves collecting water in a reservoir, either above or below ground,
transporting it to the purification plant, and then distributing it to customers. Thus, like
electricity and gas supply, a water utility has four functions of production, transmission,
distribution and supply. It also has one additional important function, that is,
wastewater disposal and treatment. Most companies are defined by geographical
constraints this usually being a natural river drainage basin. The management of water
can be further complicated when the drainage basin covers differing political entities.
This becomes significant in the supply of water on the European Continent where
3 SPC is a technique under which exchange switching, routing and facility operations are controlled by
computer software allowing computerised billing.
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rivers such as the Danube and the Rhine run through different countries. Water supply
can also be important politically within countries particularly when the administration
ofwater rights is devolved, as it is in many countries to Local Government.
The second major factor in the management and regulation of water supply and its
disposal is the environment (Kinnersley, 1994). In view of the fact that water
companies are supplying drinking water it is not surprising that the water industry is
subject to environmental regulation. It is important that customers should receive
wholesome water that is free of bacterial and other contaminants. Indeed, one of the
reasons for the development of an integrated water and sewage service was to combat
diseases such as cholera and typhoid in the developing industrial conurbations of the
mid-nineteenth century.
Water is also used for leisure and sporting activities. Kinnersley suggests that there is a
balance between the amount that can be extracted for supply and what must be
maintained to satisfy the ecology of the countryside and the various interests of water
sports enthusiasts. To account for this Kinnersley explains that there is usually an
environmental regulator and non-governmental pressure groups who are concerned
with particular issues. Water is also an important source to industry other than supply.
It is a major mode of transport, particularly in large continental masses. The inherent
potential energy within a watercourse can also be tapped to generate hydro-electric
power. Crew & Kleindorfer highlight that hydro-electric power, together with large
irrigation schemes can both have an enormous economic and environmental impact on
a geographical region. These issues are only mentioned to highlight the enormous
importance that external interests play in the water industry. This study however
restricts itself to the supply ofwater through privately or publicly owned companies.
Both Kinnersley and Crew & Kleindorfer suggest that the nature of water supply
suggests that it is very difficult to visualise water being traded in an 'unbundled' nature,
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like gas and electricity. Since there is usually little interconnection between discrete
distribution networks, competition in the water industry is not practicable. For the same
reason, competition in supply and sewerage disposal is unlikely although supply and
sewerage may be done by separate companies. With the absence of any possibility of a
competitive market, water is the most monopolistic in nature of the public utilities.
As with the other utilities metering is crucial in the management of water. Lee (1969)
explains that the costs of distribution are highly dependent on the distance from the
treatment plant. In addition to the capital costs of providing transmission, there are the
costs ofmaintaining the pipes and mains, and the additional costs of pumping. So each
litre delivered to a distant location has an additional pumping cost compared to the
costs at a closer location. Another concern about pricing arises from the stochastic
nature of demand and supply of water. For example dry weather means not only that
supply is down but also that demand increases for sprinkling and crop irrigation. One
solution to the problem, would require that the pricing policy be allowed to vary
according to weather conditions.
4.4 METHODS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
4.4.1 The Principal-Agent Model
The simplest way of describing the regulator}' process in public utilities is through the
Principal-Agent model which is sometimes called the REGULASY (regulation under
asymmetric information) model (Bos, 1998). This is where the consumers and the
regulatory commission are seen as the Principal, and the utility is the Agent. This is
depicted in figure 6 where the Principal is the regulatory commission representing the
consumers.
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Figure 6: The Principal-Agent Model of Regulation
Source: Crew & Kleindorfer (1986: p.l 10)
The regulatory commission attempts to achieve the desired quality of public utility
services (right hand box) by a number of regulatory instruments (vertical arrow) like
rate-of-return and price regulation, moral persuasion, threats and appeals to the public
through the media. The public utility responds to these signals according to its
motivation (e.g. whether or not it aims to maximise profit) with a set of behavioural
rules and a resulting control of prices, quantities, quality and profit. The commission
attempts to see what effect its instruments are having on the public utility by
monitoring and enforcement. The effect of this is that these get changed as they move
through the monitoring and enforcement arrangements (see box and arrows on left).
Information on prices etc., also comes back directly (on the right hand side of the
diagram) from the vector depicting the consumption of utility products. In addition
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there is exogenous pressure at work, shown in the top right hand corner. This can come
from a number of sources. For example, a regulatory commission might find itself
under pressure from the State Government.
Crew & Kleindorfer (1986) explain that there are five types of regulation: public
operation and ownership; profit regulation; price control regulation; franchising; and
deregulation. These will be outlined in the following sections.
4.4.2 Public Operation and Ownership
Public operation and ownership as a solution to the natural monopoly problem is in
widespread use (Littlechild, 1979; Lucas, 1979; Harper, 1989 and Henney, 1994).
Henney suggests that the basic idea is very simple. The Government owns and
manages the utility instead of it being in private hands. At first sight, the public
enterprise has several advantages. The cost savings arising from a natural monopoly are
automatically retained by society as a whole rather than being retained by the
monopolist. Even if the public enterprise charged pure monopoly prices, the monopoly
profits would be retained by the Government, the public enterprise being just another
tax collector. The allocative inefficiency would continue, as taxes are a source of
inefficiency anyway. However, pure monopoly behaviour is rarely advocated by the
supporters of public enterprise. Rather public enterprise is typically envisaged as
having the potential for maximising welfare. However, it does not always work out that
way. Prosser (1986) sums up much of the frustration caused by this sort of regulation in
the UK in the nineteen-seventies:
"The amount of consideration given by ministers and civil servants, and even
parliament, to the consumer in the nationalised legislation was much less than given to
the position of the workers and trade unions, and very much less than that given to such
general aspects as compensation and the role of ministers...Undoubtedly it never
entered the heads of many Ministers and their supporters that consumers might be in
63
need of protection from the Boards of these industries."
4.4.3 Profit Regulation
The United States approach to controlling monopolies that provide a public service, it
is clamed by Crew & Kleindorfer (1986), is founded on greater confidence in
capitalism and less on public ownership. They describe how a privately owned utility is
coupled with a regulatory framework of Federal and State public service commissions.
Over time, a philosophy of public interest has developed, to the effect that there is a
social contract between the public and the utility. In this 'contract' the utility provides
the service the public wants (as interpreted by a commission) in return for being paid a
reasonable return on the capital employed in the business. The approach, called 'rate-of-
return regulation', effectively allows a utility to set its tariffs on a 'cost plus' basis. The
disadvantage of 'rate of return' regulation' is that there is an incentive to inflate their
asset base unduly and that it gives no direct incentive for companies to reduce costs
(Henney, 1994).
4.4.4 Price Control Regulation
Instead of regulating the profits of utilities an alternative is to regulate prices, known as
'RPI-X' (Henney, 1994). The concept is that regulated prices charged by the industry
should normally rise less rapidly than prices in general (RPI), by the amount that
reflects the efficiency improvements deemed achievable within the technical and
economic conditions of the industry (and reflected in the size of the 'X' term). Henney
(1994) suggests that price control has a number of advantages: It is transparent and
easily comprehensible; it minimises information requirements; and it theoretically does
not require knowledge of a utility's asset values. It also allows companies to retain the
benefit of any efficiency gains greater than the implied 'X' term, and thus gives more
incentive for efficiency. However, the advantages of price-based controls are in reality
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not so clear-cut. For example, companies may have an incentive to conceal or postpone
price-cutting indicative prior to the setting of the control. In addition, price controls do,
in practice, have significant information requirements in order to set an appropriate
value of 'X'. Furthermore the regulator needs to take a view of appropriate rates of
return of the industry regulated.
4.4.5 Franchise Bidding
Demestez (1968) proposes franchise bidding as a means of dealing with monopoly
problems. The basic idea is to periodically publicly auction off the right to run the
monopoly as a protected franchise. Bidders would be required to specify, say for the
next period of five years, the prices they would charge for the monopoly's products. If
another bidder could operate the monopoly more efficiently than the present franchisee,
the incumbent would be required to turn over the ownership of the franchise to the
winning bidder. The bidder would be compensated for the transaction-specific assets by
the winning bidder. An alternative to a complete contract is an incomplete long-term
contract. Here adjustments would be permitted for unanticipated developments.
However, as this opens the door for opportunistic behaviour, penalty clauses may be
included as part of the contract. Another possibility, which is used frequently in union
contracts, is arbitration as a means of dealing with events unforeseen by the contract.
4.4.6 Deregulation
The argument for deregulation rests on the notion that the gains from scale economies
and price control are small in relation to the inefficiencies of regulation. Perhaps the
strongest statement of the deregulation approach was originated by Posner (1969,
p.634):
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"The logical and empirical foundations of common carrier and public utility regulation
are too shaky to support further extensions ... Non-extension offers the most substantial
prospect for the eventual elimination of regulation ... (because) in the long run, there
may be few natural monopolies, perhaps none, such is the change in consumer taste and
technology in a dynamic economy."
A number of deregulatory alternatives are possible including; unregulated monopoly,
self-regulation and 'pseudo-competition'. Unregulated monopoly involves getting rid of
the price regulatory apparatus in existence. In the case of utilities this would involve the
abolition of the regulatory commissions, although some regulation of safety, service
standards and environment might continue. Along with this would go the abolition of
industry's exclusive franchises. There would be no legal prohibition against entry.
There would be absolutely nothing legally to prevent two or more utilities supplying
the same geographical area. According to the contestable market hypothesis of Baumol
et al. (1982), when there are no sunk costs there would be no need for two firms
actually to compete, merely the threat of entry would discourage the monopolist from
raising his price above the cost-covering level. This contestable market model, it is
argued by Crew & Kleindorfer (1986), has little applicability to the 'natural monopoly'
problem, since sunk costs are typically significant in the traditional monopoly sectors.
Many 'professions', e.g. medical, dental, and legal, practise self-regulation with the
State Governments providing assistance with licensing and enforcement. Regulation by
the 'professions', however, usually involves professional practices. On the surface,
utility regulation has little in common with professional self-regulation. However,
Crew & Kleindorfer (1986) suggest that like the 'professions', the utilities are service
orientated, and utilities may be able to design appropriate dispute resolution procedures
that may be responsive to customer complaints, including presumably excessive or
inappropriate rates. Moreover they argue that the potential for self-regulation would be
increased if the State played an overseeing role. The companies should be aware that if
the State deemed that inadequate due process was being given to customers, or that the
self-regulators were not preventing monopoly exploitation, then the regulator could
step in, fix rates and take other appropriate actions. The threat of this might place some
discipline upon self-regulators. In pseudo-competition, competition and social
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regulation exist simultaneously. Crew & Kleindorfer (1986) point out that there are
obvious problems that need to be considered when implementing this form of
regulation. Splitting up an organisation will involve sacrificing economies of scale and
scope. The transfer of ownership from Government to a few number of shareholders
may merely transfer the administration from political abuse to the abuse of individual
capitalists. There will be a temptation of regulatory capture to either a particular
pressure group, whether it be customer, shareholder or philosophical ideology.
It is clear that a nationalised industry should be deregulated if the net benefit to society
is positive. Some indication in clarifying these issues can be found in Beesley and
Littlechild's Principles, Problems and Priorities in Deregulation that is displayed in a
simple 2x2 matrix shown in figure 7 (Beesley & Littlechild 1992). Demand prospects
for utility products are termed as 'Good' or 'Bad', depending on long-term trends, and
supply prospects are classed as conductive to 'Single' or 'Multiple' (competing
ownership) depending on the developments of technology.
In Quadrant D, industries present no problems of monopoly power, since multiple
ownership is quite feasible (within the UK at least). As a result of a large amount of
competition from abroad, these industries are unlikely to survive in their present state
and must adapt to competition. Consumers will gain indirectly, notably as taxpayers
but also through the greater choice of competitive products.
Industries in Quadrant C are characterised by good long-term prospects and at present
have no significant problems of monopoly power, because multiple ownership is
viable. Beesley and Littlechild (1992: pp.30-37) suggest that these are prime candidates
for deregulation.
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Figure 7: Beesley and Littlechild's 2X2 Matrix
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Waterways
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Telecoms Transmission
Airlines
Steel
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Assuming that
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SINGLE Supply Prospects for Utility Products MULTIPLE
Source: Beesley and Littlechild (1992: p.32)
Industries in Quadrant A are characterised by good demand prospects, but the supply
prospects do not favour multiple competing ownership. Local distribution systems for
electricity, gas and telephones are characterised by high sunk costs. With the possible
exception of telephones they do not face much technological challenge, and will be
sustainable as local monopolies. Consumers are therefore at risk.
Industries in Quadrant B have declining demand prospects while their supply
conditions favour a single organisation. Nationalisation was seen as a means of
resisting decline: it led to continued injections of new capital and the financing of
losses. Even after privatisation these industries would remain in Quadrant B. The aim
of privatisation would be to facilitate the movement of resources out of these industries
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and/or use existing resources more fully by developing new products and services.
However, social and political problems will accompany the withdrawal of services.
Privatisation schemes will need to be designed with careful thought to non-commercial
obligations.
Combining Beesley and Littlechild's analysis with the Techno-Economic Paradigm
described in section 3.4 suggests that information technology has played a crucial role
in deregulation. It has reduced the transactions costs and facilitated market trading
within the industries appearing in Quadrant C. In effect there is another dimension to
Beesley and Littlechild's matrix, that is technological innovation. It is the role that
innovation has played in this deregulatory process which will be discussed in the
following chapters of the thesis.
4.5 CONCLUSION
Metering is used in public utility regulation primarily as a metrological device in order
to implement cost reflective pricing, but with innovations in information technology
this role may be changing. This is crucial since in integrated networks the capital-
intensive infrastructure is designed to cater for the maximum demand. The role of
metering becomes even more important in industries where storage is difficult such as
in electricity, or if there are concerns over the conservation of the commodity as there
are in water. Due to the 'natural monopoly' characteristics of public utilities, they
require to be regulated. This can take the form of public ownership and operation to
complete deregulation. It is also suggested that if the utilities are unbundled into their
component functions, different forms of regulation can be implemented in the
production, transmission, distribution and supply functions. The role that information
technology, and metering in particular, has played in this process is crucial. The next
chapter will consider some approaches to the technological innovation, which will be
used as a framework for the analysing of metering development, and provide insight
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into its effect on the regulatory process.
CHAPTER 5
TECHNOLOGY
5.1 INTRODUCTION
There are many different approaches to the treatment of technology in the academic
literature. Technology may be approached through the traditional disciplines of
economics (Stoneman, 1983 and Clark, 1985), sociology (MacKenzie & Wajcman,
1986 and Elliot, 1988) and philosophy (Polanyi, 1962). Another approach is to assume
that there is a fairly stable and matter-of-fact state between the social, economic and/or
the technical dimensions that can be quantitatively modelled (Stoneman, 1983 and
Kaimien & Schwartz, 1982). A third assumes that the social, psychological and/or
economic factors shape technical development (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1986). It is
also sometimes reciprocally assumed that technological innovations are also capable of
shaping social, psychological and/or economic environment factors (Winner, 1977).
Some studies, on the other hand consider technological innovation at the micro and
meso scales within firms or organisations while others are concerned at the macro level
of inter-sectoral infrastructures. A further approach, more in a philosophical vein, tries
to tackle technology from its lexicographical and taxonomic definitions. Each approach
provides valuable insights into technological phenomena and the innovative process in
their own ways. Since the study of technology can be so diverse it is important to
bound one's study to a manageable proportions. The approach that is adopted in this
thesis is the role that technology plays in the regulation of public utilities. Thus it is the
study of a business process on an inter-sectoral scale that is the focus of this thesis. In
addition, chapters 3 and 4 have shown that the regulatory process in public utilities is
multi-disciplinary. It is also this multi-disciplinary principle that shapes this chapter
and in particular it is argued that the role that technological innovation plays in public
utility regulation needs to call on many perspectives.
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The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the major approaches to technological
innovation and how they may be applied to public utility regulation. A more in-depth
appraisal of some of the interdisciplinary approaches to innovation will then be
presented. This will begin with a discussion of how Systems Theory can help to
describe how artefacts within utilities are not self-contained but part of larger
technological systems. Technological and system change will then be described using
Sociotechnical Constituencies, Techno-Economic Networks and Evolutionary Theory.
5.2 TRADITIONAL WAYS OF ANALYSING OF TECHNOLOGY
5.2.1 Economic Models of Innovation
Ever since David Ricardo (1772-1823) discovered that the laws of supply and demand
alone would lead inevitably to a 'stationary state' it has been recognised that there is
some other force which can be called, and could be defined as, technology (Ekelund &
Hebert, 1975: p.93). Over the years, economists have tried to incorporate technological
phenomena in the innovative process. The most significant were Karl Marx's critique of
the Capitalist State in Capital (1867) and Joseph Schumpeter's in The Theory of
Economic Development (1934) and Capitalism Socialism and Democracy (1943). In
The Theory of Economic Development (1934), Schumpeter sees that individual
inventive 'entrepreneurs' working in competitive markets drive technological
development. This assumed perfect competition and the definition of the 'entrepreneur'
left no scope for large scale R&D. In Capitalism Socialism and Democracy (1943),
Schumpeter stresses that corporate research and development is also a major source of
industrial innovation, and large economies of scale particularly in the capital intensive
sectors has led to most technological advances taking place in large monopolistic firms.
The first attempt to quantify the role that technology played in growth was done in
independent studies by Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957). Abramovitz found that
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after accounting for the efficiency (capital-labour ratio), there remained unexplained
growth. The more recent attempts at describing the economics of technical change have
moved from the macro-economic principles of Schumpeter to cover most disciplines
within economics.
Economists are now moving away from using only the production function and neo¬
classical approaches as a means of considering the impact of technology on the
economy (Clark, 1985), to analysing the development of technology itself. Also the
traditional approach to technological discovery of innovation and diffusion as a linear
process is giving way to a more interactive approach to technological development.
The invention and innovation process has been quantified by Rosenberg (1976: eh.6) in
his notions of the inducement and focusing of innovation. Indeed, several projects over
the past forty years have demonstrated that the role of the research and development as
well as the market infrastructure was crucial for competitive success. Project TRACES
and project EIINDSIGHT in the United States, Project SAPPHO in the United
Kingdom and many similar studies showed the importance of external networks of
scientific and technical research for efficient performance (Freeman, 1982). Other
research has considered technology output measures. The methods of measuring the
output of inventions and innovations have centred around three areas: patenting activity
(Schmookler, 1966; Comanor & Scherer, 1969; Bosworth, 1980 and Soete, 1981);
innovative activity (Mansfield, 1968; Freeman, 1982 and Stoneman, 1983: p. 15); and
outputs in terms of training and learning (Pavitt, 1993). Also many attempts have been
made to show how it is possible to 'account' for technology by measuring input and
output statistics (Clark, 1985: p.74). Other approaches have focused on developing the
analysis of the nature of the time-path following the diffusion path of technology
(Stoneman, 1983: p.69; David, 1975 and Davies, 1979). David further suggests that
each firm may have a critical level of stimulus and will adopt an innovation only when
the stimulus represented by the innovation itself exceeds a critical level. Davies argues
that due to uncertainty, firms make decisions in a behavioural manner that can more
appropriately be described as 'satisfying' (Simon 1962) than as 'profit maximising'.
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This 'satisficing' may involve such factors as increasing returns, technical constraints,
social obligations and strategy.
The economic analysis of the innovative process has also been split into three levels of
scale by Stoneman (1983: p.67); intra-firm diffusion, inter-firm diffusion and inter-
sector diffusion.
Within Intra-firm Diffusion Stoneman (1983: ch.6) considers two neo-classical
approaches: the Mansfield Model predicts that the diffusion of technology will be a
sigmoid curve and the Bayesian Model considers that firms leam in a Bayesian way
from their experience. Within new institutional theories of the firm (see section 4.2),
research centres around the concept of the supply of knowledge. It is also again
founded on the concept of'satisficing' rather than optimising behaviour (Simon, 1962),
as well as Cyert & March's (1963) behavioural theory of the firm. The important role
played within a firm by groups of conflicting interests and goals, introduces uncertainty
into firms' operations, and opens up the 'black box' of the firm (Rosenberg, 1982).
Williamson's transactions costs analysis (1975 and 1991), described in the previous
chapter, has similar foundations. Also within the same conceptual framework Nelson &
Winter propose An Evolutionary Theory ofEconomic Change (1982) (see also Winter,
1991: pp.186-189 and Nelson 1994: pp.21-32). It emphasises that technology and the
structures of industry co-evolve. It is much concerned with how patterns and innovative
routines and artefacts evolve and are reproduced through time in the face of selective
pressures (see section 5.3.4 for further details).
Inter-firm diffusion splits into three camps. The psychological approach proposes that
diffusion takes time because actors respond to stimuli. The probit approach proposes
that 'across the population of potential adopters' the magnitude of at least one economic
variant influencing the outcome of individual adoption decisions is not constant but
instead, can be described by a more or less continuous frequency density function. The
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game theoretic approach meanwhile describes the adaptation of technology through a
series of logical decisions in anticipation of competitor's actions.
The study of inter-sectoral technological innovation centres around two issues.
Whether the monopolistic or competitive market structure is more conducive to
innovation, or whether innovation is best left to individual entrepreneurs or large firms
(Kaimien & Schwartz, 1982: pp.27-37). Intertwining with this debate about 'large vs.
small' and 'monopoly vs. competition', is the argument whether technology develops
through 'demand-pull' or 'technology-push'. 'Demand-pull' emphasises that innovation
is spurred by the market operating amongst a lot of highly motivated individual
entrepreneurs and is espoused by recent deregulatory polices in the UK (Harper, 1989;
Kinnersley, 1994 and Offer, 1992). However, many writers, including Rosenberg
(1982: p.231) suggest that a purely 'demand-pull' approach ignores the operation of a
complex and diverse set of supply-side mechanisms that are continually altering the
structure of production costs and are therefore fundamental to the explanation of the
timing of the innovation process. Thus technology is now viewed as coupling
technological opportunity and market demand. Also within this macro-economic
sphere lies also the Techno-Economic Paradigm described in section 3.4. It suggests
that growth and recession in the economy is dominated by different fundamental
technologies. To be effective a nation requires those institutions to be compatible with
that technology. Thus the regime ofregulation suitable for an earlier set of fundamental
technologies may be quite inappropriate for newer technology.
5.2.2 Sociological Analysis of Innovation
In sociology, attention has been paid to the role of technology since at least the
nineteen-fifties. The first major feature of the treatment of technology in the sociology
of organisations was the relationship between type and organisation structure. The
pioneering work of Joan Woodward (1965) established the presence of a correlation
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between the type of technology used (for example mass, batch or flow) and the
organisational structure adopted. The conclusions reached are, that certain technologies
for the business or organisation, pre-dispose an organisation to favour certain structures
and eschew others. Another pole in the argument is the 'strategic choice' paradigm
associated with Child (1972) which retains a contingency flavour but uses
contingencies to set limits on action, rather than to determine it. These early attempts in
a certain way have paralleled what is happening in economics, but they have not dealt
with the provenance of technologies, only their supposed effects.
A second feature of the sociological discussions of technology is the analysis of
technology in relation to the organisation and the control of work. Again there have
been two rather opposed traditions. First, there has been the socio-technical systems
approach. Emery & Trist (1960 & 1965), focus on intra-firm activities in which the
'implementation' of new technology and its effect on work redesign and control were
studied. The issues were seen here as task design and allocation, in order to optimise
both efficient use of technology, and worker satisfaction. Looking at analysis outside
the theories of the firm, Callon (1986) takes an Actor-Network approach in an attempt
to find a neutral vocabulary to describe the actions of those who are involved in
building Techno-Economic NetM'orks. The idea is that actors build messy networks that
combine technical, social, and economic elements. Callon and his collaborators stress
that the elements (including entrepreneurs) who bind together in networks are, at the
same time, constituted and shaped in those networks. This means that they avoid
making assumptions a backdrop of social, economic, or technical factors: the backdrop
is something that is itself built in the course of building a network. It also means that
they avoid making the common-sense assumption that people, entrepreneurs, or
machines are naturally occurring categories. How boundaries are drawn between (for
instance) machines and people, thus become a subject in their own right. This notion
has its roots in the discipline of semiotics, which is a rigorous vocabulary based on
symbols for talking symmetrically, about people and machines (this concept is
explored further in section 5.3.3). To a first approximation, Actor-NetM'ork Theory has
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much in common with Hughes' (1983) version of Systems Theory, which was
developed in the studies of the history of technology. This was originally intended to
describe, and account for, the growth of large technical systems. Hughes' argument is
that the successful entrepreneurs were those who thought in system terms, not only
about the technical character of their innovations but also about their social, political,
and economic context. In effect, he says that entrepreneurs, like Thomas Edison,
designed not only devices but also societies within which these devices might be
successfully located (see section 5.3.1 for further details).
The second tradition has taken a more political approach focusing particularly on the
labour process (Braverman, 1974; Cockburn, 1983 and Noble, 1986). Many of these
accounts began from a Marxian perspective that emphasises that technological
decisions follow from the effects of in-built biases in society. The implication of this
approach for the provenance of technology is that objectives of exploitation are
variously interpreted as valorisation, direct control ofworkers or gender repression, and
are seen as ever-present influences on the process that generates technology. Winner
(1977: pp.306-335), takes a slightly different approach and considers that technology
itself may delimit and even determine human needs and wishes. In this he evokes the
myth of Frankenstein, illustrating the possibility of humanity facing bondage to
autonomous technology.
5.2.3 The Role ofKnowledge in Innovation
Almost in parallel with the research traditions in the sociology of technology, in the
nineteen-sixties began the development of the sociology of science (Barnes, 1972).
This branch of research highlights the procedures and determinants of scientists'
behaviour, and the limitations of so-called scientific method. In the sociology of
science it has been argued that the rigorous scientific method grounded in logical
empiricism is socially constructed. It then follows that science is open to many
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interpretations, which may depend prevailing on social trends. Accordingly, scientific
knowledge (and now it is argued technologies and technical practices) are built in a
process of social construction and negotiation, a process which is often seen as driven
by the social interests of participants. Authors such as Collins (1981) use terms such as
'interpretative flexibility' and 'closure' to express how conflicting groups interpret the
issues and impose a solution. At the same time there has been a blurring of the
distinction between science and technology (Faulkner, 1994) based on empirical
studies of the innovative process (Rothwell, 1977 and Freeman, 1982). This has
encouraged researchers such as Pinch & Bijker (1990) and Molina (1996) to suggest
similar techniques can be used to map technological development, as in the sociology
of science (see section 5.3.2 for further discussion). Schot (1992), Rip (1995), Rip et al.
(1995), Schot & Rip (1997), Deuten et al. (1997) and Rip & Kemp (1998), take this
logic one step further by presenting mechanisms for the introduction of new technology
at the societal level (see section 5.3.4).
5.2.4 Similarities between Approaches
The similarities between these accounts can now be briefly analysed. There has been a
trend towards greater degree of realism, in that the dynamics of technological
innovation and some tools used in the analysis have become more similar. For
example, the concepts, from routines to paradigms, which have emerged in
evolutionary economics and which describe patterns and stabilities in firms and
technologies are common to all disciplines. Systems Theory and Actor-Network Theory
act as counterweights to any technological, market or sociologically determinist
interpretation of technology. There is a degree of commonality among these conceptual
approaches, in that they all imply a degree of fine structure in the technological and
organisational features of the world under study. This structure has a short to medium-
term stability, but can eventually change by means of transitions to other states and
structures. Put at its starkest, it has been suggested by Coombs et al. (1992) that where
the evolutionary economist sees a stable natural trajectory, the sociologist sees a
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normalised irreversible Techno-Economic Network: where the evolutionary economist
sees a radical innovation, the sociologist sees ruptured networks and the emergence of
new networks. Also, the nature of knowledge in organisations has also become an
important component of modern theories. Thus knowledge can be characterised as, for
example, tacit or codified (Polanyi, 1962), public or private (Teece, 1987), local and
cumulative (Pavitt, 1990). An important outcome of these considerations is that
knowledge can be seen as constituents to larger phenomena such as technology. These
phenomena may produce, to varying extents, specific irreversibility and path
dependency that can be seen as the consequences of increasing returns to adoption of
certain technologies (Dosi, 1982).
5.3 THE ANALYSIS OF INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
5.3.1 Systems Theory
The Seamless Web
It has become clear from chapter 4 that any form of technological innovation that
occurs within public utilities can only be accounted for if it is seen within the context of
the utility network as a whole. A version of Systems Theory (von Bertalanffy, 1971;
Lilienfeld, 1978 and Emery, 1981), which deals with this, was developed in the history
of technology by such writers as Thomas Hughes in Networks ofPower (1983). In this
book Hughes develops a number of sub-themes, for instance the nature of the
innovative act is explored through the creativity of Thomas Edison and in particular the
motivations, methods and sociological circumstances pertaining to his invention of an
integrated electricity network. He introduces the notion of the 'reverse salient' or
bottleneck within a system that provides an internal dynamic for technological
evolution. He also compares the interaction of technology and politics by exploring the
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context of systems development in three Western cities: Chicago; London; and Berlin.
Another theme brought out by Hughes is the theme of technology as an improver of
natural circumstances. He cites the hydro-electric resources of the Sierras ofCalifornia
which were seen being transformed into economic goods by engineers and
entrepreneurs. Another question that Hughes addresses is the autonomy of the
technology. He concludes, like Winner (1977), that to some extent systems do have an
internal drive, with the emergence of 'reverse salients' and their ongoing solution
provides the engine for their evolution. Nonetheless, the style of different systems
depends on cultural factors such as economic principles, legislative constraints,
historical contingencies, and geographical factors, both human and natural. These
regimes ofregulation (my words) stem from the societies in which they grow, varying
according to time and place. He suggests that in electricity networks one constant
dominates and that is load factor (see section 4.3.1), and in many cases decisions are
made to improve load factor, shaping the form of electricity supply systems. He also
argues that if the management of public utilities relied solely on economic factors such
as load factor, analysis would be relatively simple. But he argues that this is not the
case. In London for instance, during the early part of the century, electricity utilities
were contained within the boundaries of Local Government jurisdiction and thereby
restricted to small-scale technology and limited diversity. This was the price that
Londoners paid for placing high value on Local Government rather than low cost
electricity. Also after the nineteen-thirties, electricity supply was used to supply social
needs by subsidising rural and socially deprived communities through the notion of
universal access at equal price. Thus he concludes that economics is not an absolute
detemiinant of the growth of infrastructure systems. Power systems he argues,
encompass a technical core of components as well as institutional components. He
suggests that such encompassing systems could be labelled 'sociotechnical systems'
rather than 'technological systems'. Unfortunately, Hughes ends his study in 1930,
restricting his analysis to the growth of the electricity network infrastructure, and says
little about the infrastructure change that has occurred since then. This thesis should be
seen as building on Hughes' analysis by considering the changes in network
infrastructures during the nineteen-eighties and nineteen-nineties. In particular, the role
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that information technology has played in Hughes' 'sociotechnicaf process once a
network infrastructure has become developed and established is studied. In order to do
this, writings concerning innovation and change in the context of existing network
infrastructures need to be considered.
The 'Highway'
Such an applied study of infrastructure change has been carried on an in the
telecommunications sector of the USA. Saehney (1992) in his study of stages in
infrastructure development of the public telephone network, describes it as the
'highway' of the information age (see also Kubicek & Dutton, 1997: pp. 10-15). The
advocates of investments in telecommunications infrastructure evoke the 'highway'
analogy, to underscore the social and economic importance. Moreover Saehney has
developed the 'highway' analogy to go beyond a relatively simple metaphor and has
used it as a heuristic device for model construction. The experience with transportation
technologies is used to develop an abstract model for understanding the growth pattern
for emerging telecommunications technologies. Saehney argues that in the case of
infrastructure technologies, the interconnections or the 'system of relationships'
between elements are more important than the constituent elements themselves. This
'system of relationships' is greatly influenced by social, economic and cultural factors.
Saehney argues that the extension of the telephone network into rural areas is a social
decision, not a question of technological nodes (switches) and links (transmission
channels). The actual placement of the network on the geographical space is therefore
considered to be an artefact of social design rather than pure engineering
considerations. In other words, the network structures of the infrastructure technologies
grow in "the sociocultural milieu of the larger society." Thus, different societies are
likely to influence the development of the infrastructure technologies in different ways.
However, Saehney claims that within a socio-economic system the organising
principles for the 'system of relationships' of different infrastructure technologies are
likely to be the same. In the same vein Mansell (1993) demonstrates how both policies
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and technical aspects are themselves shaped by actors in the telecommunications
sector, including Governments, public telecommunication operators, equipment
manufacturers, and large users of public and private telecommunication networks. She
goes on to consider the strategy of telecommunications policy which lies between an
'idealist' vision of full competition versus a 'structuralist' of dominant players being
regulated by a creative public policy. Nonetheless unlike railways and
telecommunications, many other network infrastructures have more than just a
transportation component. The electricity industry has generation, the gas industry has
upstream production and storage, and water supply involves storage as well as
purification and waste-water treatment (see sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2 & 4.3.4). Therefore in
these network infrastructures, the 'highway' model breaks down. Two possible ways
forward are Sociotechnical Constituencies and Techno-Economic Networks.
5.3.2 Sociotechnical Constituencies
Alfonso Molina (1990; 1995 and 1996) builds on Hughes' notion that network
infrastructures are sociotechnical systems, and attempts to order the system of
relationships that Saehney recognises for infrastructure change in a formalised
framework. He then presents a methodology to study the development of technology
through constituency building and socio-technical alignment. His programme starts
from the realisation that the process of innovation in technological development entails
the build-up of Sociotechnical Constituencies. Sociotechnical Constituencies are
defined as:
"Dynamic ensembles of technical constituents (e.g. machines, instruments) and social
constituents (e.g. institutions and interest groups) which interact and shape each other
in the course of the creation, production and diffusion of specific technologies."
Molina's ideas are derived from works in the sociology of scientific knowledge, the
increasing blurring of the science/technology distinction and developing interest in
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technology studies. Collins (1981) in his Empirical Programme ofRelativism (EPOR)
shows that during the development of knowledge there may be many ways of
interpreting the same problem (interpretative flexibility) and when these possibilities
are being closed down a closure occurs similar to Fleck's (1993) crystallisation of
contingencies in the technical process. This theme of technological innovation is taken
on by Pinch & Bijker (1990) who propose a format for the Social Construction of
Technology (SCOT) where the notion of the social group can be given empirical
reference in the study of technological development. The social groupings are then
formalised into a Sociotechnical Constituency by Molina. These constituents are built
up by an alignment, which is:
"The process of creation, adoption, accommodation (adaptation) and close or loose
interaction (interrelation) of technical and social factors and actors which underlies the
emergence of an identifiable constituency."
This process of alignment suggested by Molina may be both a constructive and
destructive process, which involves situations of tensions and recommendations
(termed interpretative flexibility) during the creation of a constituency. The
constituency is congealed and finally crystallised and 'closed' in the form of the
technological artefact. The concept of the 'diamond of alignment' has been used to
illustrate the multiple dimensions of alignment required for successful constituency
building at both the meso intra-organisational and macro inter-organisational contexts.
Figure 8 shows the diamond of the inter-organisational (industry-level) alignment,
which is the level of analysis being addressed in this study.
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Figure 8: Diamond of Inter-Organisational Alignment
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The focus (centre) of the diamond is the evolving technology and its associated
constituency. In the constituency there is no specific delineation between the
constituencies, rather they should be seen as continually evolving. The shaded areas (I)
and (II) represent the sociotechnical nature of the technology (T). The principle is that,
the better the starting-off alignment of I and II (constituency/technology) with other
various dimensions (1,2,3,4) of the 'diamond', the more effective the solution will be.
Molina gives examples of inter-organisational governance (dimension 1), nature of
target markets (dimension 2), outside parties that are target constituents (dimension 3),
and interacting technologies (dimension 4).
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Chapter 3 described how the regulatory process involves various regimes ofregulation
involving market, social and technical constraints. These are similar to dimensions 2, 3
& 4 in Molina's diamond which are bound together by reglementation (my word) or
governing rules represented by Molina's dimension 1 in 'the diamond'. The
constituency now turns into a regulatory framework in which the development of the
technology can be studied.
Sociotechnical Constituencies provide a good and more comprehensive starting point
in analysing the process of technical change within a network infrastructure than
general Systems Theory. Indeed, section 15.3.2 of the thesis uses this methodology to
analyse the influence if infrastructure architecture in metering. In order to obtain an
insight into how technology has an impact in developing a network infrastructure, a
mode of analysis that does not limit itself to the sociotechnical has to be considered.
Such an analysis can use the notion of Techno-Economic Networks.
5.3.3 Techno-Economic Networks
Techno-Economic Networks (Callon, 1992a; 1992b and 1996) are derived from Actor-
Network Theory, which grew up in science and technology studies as an attempt to
understand the way that social and technical factors are embodied in texts and artefacts.
It assumes that relations are explained through such phenomena as the 'seamless web'
(Hughes, 1983) and 'heterogeneous engineers' or actors (e.g. entrepreneurs or
scientists), the subtlety of which is partly linked to its derivation from semiotics. Thus
there is a combination of an agency (actor) and a structure (network) which cannot exist
without each other (Green et al. 1999). The distinction between objects and subjects
(human and non-human) in Actor-Network Theory is not given but is rather made and
remade, and it also describes how asymmetries are built up through extending networks
of relations. This leads to a 'centre of translation' which defines the relationship
between two actors which are inscribed in intermediaries such as texts and artefacts. A
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Techno-Economic Network is a term to describe the types of organisations (research
centres, commercial institutions, and public authorities) that result from Actor-
Networks.
A Techno-Economic Network is defined as:
"A co-ordinated set of heterogeneous actors - for instance, public laboratories, centres
of technical research, companies, financial organisations, users and the Government -
who participate collectively in the conception, development, production and
distribution or diffusion of procedures for producing goods and services, some of
which give rise to market transactions." (Callon, 1992a)
In certain cases, Callon shows that it is possible to anticipate the evolution of these
Techno-Economic Networks. The actors may behave predictably, and the technology
and its products evolve along lines that are relatively easy to characterise. In other cases
however, he suggests that the actors composing Techno-Economic Networks have
significant degrees of freedom. They develop complicated strategies and there may be a
number of innovations, and these may provoke unexpected rearrangements. They can
separate into smaller networks, or they can join other Techno-Economic Networks to
form more or less extensive ones.
The notion of Techno-Economic Networks has many similarities with Sociotechnical
Constituencies in that they are both dealing with infrastructure systems, but they have
also significant contrasts. The difference in the two approaches can be traced back to
their philosophical foundations. Sociotechnical Constituencies, which is based on the
sociology of scientific knowledge assumes that there is an intrinsic social element to all
phenomena. On the other hand Techno-Economic Networks as in Actor-NetM>ork
Theory, with its roots in semiotics, emphasises that symbols may be embedded in a
natural non-human as well as a human process. Thus a Techno-Economic Network has
a distinct advantage when considering the regulation of public utilities, since as Hughes
(1983: p.463) points out; they are constrained by natural climatic and geographical
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factors. As well as the philosophical differences, the idea of Techno-Economic
Networks goes at least some way in trying to account for the choices to be made and
new configurations of actors that may appear. In other words, it is more concerned with
the changing regulatory environment as a whole, with particular emphasis given to the
use made of technology. In contrast, Sociotechnical Constituencies focuses on
innovation and technological development and particular emphasis is given to how the
regulatory environment shapes the technology. To summarise, Molina focuses
primarily on the development of technology within a network, while Callon tries to
explain the development of the network, and considers the role of technological
development within that network.
Figure 9: The Translation of Techno-Economic Networks
Translation 1
Intermediaries:
Ar'Br2Cr3...
>
Technology
Economic and
Social Principles
Publicly Owned
Monopolies in the UK
Privately Owned and
Operated Utilities in the UK
Privately Owned and
Operated Utilities in France
Translation 2
Publicly Owned
Monopolies
in France
Privately Owned and
Operated Utilities
in the UK
Intermediaries:
Ar'Br2Cr3...
The System
Working in the UK,
Adopted by other
Networks
Techno-Eeonomie
Network
Intermediaries.
Ar'Br2Cr3...
e.g European
Harmonisation
Techno-Economic
Network
Techno-Economic
Network
Source: Adapted from Callon (1992a)
Some Form of
Intermediate
(Hybrid) System
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The language used is also different. Techno-Economic Networks are constituted of
actors and intermediaries. Gallon describes that the starting point in analysing a system
through Techno-Economic NetM'orks is to recognise a bundle of links and relations
between heterogeneous actors who are competing and co-operating with each other.
Once this system has been created the links that reinforce and shape its structure are
called intermediaries. Intermediaries may be linked to a particular activity like texts,
artefacts, money and natural phenomena (like the weather). Thus one Techno-
Economic Network can 'translate' to another by means of actors working through
intermediaries. Figure 9 illustrates such a process.
An actor A can transform intermediaries of rank n+1. There can be many
intermediaries which can be written in the form N(A)=Br1CrDr3... N(A) signifies a
network in which A is attributed with putting intermediaries into circulation (B,C and
D are the intermediaries, and r1, r2 and r3 are the relationships between the
intermediaries). To illustrate this process, the effect of information technology on
Beesley and Littlechild's 2x2 Matrix (see figure 7) shown in figure 10 shall be used
(see section 4.4.6). N(A) in figure 9 could be for example a publicly run monopoly that
is equivalent to quadrants A of the matrix in figure 10 and N(C) could be a competitive
structure equivalent to quadrants C in the matrix in figure 10. An intermediary
meanwhile could be the advance in information technology and new rules or
regulations that have facilitated the creation of a new market structure. This can be
signified by the transformation of an industry from Quadrant A to Quadrant C in figure
10. This principle is used in section 16.3.2 to create a guide to map the regulatory
process for the forthcoming case studies.
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Figure 10: Beesley and Littlechild's 2x2 Matrix shown in figure 7 with the added
perspective if Techno-Economic Networks illustrating the role of Information
Technology
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SINGLE Supply Prospects for Utility Products MULTIPLE
Figure 9 also shows that the translation processes can take two forms. The first
involves an interpretative operation in which an actor (e.g. the UK Government)
installs a new deregulated regime, facilitated by advances in information technology.
This system is then seen to be more efficient than the old monopolistic system and is
adopted (and refined) by a further actors (e.g. the French Government). The second
involves the two Actor-Networks (e.g. the UK and French electricity networks) who
merge due to for example European Union harmonisation and/or advances of
information technology. Of course there are also other intermediaries at play other than
information technology, such as culture, geography and demography, to name but a
few. These are in turn inscribed in texts such as Acts of Parliament, standards and
protocols. These intermediaries can be thought of as constituents, which can influence
the outcome and shape, of the Techno-Economic Network. In terms of Sociotechnical
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Constituencies one can therefore think of Techno-Economic Networks as the shifting
framework (interpretative flexibility) within which a particular aspect of reality is
socially constructed, but with the added complication of non-human actors. The
networks thus formed can differ both in their convergence and in their degree of
irreversibility. In highly convergent and irreversible networks the actors are perfectly
identifiable and their behaviour is known and predictable. Normalisation is another
important feature of Techno-Economic Networks. In a normalised Techno-Economic
Network, links are more predicable, fluctuations more limited, actors and
intermediaries more closely aligned. Thus the possibility of analytically describing
Techno-Economic Networks depend on their degree of irreversibility, of convergence
and normalisation. Techno-Economic Networks are not rigid and fixed forever; they can
break down and give rise to different Techno-Economic Networks. For analysts using
this theory, the analysis of concrete instances of technological change is conducted
through the analysis of the associated networks and their changing properties of
reversibility and normalisation.
It is clear that both the Techno-Economic Networks and Sociotechnical Constituencies
approaches have differences in their philosophical backgrounds and their applicability.
Sociotechnical Constituencies are more appropriate when considering technical change,
and Techno-Economic Networks are used when considering system and regulatory
change. It is these principles which along with Evolutionary Theory that are carried
forward in the analysis in Part III of the thesis.
5.3.4 Evolutionary Theory
Donald Campbell (1965: p.27) describes three basic characteristics to Evolutionary
Theory in the social sciences. The occurrence of variations, which may be
heterogeneous, haphazard, 'blind', 'chance', 'random', but in any event variable events.
This is the equivalent to the mutation process in biological evolution. Then there is the
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selection criteria such as selective elimination, selective propagation and selective
retention, of certain types of variations. This is analogous with the differential survival
of certain mutants in biological evolution. Importantly however, Campbell points out
that there is a crucial difference between the selectors in science and social science. In
science, the selectors are considered to be a natural phenomenon. In social science, they
can be natural, social or as assumed in this thesis, a complex mixture of natural and
social phenomena. Finally there has to be a mechanism for the preservation, duplication
or replication of the selective retention of certain types of variations. The rigid
duplication process of the chromosome/gene system is the equivalent in plants and
animals. Hull (1998: pp.408-409) summarises the evolutionary process by arguing that
a replicator is an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive
replications. An interactor is an entity that interacts with its environment in such a way
that this causes the replication to be differentiated. This in turn leads to selection, which
is the extinction and proliferation of interactors. Campbell also suggests that the
evolutionary perspective is rather undeveloped in the social sciences due to an early
contamination by reactionary political viewpoints. He considers that if one is willing to
consider that technology is a consequence of a mixture of natural and social
phenomena, many of the political pitfalls of Social Darwinism can be avoided. So he
dismisses the idea of the 'natural' as the only selection mechanism in the evolution of
social systems. Moreover, Campbell emphasises that the natural dimension and socio-
cultural melee in which knowledge is created are difficult to distinguish.
One of the most developed areas of study in evolutionary principles applied to
technology lies within the economic sphere (Saviotti & Metcalfe, 1991). The most
notable of these works is Nelson & Winter's An Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change (1982). Their proposals emphasise the inevitability of mistaken decisions in an
uncertain world, and the active observable role of the economic environment in
defining 'mistakes' and suppressing the mistakes it defines. Evolutionary economics
starts by combining the Schumpeterian heritage, stressing the fundamental role of
innovations in long-term economic development (Schumpeter, 1943), with the
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behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1992). Economic and technical changes
are therefore introduced and illuminated by satisficing, rather than optimising, firms.
Variation is the outcome of firms' search activities and selection occurs by means of
competition, though this is seen as taking place in a 'selectional environment', rather
than a simple neo-classical market. The balance between search activities and the
operation of the selection environment then shapes firms' behaviour.
The principles of evolution have also not escaped the attention of those attempting to
describe, explain and predict technological progress (Cziko, 1995: pp. 161-166). As
early as 1863 Samuel Butler explored the theory that machines develop in a way that
resembles living organisms. Unlike Butler's account of the evolution ofmachines, more
recent accounts have attempted to understand the innovative process in an evolutionary
light. In The Evolution of Technology, George Basalla argues that new inventions do
not emerge magically from the minds of inventors, rather they are modifications of
preceding artefacts or processes. He provides the example of Eli Whitney's cotton gin,
which was 'invented' in 1793 but was based on the Indian chcirka that had been used for
thousands of years to remove seeds from cotton. Basalla also points out that the
diversity of artefacts varies from one society to another. The source of the diversity can
be found in psychological, socio-economic and cultural factors. An example of this
diversity is that more than 1000 smokestack designs were patented in the United States
during the nineteenth century in the unsuccessful attempt to prevent the escape of
embers and sparks from wood burning locomotives. In this way variation, retention and
selection become the three essential elements of Basalla's view of technological
evolution. Like Basalla, Joel Mokyr's The Lever of Riches suggests an evolutionary
context for technological advances. In his accounts of historical case studies in Europe
and China, Mokyr emphasises the growth of human knowledge. He suggests that the
conceptualisation of the product or the process may be analogous to the genotype of a
species while the process or product itself is analogous to the phenotype. Thus:
"The phenotype of every organism is determined in part by its genotype, but
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environment plays a role as well. Similarly, the idea constrains the forms a technique
can take, but adaptability and adjustment to circumstances help determine the exact
shape." (Mokyr, 1990: p.275)
In What Engineers Know and How They Know It, Walter Vincenti breaks away from
the limits imposed by the rather strict biological analogy employed by Basalla and
Mokyr and makes a compelling case for a more general selectionist account of
technological development. A variation and selection analysis is used to account for the
growth of engineering in five detailed case histories of important innovations that
paved the way of the modem aeroplane. Vincenti emphasises the advantages of
vicarious trials over direct trials. Direct trials are not based on any systematic attempt to
leam from previous trial. Vicarious trials set up a rigorous selection process that
involves experiment, analysis and simulation. Analytical vicarious trials can be even
further removed from direct trials in that they use more abstract tools such as computer
simulation.
A Quasi-evolutionary methodology for the management of new technology has also
recently been developed by Schot (1992), Rip (1995), Rip et al. (1995), Rip & Kemp,
(1998), Deuten et al. (1997), Schot & Rip (1997) and Rip & Kemp, (1998) known as
Constructive Technology Assessment. The key to Constructive Technology Assessment
lies in the understanding of the nature of the regimes that are surrounding the
technology such as network irreversibility, social acceptability and environmental
sustainability. Rip suggests a number of factors that are important in the successful
introduction of a new technology. One of the factors includes strategic decision making
which considers amongst other things the longer-term possibilities for a new
technology in relation to existing infrastructure regimes. Deuten et al. meanwhile focus
on the embedding in society of new products and their relevance to markets, their
admissibility with regard to standards and their acceptance by the public. With
Constructive Technology Assessment, writers like Schot (1992) propose a methodology
by which socio-technical assessments can be made where the processes of variation,
selection and retention are seen as interdependent activities. Schot (1992) sees that
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there are many (often interacting) factors which influence the development of
alternative variations such as, the modification of the selection environment and the
creation of the technology itself. Thus evolutionary thought is departing from a
technical or social mechanism to an interactive socio-technical process. Moreover,
Schot (1992) sees the role of regulation as crucial as generating variations, selecting
variations and linking variation and selection. Schot & Rip (1997) then suggest that
regulatory policy is dominated by two dynamics, namely, the 'society side' or the
'technology side'. An example of 'society side' domination is given by clean air
legislation in California that has prompted development in electric vehicles. On the
'technology side', strategic niche management of renewable energy technologies, which
allows implicit financial subsidies, has encouraged and broadened the research on
renewable power generation technologies in the Netherlands. Schot & Rip (1997) go
on to suggest that there should be a third strategy (which is at the core of Constructive
Technology Assessment and is a combination of the other two) that attempts to create
and exploit linkages between supply and demand (or variation in production and
selection environment). In this they identify 'loci for intervention' and 'technology
niches' where technology can be developed in a socially and environmentally
acceptable fashion. Thus Rip & Kemp, (1998: p.365-386) suggest that rather than a
regulator imposing economic, technical or social solutions, any intervention should act
as a facilitator searching for alignments carried out in a co-evolutionary way.
In sections 15.3.3 and 16.3.3 evolutionary analysis is used to describe the development
of technology in an attempt to draw together the commonalties of the Sociotechnical
Constituency (chapter 15) and the Techno-Economic Network (chapter 16) approaches.
In saying this, there are some apparent limitations to evolutionary methodology.
Variation/selection activities cannot scan the whole environment, but are generally
guided by previous experience. Knowledge is therefore constrained (bounded) and
local (Simon, 1962). However this is arguably of only limited importance in
technological development since patterns and rigidities exist which constrain the
behaviour and routines so that decision rules can be identified. These involve
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technological trajectories and regimes (Nelson & Winter, 1977) and Rip & Kemp
(1998: pp.360-362), dominant designs (Abernethy & Utterback, 1975 and 1978),
technological guideposts (Sahal, 1981) and technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982).
Nonetheless as Green et al. (1999) and Rip & Kemp (1998) point out any analysis in
technology must capture the flexible and should not be rigid as in a Paradigm. Thus
meso-level approaches such as inter-sectoral studies should be informed by both
paradigms such as the Techno-Economic Paradigm and more closely focused with
work within Systems Theory such as Socio-technical Constituencies, Techno-Economic
Networks and Evolutionary Theory.
Table 3: A Comparison of Theories of Technological Change
Philosophical
Foundation
Primary
Focus
Dimensions
Considered
Treatment of
Knowledge
Time
Sociotechnical
Constituents
Sociology of
Scientific
Knowledge
Technological
Development
Within a
System
Social Process:
Human
Bounded to
the Social
Dimension
Static
Techno-
Economic
Networks
Semiotics Actors
Involved in
System
Change
Social Process:
Human and
Non-Human
Bounded in
Symbols/
Artefacts
Static
Evolutionary
Theory
Variation /
• Selection /
Retention
Change
Occurring
Within
Systems
Multi-
Disciplinary: •
Human and Non
Human
Bounded in
Social and
Natural
Phenomena
Dynamic
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5.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has reviewed some of the relevant literature on technology studies. It has
concluded that the literature is diverse and that there are many valid ways of
approaching the subject of technological innovation. It is also concluded that one
approach alone will not suffice in providing the business analyst a rounded picture of
the interrelation of technology and public utility regulation. This is due to their
different philosophical foundations or their focus of study (e.g. technological change
vs. system change or social vs. economic dimensions). Out of the literature five
approaches have been chosen for the basis of the analysis of the case studies presented
in chapters 14, 15 & 16. These are the versions of the Systems Theory presented by
Hughes and Saehney, Sociotechnical Constituencies, Techno-Economic Networks and
Evolutionary Theory. These approaches are all examined within the framework of the
Techno-Economic Paradigm presented in section 3.4. The merits of each of the
approaches studied, both for descriptive, explanatory and prescriptive methodologies,
are then presented in the final conclusions (chapter 17) of the thesis.
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PART II
THE CASE STUDIES
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CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDY No.l:
ELECTRICITY IN THE UK
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Before 1947, there were 560 electricity suppliers in the UK, of which around a third
were privately owned (Hannah, 1979). In 1947 the electricity companies were
nationalised and the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) was formed. It took
responsibility for the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity in
England and Wales. The CEA formed 14 Area Boards (two of which were Scottish)
who were responsible for the distribution of electricity in their own regions. In
Scotland, two vertically integrated, independent companies were formed: The South of
Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) and the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board
(NOSHEB) (Surrey, 1996: pp.3-13 and McGowan & Thomas, 1992: ch.12).
The Electricity Act of 1957, which separated the functions of generation and supply
from the co-ordination and control of the system as a whole revised this structure. The
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) was set up to handle generation and
transmission including most of the conventional and nuclear generating plant in
England and Wales. The Area Boards had responsibility for distributing electricity
through low and medium voltage as well as selling it to domestic, commercial and
industrial consumers in their geographical regions. The prices were presented mostly in
the form of published prices, derived from bulk supply tariffs that the CEGB charged
the Area Boards which were based on marginal-costing principles. The Boards also
operated electrical retailing businesses (Surrey, 1996: pp.3-13 and McGowan &
Thomas 1992: ch.12).
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In the late nineteen-seventies and early nineteen-eighties it became apparent that the
ministerial policy of marginal-cost pricing was not providing efficiency benefits and
was effectively giving an implicit subsidy to the coal industry. Furthermore, a 1981
Monopoly and Mergers Commission (MMC) report stated that, in addition to the cost
pricing and subsidy problems, the industry required large investments in infrastructure
and monitoring of the cost of such infrastructure (Henney, 1994). This heralded the
infrastructure changes that will be discussed further in this case study.
6.2 INFRASTRUCTURE
6.2.1 A BriefHistory
In February 1988 the Government published its plans for the restructuring and
privatisation of the electricity industry in the UK. The restructuring involved: the
splitting of generation from transmission; liberalising the generation market;
establishing a series of privately owned regional monopolies for distribution; and the
liberalisation of supply.
To this end, the CEGB was divided into three parts. The National Grid was separated
from the generation industry, and is now owned by the National Grid Company (NGC).
The 12 Regional Electricity Companies (equivalent to the old Area Boards) owned the
NGC in turn, each holding a stake according to their size. The fossil fuel power stations
were split between two companies: National Power, which was to take 70% of the
generating capacity, including nuclear-powered generation plants, and PowerGen,
which would take 30%. These two companies were to compete with each other and
with independent power providers. Competition was also introduced into generation
and supply with non-discriminatory access to national transmission and local
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distribution systems. A Pool was set up involving daily bidding and a half-hourly
market (Surrey, 1996). The Pool is essentially a 'spot market' on which suppliers
purchase electricity from the generators. The Pool has allowed competition in an
industry that requires extremely fine technical co-ordination between each stage of the
supply process.
In the light of considerable debate, the nuclear plants were considered to be unsaleable,
and were subsequently withdrawn from the privatisation process. In December 1989,
the Government announced a revised structure, with two new companies, Nuclear
Electric and Scottish Nuclear, created to own and operate English and Scottish Nuclear
power stations. Under this structure, National Power was left with about 50 % of total
generating capacity. On 31 March 1990, the new structure was introduced and in
December 1990 the 12 English and Welsh Regional Electricity Companies (RECs)
were privatised. This was followed by the sale of sixty per cent and forty per cent of the
shares in National Power and PowerGen being floated in March 1991 and March 1995
respectively. Further in April 1995 the Government announced its intention to privatise
the nuclear plants. In preparation for the sale, the nuclear sector was restructured and
Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear ceased to exist. A new holding company, British
Energy now owns the AGRs (advance gas-cooled reactors) and the PWR (pressured
water reactor) formerly owned by these companies and was duly privatised in 1996.
Meanwhile, the old magnox plants have been placed under the ownership ofMagnox-
Electric and retained in public ownership (McGowan & Thomas, 1992).
In order to secure the future of the nuclear plants, each Regional Electricity Company is
required to obtain a proportion of its power supplies from non-fossil fuel resources. A
fossil fuel levy (FFL) on electricity prices was subsequently introduced to compensate
those companies for the additional costs of such power. This levy is in effect a tax to
subsidise the nuclear sector and prevent it from making a loss (mainly due to spiralling
decommissioning costs). Following the flotation of British Energy the FFL levy has
been reduced and now stands at 2.2 pence in the pound to continue to help fund
100
alternative renewable energy sources that would otherwise not survive in the market.
Furthermore, Magnox Electric is likely to continue to receive subsides from the FFL
(.Electricity Association, 1997).
In Scotland, SSEB and NOSHEB were privatised as vertically integrated companies
ScottishPower and Scottish Hydro Electric. Each has a mix of generating capacity.
They own and operate the monopoly transmission and distribution functions in their
areas and have retail supply functions. Both of these companies have undergone
considerable expansion since privatisation. ScottishPower for instance, is now a multi-
utility and has purchased one of the England and Wales RECs (MANWEB) and
Southern Water, as well as having interests in gas (Caledonian Gas) and
telecommunications (Scottish Telecom).
Until March 1992, Northern Ireland Electricity both generated and distributed
electricity in the province. In 1992 its four power stations were sold: Kilroot and
Belfast West to Nigen, a joint venture between the Belgian Powerfin and AES Electric;
Ballylumford to a subsidiary of British Gas; and Coolkeragh to a management-buyout
team. Northern Ireland Electricity is now left with responsibility for distribution and
supply only (McGowan & Thomas, 1992).
6.2.2 Regulation
The Office of Electricity Regulation (Offer) is responsible for the regulation of the
electricity industry in the UK. Set up in 1990, it is headed by The Director General
(DGES) who is appointed on a four year basis by the Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry. Offer now has over 200 employees, ofwhom approximately half are based in
regional offices across the UK to deal with complaints, and the other half at the head
office in Birmingham. The office is financed by annual fees, which translate to a cost of
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around 40 pence per customer per annum (MacKerron & Boira-Segarra, 1996).
Offer's statutory duties are defined in Section 3 of the Electricity Act 1989. They are: to
ensure that licensees can finance licensed activities; to promote competition in
generation and supply; to protect the interests of customers with respect to pricing,
ensuring the quality of supply by the meeting of specified customer service standards;
and to maintain the reliability and continuity of supply. More simply, these duties can
be stated as protecting the consumer and promoting competition, whilst allowing the
regulated companies to earn a reasonable rate of return (Henney, 1994: ch8).
The discretion of the Director General is not, however, unfettered. A licensee can
refuse to accept a proposed change and appeal to the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission (MMC), and in some cases a licensee can force the Director General to
refer the matter to the MMC if a condition is to continue to apply. There is also a right
of appeal to the Parliamentary Ombudsman on grounds of maladministration for not
dealing with the issue in a proper manner (Henney, 1994: ch.8).
Amongst Offers' responsibilities is financial regulation. RPI-X price controls are use by
the regulator to control prices of monopolistic parts of the system (see section 4.4).
RPI-X is effectively a cap on the average price per kWh of electricity transmitted,
distributed or supplied. The X factors are set by the regulator and were initially set for
three, five and four years respectively for transmission distribution and supply,
although the regulator has the option to review the X factors sooner. The initial values
for the 'Xs' for privatised electricity companies were set by the Government in a
bargaining process with the directors of the companies. The outcome reflects the choice
that the Government made between the interests of customers and lower prices, the
taxpayers' interest in higher proceeds from the sale, and the interests of future
shareholders in growth earnings. Subsequently on review by the Director General the
Xs have invariably been tightened (Henney, 1994: ch.8).
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6.2.3 The Electricity Market
Generation of electricity supplied to the National Grid after privatisation has been
dominated by the three largest UK generating companies, which were originally split
off from the pre-privatisation monopoly: National Power; PowerGen; and British
Energy. Despite competition amongst generators being allowed, and the growing
number of small, independent generators, the market in the generation sector has been
slow to develop. Tables 4 and 5 show the energy mixes and market shares in the UK.
Table 4: Energy Mix Used for Electricity Generation in the UK (%)
Coal Nuclear Gas Oil Hydro Other
1989 64.5 23.6 0.7 9.4 0.5 1.2
1995 48.0 28.4 16.7 4.8 0.6 1.5
Source: Electricity Association (1997: p3)
Table 5: Market Shares for Electricity Generation in England & Wales
NP PG Nuclear
Electric
Magnox
Electric
First
Hydro
Independent
Generators
Net Capacity at
31 March 1996
(MW)
19,269 15,282 7,128 r 2,989 2,088 5,924
% Share of Total
UK Capacity
30 24 11 4 3 9
Source: ElectricityAssociation (1997: p6)
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PowerGen and National Power are by far the largest fossil-fuel generators and continue
to dominate the market, which contributes to the peak load (marginal plant). One of the
main concerns has been that National Power and PowerGen have had the ability to alter
Pool prices in the electricity generation market. Although competition in generation has
been increasing, in practice the two large fossil fuel generators have a considerable
amount ofmarket power. Effectively they have been setting the Pool price except when
the pumped storage plant (in Wales) is at the supply margin. Accordingly under the
threat of an MMC reference, an agreement was obtained that National Power and
PowerGen would divest 4GW and 2GW respectively of coal and oil-fired plant by
December 1995, which would double the level of independent competition. By April
1996, PowerGen had sold two of its generators to Eastern Electricity, and National
Power had agreed to lease three of its power stations to Eastern Group over a 10 year
period, at a cost of around 1.7 billion pounds (McGowan & Thomas, 1992).
Vignette I
One of the problems of electricity generators is that nearly all the major forms of
electricity generation potentially produce major environmental hazards. Fossil
fuel plants produce gaseous by-products such as SO, and CO,. Nuclear plants
potentially have a more obvious danger, as witnessed at Chernobyl in the
Ukraine. The problem in the UK has been side stepped in a rather ingenious way
but prompted by EU legislation that allowed gas to be used in power stations for
the first time. As a result there has been a dash to build new CCGT (combined
cycle gas turbine) generators in the UK supplied by its considerable indigenous
gas resources. The total capacity had risen to 6,900MW in 1995 from virtually
nothing in 1989. Since this, gas generation has replaced ageing coal stations,
which has enabled the UK to conveniently cut SO, and CO, emissions.
Nevertheless this reduction in coal capacity has had a less savoury knock-on effect
in society. In particular, it causes highly visible unemployment (e.g. in the coal
industry). This caused the Labour Government which was elected in May 1997 to
call a moratorium on the building of new gas-fired power stations and conduct a
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widespread review of energy policy, and in particular the Pool.
(Sources: Interviewees: Margaret Doak, DA/DSM; Mike Eggleton, UKDCS; and
MacKerron & Boira-Segarra, 1996)
With a few exceptions, all electricity in England and Wales is now traded through the
Pool. ScottishPower, Hydro-Electric and Electricite de France (EdF) also participate in
the Pool, buying and selling through interconnections with the National Grid. Each day,
generators bid their prices for the following day. The National Grid Company
assimilates the prices offered and decides upon the capacity required from each
generator in order to meet forecast demand plus a margin for reserve with the aim of
balancing electricity requirements across the country. The price of electricity changes
each half hour and is based on the highest offer price plus a 'capacity credit', which is
intended to encourage investment in new generating plant.
Vignette II
Due to the concentrated nature of the generation sector in the UK electricity
industry, the Pool Purchase Price may be unnaturally high and not reflect
marginal cost pricing. In order to smooth out the price fluctuations inherent in
this system, large generators and suppliers of electricity tend to prefer to set up
long-term contracts. These are known as contracts for differences, since the
supplier or buyers pays the difference between the Pool price and the contract
price. The principle of most of the financial contracts is a two-way option. The
price for supply is fixed at an agreed level. Should the half-hourly Pool price
differ from that agreed, then either the generator will make up the difference or
the supplier will refund the difference, depending upon whether the Pool price is
below or above the agreed price.
(Source: Interviewee: Mike Eggleton, UKDCS)
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Transmission in the UK (which accounts for around 5 per cent of final electricity costs:
see figure 6) involves the transfer of electricity from the generator to the grid supply
point (GSP) accessed by the local supplier, usually the Regional Electricity Company.
The 1989 Electricity Act requires a transmission licence holder to develop and maintain
an efficient, co-ordinated economical supply of electricity to facilitate competition in
the supply and generation of electricity. The National Grid Company (NGC) is the only
transmission licence holder in England and Wales and it operates the 275kV and
400kV transmission system. NGC is also required to offer terms for connection, and
use of the transmission interconnections between Scotland and France. Users ofNGC's
network pay NGC 'use-of-system' charges that are subject to a price control formula
(RPI-X). NGC is also required to produce a Seven Year Statement (SYS) which is
updated annually. The SYS sets out technical information concerning the capacity and
physical characteristics of the transmission system. At the time of privatisation in 1989
ownership of the NGC was shared between the distribution companies (the RECs). In
December 1995, the separation went further with the RECs' holdings of the National
Grid being floated on the Stock Exchange.
Table 6: The Percentage Contribution Each Function makes to the Final Electricity
Price before the Fossil Fuel Levy was reduced in 1995
Demand
(MW)
Generation Distribution Transmission Supply FFL
<0.1 52 26 5 7 10
0.1-1 59 22 ■5 4 10
>1 69 15 5 1 10
Source: Thomas (1996)
Scotland has two transmission systems, owned by ScottishPower and Scottish Hydro-
Electric. The two systems are connected to each other by a number of interconnectors.
ScottishPower's network is also connected to the National Grid in England and Wales,
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allowing it to generate or withdraw electricity as appropriate (Electricity Association,
1997).
Distribution is the term used to describe the transfer of electricity over lower voltage
circuits from the transmission system to customers. There are 12 Regional Electricity
Companies (RECs) in England and Wales who are the monopoly providers of a
distribution infrastructure in an authorised area. These systems comprise the 240V
networks for supplying domestic customers and the higher voltage networks up to and
including 132kV networks. Each REC has a Public Electricity Licence, which requires
the licensee to develop and maintain an efficient, co-ordinated and economical system
of electricity supply. The licence requires each Public Electricity Supplier (PES) to
publish a Distribution Code, which sets out the technical and operational requirements
for plant connected to the PES's own network, and describes how the system should be
operated and developed. Initial licences have a minimum duration of 35 years and the
Secretary of State is required to give 25 years' notice of termination (Electricity
Association, 1997).
Each REC distributes electricity for its own supply business and for second tier
suppliers whose customers are within its area. This system of Third Party Access
requires the REC to offer terms of connection to, and 'use-of-system' on a non¬
discriminatory basis. The charges for this 'use-of-system' are subject to a 'RPI-X' price
control formula. At privatisation the Government retained a golden share in these
companies, but this ran out. in 1994. Since then they have attracted a great deal of take¬
over activity, especially from companies from the USA (ElectricityAssociation, 1997).
Supply is the term used to describe a REC's role in providing sufficient electricity to
the end user. Supply consists of passing on appropriate charges for generation,
transmission and distribution costs, metering charges, setting tariffs and promoting the
safe and efficient use of electricity. The supply market has successively been
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liberalised. In 1989 customers with demand over 1MW were allowed to purchase their
electricity supply from a company other than their own REC. The franchise limit was
dropped to lOOkW in 1994 and was abolished completely in 1998. As a result of the
commercial and regulatory arrangements electricity supply is now, in principle, a
competitive business (Electricity Association 1997). Figure 11 summarises the
contractual arrangements in the liberalised UK electricity market.
Figure 11: A Diagrammatic Representation of the Contractual Arrangements of the
Deregulated Electricity Market in the UK
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6.3 METERING
6.3.1 Metering Policy Pre 1990
From the early days of electricity, the peak load problem has been present and the need
to provide an appropriate pricing policy recognised (see section 4.3.1). Initially
customers were not individually metered but were charged fixed rates or rates that
varied by the number of light bulbs, etc. The simple, electro-mechanical meter, the
familiar spinning-disk variety still in use around the world today, was invented in 1888
but did not become widely used until some time later (Hannah, 1979).
Vignette III
Metering technology remained much the same until the nineteen-seventies and
nineteen-eighties when there was a period of rising energy prices that reduced
electricity growth rates. In response, energy conservation, demand side
management and energy efficiency programmes grew in number. Demand for
more sophisticated meters, demand recorders, one-way and two-way
communication devices grew substantially as power companies actively started to
study and modify customer energy consumption. Meter manufacturers responded
by embarking on several approaches to the growing need for more accurate
meters with data collection and 'time-of-use' capabilities, and meters with remote
reading and diagnostic capabilities:
"The purpose was to optimise generation and the load profile."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Dick, Electricity Association)
It was not until the electricity industry in the UK had become nationalised and fully
integrated in the nineteen-fifties that any large-scale programme of load management
could play a part. Since, in general, electricity must be consumed as soon as it is
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produced there must be enough generation, transmission and distribution capacity to
meet the maximum instantaneous demand. In practice this maximum demand should
only occur once a year which means that for most of the time there is plant lying idle. A
measure of this efficiency of the system is called the load factor, which is given by the
formula:
Load Factor = Average kilowatts over the year
Maximum kilowatts during the year
Source: Turvey & Anderson (1977: p.347)
Vignette IV
To counter the load factor problem 'time-of-use' (TOU) was introduced. Also for
large consumers, in addition to the conventional standing charge and energy
charge, a maximum demand charge was levied to make customers aware of the
impact on the system. TOU tariffs were charged at marginal cost when the system
was under utilised. Examples of these were evening and weekend tariffs for pubs
and clubs and the Economy 7 tariff, which charged storage heaters at times of low
demand. The metering technology used for these tariffs varied but usually
entailed two meters, one for the standard rate tariff and one for the off peak tariff,
with the off-peak meter (and circuit) being controlled by an electro-mechanical
time-clock.
(Source: Interviewee: Ian Pope, Ian Pope Associates)
Amongst large industrial consumers of electricity where the possibility for load
management was greatest TOU pricing was supplemented by half-hourly demand
recorders, which were recorded on a roll of paper similar to ticker tape.
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"Away back in the sixties and seventies the collection of large amounts of data
was not really feasible. The cost of metering was quite high and time of day
metering and half hourly metering had to be manually fed in. So this was not used
except for the very largest customers and then it was used more to provide a
maximum demand charge rather than relating the price to the marginal cost of
the supply... The tools we used to do this were pretty clumsy."
(Source: Interviewee: Ian Pope, Ian Pope Associates)
The next advance came with the gradual introduction of teleswitches to replace
timeswitches on the meter. Teleswitches differ from timeswitches in that they are
switched remotely through some form of communications device. In the UK the radio
network was exclusively used. Teleswitches gave the electricity utility greater
flexibility in the way they could switch on and offload. For example the time clocks all
tended to switch on at the same time, teleswitches allow this to be staggered.
Teleswitches also allowed more flexible tariff regimes in that load could be switched
on and off outside the time clock settings.
Vignette V
In 1986 the Electricity Council4 were involved in trials in energy management
systems, particularly, radio teleswitching.
"The industry could speak with a single voice through the Electricity Council and
say to the manufacturers that the future was in electronic metering. This
encouraged the major manufacturers like GEC and Schlumfoerger to go into
commercial production of radio teleswitches so they became commercially
available. GEC and Schlumberger also had an agreement over three or four years
before the others could come in. That was the reward for being the developers."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Dick, Electricity Association)
"An example of metering technology taking the lead was the development of the
4 The electricity industry trade association, later to become the Electricity Association.
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two-element meter and teleswitch that ScottishPower and Scottish Hydro utilised.
This truly used teleswitching as dynamic switching. It provided a 24-hour
separately switched, separately metered system all in one meter box. The radio
teleswitch drove some of the innovative tariffs in the late nineteen eighties which
utilised the peak demand on their integrated supply network."
(Source: Interviewee: John Heathcock, Schlumberger)
Another fundamental approach was to develop a new generation of 'solid-state'
meters with no mechanical moving parts and additional capabilities such as data-
collection and retrieval. In particular, the Electricity Council encouraged
Schlumberger in a trial of low cost domestic electronic meters:
"There were trials of several hundred of these all over the country."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Dick, Electricity Association)
These electronic domestic meters have been available on the market since 1984,
and are very gradually replacing traditional electro-mechanical (Ferraris disc)
meters. A parallel revolution was also taking place to make it possible to read
meters faster, more accurately and remotely. Hand-held computers that record
and, in some cases actually read meters, advanced by the late eighties to the point
where some can now be ready by simply holding a sensor against a port on the
meter. This reads the contents and stores it on a portable computer for
subsequent billing and data analysis. This has now moved on to mobile systems on
the market now, that allow a van driving along to pick up readings from
especially equipped meters from homes on the street. The final step is where the
meter readings are down-loaded via a radio link to base stations covering a whole
town for billing. Trials are also being carried out using the telephone network and
mains-borne communication. These more ambitious developments however, have
so far been limited to relatively small-scale experiments.
By 1988, on the eve of deregulation, all manufacturers had stopped producing
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electro-mechanical meters. At this point "we (the UK) led the world" in electronic
forms of communication.
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Dick, Electricity Association)
However there were two snags:
"The tremendous work done in the eighties by Schlumberger to introduce the
electronic single phase meter was undone by a failure of the technology and the
pressures of privatisation to conserve cost."
(Source: Interviewee: Brian Bates, AMPY)
and
"The bulk standard electro-mechanical meter only cost £15...Unfortunately some
of these early electrical devices were costly (£200) designed down to a low cost
figure so that there were reliability problems."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Dick, Electricity Association)
As a result it was necessary for meter manufacturers to withdraw from service a
very large number of electronic single-phase meters in the late eighties and early
nineties.
"The measuring technology had gone pear shaped. There were widespread
failures or potential failures, which the utilities could not tolerate...In addition
from the utility's point of view they had to provide the means for the development
of competition in a deregulated market by a certain date and these failures were a.
hindrance."
(Source: Interviewee: Brian Bates, AMPY)
6.3.2 The 'Over 100kW' Market
Since 1994, consumers both over 1MW and lOOkW, have been able to negotiate
individually for their electricity supplies. This has meant that instead of prices being
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produced based on marginal cost principles, it has been left to the market itself to
define the price of electricity. The role played by metering in the success of this newly
created market is crucial. These new arrangements mean that a network of contractual
relationships have been set up requiring more metered data which is provided quicker
than has hitherto been necessary.
Second tier customers receive their electricity externally through the existing grid and
their local distribution system provided by their local RECs. The amount customers
consume is metered at half hour intervals. Metered data are collected, processed and
send to the supplier by United Kingdom Data Collection Services (UKDCS), acting as
an agent to the Settlement Administrator of the Electricity Pool. There are estimated to
be 55,000 sites in the United Kingdom with an electrical load in excess of lOOkW. Of
these 25,000 are now in the second tier. A further 10,000 sites are believed to be in
first-tier supply (i.e. purchasing electricity directly from their regional electricity
suppliers, but with second-tier metering equipment installed).
Bringing competition to the supply side of the electricity industry is made possible by,
and is wholly reliant on, advanced digital metering and communications, as well as
some extensive systems of data collection and analysis. To illustrate the scale of the
system, Eastern Electricity currently processes data from some 5500 second-tier sites
every day. This equates to 1.6 million half hourly readings each week. Meanwhile, the
. reliability of remote data collection is better than ninety-eight per cent.
Vignette VI
In this system certain codes of practice have been established. All consumers over
1MW and all consumers taking a second tier supply over lOOkW require half-
hourly metering. Every second tier site has to have a Code 3 or Code 5 approved
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meter with a bespoke communications link. These are installed commissioned and
tested by meter operators approved under the UK Electricity Pooling and
Settlements Agreement.
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Dick, Electricity Association)
"The codes of practice have been developed by the Electricity Pool to cover the
competitive market. The idea was that the Pooling and Settlement Agreement
would require certain accuracies in metering, depending on the certain classes of
customer. It contained schedules, which gave a summary of those accuracies but
we agreed that there would need to be some more detailed documents to spell out
the physical engineering requirements. So codes of practice 1, 2 and 3 were
developed from some earlier codes of practice from the bulk side of metering.
Codes 1 and 2 cover generator metering, distribution metering, transmission
metering and bulk supply metering. Code 3 is for very large customers, 1MW and
above. Code 5 metering is the lOOkW market and Code 6 is metering for the
domestic market."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Dick, Electricity Association)
The introduction of competition in the 'over lOOkW' market was not without its
problems:
"The regulator was given a lot of 'duff gen', and he thought the meter was a much
simpler device than it actually is. The system nearly collapsed. It needed some
people to come into Offer who were less purist in their liberalisation views. You
need discipline, and discipline in not a word that regulators like if they are
deregulating."
(Source: Interviewee: Mike Eggleton, UKDCS)
Nonetheless large electricity users in the UK are now enjoying reduced prices for
their electricity, but whether the system is more efficient is debatable.
"Clearly the 'over lOOkW' market has responded to pricing signals, and load
factor has been increasing because of this. So there is a clear demonstration that
the large customer does respond to price signals in its metering. However, I think
because we have moved from a system where costs were measured in the public
sector way including social provisions, to one in which cost is paramount, I am not
sure that you can measure all that accurately what the reduction of costs has been.
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I think that you can rest on the fact that you have a market which is much better
at disclosing costs than in previous systems and people are responding to those
costs, so it can be deduced that the system is a lot more efficient. Whether you can
sit down and do an audit of the system, to prove that it is more efficient is a
different story. I am not sure that you can."
(Source: Interviewee: Ian Pope, Ian Pope Associates)
Another issue when considering the benefits (or otherwise) are the effects of
contributory factors that have happened over the past twenty years in the UK.
The move away from an industrial base to a service based economy or the 'dash
for gas' in electricity generation and basic demographic changes may have played
their part.
"It is a combination of factors. There is an underlying way that society goes about
things. For example the amount of street lighting has increased. This makes better
use of the assets at night time when demand is low. So whether that can all be put
at the feet of metering and price signals I am not sure. Be cautious, there are a
number of factors going on here!"
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Dick, Electricity Association)
6.3.3 Profiling
From 1 September 1998 all twenty-five million electricity customers in the UK began
to be eligible to take competitive supply. When plans were being developed for the
competitive market in domestic electricity it seemed that the next logical step would be,
that any customer changing from their local Public Electricity Supplier to a new
supplier would require to install half-hourly metering and an associated communication
device (Offer, 1992). Offer decided however, "in order to encourage competition" in
the new market, that the 1998 trading arrangements would not require half-hourly
meters to be installed and the trading would be administered by the Initial Settlement
and Reconciliation Agreement. The reasons for this change in tack towards metering
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technology were twofold. First, the difficulties experienced in the lOOkW market
suggested that the practical experience of the installation of such devices might cause
such confusion that it endangered the purpose of the exercise which, it was to
introduce, namely competition. Second, and more important, the costs of installing
such meters are significant for smaller customers and this would be likely to restrict the
freedom of customers in choosing their own supplier. Flalf-hourly electronic meters
cost between £200 and £300 compared to £10 to £15 for an electro-mechanical meter,
while the average domestic electricity bill is around £300 per annum. This is a classic
'catch 22' situation. If half-hourly metering was to be installed, new products and
services could be developed to encourage competition. Yet if the installation of these is
too high, the customer is unable to bear the cost.
Instead it was agreed that the 1998 trading arrangements would make cost-effective use
of a small number of generic profiles to represent the demand for large populations of
similar customers. These populations are called 'profile classes'. Each customer who is
not equipped with half-hourly metering is allocated to one of eight 'profile classes' at
the beginning of the new market. As the market develops, the initial eight classes may
be modified and/or new classes developed. With the decision to use 'profile classes' one
of the opportunities to develop an integrated metering, communications, and
multimedia network has stalled, in the UK electricity industry. It is unlikely to be
economic for one customer to choose an electronic meter for their electricity supply
alone. Similarly it is unlikely to become economic for one customer to choose a mains-
borne signalling system and a neighbouring customer to choose a radio teleswitch
system.
Vignette VII
The change of role that metering has had on the deregulatory process caused
many ironic comments:
"If you go back in history to 1994, Offer were making all sorts of noises that
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metering and communications were going to solve all sorts of problems for 1998.
Offer went very cold on that in 1996 and on the run up to 1998 nothing has been
heard of at all. Companies are not going to invest in systems that are not going to
pay for themselves."
(Source: Interviewee: Nigel Orchard, Pilot Systems)
The decision to opt for profiling has undoubtedly been an inhibitor to the
development of metering technology and has caused a number of dramatic
comments:
"Profiling was the final kiss of death for electricity metering... It cost GEC their
company. For Schlumberger it cost them their growth and future in the UK."
(Source: Interviewee: Craig Howarth, ABB Kent)
"There are fears that suppliers can use such profiles to 'cherry pick'." This means
that suppliers will select only the more profitable customers to supply resulting in
a two tier system.
(Source: Interviewee: John Cooper, Offer)
Even Offer admits that:
"Profiles are definitely a compromise."
(Source: Interviewee: John Cooper, Offer)
Nevertheless there is a general optimism that the bottleneck which is being seen in
the domestic market is just a temporary phenomenon. Once the profiles are in
place suppliers may wish to build new profiles on the back of more sophisticated
metering to optimise their energy portfolio:
"Then you can have profiles for weekends, profiles for public holidays and
lifestyle profiles etc. Profiles should be seen as the a starting point."
(Source: Interviewee: John Cooper, Offer)
There is also the issue of how the Pool works as it requires data on a daily basis,
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and this may not be suitable for competition on the domestic market.
6.3.4 The Liberalisation ofMeter Operation
The role of meter operator was established by the regulator in 1992 as a separate
business for the 'over lOOkW' market. The meter operator is responsible for the
provision, installation and maintenance of the meter. Until then the host REC had a de
facto monopoly of the meter operation role. This was changed, and the meter operator
role was made competitive so that customers could appoint their own meter operators.
Since the abolishing of the franchise market in 1998, the meter operator has been
appointed by the Supplier. The liberalisation of meter operation is proposed to be
spread to all electricity customers from 1 April 2000 (Offer, 1997: pp.21 & 22).
Vignette VIII
In Offer's words:
"We are very keen to see competition in electricity metering. The Director
General in 1992 enabled any customer to own their own meter to facilitate
competition in meter operation for half hourly metering. So there are separated
regulated businesses in each REC offering metering services."
(Source: Interviewee: John Cooper, Offer)
In practice little competition has emerged. There are only four licensed meter operators
in addition to the RECs and only one of these meter operators Datum Solutions (a
National Grid Company who have 12,000 installations) have any market penetration. In
saying this some RECs have national facilities in addition to their activities in their own
distribution area. One of the reasons for the lack of competition was the problems
associated with installing half-hourly meters when the 'over lOOkW' market was
opened up to competition.
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Figure 12: A Diagrammatic Representation of the Contractual Relationships in the
Meter Operation and Data Collection Markets
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Vignette IX
"There was mayhem in 1994 when the lOOkW market opened, there was no doubt
about it that Offer did not understand the problem and they kept insisting on the
purity of competition in meter operation roles. Consequently some companies
were in that business who had no idea what they were about and it was a
disaster... Even Datum Solutions who only had experience in transmission
metering suddenly found that there was a lot more difficulties to customer
metering than they ever thought."
(Source: Interviewee: Mike Eggleton, UKDCS)
Even Offer have found it disappointing:
"They (the RECs) clearly have got a monopoly at the moment. What was
disappointing to me was that meter manufacturers have talked and are still
talking of offering a complete package for installing meters and reading meters.
Manufacturers are in a dilemma because they are tied in to their own make of
meters for installation purposes."
(Source: Interviewee: John Cooper, Offer)
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Representatives of the RECs are very keen to point out that there is a regulatory
vacuum here:
"A REC will not invest in new metering if they think that they are going to loose
their metering business in 2000."
(Source: Interviewee: Margaret Doak, DA/DSM)
This is a phenomenon of stranded assets and is key both to the development of
metering technology and the liberalisation of the meter operations market. A
solution could be that the meter operation function is split into its subfunctions of
meter ownership, meter installation and meter maintenance. So in effect the
meters would be owned by a financial leasing company and the operation and
maintenance conducted by sub function. For example, when the railway system
was privatised, the fixed infrastructure was vested in Railtrack and the rolling
stock was sold to Roscos (Rolling Stock Leasing Companies) who lease the assets
to train operating companies.5 Nonetheless, the final shape of the meter operation
business in electricity is still unclear but one thing that is certain is that the
stranded assets issue has caused a great uncertainty in the meter operations
market and has inhibited technological development:
"Prior to 1998 electricity companies seemed to be going along quite happily
installing meters. Then it dawned on them by 1998 they may not be owning the
meters in the future so they all went to the cheapest and most simple meter
available."
(Source: Interviewee: Craig Howarth, ABB Kent)
3 There are three Roscos: Angel Train Contracts Ltd owned by The Royal Bank of Scotland; Eversholt
Leasing owned by The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank; and Porterbrook Leasing Ltd. owned by
Stagecoach.
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Others believe that the insistence in developing a meter operation market is not
only in inhibiting technology but also inhibiting competition in the domestic
market:
"It could have been handled better by Offer. If they had defined the job of the
distribution business to provide a connection to the premises and half-hourly
information on the consumption of that premises. That function then becomes
part of the monopoly distribution business. The supply business is then in the
business of purchasing electricity, arranging contracts with the distribution
business, collecting the money from the customer and paying the distribution
business. Then you could create a market where every customer could have had
half hourly metering at really a very cheap price."
(Source: Interviewee: Ian Pope, Ian Pope Associates)
6.3.5 Data Collection
For purposes of settlement between suppliers in the 'over lOOkW' market, the Pool
Settlement System Administrator (SSA) requires the meter readings from second tier
customers' half-hourly meters. These readings are aggregated to determine the bills of
second tier suppliers. These are then deducted from the total amount of electricity
purchased from the Pool at each grid supply point in order to calculate the public
electricity supplier's bills. Consumers need suitable communications equipment
(usually a modem or Paknet installation) to be taken on a daily basis for Pool
settlement purposes. The franchise for data collection for the SSA is put out to
competitive tender on a periodic basis.
Vignette X
United Kingdom Data Collection Services has been awarded the franchise up
until 2000 for data collection for the 'over lOOkW' market. Over the past ten years
a UKDCS has grown from a handful of people to nearly a hundred. It collects
each night over 48 half-hourly readings from 60,000 sites, monitors contract
changes and deals with three settlement runs:
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"The settlement runs and the runs we (UKDCS) do to process this, used to take
hours in 1993 and 1994. But it is now taking minutes. That is because giga bites of
information can be processed in nano seconds and it used to be mega bites in
seconds. Technology makes data processing a lot faster. So if people want to
process 25 million customers' electronically every day, that is feasible."
(Source: Interviewee: Mike Eggleton, UKDCS)
UKDCS was formed to collect data for the 'over 1MW' business after the 1990
franchise break. At that time each REC appointed a data collector for its business
called a Settlement Administration Manager. The settlement administrator who
was at that time National Grid Company (later ESIS) appointed UKDCS as the
data collection agent as the result of a tendering system. The settlement system
has to create a balance at each grid supply point of what has been taken out and
what is going into the feeders. This software was called the secondary data
collection system. Only recently UKDCS launched a replacement for this called
the Star system. The Star system is more flexible and works with Microsoft
software and it gives advanced presentation of readings and formats. The 15-
meter operators, 14 PESs, 30 suppliers and Offer interface with the Star software.
It is difficult to see that with the experience that UKDCS has built up over the
past ten years and the investment which has gone in, that there will be a credible
alternative when their franchise comes up for tender in 2000:
"Barriers to entry are high in this business. This is a fifteen million pound
business, so there are six or seven million pounds worth of the assets, hardware,
software and skills."
(Source: Interviewee: Mike Eggleton, UKDCS)
Barriers to entry may be high for data collection in the 'over lOOkW' market but the
story is different in the 'under 100kW' market. It is due to be opened up to competition
on 1 April 2000 (Offer, 1997). There are already REC metering companies who are
offering their services nation-wide for the liberated gas market (see also section 8.3.5).
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Most are relying on low technology operations with human meter readers using hand¬
held terminals (see section 12.4.2). There are concerns expressed here that there has
been a lack of co-ordination in the liberalisation of data collection the electricity and
gas markets in the UK. The function of data collection from metres in the domestic
market was liberalised for gas in 1996. It is argued that this has given the RECs a head
start in developing competitive meter reading companies which read both electricity
and gas meters at the expense of British Gas. This, along with other issues concerning
the co-ordination of the electricity and gas industries in the UK, has led the latest
review of regulation of energy supply in the UK to suggest the amalgamation of Offer
and Ofgas (the gas regulator).
6.3.6 Prepayment Metering
Customers who pay for their electricity by means of prepayment meters (PPMs)
comprise a significant percentage of domestic electricity consumption in the UK. These
devices use magnetic card tokens, electronic keys, and more recently, smart cards.
Offer takes a view that consumer disconnections should effectively be ended, but that
RECs should be allowed to implement ways to ensure that bills are paid in full.
Therefore there has been a large growth in prepayment meters and now 1 in 8 domestic
customers use this type of meter. The number of annual disconnections has fallen
rapidly since March 1990 (when it ran at an annual rate of 80,000): in 1994 the annual
rate had dropped to the virtually negligible annual level of 1200. This is undoubtedly
an advance, though it does not of course ensure that 'disadvantaged' consumers are able
to afford electricity any more than before (Surrey, 1996).
Customers have to pre-pay at charging points for example retail shops or post offices.
Rates of repayment are controlled by electricity companies' customers who can if
necessary self-disconnect and reconnect themselves. Also, PPMs cost customers more,
so a surcharge is imposed in every region in the UK except Hydro-Electric in Scotland.
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Properly managed prepayment meters can be a good solution to repaying debt and
budgeting electricity consumption. It would also be wrong to equate PPMs with
'disadvantaged' or those experiencing fuel poverty. The majority of the three million
electricity PPM customers are not in debt, and have never been. Unlike gas PPMs, in
electricity these meters have been promoted as a preferred payment method for all
customers:
Vignette XI
"Approval ratings are high because users experience advantages in paying off
their debt while remaining on supply. And all PPM consumers have benefited
from the real reduction of more than 20 per cent in electricity unit price since
privatisation."
(Source: Interviewee: John Heathcock, Schlumberger)
Increasingly these prepayment meters are becoming electronic devices rather
than electro-mechanical devices. The electronic meters break down into the
Ferranti (now Siemens) card system and the Schlumberger key. Most of the
northern companies use the Siemens card and the Southern companies the key.
Smart card metering has been a recent introduction. It was initially a response to
detect theft but can also be used as a two-way communications device (see section
12.4.5). This means that smart cards have the potential to be incorporated in
other home automation systems. Other commentators meanwhile do not see a
great prospect of building on, from smart cards to fully electronic metering:
"I don't see an explosion of this. The card system was quite inflexible in that it
needed an accounting back-up to check that people were buying cards...These are
also very high cost devices and their reliability is less than average. Their
certification is about three to four years compared to ten to fifteen for normal
meters."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Dick, Electricity Association)
The latest chapter in the story of prepayment meters are proposals for a levy to help
125
customers who use them. In February 1998 it emerged that the industry is looking to
impose a £4 charge to cross subsidise the less well off. Perhaps the crux of the
argument comes in the belief by many that costs and management of services are the
business of companies, and income for customers on State support is the proper
responsibility of Government. Frustrated with the criticism about disconnection for
non-payment, the industry has a clear view. If people cannot afford services, they
argue, it is the job of the social security system to step in, not for the privatised utilities
to wheel out welfare (Garret, 1998).
6.4 SUMMARY
Prior to 1989 and the privatisation and deregulation of the electricity industry, metering
played a significantly different role than it does today. The vertically integrated and
monopolistic structure allowed integrated resource planning in which the development
of the sophisticated electronic meter was at its heart. The key aim of the industry was to
maximise the load factor by introducing marginally priced, 'time-of-use', tariffs using
meters which could be remotely switched using timeswitches or radio teleswitches.
With the unbundling of the generation, transmission, distribution and supply functions,
integrated resource planning became impractical. The introduction of this form of Third
Party Access has thus inhibited the development of this form ofmetering technology.
Instead of metering being used to facilitate the optimum running of the electricity
network through maximising load factor it has been used to facilitate the development
of competition (Offer, 1992). The belief is that the rigour of the competitive
environment is a more effective way of producing an efficient system. As a result,
mandatory half-hourly metering with a communications device has been introduced in
the large commercial and industrial market. This has allowed electricity to be traded on
an open market, and 'real-time' pricing has been introduced. The down-side is that these
devices are costly. So costly that in fact when competition was introduced into the
126
domestic market, electronic metering could not be introduced. A system of profiling
was chosen using old electro-mechanical technology rather than half-hourly metering.
Despite this the industry is still optimistic that once competition in the domestic market
gets bedded down, suppliers will wish to manipulate their generation portfolios in such
a way that innovative pricing using advanced metering technology will gradually be
introduced.
Profiling may have been a blow to the metering industry but the major bottleneck to the
development of universal two-way electronic metering are the plans to liberalise the
function of meter operation in 2000. Regional Electricity Companies are fearful that
they will lose their franchise to operate meters and will be left with stranded assets. One
solution is to hive off the ownership of the meters into a leasing company. However
financial leasing is not the core business of electricity companies, and the industry
appears rather flat-footed in response to this challenge.
To summarise, the response of innovation in metering technology to deregulation has
been spectacular. The emphasis has shifted from using meters for integrated planning
to facilitating competition. As a result, 'real-time' pricing is the norm in the industrial
market. Nonetheless there are challenges. The introduction of profiling in the domestic
and small non-domestic market, has halted the development of 'time-of-use' pricing in
that sector for the meantime. Also the liberalisation of meter operations has set the
electricity industry a challenge that it is finding difficult to cope with. In time however
the industry seems confident that these regulatory forces will define a new generation
of meter which will not only be a metrological device but also a customer interface
terminal that manages electricity load as well as other services.
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CHAPTER 7
CASE STUDY No.2:
ELECTRICITY IN FRANCE
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Picard et al. (1985) describes how from 1884 until nationalisation in 1946 electricity in
France had developed in a mixed municipal, private and delegated-out format. The
delegated-out format usually consisted of publicly owned municipalities who often
gave long-term franchises to private companies to develop electricity networks. By the
nineteen-thirties plans were being made to co-ordinate collectively the resources, by the
State. Most notable was La Federation des Collectives Concedantes that in 1933 was
formed to co-ordinate interdepartmental and inter-company activities. This created the
environment for the rural electrification and interconnection. Also a major part of this
infrastructure development was Programme 38, sometimes called Le Plan des 3
milliards, which was laid down by statute in June 1936. It created the Groupement de
I'Electricite to finance a programme to develop hydro-electric resources for electricity
generation, and the interconnection of transmission between isolated networks.
Eiectricite-Gaz de France (EGF) was set up in 1946 by amalgamating into one
nationalised company the municipal and private utilities. Nonetheless there were a few
exceptions. Article 23 of the 1946 Act stated that certain municipal undertakings that
already existed at the time of the Act, could be excluded from its scope. So for
example, at the time of nationalisation, Electricite de Strasbourg applied successfully
not to become part of EGF and it has remained independent ever since. Also private
companies such as Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux and Compagnie Generale des Eaux
operate some municipally owned electricity operations in certain locations (e.g.
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Grenoble and Monaco).6 The two years in which the electricity and gas administration
was combined were difficult ones, and in 1947 EGF was demerged and two separate
companies Electricite de France (EdF) and Gaz de France (GdF) were created. Despite
the creation of two companies, the distribution, personnel and secretariat functions have
remained combined to this day in an organisation known as EdF-GdF Services. This
has the advantages of combining the shared services of the two companies but some of
the old tensions are still evident, and Jacques Lacoste, a former president of EdF once
memorably remarked that:
"It is like an animal with two heads." (Picard et al. 1985: ch.9)
In May 1947 Roger Gaspard became Chairman and Chief executive of EdF and set
about developing the company into the organisation we know today. Gaspard's system
known as Le Systeme Gaspard consisted of close relations with politics. This meant the
development of the network through public funding and the development of the
principle of electricity as primarily a public service rather than a business device. In
ancient societies, explained Gaspard:
"The system did not cater for everyone in society, which was a situation which could
only be remedied by nationalisation." (Picard et al. 1985: p.42)
This case study will explore the development of Le Systeme Gaspard now known as Le
Model EdF (Wieviorka & Trinh, 1989), and the role that metering technology has
played in its evolution in the past twenty years.
6 See section 11.2.3 for more details about Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux and Compagnie Generate des Eaux.
7.2 INFRASTRUCTURE
7.2.1 Regulation
Vignette I
One of the major reasons for the creation of EdF was to co-ordinate and further
develop France's hydro-electric resources. Prior to the formation of EdF power
was being generated from water sources in the Alps, Pyrenees and The Massive
Central. The most important of these was Compagnie Nationale du Rhdne a
gigantic project, begun in 1921 to harness the economic potential of the Rhone
basin. Opponents of the hydro-electric power came from two sources. First, the
environmentalists who saw the development as: "ravaging our beautiful
mountains." Second, the liberal freemarketeers maintained that thermal
generation was cheaper and more flexible. However the argument which swayed
the case in favour of hydro-electric was the fact that resources of both coal and
gas within the national boundaries of France were scarce. This argument has been
a continuing theme of energy policy in France ever since.
(Sources: Interviewee: Paul Bongrain, EdF and Picard et al. 1985: p.64)
Atomic energy is after hydro-electricity the second grand industrial adventure
conducted by EdF. The first nuclear power plant was built at Chinon, in the Loire
Valley in 1957 and today eighty per cent of France's electricity demand is supplied by
this form of generation (Picard et al. 1985: p.207). The nuclear power programme has
been dominated by geopolitical rather than commercial logic. In 1948 France became,
along with the United States and The United Kingdom and later The Soviet Union and
China the first nations to openly have an arsenal of nuclear weapons at its disposal.
Also, France is relatively impoverished in indigenous sources of fossil fuels and by
1973 over fifty per cent of electricity produced by EdF came from sources of oil (39
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per cent) and Coal (16 per cent) much of which was imported. Events in the Middle
East, the world's major oil producer, during the course of that year, conspired to
produce a crisis in oil production and exposed France to its dependency on external
sources.
Figure 13: A Graph Showing the Changes of Fuel Mix in Electricity Generation in
France from 1973 to 1988
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Source: Picard et al. (1985: p.246)
As a response on 5th March 1974 the President of the Vth Republic Georges Pompidou
presented Le Plan Messer that intended to wrestle back the control of France's own
energy production. At the centre of this strategy was the development of nuclear
technology since it largely enabled the production of electricity without relying on
external sources (see figure 13). The result of this programme means that it is now self-
sufficient in electricity generation and is indeed a net exporter.
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988
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EdF is seen as an important ingredient to the success of France domestically as a public
resource, and internationally as a means of not being dependent on other nations for
energy. Nonetheless, it is argued, EdF is given enough independence from the French
State to be run on sound economic principles, which enable it to provide a security of
service, which is both safe and competitive. This Model EdF makes it in the ex
chairman of EdF Marcel Boiteux's opinion, the "most Japanese of French companies."
(Picard et al. 1985: p. 165)
Whilst substituting electricity for the direct use of fuels was clearly part of the French
nuclear strategy, becoming a major export supplier of electricity was not. Trade built
rapidly from 1983 as the output of French plants along the Swiss and German borders
was increasingly contracted to foreign utilities. The next major landmark was the
completion of the 2,000MW DC link to the UK in 1987. This project was co-financed
by the UK CEGB and EdF. The official policy was that trade between the countries
would largely balance, with France supplying surplus nuclear electricity when it was
available, and the UK supplying at peak times from its coal and oil-fired stations. In
reality the flow of electricity has been almost exclusively one way to date (from France
to the UK). There were also unsuccessful attempts by German industrial companies,
such as BASF, to import power using the transmission lines of their local utility. Whilst
these were successfully resisted by the German utilities, the current attempts by the
European Commission to introduce mandatory Third Party Access (see section 7.2.3)
may have been somewhat stimulated by this dispute (McGowan & Thomas, 1992).
By 1989, a number of issues arose which now seem to suggest that the risk-free future
that nuclear power promised was indeed an illusion. In particular the coincidence of the
uncovering of a generic fault in the steam generators of a number of the 1,300MW
units with one of the driest summers and autumns on record caused EdF problems. The
dry weather cut deeply into hydro output and meant that EdF had serious problems
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meeting demand for the autumn months and it had to resort to large-scale imports of
power. Also the persistent low oil price since 1986 and decommissioning as well as
other environmental costs has led questions to be raised about the efficiency of nuclear
generation. Another urgent priority for EdF is to invest in those areas of the system,
notably transmission and distribution, which were neglected to carry out the nuclear
programme. EdF is aware that, in transmission and distribution, the French electricity
supply system falls short of the standards set by other European utilities, and
transmission and distribution investment will exceed that of generation for some time
to come. The need to invest in international linkages is also becoming pressing,
although for rather different reasons. Tip to now EdF has been able to build its export
trade using existing links which were constructed to improve grid stability and to allow
seasonal flows of power to and from hydro-electric producing countries. These lines are
now nearing saturation and electricity pylons are not popular, especially in the scenic
Pyrenees and Alps, and proposals for new lines will be hard fought.
Perhaps fifteen years ago, McGowan & Thomas (1992) argue that it seemed likely that,
EdF could carry through its construction programme to time and cost, without running
into major opposition. EdF now knows that this is far from the case. In the medium
term, it has to deal with some of the nuclear programme's unexpected consequences,
notably a shortage of peaking capacity. In the longer term an important aspect will be
decommissioning. Nevertheless, the demise of the nuclear power programme in the rest
of Europe has left EdF unfazed. EdF is in no doubt that, all things being equal, nuclear
power remains by far the most economic choice.
7.2.2 EdF and The State
Ever since the Enlightenment and the Revolution of 1789 there has been a recognition
of the central running of the State for collective interests. Enshrined in this concept is
Le Model EdF combining monopoly, harmony and social consensus. The problem has
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been to reflect the ever changing social, economic and technological environment in
this structure. EdF was intended to optimise the resources, both social and technical to
a more egalitarian society. This founding model based on the principles called the X-
Ponts was seen as the convergence ofpolitical, social and the technical dimensions.
Despite this grand vision the reconstruction the French electricity network after the war
was almost entirely reliant on aid from the LISA. Indeed from 1948 to 1951 eighty to
eighty-five per cent of financial investment, in EdF was through The Marshall Plan
(Picard et al. 1985: p. 102). Even in 1952 when the Marshall aid ceased there was still
large investment, particularly in hydro-electric power in the fifties, and in nuclear in the
nineteen-seventies, both of which required State financing. With the withdrawal of
American aid, pricing structures also required to be changed, resulting in rates increases
which were required to finance the infrastructure development. This financing was, and
still is realised through a series of command style plans in which the budgets are made
by a joint industry and political collaborating body. It is claimed by the French
Treasury that, despite this arrangement, EdF is fully independent, with the Treasury
soliciting only "budgetary restraint" and "advice" (Picard et al. 1985: p. 107).
From the formation of EdF in 1946 up to about 1968 the dominating preoccupation of
the Finance Ministry was to keep the price of electricity as low as possible. As a
consequence, EdF had the greatest difficulty in balancing its accounts and in finding
sufficient revenue to finance an appreciable part of its investments. Consequently a
substantial part, about half, of the investments were financed by the State. The large
proportion of investment was financed by loans, in which the need to service a growing
volume of debt detracted evermore strongly from already small operating margins,
reducing still further the possibilities of self-financing, and obliged recourse to further
loans (Lucas, 1979).
In 1966 Simon Nora, the inspector of finances published a report on the poor
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performance of public companies. It proposed an independence for EdF in which it was
to maximise both profit and public service, in what was in essence a self-sustaining
organisation. This enabled EdF to be founded on sound economic objectives rather than
political needs. After the signing of this Contrat de Programme, the participation of the
State in the financing of the investments of EdF was reduced by the simple expedient
of permitting increases in tariffs. This period of increased cash flow led to the financial
stability of EdF improving rapidly (Lucas, 1979).
The financial recovery was checked by the first rise in fuel oil prices in 1974, which
was not compensated by permission to make a corresponding increase in tariffs. It was
not until 1 March 1976, following the permission to increase tariffs by a further fifteen
per cent, that it was possible to remove the principal anomalies remaining in the tariffs
as a result of the large change in fuel oil prices in 1974. Hardly had EdF managed to
obtain permission for this increase in tariffs, when they were struck by a natural
calamity. 1976 was the driest year since EdF was formed; the shortfall of hydro-electric
power had to be generated from expensive oil (and less expensive coal). Aggravating
these factors was the need to finance an ambitious capital-intensive nuclear programme
out of a modest cash flow. Nonetheless, since the end of the investment in the nuclear
programme in 1982, the French Government has stopped payment to the company
(Hooper, 1996).
7.2.3 Competition
As the rest of the world looks to the privatisation and deregulation of its electricity
markets, France has shown little interest in opening its market up to competition in
electricity production and supply. A Ministry of Industry report by M. Claude Mandil
in 1993, has strong views on the matter and calls for competition in Europe, favouring
the Single Buyer Procedure. The Single Buyer Procedure amounts to EdF maintaining
its monopoly to transmit, distribute and supply electricity in France, while it buys its
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generation on the open market. This contrasts with the Third Party Access approach
where the monopoly distributor must provide non-discriminatory access to third party
electricity suppliers. Since EdF generates enough electricity for the whole of France
and exports the remainder, the policy clearly would maintain EdF as the sole player in
the French market, and a major exporter of generation in Europe.
Vignette II
It is claimed that the Single Buyer Procedure:
"recognises the importance of competition, particularly in the production of
electricity, where it could constitute an important catalyst for competitiveness."
(Source: Interviewee: Paul Bongrain, EdF)
However, it also sees the need to limit competition both in order to preserve the
public interest and enable the implementation of long-term policy.
"a free-market approach endangers social considerations such as the obligation to
provide universal services, equal treatment to customers, and the right of the
authorities to intervene on the grounds of energy policy...This is the position of the
French Government, not EdF. The Government does not seek to persuade others
to follow this approach, but to leave them to choose the approach which is most
suitable for their country."
(Source: Interviewee: Paul Bongrain, EdF)
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, Directive 96/92/EC of the European
Parliament on 16 December 1996 came down in favour of both the Third Party Access
model (Article 17),7 and the Single Buyer Procedure (Article 18) form of regulation.
This effectively means that EdF will continue to reign supreme in France, and be a
major influence in Europe as a whole for some time to come.
7Third Party Access is the system operating in the UK, (see chapter 6).
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7.2.4 The Single Buyer Procedure in Practice
The problem that EdF has to overcome, is the response to public opinion. Its unwieldy
inflexible nature does not react well to sudden mood swings of the public. In the past
EdF have acted in principle for 'public welfare' but it does not have a mechanism in
which the customer can express choice. Increasingly customers are combining in
consumers groups to lobby decisions taken at the centre. In the most extreme critics
claim that the world of EdF is becoming increasingly "inhuman" and "Kafkaesque"
(Wieviorka & Trinh, 1989: p. 135). Another important interaction is with EdF's
suppliers. There are a number of companies who rely on EdF's custom for their
existence. For example some of the larger ones are Alsthom and Framatome. A strong
and reliable EdF is crucially important to these organisations who are significant
employers in France.
EdF has also begun actively to encourage foreign and multi-national companies to set
up production facilities in France with the lure of cheap electricity. A particularly
controversial deal was a joint venture between EdF and Pechiney, which also involved
the French Government, to build an aluminium smelter at Dunkirk. Whilst EdF and the
French Government have managed to convince the European Commission that the deal
does not run counter to Community law, it does involve a risk to EdF. There is clearly
the risk that the venture will not be profitable since demand, and hence prices, for
aluminium are highly cyclical.
In other markets, EdF's efforts have been less controversial. The policy of aggressively
pursuing the space heating market in new dwellings has been successful. About two-
thirds of new residences exclusively use off-peak electricity for space heating. This
success has been possible because of the comparatively low penetration of natural gas.
For existing dwellings, EdF has been less successful. In practice, with low oil prices,
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most householders find it more economic to use oil throughout the year. Nonetheless,
with the space heating demand it has won, EdF has been able to obtain a much greater
utilisation on its plants than would otherwise have been the case. It has also made
electricity demand highly temperature dependent.
EdF is also expanding into the newly deregulated telecommunications market in France
(see chapter 13). A law passed in July 1995 granted EdF the right to offer public
telephony services along with the national rail company (SNCF), the motorways and
the Parisian transport company (RATP). This makes EdF part of an exclusive group
which has a right to develop a national telecommunications infrastructure (Whitehead,
1997a).
7.2.5 Trade Unions
The role of trade unions are also seen as central to EdF and its development,
particularly the Federation de I'Eclairage (CGT). The influence of la CGT can be seen
in the pioneering personnel relations in the EdF system. There is equality of salaries
between men and women and a consultative process between management, unions and
the Government Ministry fixes these salaries. The workers' hand is strengthened further
by a massive social budget amounting to one per cent of EdF's expenditure, for sports
facilities canteens and cultural activities (Picard et al. 1985). The CGT still wields a
great influence today, particularly with the reliance of French economy on electricity
and as a default on EdF. Almost every commercial and non-commercial organisation in
France has a connection with EdF since they are the monopoly supplier. Any move
towards deregulation or privatisation would inevitably lead to the erosion of the CGT's
power, and would therefore be strongly resisted (Whitehead, 1998).
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7.2.6 Management
In 1946 many of the electricity managers were hostile to the nationalised model for
electricity, in particular the graduates of the large engineering schools. The power of
these players rested in their incumbency in the old private and municipal organisations,
as well as their engineering and economic skills. It was for this reason that early senior
executives in EdF had to have experience ofGovernment work. Pierre Simon, the first
President and Roger Gaspard, the first Director General, had both held ministerial posts
in the French Government prior to their posts at EdF (Wieviorka & Trinh, 1989).
Vignette III
"Now, however, culture in EdF has become so divorced from commercial reality
that it is often described as being as a State within a State (Tetat EdF') not
accountable to the people. In the founding model of EdF there was little scope for
customer opinion. The anti-nuclear debate is seen as an example of the
organisation not being accountable to public opinion. Particular criticism came
from environmentalists and left wing intellectuals. Neither did it suit liberal
economists who see the programme as not being the most cost effective process."
(Source: Interviewee: Jean Gasc, SLE)
Indeed EdF shows symptoms of bureaucratic regulation (see section 3.4). It is an
enterprise with a professional elite with the concentration in one large
organisation, where power is delegated from the State. To maintain its credibility
EdF has to be seen to passively respond to their customers' and the State's needs.
This is not an easy task:
"The staff at EdF should not be seen as structuring society in a type of 'electro-
facisme'. What is required is a co-operative network with the external
organisations without one actor becoming too dominant. The pressures that face
EdF today is responding to the changing social, economic, political and technical
environments. The State for example, is not the same today as it was when EdF
was created, so how should EdF work with this 'different State'."
(Source: Interviewee: Paul Bongrain, EdF)
7.2.7 The Future
It is suggested that the future model for EdF is through a process 'modernisation' and
'mobilisation', somewhat in the Paris or French School of regulation (see section 3.2).
Vignette IV
"Modernisation means the development of suppleness and flexibility in work
procedures. This involves debureaucratisation, the introduction of modern
technology such as information technology and the changing ofworking practices.
To implement this modernisation there requires to be a mobilisation of all the
actors both externally and internally. The challenge is to co-ordinate these forces
in a co-operative collective way. The practicalities of this mobilisation involve a
collective culture for the common good through 'management strategique integre'
(integrated strategic management)."
(Source: Interviewee: Paul Bongrain, EdF)
An eighteen-page statement published by EdF on 19th April 1988, signed by the
Director General summed up this newly integrated management strategy. "It is
necessary to respond to the changing demands combining the harmonisation of
decentralisation and the coherence of anticipation and reactivity." Quality is also placed
highly on the agenda. "The mark of quality is part of the conviction that the high
standards are essential not only in working practices, but also on the interaction of
external actors."
7.3 METERING
7.3.1 Strategy
Metering technology is a key player in EdF's future development. Initially introduced
to permit new and more complex pricing in industrial metering applications, electronics
140
are now being extended to all electricity metering. The switch from the electro¬
mechanical induction mechanisms, to electronics is now a relatively inexpensive
industrial commonplace for the manufacturers. This change enables new customer
interfaces to be developed, for easier and more efficient domestic electrical energy
management. The research centres at EdF are preparing the next generations of
metering systems, which will support new customer services. These are chiefly in order
to facilitate closer relations with the utility and the most efficient use of electrical
energy possible. These new services cannot be designed without systematic use of
telecommunications resources both outside and inside the home (see section 12.4.1).
To improve their services on offer to the domestic customer, EdF and GdF have
launched the ICC project (Communicating Customer Interface). Among these new
services are automated management of supply contracts and automatic meter reading.
Also for distribution, it is hoped that the ICC will provide improvements in: more
efficient demand side management; greater internal productivity; and better public
image. EdF and GdF are revolutionising the interface concept with the customer by
adding communication facilities between the distributor and the customer. The ICC
project means to develop a complete communication system utilising power line carrier
technology on low voltage link, the public telephone network and radio. In order to
manage the new services and the architecture of the ICC system, EdF and GdF have
organised the project into three stages. First there are preliminary studies to evaluate the
relevancy of developing a new service. Second there is in-situ implementation of
thousands of experimental ICCs. Finally there is the definition of the definitive list of
services and of the 'target' architecture (Electricite de France, 1994).
7.3.2 Pricing
In the fifties EdF started to determine the hydro-electric and thermal generation needs
using pioneering mathematical modelling techniques such as linear programming, to
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optimise the generation and dispatch of electricity. Coupled with this, generation
planning was development using a marginal cost pricing structure pioneered by
economists at EdF. This was called the le Note Bleu and was based on welfare
economics. It uses the principle of cost reflective pricing where each consumer group is
charged different prices to reflect the actual cost of supply, rather than everyone being
charged a flat rate. This in effect made an attempt to mimic the laws of supply and
demand in the nationalised monopoly, while maximising consumer and producer
surplus.
Vignette V
The necessity for EdF to finance itself brought to prominence a young economist
Marcel Boiteux who pioneered marginal cost pricing. Indeed, work done by
Boiteux amongst others at EdF during the nineteen-fifties laid the foundation for
public utility pricing in particular and monopoly pricing in general for the next
forty years. Boiteux sums up the rub of public utility finance as follows:
"One might imagine that the sole difference between the management of a private
and public enterprise is that the benefits of the private enterprise go to the
capitalist, while in the public enterprise it goes to the State. However it is
important to know who is pocketing the money when it is a private individual but
when it is the State it does not seem to matter."
(Sources: Interviewee: Paul Bongrain, EdF and Picard et al. 1985: p.91)
Marginal cost pricing was introduced to EdF in the nineteen-fifties. Le TarifBleu is for
customers in the 3-36kW band, Le TarifJaune for customers in the 36-250kW category
and Le Tarif Vert for customer whose demand is over 250kW. Most consumers are
charged on the universal tariff, either with ('double tariff) or without ('simple tariff) a
time-of-day rate. Since 1981, the company has significantly broadened its tariff range
available to customers and has conducted in-depth modification to its tariff structures
(.Electricite de France, 1993). Due to uncertainties affecting the electrical system, the
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cost of electricity generation not only depends on the time of day that the electricity is
supplied but also on such things as the demand level, and equipment availability. To
account for this some 'real-time' pricing options have been introduced. For example,
there is the EJP option that in effect modulates the price in accordance with 'real-time'
system demands. Also as a result of the development of electric heating, power
requirements are closely linked to the seasonal cold weather peaks. These peaks in
demand are therefore concentrated over a small number of winter days not known in
advance. Thus, in the residential sector, the EJP option has been further developed,
based on the splitting up of the year in 'real-time'. In this option named tempo, a year is
divided into three types of days: 300 'blue' days (the cheapest), 43 'white' days (medium
price) and 22 'red' days (the most expensive). Each day is divided into two periods
(nights cheaper than days). The colour of each day is defined only the day before.
Customers are encouraged to be equipped with an energy controller in order to program
appliance-usage according to the tariff periods and their comfort needs. This
sophisticated energy controller enables customers to program with a great accuracy and
flexibility their energy consumption according to the prices and the chosen level of
inside temperature. The energy management system consists of electronic meter,
timeswitch signal box, communications device, tempo controller and a Minitel,8 It
offers the following services: heating control, time control, tariff control, maximum
demand control, remote control of heating by phone, manual override, display of
electricity expenses in French Francs and remote reading. Remote measures and
surveys in each dwelling allow a very complete feed-back to be obtained. Before
adopting this option, EdF conducted an experiment on a sample of 800 customers and
found that customers had been on the whole satisfied with this new tariff and had
reduced their level of consumption when the price was high. EdF launched the tempo
tariff option in September 1993 and had the goal to have 300,000 consumers with this
option at the end of the year 1996 (Electricite de France, 1993; Electricite de France,
1995a and Electricite de France, 1995b).
8 See section 13.3.4 for further details about Minitel.
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Up to now at EdF, a specific electronic meter is developed every time it wants to
launch a new tariff such as the EJP. Therefore it takes between two and three years to
develop a new electronic meter, mainly because of the great number of environmental
tests the meter has to pass before its acceptance. The main goal of the Universal Tariff
Processing Concept (UTPC) project is to reduce to a great extent, the time needed to
obtain an electronic meter. This research project was launched in 1994 in co-operation
with the French company SAGEM and results today in a prototype. The other main
goals of this project are to cover many industrial metering needs. This includes
functions such as the monitoring of the quality of the power supply or multi-users'
metering. It is also considered essential that programming of the meters can be changed
remotely, that devices are reusable, that electronic meters based on UTPC principles
have at least the same reliability as the current meters, and the cost is about the same as
meters installed at present (Electricite de France, 1994a).
The introduction of marginal cost pricing was not initially overwhelmingly welcomed
when it was first introduced in the nineteen-fifties. Cost reflective pricing meant the
customers in remote geographic regions would require to pay more for their electricity
and subsidies had to be introduced in some areas such as Brittany, to reflect this. In
addition, members of the French Communist Party denounced these tariffs as "contrary
to the interests of the working class" as they privileged some individuals over others.
The introduction of the Le Tarif Vert also preceded the Treaty of Rome and the
Common Market in 1957. It therefore reflected the optimisation of French electricity
for French industrial needs rather than a European network for European Industrial
needs, a fact that is only beginning to be addressed today.
Nevertheless, EdF, most especially since the appointment of Marcel Boiteux to the
position of Director General, has practised a policy of relating tariffs to marginal costs.
EdF maintains that a properly constructed tariff should not only aim at ensuring the
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commercial, economic and financial health of the enterprise but, in the case of a public
enterprise, should also aim at directing activity towards an economic optimum for the
community. There is a large body of economic writing which suggests that in some
sense prices set at long-run marginal costs will have the desired effect and will neither
encourage waste nor discourage economic application of electricity. Naturally this
requirement also excludes the possibility of cross subsidy between sectors or classes of
consumers.
The requirement to translate the marginal costs for a specific consumer into tariffs is a
complex function ofmany variables and inevitably leads to compromise. Generally the
function is reduced to a formula whereby the customer pays partly according to its
maximum demand (in kW) and partly according to the number of units taken (in kWh).
The greatest controversy is centred around the tariffs designed to encourage electric
space heating in the home and in commerce, the so-called tariffs 'tout electrique'. This
was a response in the eighties to the excess in generation capacity caused by the
commitment to the nuclear programme. The tariffs require a larger payment for units
and a smaller payment for capacity than EdF incurs in buying and operating a nuclear
station. If a consumer installs electric heating and EdF meets that increment in load by
installing a new slice of nuclear plant, then it appears at first sight as if the costs
incurred by EdF bear no relation to those recovered from the consumer by the tariff.
Thus the tariff is a long way from reflecting true costs.
In order to reduce the rate of growth of electric heating, I'Agence pour les Economies
de Energie proposed that an advanced payment should be made by the constructor to
EdF for any building that depends on electricity for one-half or more of its heating
power. The measure was resisted by EdF as a serious impediment to their domestic
marketing, but was supported by the other fuel industries, and especially gas.
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7.3.3 Customer Service
One of the policies of EdF is to be engaged on the improvement of the quality of
supply. That is why the EMERAUDE contract was created in 1992, in association with
the representatives of French industry. This contract details quality of supply criteria,
and in particular the number of failures (short or long) and the limits of the slow
fluctuations of voltage that are acceptable. In case of failure on these criteria, EdF pays
for the damage due to the voltage faults. EdF needs a metering device that will be able
to measure the quality of the supply according to the criteria given by the EMERA UDE
contract. Moreover, this device has to be user-friendly enough for the customer, and
also has to be read and programmed by remote devices. Therefore EdF is developing a
new meter that could measure both consumption and quality of supply (Electricite de
France, 1995c).
7.3.4 Research and Development
The research and development division of EdF, based at Clamart in the suburbs of
Paris, performs theoretical and experimental studies in all areas related to the
Company's activities. This includes the design of the future facilities of the generation
and transmission system to improve performance and reliability, and reduce the impact
of existing facilities on the environment.
In parallel with the development of a new generation of electronic meters based on a
new architecture, the research and development division of EdF is developing an open-
ended modular testing bench for electronic meters. This allows rapid incorporation of
changes and modifications for testing new appliances, with integration of specific
functions as necessary. The support bench is thus a test platform for metering
equipment, designed on a modular basis in order to act as a support for specific
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applications. The bench has a set of standard functions adaptable to the testing of
different types of meters. The first generation domestic electronic meters have brought
reassuring test results. In a period of three and a half years, when about a hundred
thousand meters have been installed, the real failure rate is less than 0.3 per cent.
Furthermore, a significant number of these failures came from mechanical and not
electronic pieces of equipment (Electricite de France, 1995d).
Vignette VI
"Utilities in the Continent are much more protective of their manufacturing base.
Utilities in those countries will not import new technology and will only embrace it
when manufacturers in their country are capable of producing it... The French
electricity market is still being driven by technology. Still investing in very
sophisticated and complex metering so as to manage the load profile."
(Source: Interviewee: Brian Bates, AMPY)
In effect, metering technology is being developed to make the present system of
vertically integrated electricity supply run more efficiently.
7.3.5 Standards and Protocols
There are two main trends in the field of electronic metering in the nineteen-nineties.
Firstly, devices are becoming very sophisticated allowing more and more parameters to
be measured, computed and stored. Secondly, transmission media are now used in
metering (e.g. the Public Switched Telephone Network, the Integrated Service Digital
Network, the power line carrier systems, a wide variety of field buses, the X25
network, etc.). Thus, the challenge is now to ensure that a complete interconnection is
possible between all equipment resources, based on a coherent and global architecture.
The traditional protocols are clearly limited because they can transport only bits of data
without considering the problems raised by the complexity of telecommunications
structures. For this reason, EdF's research and development division, in association
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with a manufacturer, has initiated a project aimed at specifying a general model of an
application layer description that is less complex than the standardised MMS
(Manufacturing Message Specification) model. The result is a simple model called
DLMS (Distribution Line Message Specification), which is sufficiently extensive for
remote reading and network automation. DLMS is now considered a standard from the
IEC's (International Electrotechnical Commission) point of view. The main interest of
DLMS is to ensure complete independence between the world of applications,9 the
protocols and media that may be used. DLMS offers a high-level interface based on the
notion of service, which covers all needs for remote meter reading and remote control.
For example, standardised services offer very easy ways to read and write variables, to
start and stop processes, to down-load new applications or to manage access rights on
objects. To illustrate these capabilities, EdF has developed two architectures in
accordance with DLMS: the PLAN (Power Line Automation Network) architecture,
based on a power line carrier system and the TRIM+ protocol on the traditional phone
network. Both are now under discussion in IEC meetings aimed at standardisation. EdF
is now designing complex architectures that integrate both PLAN and TRIM+
(Electricite de France, 1996).
7.4 SUMMARY
The route that France is taking with respect to the regulation of electricity is by means
of a vertically integrated nationalised network. Through its promotion of the Single.
Buyer Procedure it wishes to retain EdF as a national champion but also a strong player
on the European and international electricity markets. EdF is well aware that it has to
adapt to the changing economic, social and technical environment. It sees this can be
achieved through a process of 'modernisation' and 'mobilisation'. A key role in this
process is given to technology. Nuclear technology enabled France to become self-
9 All metering applications both fluid or electrical.
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sufficient and even an exporter of electrical power during the nineteen-eighties. This
strategy has been complemented by the development of sophisticated metering that has
allowed the introduction of cost reflective pricing mechanisms. In this way metering
technology is being used to make the system more efficient by increasing the load
factor. This in turn is being used to justify the integrity of the vertically integrated
monopolistic framework. It also places EdF in a strong position in developing standard
protocols for metering technology such as DLMS. EdF is the largest electricity utility
in the world with a strong research and development division. This gives it a powerful
presence in European and on international technical committees. Indeed EdF's
international expansion plans have been compared with Napoleon Bonaparte's
ambitions for the First Empire (Whitehead, 1998). On the downside, it is suggested
EdF operates remotely from the disciplines of the market and has been seen by some as
a 'State working within a State' which is detached from its customers.
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CHAPTER 8
CASE STUDY No.3:
GAS IN THE UK
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In 1792 William Murdoch, an inventor and entrepreneur, ignited the gas revolution in
the United Kingdom by using gas lights at his home in Redruth, Cornwall (Peebles,
1992: p.8). By 1812 the UK had the World's first commercial gas works, and in 1830
the number of gas undertakings in the UK had grown to some 200. The Gas Act of
1948 then amalgamated and nationalised all the private and municipal gas companies
(now numbering 1,046) operating in the UK. This resulted in the creation of 12
Regional Gas Boards and the formation of the Gas Council. At this time, production
largely involved the high cost process ofmanufacturing from coal. It was not until after
the award of licences for exploration, under the Continental Shelf Act 1964, when
substantial reserves of gas were discovered in the UK portion of the North Sea, that the
gas industry in the UK received a second wind. Since this time natural gas has been
steadily introduced for heating, cooking, industrial process and more recently, power
generation purposes. Changing the existing method of operations required the
conversion of gas appliances throughout the UK, enabling them to bum natural gas. It
also necessitated the construction of additional gas terminals on the East coast, and a
high pressure transmission system for transporting supplies to the Regional Boards.
The rapid development in the exploration and production of gas had a similar impact
on the structural elements of the transmission and supply of gas, requiring amendments
to the organisational structure of the gas industry. Under statutory guidelines in the Gas
Act of 1972 the Gas Council was renamed the British Gas Corporation and assumed
control of the 12 Area Boards. The British Gas Corporation continued to enjoy
monopoly rights over the sale of gas and was extended monopsony powers with respect
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to any gas reserves from the UK's sector of the North Sea (Cameron, 1995).
The introduction of natural gas has substantially increased the demand for gas. The
demand for gas more than doubled between the years of initial conversion operations in
1967, and the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979. In fact the oil price increases of 1973
were a contributory factor in raising the demand for gas in the commercial, industrial
and domestic markets. In the interim, further gas deposits were discovered in the North
Sea, Irish Sea, and more recently West of Shetland, and input terminals were added to
the transmission network at Easington, Barrow-in-Furness and St. Fergus (Peebles,
1980). This development of the natural gas industry in the UK must be considered a
magnificent achievement and was delivered through a vertically integrated market.
This case study will consider developments in the gas industry in Great Britain (not
Northern Ireland) since 1979. The town gas industry in Northern Ireland collapsed in
1984 and the fledgling natural gas industry has yet to take off in the Province following
the construction of an interconnector from Scotland in 1996 (Ofgas, 1997).
8.2 INFRASTRUCTURE
8.2.1 Privatisation
In May 1985 the Government announced its intention to privatise the British Gas
Corporation (BGC). Under provisions made in The Gas Act (1986), the businesses of
the BGC were vested in British Gas pic (BG) (Bamett, 1996). British gas was then
offered for public sale in December 1986. In terms of structural reform, no provisions
were made in the legislation for industry restructuring, and BG was sold as a vertically
integrated concern. 12 quasi-autonomous regions operated the supply arm of the
business, though the purchase, transmission and storage activities were co-ordinated
centrally. Although no restructuring took place, the Gas Act 1986 did legislate for the
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introduction of competition, though in practice it added little to the Oil and Gas
Enterprise Act (1982). Previously, the Act had allowed for access to the gas
transmission network by introducing common carriage for potential gas competitors
and the requirement that any gas be offered for sale to BG, ceased. The Act also
legislated for the disposal of BG's offshore assets, which were vested in the new
company, Enterprise Oil (Cameron, 1995).
British Gas pic (BG) was privatised with a monopoly licence to supply gas to all
customers below 25,000 therms in Britain. It also retained control over the mains
network of gas transportation and storage facilities. The company was required to offer
customers a fixed tariff and not to show any undue preference in the setting of the
tariff. The argument put forward for retaining a vertically integrated monopoly was that
British Gas needed the scale and the size in order to engage with international
competitors. As supplies of natural gas became scarce, companies would have to
compete for the remaining gas fields. Competition for such fields would be on an
international basis and therefore BG would need to be as large as the State-owned
monopolies of other countries in order to compete effectively (O'Neill, 1996).
The privatisation of British Gas in 1986 led to the establishment of a complex
regulatory framework based largely upon a licensing system. The Government
supervisory body is the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). In addition, a
regulator for the gas industry was established, (the Director General of Gas Supply,
DGGS) who heads the industry watchdog Ofgas (Office of Gas Supply). The
Monopolies and Merger Commission (MMC) support Ofgas in this role. The MMC's
responsibility is clearly prescribed by statute. It is required to make recommendations
on licence modifications where the Director General and licensee fail to reach
agreement (Cameron, 1995 and O'Neill, 1996).
Ofgas' function covers economic and to a lesser extent social matters. It currently
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monitors the activities of the public suppliers of gas and, where necessary, to enforce
compliance with important requirements of the Gas Act affecting such suppliers. Other
functions include keeping under review the carrying on, both within and also outside
Great Britain, of activities connected with the supply of gas through pipes, and
collecting information with respect to such supply. Ofgas is also responsible for a much
wider range of activities, reflecting the new licensing regimes including; the issuing of
licences and monitoring of levels of service which BG and other gas companies
provide to their customers (Cameron, 1995 and O'Neill, 1996).
The Government, through the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, retains only a
few functions in day-to-day regulation of gas supply, chiefly the granting of
authorisations to supply, testing meters, and checking gas quality and overseeing
competition law. The Department of Employment is concerned with making, and the
Health and Safety executive with enforcing, safety regulation. At present, BG has a
statutory obligation under the Gas Acts to provide a 24-hour emergency response
service to handle gas leaks at premises which it supplies with gas, in order to deal with
threats to public safety (Cameron, 1995 and O'Neill, 1996).
The Gas Consumers Council (GCC), is an independent body whose function is the
investigation of complaints from both tariff and contract customers. In the event that
they are not resolved, either at regional or national level, they can be referred to the
Office of Fair Trading (OFT), if they relate to contract matters, or to Ofgas, if they
relate to tariffmatters (Cameron, 1995 and O'Neill, 1996).
Since privatisation in 1986, BG has been subject to a number of Monopolies and
Mergers Commission (MMC) reports and an investigative review by the Office of Fair
Trading. The first of the MMC references in 1988 concerned lack of transparency in
BG's pricing structures. The result of this was a requirement for BG to publish price
and tariff schedules to ensure that BG did not engage in discriminatory pricing. Despite
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the MMC recommendations in 1988 competition was relatively slow to develop. Only
the larger oil companies emerged as potential competitors in the gas contract market.
An Office of Fair trading report in October 1991 made several further
recommendations including an undertaking of BG to relinquish sixty per cent of the gas
contracts market and separate its transportation and storage operations from all other
BG activities. The need for BG to restructure its business was then reaffirmed in
December 1993 in a MMC review, requested by BG. It felt that regulatory
developments since privatisation were creating uncertainty and was impeding the
ability of BG to carry out its business effectively. The Gas Act (1995) followed shortly
after these reviews. In order for the licences to comply with the new licensing
framework set out in the Gas Act (1995), any transportation activities must be distinctly
separate from those of supply. BG proposed a 'transfer scheme' in accordance with the
requirements of the Act. The 'transfer scheme' involved the creation of a subsidiary
company, called Centrica, to which the bulk of supply and trading assets and liabilities
were transferred. The 'transfer scheme' took effect in March 1996. Under the demerger
proposals, Centrica assumed control of all of BG's trading property and businesses and
also the Morecambe Bay gas fields. Also vested in the subsidiary company is BG's
interest in Accord Energy Ltd, an energy trading company. The transportation and
storage businesses are now the responsibility of TransCo International. In addition,
TransCo International has more wide-ranging subsidiaries including exploration and
production, global activities and power generation (Cameron, 1995 and O'Neill, 1996).
Vignette I
"The structure and people which has made a success of the company in one era is
no longer the structure or people which make it a success in the next era... The
gas industry in the UK started in private hands and then came together when the
British Gas Corporation was set up as a national objective, to harness natural gas
for the benefit of the country. Now 1 think that was absolutely the right way to do
it. It was centrally planned and directed and has indisputably created a network
which has benefited the country immensely. But I think the system evolves, the
pipeline system is there, it has stood us in good stead, but access of it is now being
opened up to let others use it with a payment of a fee to TransCo."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Curran, Ofgas)
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8.2.2 Production
The extraction and production of natural gas is conducted mainly by the larger oil and
gas companies, sometimes in partnership with BG. Initial consortiums between BG and
various oil producers were further empowered by Government policy at the time.
Policy dictated that any discoveries of natural gas were to be offered for sale to BG.
This situation changed following primary legislation in the Oil and Gas Enterprise Act
(1982). Further moves to end BG's monopsony included MMC recommendations in its
gas report in 1988, disallowing BG from contracting for more than ninety per cent of
any new gas field. Among the companies that supply gas in Great Britain are oil
companies such as Amoco, Conoco, Mobil, Texaco, Shell, Elf, Total, Amarada Fless,
Esso and BP, to name but a few (Barnett, 1995).
In order to cope with peak demands in the winter months, gas is balanced from supplies
of liquefied natural gas and gas stored in underground reservoirs, by line packing, or in
tanks adjacent to the network. These type of storage facilities also provide gas in the
case of a disruption of supply due to plan failure or emergency. Rough is the largest of
BG's storage facilities and is a former gas field that has been redeveloped as a seasonal
store for gas in the North Sea. Also load is managed by offering large customers
interruptible gas contracts so that they switch energy supply (usually fuel oil) during
times ofpeak demand on the system.
8.2.3 Transmission and Distribution
Following the extraction and production process, the gas is fed into various beach head
terminals and thereafter fed into the national transmission system (NTS) at high
pressure. Prior to final resale, the gas then passes through differing levels of the
regional distribution networks (now known as Local Distribution Zones, LDZ) at
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increasingly reduced pressures.
Of all the stages in the natural gas chain, only transmission and distribution are now
considered natural monopolies. As with all the utilities that operate a network, once the
network is constructed (usually at very high cost) the costs are sunk and the
infrastructure effectively has no resale value. It is therefore inefficient to develop
alternative networks. A transportation price control formula (RPI-X)10 has been
introduced to limit the overall revenue obtained by BG's transport and storage business,
TransCo (see Barnett, 1995; Cameron, 1995 and O'Neill, 1996).
8.2.4 Supply
For the retail supplier there are few fixed assets. The only requirement for retail
suppliers is to organise contracts with the producers and the customers. Therefore,
barriers to entry (or exit from) the retail supply market are low, competition is largely
on price, with any differentiation consisting merely of financial arrangements in the
terms of the contract. Centrica is BG's supply ami.
Vignette II
"People who have a background in financial service type companies are being
appointed by Centrica. This causes a problem for the regulator because the
people who are running these companies have a red-blooded commercial
approach. Gas supply is a financial services operation, and to emphasise this
Centrica have produced the Goldfish card, which a loyalty card and a credit card
at the same time."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Curran, Ofgas)
10 See section 4.4.4 for a fuller explanation of RPI-X
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The UK gas supply market is split into three main sectors, industrial, commercial and
domestic. Legislation in the Gas Act (1986) defined the various sectors of the market as
being based on the volume of gas demanded. The industrial market consists of some
76,000 customers and consists of about 25% of sales volume. For these consumers
whose consumption exceeded 25,000 therms annually, the market was open to
competition at the time ofBG's flotation. The franchise market was reduced in 1992 to
customers demanding more than 2,500 therms annually. This sector comprises many of
the commercial customers, generally classified as hotels, schools, hospitals, offices etc.
and accounts for about 18% of the market by volume. The domestic consumer market
comprises over 18 million customers and was gradually opened up to competition
during 1997 and 1998. Since the non-domestic market was opened up, BG's share has
been falling dramatically. Competitors have been 'cherry picking' the market and have
focused on high load contracts. Price schedules were also introduced to the non-
domestic market to prevent BG from using a predatory policy to keep new entrants out
of the gas supply market. Since BG had to publish its prices for all industrial and
commercial users, competitors knew exactly what contractual terms they had to offer in
order to win business. This policy allowed competitors to win eighty per cent of the
large firm (not interruptible) business. The power station market has also emerged since
1990 and has been competitive. Although BG is the largest single supplier, it has never
had the dominant position that it has enjoyed elsewhere in the gas industry (Ofgas,
1997).
in order to extend the leVel of competition further, with a view to full competition in
the domestic market, the Gas Act of November 1995 provided for various supply
activities to be authorised separately. The Act created three classes of licensed
activities. Public Gas Transporters who are concerned with the operation of pipeline
systems for the transportation of gas. They convey or store gas from the terminal to the
meter, or possibly from or to other public gas transporters in arrangements with
shippers. Shippers are concerned with arranging for gas to be transported, normally
from beach terminals through the public transporter pipeline system. They also sell gas
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to suppliers. Suppliers are concerned with the direct sale of gas to the consumer and act
as the first point of contact for the consumer. To circumvent some of the problems
involved in storage, shippers also offer interruptible contracts. In return for securing a
lower unit price, customers are prepared to have their supply interrupted during periods
of peak demand.
There are four main categories of competitors in the marketing of gas. First, gas
producers which also ship such as Alliance Gas (BP, Statoil and Norsk Hydro),
Quadrant Gas (Shell and Exxon), Kinetica (Conoco and PowerGen), Neste Production
Ltd (a Finnish company trading with Northern Electric), Agas (Elf Aquitaine), Mobil
Gas and Amerada Hess (trading with Scottish Hydro-Electric). Second, Regional
Electricity Companies: all 12 RECs in England and Wales have established gas
marketing arms, as has ScottishPower. Third, specialist fuel distributors who were
strong in the LPG market prior to privatisation such as British Fuels, Flogas and Calor.
Finally, there are independent brokers of gas such as United gas and Bell gas (see
O'Neill, 1996 for more details).
8.2.5 The Network Code
The rapid development of gas competition has necessitated the introduction of a set of
business rules to act as a foundation for the exchange of contracts required for the
transportation of gas (O'Neill, 1996). The rules are embodied in the Network Code
which outline the rights and responsibilities of companies involved in the transmission
of gas. The Network Code was implemented in 1996 and its purpose is to allow gas
shippers open and non-discriminatory access to the gas pipeline and storage system
operated by TransCo. It also details the obligations of TransCo in providing a
transportation service to its customers. The Code is essentially a framework of
contracts that act as guidelines for shippers utilising the transportation network and
seeks to establish access on an equal and transparent basis.
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The main principle underlying the creation of the Network Code, is the requirement for
operational balancing. Shippers are encouraged to balance their supplies and demands
on a daily basis. If demand rises above that being supplied by a designated shipper,
TransCo imposes a charge for the extra gas used. Alternatively, if a shipper inputs more
gas than is necessary to meet demand, then a payment is received from TransCo. This
is referred to as the flexibility mechanism. A trading system is crucial to the procedure
by which TransCo maintains records of every gas consumer. It indicates which shipper
is supplying gas, the volume of the gas being transported and for which supply site the
gas is intended. Each meter point has a unique reference number, the 'M' number. This
number and the relevant postcode enables TransCo to charge shippers correctly for
transporting gas to each and every supply point. It also covers the process of
transferring customers from one shipper/supplier to another. TransCo is also subject to
a range of standards in the areas of supply which include supply point transactions,
meter readings and data-loggers. TransCo's performance against these standards is
monitored regularly and reported to both Ofgas and the shippers. If TransCo falls
below the standards set, it becomes liable to provide compensation to the affected
shippers (O'Neill, 1996).
Vignette III
A suite of computers systems (UK-Link) has been developed by TransCo to
support the Network Code. UK-Link has continuously updated in consultation
with the industry. The Network Code has opened the possibility of a spot market
for gas but it is thought unlikely to develop in the near future:
"There has been an active one (spot market) in North America for many years,
but in North America the sources of supply are different. They are more
numerous on land, and they tend to be pure gas fields unlike what is found in the
North Sea (which are often gas, condensates and oil together). In the North Sea
the take off is restricted by the oil extraction, so you cannot manipulate the swing
(load factor) as easily. In the UK there has always been a distinction in contracts
between base load contracts, peak shaving and ones in between, in terms of
matching supply with demand. One way in which a UK spot market could
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develop however is through the rules of the Network Code. There are significant
financial penalties if a shipper fails to deliver gas into the system when the shipper
said it would, on a 24 hour basis. The spot market will be there in putting
producers in touch with suppliers on an instant basis. So if a shipper has seriously
underestimated its demand, instead of defaulting in its obligations in the Network
Code it can then go to a producer, and at a price, obtain gas."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Curran, Ofgas)
8.3 METERING
8.3.1 Metering Technology
Samuel Clegg took out the first known patent for a wet gas meter in 1815, but records
indicate that metering of gas did not come into general application in the UK until the
1830s. The original meters had a rotating drum operating in a bath of water. These
caused problems, because water could freeze during the colder months of the year, or
because the water evaporated. But by around 1850, dry meters devised by John Malam
(1820), Miles Berry (1833) and Alexander Wright (1844) were introduced and these
remain the basis of the type of meter in general use today. The introduction of
prepayment meters in the UK, patented by T.S. Lacey in 1870, took place towards the
end of the century (Peebles, 1980). This was an interesting development in that it
helped to spread the use of gas to the less wealthy sections of the community. Gas
metering technology remained relatively unchanged for the next hundred years until
recent changes caused by developments in the areas of micro-electronics and
ultrasonics. Thus today the role of the gas meter has changed from a cash register
where you want meters read and bills sent out as efficiently as possible, to an
instrument which can manage and monitor load.
CEN TC294 sets out the user requirements for gas metering technology in the UK in
document reference WG1/N65E of the European Union. This document has tables on
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applications with generic headings concerning functions and performance
requirements. It also goes further in setting other requirements covering economic
considerations, standards, communication systems, integrity, security, privacy,
confidentiality and power supply. It also separates out response time, throughput,
priority requirements and defines data formats for common variables.
8.3.2 Pricing
The domestic supply market in the past was based on the concept of universal service
at equal price. One of the major worries for Ofgas is that as competition develops
prices will then vary across the country. In general, those areas which are far away from
the beach-head (where gas is delivered by producers to TransCo) will be forced to pay
higher prices than these near the beach-head. Although the introduction of competition
has reduced overall supply prices, it will also be introducing pricing inequality across
the country as BG's traditional structure of cross-subsidies is unwound. This means that
the new entrants to the market will target ('cherry pick') customers close to the beach
head first. This could put BG in the situation where it is left with only the less
profitable customers, either those in higher-cost geographical locations or those
previously subsidised (bad debt) customers.
Vignette IV
Nonetheless there is almost an evangelical zeal to the privatisation of the gas
industry in the UK:
"Britain leads the way with gas prices, we have the lowest gas prices in the world,
ahead of even North America. Now some of that is down to competition and the
opening of the UK gas market. That is of enormous competitive benefit for British
industry. I think that is where pressure will ultimately come to bear, it is certainly,
happening in Germany and will happen in France. Companies like Air France are
in the third division compared with British Airways and are costing the French
taxpayer a great deal of money. This is not technology, it is political will to open
up markets. Just as a number of years ago it was not the market which regulated
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the gas industry it was the Treasury which set gas prices according to the
Government needs."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Curran, Ofgas)
This optimistic picture belies some problems. British Gas has been damaged by its
commitment to high-priced 'take-or-pay' contracts to buy gas in the North Sea. This is a
key factor in allowing the new market entrants to undercut BG's prices by large
margins, because the price of gas has fallen since the 'take-or-pay' contracts were
signed. These contracts are estimated to be worth at least forty billion pounds over the
next twenty-five years. Although there have been suggestions that BG finds itself in
this situation due to mismanagement and lack of foresight, the company blames the
Government and the regulator in misleading it over the pace of market liberalisation.
Moreover, a number of these contracts date from before privatisation, and were
therefore agreed under very different market conditions (Bamett, 1995).
The tariff charge in the UK comprises a fixed element, the standing charge, and a
commodity charge that applies to differing levels of consumption. The commodity
charge reduces as demand moves progressively to higher levels of consumption. Earlier
differences in standing charge to reflect regional factors, have been replaced by a single
national charge, and in October 1991 it was altered from a quarterly, to a daily rate.
Commodity rates have also altered. Previously a single commodity rate applied across
all consumption levels, but in March 1990 a lower charge was introduced for
consumers above the 15,000 therm level. In April of the following year, the commodity
charges were further tiered to reflect demand levels. Different tariffs were offered to
consumers within specific consumption bands, with the thresholds set at 5000, 10,000
and 15,000 therms a year respectively. The distinction in tariffs, and corresponding
demand levels is however being eroded, following the influx of competition in the gas
market (Ofgas, 1989).
The two elements of the tariff, the fixed and commodity charge, are designed to cover
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the various costs involved in supplying gas. The standing charge contributes only to the
fixed costs in the provision of a gas supply, such as meter reading, customer accounting
and pipe or meter maintenance. The commodity charge contributes primarily toward
gas purchase costs, transportation and the costs of storage facilities.
Vignette V
Despite the strong seasonal factors that influence the demand for gas, seasonal
tariffs or any form of promotional tariff have not generally been a strong feature
of operating policy and tariff structures:
"Apart from interruptible contracts for very large customers, I do not see that
('time-of-use' pricing) happening in gas. In a 24 hour cycle the gas is packed in the
pipes so there is not such a same sensitivity to the timescales as in electricity. So
there is a certain lag for gas in contrast to electricity which is instantaneous."
(Source: Interviewee: John Heathcock, Schlumberger)
Although there is no plan for extensive 'time-of-use' pricing in gas, there has been an
introduction of different payment mechanisms with the introduction of the DirectPay,
and more recently, the OptionPay tariff. They allow customers to pay their accounts
monthly by variable direct debit at a discount. Around one quarter of domestic
customers pay in this fashion.
8.3.3 Electronic Metering
During the early nineteen-eighties, BG was involved in a mains-borne (power line
carrier) field trial with both water and electricity utilities. The project was the first
major automated meter reading field trial in the UK involving all three major utility
industries. At the time, it was felt that a single unit collecting data from three meters
would be more cost effective than individual home units or separate systems. Much
effort was put in to ensure that valuable data, in terms of response time and availability,
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were collected on the performance of the medium chosen. BG took a central role in
data analysis and reporting for the trial, and utilised BG's Viewdata system, which was
available to all parties involved for fault reporting. The trial identified some areas for
development, such as the need for repeaters for collecting data from houses at the
extremities of the distribution cabling, and such issues as network management and
data collection for larger installation bases. Time during and following the trial was
used to refine the perceived industry requirements for a remote meter reading system.
These included the data that was to be collected, and fast response time required for
detection of gas theft (.British Standards Institute, 1998).
Also during the mid nineteen-eighties BG participated as an observer on trials of 'no-
ring-trunk' technology called CALMS. This allowed access to two dummy gas loads
and basic data communication to twenty-five homes on the trial. Data acquisition
software allowed direct comparison of communications system performance with
mains-borne system. A follow-on project involving the British Telecom (BT)
BitStream system allowed BG to further develop ideas for data management within the
home unit, for an automated meter reading system. In collaboration with SEEBOARD
(a REC) and Mullard, BG worked on the specification for gas requirements, for both
long-term aims and short-term service evaluation. When BT decided to stop its own
development work on BitStream the project terminated (British Standards Institute,
1998).
Following these trials, the utility industries faced changes associated with privatisation
and BG's effort diminished as other options were pursued. BG became more interested
in having access to its own automated meter reading system for gas metering alone, not
relying on third party data communication channels. In 1993/4 British Gas was
involved in a radio-based remote meter reading field trial initially involving 1000 'R5'
pulsed output meters. The system was hierarchical and multi-layered, with a one-way
in-bound radio communications device at the meter level. It transmitted the
consumption value and tamper status to a second level concentrator unit, on a pseudo
164
random basis to avoid collisions with its neighbours, four times a day. The transmitter
used a 50MHz carrier with an effective radiated power rating of lOmW. The baud rate
between levels was 1200bps and the data-link protocol used was an X-25 hybrid. At the
concentrator, the meter data was time-stamped and stored, and then up-loaded on
request to a third layer controller device using two-way radio communications. From
the controller to the host user, the communications path used was the PSTN. Following
the large-scale changes occurring within UK Gas during the early to mid-nineties
priorities changed, and the technology was not developed further. Consequently, the
equipment was decommissioned in early 1995 (British Standards Institute, 1998).
In 1994 TransCo in collaboration with Gaz de France and others developed a
management information system for recording operational field data read locally from
'E6', or ultrasonic, gas meters. The system, called E6 Diagnostic Data Interface or
EDDI, consisted of a portable hand-held reader, or Diagnostic Data Reader (DDR), and
a system controller/database, which ran on a stand-alone PC, located in a TransCo
district office. An EDDI controller supported up to 20 DDRs, which in turn could
record data from up to 100 meters. The EDDI system worked by firstly entering an
alpha character, called E6 'flag', recorded from a meter's LCD during a billing cycle
meter read, and the customer's details into the database's customer list. Details of up to
100 E6 meters were then selected and down-loaded to a DDR along with an encrypted
version of the DDR's application program and specific security details regarding
restrictions on the DDR's usage. The DDR communicated serially with a meter through
the industry standard optical port and probe interface, conforming to the BS EN 61107
protocol. Its applications software was designed to interface with all E6 meters
purchased by TransCo. To date two protocols have been supported; one utilises the 'C'
programming mode of BS EN 61107, the other proprietary protocol was developed
specifically for the E6 meter to minimise communications power requirements. Both
incorporate similar asynchronous meter 'wake-up' sequences which essentially ensure
DDR/meter communications are synchronous with the meter's natural cycling periods.
A DDR reads, and records, typically 60 of the meter's operational parameters. Captured
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data are immediately analysed and summary reports are displayed for appropriate
section by operational staff in the field. There is full reporting via the EDDI database,
which incorporates customised reports for use by TransCo special gas investigators to
collate data on suspected meter tampering trends (.British Standards Institute, 1998).
Presently the system has been installed in TransCo districts for use by metering
operational staff and by BG's gas research and technology centre to support an Ofgas
requirement to monitor the first 15,000 production meters in the field. More recently, a
hybrid system has also been developed for use in TransCo Area East's Hertford
Laboratory to record all E6 meters returned from the field installations (Ofgas, 1997).
8.3.4 Prepayment Metering
Under the terms of their licences, suppliers must offer domestic customers the option of
a prepayment meter prior to disconnecting them for failing to pay their accounts. Just
under a million domestic gas customers utilise a prepayment metering device and up
until recently were traditionally coin and token operated.
Vignette VI
Quantum metering, a two way electronic system for prepayment using smart
cards, was introduced by BG in the late nineteen-eighties and early nineties. This
enabled the utility to re-set tariffs and extend customer credit electronically:
"It was put into place by BG in its previous all-seeing all-knowing form... Under
the old system the monopoly could push the technology and this approach has
been questioned in the new deregulated market. It was a wonderful system, the
type of system that British Gas would go for when they had all of the market, but
this type of system is not particularly appropriate in a competitive market... One
of the problems is that Quantum is expensive, very very expensive... What we are
looking for just now is not technology push, but market need. What we have at
the moment is Quantum as a very expensive blocker and what we would like to see
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is all the new suppliers coming out with their own innovative solutions to these
problems."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Curran, Ofgas)
In order to provide this in the first phase of domestic competition, the Quantum system
run by TransCo was modified to allow suppliers to use it. Processing of Quantum
transactions has been centralised in Newcastle-upon-Tyne in one office, which has
secure arrangements to prevent Centrica gaining access to details of Quantum
transactions carried out by the customers of other suppliers. This arrangement appears
to have worked satisfactorily for the first phase of domestic competition, but may need
revision as competition begins to take hold.
8.3.5 The Liberalisation ofMeter Operation and Data Collection
Until 1996 BG had been responsible for all gas metering. During that year Ofgas
established a framework to allow competition in meter reading and meter provision
installation.
Vignette VII
"The metering side is overdue for some innovative solutions, and I think it will be
a 'big player' who will make an impact e.g. Siemens or Schlumberger. Metering
has been a secondary matter certainly from the gas perspective. In the past it has
been dominated by British Gas and a few large metering companies, who did not
compete but relied on British Gas for its annual order. That is not a recipe for
innovation or new solutions, that made things very static."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Curran, Ofgas)
Ofgas' Competitive Metering Steering Group (CMSG) brings together experts and
interested parties from a variety of different backgrounds to consider issues associated
with competition in metering. Organisations include the Council of Registered Gas
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Installers (CORGI), the Institution of Gas Engineers (IGE), the Gas consumers Council
(GCC) and other customer groups, meter manufacturers, shippers, suppliers, public gas
transporters and companies able to offer alternative meter reading or installation
services. In October 1996 meter reading was opened up to competition. By December
1996, some 23 meter reading companies had registered with Ofgas (Ofgas, 1997).
Vignette VIII
One example of how the future may develop is highlighted by British Gas*
activities in data collection. When British Gas separated its trading businesses
from TransCo, TransCo had the responsibility for gas meter reading, but it used
as its agent British Gas' own meter readers, who were employed by its gas supply
arm, now known as Centrica. This situation was unsatisfactory, as it resulted in
Centrica reading the meters for competitors' customers.
Centrica proposed that it set up a joint venture meter reading company with
another party, in which BG would be a minority shareholder. BG's prospective
partner, Group 4, was identified following a competitive tendering exercise. Ofgas
consulted on its proposal and the industry generally accepted that the joint
venture option should be pursued. On 14 October 1996, the joint venture, known
as AccuRead, became operative.
While AccuRead initially provided TransCo's meter reading service, this business
has been progressively opened to competitive tender. The first of these tenders, for
TransCo's industrial and commercial meter reading service in the North-Eastern
and Northern metering zones, was awarded in November 1996 to Northern
Metering Services Ltd. an agency company of Northern Electric (a REC). Other
meter reading suppliers now in the market include Lowri-Beck (the only
independent competitor) and subsidiaries of utilities such as Energy
Communications Services (London Electricity) and East Midlands Electricity
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Metering Services.
"What you are seeing is regulatory pressure on efficiency coming to bear, and this
has caused the gas industry to come up with structural innovations. They are
looking at the costs closely, which has meant a move to the out-sourcing of
activities. Subcontractors can do the work at a lower cost than the utilities
themselves. They have had to look critically at their operations and what is
happening is what has occurred in the oil industry for a number of years, where
they are leaner utilities clustered around by service companies. The situation
where one company would read both the gas and electricity meter could not have
happened in the old days. Now as the utility players are being broken down into
smaller units, horizontal integration is a distinct possibility. Alliances will take
place in which companies may well read gas and electricity at the same time, and
maybe even water. The examples are Hyder (Welsh Water and South Wales
Electricity), United Utilities (North West Water and Norweb) and ScottishPower
but I'm sure there will be other examples coming down the line."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Curran, Ofgas)
Competitive meter provision and installation is some way behind meter reading, but
some progress is being made. Key events have been the publication of Ofgas1 Codes of
Practice for Meter Installation and the start of a registration scheme for the approval of
meter installers. There has also been a trial set up for competitive meter installation by
TransCo and the establishment of a Network Code modification working group chaired
by TransCo. The trial offers shippers the opportunity to have replacement meters
installed by companies other than TransCo. In its transportation charging statement,
TransCo has published initial rebate prices for meters installed by others in the trial. All
meter installers who wished to participate in the trial need to be approved by Ofgas,
There is a clear recognition in regulatory circles that liberalisation of meter operations
and data collection has been an inhibitor to sophisticated metering and the benefits that
this would bring. Meter operation involving the functions of ownership, installation and
maintenance have not yet been fully defined. It is in the area of meter ownership in
which there is greatest debate. At present TransCo has a monopoly over meter
ownership, and if competition is introduced there is likely to be the issue of stranded
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metering assets. This problem has been overcome in the rail industry where Railtrack
owns the rail infrastructure and the trains are operated by franchisees who lease the
rolling stock from financial leasing companies (Roscos). In the same way metering
assets could be leased to companies who install and maintain meters while they are
leased from financial organisations. It is yet to be seen whether Ofgas will force
TransCo to sell some of its metering assets in order to introduce this regulatory
mechanism.
8.4 SUMMARY
The regulatory structure in the gas industry is in a transitional stage from a vertically
integrated structure to one in which gas transportation, shipping and supply is being
unbundled. Competition is being introduced in the shipping and supply functions. The
regulatory system that operated in the second half of the twentieth century has been
gradually dismantled to make way for a more competitive and transparent system. This
does not mean that the preceding system was wrong, merely that the management of
gas operations has evolved. In this evolution, information technology has played a
facilitating role in developing the competitive system.
Due to its ability to be relatively easily stored, metering of gas is not as crucial as in
electricity or telecommunications (see section 4.3). Nonetheless field trials have been
carried out in electronic metering systems, automatic meter reading and ultrasonic
metering. Development ofmetering has been inhibited in recent years by the attempt to
open the meter operation and data collection functions to competition. Two issues
predominate. If competition is to become a reality in meter operations, a solution has to
be found for stranded assets. This may be found by a leasing mechanism, which has
been pioneered in the railway industry. With respect to data collection, electronic
metering technology remains too costly to compete with manual pedestrian meter
readers. If wide-spread electronic data interchange is to become a reality in the gas
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industry, the major impetus has to come from outside the gas industry, perhaps, multi-
utility, multimedia or home automation functions.
CHAPTER 9
CASE STUDY No.4:
GAS IN FRANCE
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The use of gas via pipeline in France dates back nearly two centuries, Francis Lebon
being the first Frenchman to use gas for lighting purposes. Its expansion was most
spectacular when natural gas supplanted manufactured gas. The 'conversion' as it was
called in the gas industry in France, lasted about twenty years (from the mid nineteen-
fifties to the mid nineteen-seventies) and was marked by the successive arrival of
sources of natural gas from different countries. As with electricity, gas companies were
of mixed ownership prior to 1946. In 1946 both electricity and gas were nationalised
together, as one joint company. The post-war Government was a coalition of Gaullists,
Socialists and Communists with the principles of: "An economic system where profit
and interests of individuals should not benefit at the expense of the nation as a whole.
Rather these communal riches should be used for benefit of everyone." (Beltran &
Williot, 1992: p. 15). Certainly it is difficult to find an article of this time which is
hostile to nationalisation.
It became apparent soon after nationalisation, that the administration of the joint
Electricite-Gaz de France (EGF) was being dominated by the electricity lobby. There
were a number of reasons for this. The scale of the electricity industry was larger than
that of gas, making it the dominant partner. Also, electricity was seen as a universal
necessity and had become, during the previous decades, the dominant mode of power
for lighting and urban transportation. Most importantly, electricity was viewed as a
strategically important resource, which was to be developed by indigenous resources
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such as hydro-electricity. In contrast, French resources for coal and natural gas were
relatively scarce. This caused friction of the management of the two functions of EGF,
and by 1947 the two companies were partially demerged into two separate financially
autonomous organisations, Electricite de France (EdF) and Gaz de France (GdF).
Exploration, equipment provision and research studies became independent while
human resources, distribution and general affairs remained mixed (EdF-GdF services)
(see Picard et al. 1985 and Beltran & Williot, 1992). This case study will consider the
infrastructure and market for natural gas in France since the demerger of EGF, and then
go on to investigate the role that metering technology has played in its development
over the past twenty years.
9.2 INFRASTRUCTURE
9.2.1 Production
Today, Gaz de France (GdF) has a monopoly right to import gas under the 1946
nationalisation law. Under the law the management of the nationalised gas
undertakings is the responsibility of a national public institution of an industrial and
commercial nature entitled: "Gaz de France - Service Nationale" (Cameron, 1995).
GdF is a public national corporation with a commercial character (etablissement public
national de caractere industriel et commercial). The company's capital is entirely owned
by the French Government. Its legal basis lies in the Act ofApril 1946. Under that Act,
eighty four per cent of the nationalised gas facilities were transferred to GdF and it is
the sole importer and exporter of fuel gas into and out of France.
Despite its monopoly, the company is not a law unto itself. Under Decree No. 85-1108
of 15th October 1985 concerning gas transport by pipeline, it is necessary to obtain
ministerial approval for all import contracts. It states: "Agreements, including contracts
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to import gas for the purpose of supplying it to networks operated under concession or
authorization shall be submitted for approval to the minister responsible for gas"
(Cameron, 1995).
France is poor in indigenous fossil energies and it now imports almost all of its oil,
more than ninety per cent of its gas, and two thirds of its coal (Guichard & Casterman,
1994). In all, the national production only covers a little less than half of its energy
needs. This results in an energy policy that rests on three pillars: there is a systematic
effort for energy conservation; there is reliance nuclear energy for the production of
electricity; and there is the diversification of imports, both in the nature of the energy
and in their sources. This has resulted in Gaz de France being one of the largest
importers of natural gas in the world. Domestic production of gas covers less than
about ten per cent of the needs of the French market, and is declining. To guarantee the
security of its supplies, over the last thirty years Gaz de France has built up one of the
most diversified supply bases in the world. Its principal suppliers are: Russia, which
provides 30% of supplies; Norway 28%; Algeria 20%; and the Netherlands 14%. Gaz
de France also considers that the United Kingdom, Nigeria, the Middle East (Qatar,
Abu Dhabi, Oman, Yemen, Iran) and Central America (Trinidad and Tobago,
Venezuela) will play a significant role in the medium term in diversifying and
balancing its supplies.
Gaz de France concludes long-term supply contracts, lasting ten to thirty years with
producers. Short-term security of supply is ensured in two ways: underground storage
facilities and so-called interruptible customers (who have access to substitute energy
and whose natural gas supply can, with advance notice, be interrupted). Underground
storage sites are used primarily to store surplus resources during low consumption
periods and to make them available during high consumption periods. Interruptible
customers are an additional means of adjustment used, in particular, to cushion the
effects of certain unforeseen events (Cameron, 1995).
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Two French companies, Elf Aquitaine and Total, are very active in the exploration and
production of gas (Puyraimond & Bakkaus, 1994). Indeed, for more than thirty years,
the French oil policy was implemented through these two semi-public groups. In recent
years however, Elf Aquitaine and Total have been privatised. It should also be noted
that the current GdF monopoly is by no means absolute. In addition to the special role
of the distribution companies, Elf already imports directly from Norway and uses the
gas in the Compagnie Fran^aise du Methane (an independent gas transmitter) network
in Central France, albeit in close partnership with GdF.
In France, gas production is concentrated in the South-West region with the deposits at
Meillon, Rousse, Lacq and Saint-Marcet. It is Elf Aquitaine who operate these natural
gas deposits. These meagre domestic stocks are supplemented by mine gas recovery
plants in the abandoned coalfields in Northern France, operated by GdF. In 1994 GdF
founded a company called GIE Methamine, from the co-operative venture (50:50 equal
stakes) between Gaz de France and Charbonnages de France (CdF) to recover these
mine gas deposits. Dwindling domestic stocks of natural gas and rising demand have
been progressively supplemented from other countries. Imports of gas from Algeria
began in 1965 and gas from the giant Groningen gas field in the Netherlands has been
imported since 1967. Moreover, Norway's contribution to France's natural gas supplies
has been increasing since supplies first came on stream in 1977. The construction of the
NorFra pipeline, now links the Sleipner and Troll offshore gas fields in the North Sea
with the French coast near Dunkirk. But it is Russia who is today France's primary
source of natural gas. With Gazprom, the world's largest producer and exporter of
natural gas, Gaz de France has developed extensive industrial and technological co¬
operation both upstream (research, liquefied natural gas, storage) and downstream
(energy conservation, training). The USSR began supplying France with gas in 1976
(Beltran & Williot, 1992 and Lucas, 1979).
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A key feature of the natural gas industry in France is the role of liquefied natural gas
technology. Flaving imported Algerian LNG since 1965, GdF has studied, designed,
built and operated LNG facilities and is now one of the world leaders in liquefying,
transporting, storing and regasifying LNG (Barnett, 1995). Gaz de France operates two
LNG terminals in France, at Fos-sur-Mer on the Mediterranean coast and at Montoir-
de-Bretagne on the Atlantic coast. Also through its subsidiaries Soffegaz (consultancy)
Gaz Transport Technigaz (transport), Messigaz and Methane Transport (ship leasing)
GdF has developed large-scale strategic and industrial partnerships with its suppliers
(Coste, 1994).
9.2.2 Transmission and Storage
The freedom to transport natural gas in France is restricted to public undertakings or
national companies in which the State or other public entities have at least 30%
shareholding (Cameron, 1995). In effect, carriage is a monopoly of GdF except in the
South-West where gas is transported through the Toulouse region by Societe Nationale
des Gaz du Sud-Ouest (SNGSO) and outside the South-West area by the Compagnie
Fran^aise du Methane (CFM) network.
In France the transmission of natural gas was regional in the nineteen-fifties, then
became national in the seventies, is now European and it is the aim of GdF to be
intercontinental in the future (Philippe et al. 1994). As of 1941, the RAP (Regie
Autonome des Petroles) or 'State-run autonomous petroleum company' began operating
the fields of Saint Marcet whose production was intended to supply Bordeaux and
Toulouse. Development of natural gas in France increased when Elf Aquitaine (then
called SNPA, Societe Nationale des Petroles d'Aquitaine) discovered the field of Lacq.
Gaz du Sud-Ouest (SNGSO) was then given the responsibility for the transmission and
marketing of the natural gas in the South-West. For this purpose, SNGSO constructed
pipelines that supplied this region. Also, during 1958 and 1959, Gaz de France built
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trunk lines to other parts of the French transmission system. This enhanced
transmission system made it possible to supply the regions of Paris and Lyon. At that
time, Gaz de France and Elf Aquitaine founded the Compagnie Fran9aise du Methane,
a subsidiary in charge of the transmission and marketing of natural gas over to a larger
proportion of the country.
The French gas transmission system underwent a second phase of development,
beginning in 1965, with the first deliveries of LNG from Algeria. From then on, the
pipeline system developed at a sustained rhythm according to the arrival of new
resources at the French borders. Gaz de France now participates in the trans-European
system with MEGEL (Germany), SEGEO (Belgium) and BOG (Austria) and has
completed French-Swiss and French-Spanish links. Thus, from now on, the framework
under which the French transmission system will develop is established by the
development of natural gas not only in France but in Europe as a whole.
There are 14 underground storage facilities throughout France (eleven in aquifers and
three in salt caverns), accounting for one third of annual French consumption (Blondin
& Ferrier, 1994). These natural gas reservoirs are buffers, which adjust supply to
demand. Since daily consumption changes at a ratio of 1 to 8 between summer and
winter and because over ninety per cent of French needs are met by imports,
underground storage facilities have a tactical and strategic purpose. They guarantee
supplies to customers if a major source of supply fails. Therefore the stocks account for
4 months of national consumption.
9.2.3 Distribution and Supply
GdF has been granted the franchise for all municipalities in France, apart from a few
who retain direct responsibility for gas distribution. The exceptions to the GdF
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monopoly are set out in Articles 8 and 23 of the 1946 Act. Article 23 of the Act states
that the municipal undertakings which already existed at the time of the Act can be
excluded from its scope (Cameron, 1995). There are 12 regies (utilities) established by
municipalities, two mixed economic groups (Societes de Distribution a Economie
Mixte) in which the majority share is held by the State or by public authorities, and
three non-nationalised enterprises. The most important undertakings are those of
Bordeaux, Dreux, Grenoble, Monaco and Strasbourg (Aubert et al. 1994). Gaz de
France is therefore responsible for about ninety-five per cent of natural gas distribution
in France. There are also consultative bodies designed to co-ordinate links between
GdF, EdF and local interests and to give advice to the chairman of the distribution
region. The members comprise 12 representatives of the users (nine from the
communes, two from industrial users and one from family associations) and one
representative from personnel. The committees are not the same for gas as for
electricity distribution. The non-GdF municipal concessions are granted for a period 30
years and are often delegated to private companies such as Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux
(SLE).
On several occasions GdF has been obliged to defend vigorously its monopoly on gas
distribution. Notable cases have involved Commune de la Reole, Commune de
Bonneville (Grenoble) and the municipality of Dreux all of whom wished to extend
their concessionary rights in one way or another but were blocked by court rulings.
However the professional organisation which represents the gas distribution regies
(SPEGNN: Syr.dicat Professionel des Enterprises non Nationalises) claimed that the
ruling at Dreux departed from the competition rules of the European Union. This is a
disturbing new departure for French gas policy in that European law may threaten the
close relationship that GdF has with the French State (Cameron, 1995).
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9.2.4 The Role ofGas in the Energy Market
As a result of a policy of price controls to combat inflation and competition from low-
cost oil, by 1969 GdF was greatly in debt. Emphasis from this time on has been placed
on financial recovery at the expense of investment. In this the enterprise has been
largely successful, and since 1976 has been fully financially independent. This turn
around in fortunes is even more remarkable considering that in the mid-seventies, the
company suffered a massive operating deficit, due to equipment failure in the
compression equipment for LNG from Skikda, in Algeria. The second contribution to
the favourable evolution was in the conversion from town to natural gas. Another issue
for gas is the relationship with electricity, and particularly the role of gas in the 'tout
electrique, tout nucleaire' policy of EdF and the French State (Wieviorka & Trinh,
1989: p.50). This has resulted in a curious imbalance in energy policy where France is
self sufficient in electricity yet it imports nearly all its gas. Despite this handicap GdF is
now relying on its solid financial recovery to develop a new growth strategy, targeting
expansion upstream and downstream both in France and internationally.
During the past four decades, the quantities of pipeline gas have increased considerably
and now account for twelve per cent of the total primary energy used in France.
Nevertheless this is still well below the average for the European Union (see table 7).
The low penetration is not only accounted for by greater strategic emphasis given to
electricity but also by the lower population density and the need for a widespread
distribution system. This geographical context makes the contribution of LPG in
France more significant than in many of its European neighbours (Coste, 1994).
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Table 7: Penetration of Natural Gas as a Percentage of Primary Energy Consumption
by Country (1987 Figures)
Country Primary Energy Consumption (Per Cent)
Federal Republic ofGermany 17
Belgium/Luxembourg 16
France 12
Italy 22
The Netherlands 46
The United Kingdom 24
EU Average 19
Source: Beltran & Williot (1992: p.277)
For several years, Gaz de France has been working to open up new natural gas markets,
notably co-generation and the natural gas vehicle markets. Co-generation represents
more than twenty per cent of the increase in natural gas sales. The market has strong
growth potential where combined heat and power is required. The clean air Act which
the French Parliament passed in November 1996 has heightened Local Government
interest in natural gas vehicles. As a response, Gaz de France has rethought its
development strategy for natural gas vehicles to focus on public transport, street
cleaning and urban utility vehicles. Partnerships with manufacturers and Local
Government are being developed and a more extensive refuelling network is being
organised. Nonetheless, due to the French Government's commitment to nuclear
generation it can be expected that the use of gas for electricity generation in France will
not increase rapidly.
9.2.5 Gas and the Social Structure of France
With over nine million customers in France, Gaz de France is committed to promoting
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a new approach to customer relations and paving the way for "a modern public
service." Developed with several consumer organisations, the 'service performance
guarantee' is at the heart of Gaz de France's commitments. This guarantee has eight
commitments to service quality and are shown in Appendix V. GdF also works in close
co-operation with Qualigaz; the trade organisations' quality-control agency (Casterman,
1994). On a public relations side, GdF has developed the Gaz de France Foundation
and has stepped up its efforts in environmental protection, notably in co-operation with
the French hiking federation. The restoration of the Pointe du Raz natural heritage site
in Brittany is a major project and GdF also continues to develop its partnerships with
Local Authorities for environmental conservation. This Ecoville scheme has the
support of regional representatives of Gaz de France (its 'eco-network'), and in each
case offers the most suitable scheme using all these facilities adapted to local context.
Also in April 1996, a protocol agreement was signed by Gaz de France and the
Ministry of the Environment for the restoration of 467 gas plant sites, which are still
the Company's responsibility. The Company committed itself to carry out
environmental audits of the sites.
In France, unlike other countries or industrial sectors in which joint research
organisations exist, research and development is shared between gas companies and
various institutes (Bureau, 1994). Every year, French companies grant very large
budgets to these projects. These constant efforts in research and development have
made it possible for the French gas industry to reach and maintain its prominent
position in the world. The gas companies, Gaz de France, Elf Aquitaine, Total, and
numerous companies in gas allied industries have set up research centres, including the
French Petroleum Institute and CETIAT (the technical centre for ventilation and
heating industries). These research programmes have often received funds from public
authorities and more recently from the European Union.
Concern about employment is also paramount in French society, and unlike the UK,
this is not seen as a flexible resource. Thus the Employment Foundation, was created in
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1995 by Gaz de France, Electricite de France and three trade unions to help create
permanent jobs in the community. The goal is to encourage employment, especially for
young people, through four approaches: developing economic growth; training;
adapting and reducing working hours; and ensuring workplace equality. It is also
acknowledged that these initiatives require major changes in workplace organisation,
and profit related pay schemes are also becoming more popular.
One of the cornerstones to the policy of French gas is GdF's role in the international gas
market. Its strategy involves a number of areas. It acquires interests in foreign
companies and creates companies with local investors. It makes national agreements in
research, training and has scientific and technical co-operation agreements with other
countries. The ambition is simple. Gaz de France aims to be an important player in the
global gas market and to participate in the development of natural gas as a major source
ofworld energy.
9.2.6 The Future Structure
The Ministry of Industry established a working group in 1993 to investigate the
question of how to put more competition in the field of gas and electricity regulation
(see also section 7.2.3). Chaired by M. Claude Mandil, Director General of the Energy
and Raw Materials Ministry, the working group held 32 hearings during 1993 and
studied developments in Germany, Spain and the UK. Regarding gas, it argues that
GdF must retain a controlling role in the provision of gas and that this should be
recognised by the priority award of import licences and preferential rights in storage
and distribution. Also the company should have a "particular vocation to act in the
international arena." A major concern is security of supply, and the report considers
that this is GdF's most important responsibility. Existing supply contracts, supply
diversity, storage capacity and interruptible contracts are deemed satisfactory in
ensuring security of supply. GdF has three main responsibilities in these areas:
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• monitoring and guaranteeing "an appropriate gas balance" to enable the authorities
to issue import licences without putting the balance at risk;
• co-ordinating the operation of large underground storage facilities and the
implementation of interruptible contracts;
• developing an international presence "to improve its efficiency in its traditional
activities while ensuring an adequate return on investments."
The report supports the idea that large gas producers should be able to negotiate
imports directly with international suppliers. The resulting competition "would ensure
competitive supply." At the same time, the report advocates a unified negotiating
position when faced with sellers in a monopoly. A single negotiating group is argued to
be a solution (the Single Buyer Procedure). It recommends import licences for two
categories: large networks and energy intensive industries. These would cover the life
of the supply contract (fifteen years for networks as a minimum and seven for large
industrial companies as a minimum). This should not interfere with the activities of
GdF, especially in international markets. There would also be a contribution to
flexibility of supply through adjustable contracts, as well as physical or financial
participation in storage facilities or interruptibility commitments. The authorities would
continue to approve individual supply contracts to ensure that the natural gas balance is
guaranteed.
Gas exports could be treated differently since export is not a function of the importers,
whose authorised quantities are set in accordance with the national gas balance. The
export monopoly of GdF could be replaced by a series of licences issued by the
authorities in accordance with the requirements of the national gas balance. Holders of
import licences and producers would be eligible for export licences.
With respect to producing gas, the report recommends that gas producers should be
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able to sell their output to any other operator holding an import licence. Since
production is in decline, this innovation would probably not have a dramatic effect.
Unbundling should be introduced but only to the extent of separating integrated
company's accounts, not its management.
Vignette I
A typical reaction to this in the UK is illustrated by this comment:
"Well, I think it is just a French form of central planning. I'm probably making
this too simplistic, but in my contacts with Gaz de France it seems similar to what
British Gas was twenty years ago, there is overmanning, complacency, and lack of
efficiency. It strikes me that what seems to be happening in France is a resistance
at a very high level in the central planning system and the Government machine
that they are not going to open their doors to this (Third Party Access). They will
justify this with arguments of national security and lack of indigenous resources.
They will pay a price though, and I think the revolt over inflexible markets is just
the beginning."
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Curran, Ofgas)
9.3 METERING
9.3.1 Metering Technology
Vignette II
At present the only measurement made on gas meters in France is cumulative
volume. For different classes of customer there exists a choice of different
calculations, each of which has its own specification. A feature ofmany apartment
blocks in France is that they are communally heated, and gas consumption is
collectively measured. In principle the meter is chosen as a function of the uses of
gas and the specific types of appliances the customer has. In the main, the
technique used for measurement in the domestic market is the diaphragm meter
where the inner lining of a membrane is deformed as the gas flows past. With
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larger consumers rotating pistons and turbines are used (see table 8).
Data is input in cubic meters on miniature hand sets. The data is then further
down-loaded by attaching the portable to a mother station at the end of the meter
reading schedule. The readings are then dumped on to a server at head office.
Table 8: Order and Size ofMeters Used by Gaz de France
Meter Pressure (bars) Flow (cubic meters per
hour)
Membranes 0-0.1 0-100
Rotating Pistons 0-70 1 -1,000
Turbines 0-80 10-100,000
Source: Gaz de France
For the individual domestic meters, the task of installation, the reading and the
maintenance is under the direction of the combined EdF and GdF operation
(EdF-GdF services). Installation of metering is the responsibility of the customers
(under the oversight of EdF-GdF services) and the reading is carried out by EdF-
GdF services. The distributor (GdF) on behalf of the client carries out the upkeep
of the meter.
(Source: Interviewee: Jean-Claude Bardin, GdF)
9.3.2 Pricing
Part of the reason for GdF's financial problems (described in section 9.2.4) were due to
the fact that tariffs were not structured to more accurately reflect the costs of supplying
different customer classes. Prices charged by GdF to consumers also had to be
submitted for ministerial approval, and in the fifties this meant that tariffs charged for
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expensive town gas were kept below cost due to social reasons. Consequently the
tariffs charged did not reflect the costs ofmanufacturing, distributing and supply of gas.
Also at this time the pricing of gas and electricity began to diverge with electricity
going the marginal route in order to express the constraints of electricity generation
(see section 4.3.1). But by the late fifties harmonisation in gas tariffs had also been
achieved with three basic tariffs (Beltran & Williot, 1992: p.44). There was a general
tariff for small consumers. This consisted of a fixed charge and a price per therm (it did
not have a seasonal component). A similar tariff of the same structure was also
available for larger customers. There was a tariff consisting of a fixed charge and a
seasonal consumption charge for commercial and small industrial customers. For the
very large industrial customers, a maximum daily demand and seasonal demand were
also included in the calculations.
In 1985 industrial prices were decontrolled, creating a regulated and non-regulated
sector. However, the Ministries of Finance and Industry still 'supervise' industrial prices
to prevent cross-subsidisation from other sectors. Under a Decree ofNovember 1990, a
distinction is now made between tariffs de reseau public de transport (industrial
consumers) and tariffs de reseau de distribution (distribution companies). Any changes
made to the tariff charged to industrial consumers (up to 170,000 therms a year) also
have to be approved by both of the above ministries. In this sector the key elements in
setting prices are the average cost of supply and the estimated financial results of GdF,
projected up to two years ahead. A principle of non-discrimination applies so that, in
each region, consumers with the same supply and load characteristics will face the
same prices. Interruptible contract account for more than half of GdF's total industrial
sales and are related to the delivered price of heavy fuel oil of each individual
consumer in the current month (Cameron, 1995).
Prices for domestic customers are subject to regulation by the Ministry of the
Economy, according to Decree No 90-1029 of 20th November 1990. According to
Article 2 of the decree, the price has to take into account the costs of maintenance and
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renewal of installations for storage, transport and distribution as well as the costs of
providing the gas and of using the above installations. The sale of natural gas is also
subject to VAT of 18.6%. In addition, there is a special tax on industrial, non-heating
uses of gas above 170,000 therms a year. Introduced in 1986, the tax is known as the
TICGN (Taxe Interieure a la Consommation du Gaz Naturel). Within the range of
domestic consumption up to the equivalent of 2,000 therms per year, GdF has four
tariffs:
• Base: Cooking (up to 34 therms/year)
• B0: Cooking and hot water (34-239 therms/year)
• B,: 239-1, 024 therms per year
• B2I: above 1, 024 therms per year.
All four tariffs have an annual standing charge and a commodity charge. The Base and
B0 tariffs are uniform throughout France but the commodity charge in the B, and B2I
tariffs vary by six regions with the more remote regions such as Perpignan paying
eleven to fifteen per cent more than Lille or the suburbs of Paris. These variations are
intended to cover the higher transmission costs to these areas. Over eighty per cent of
domestic and commercial users are located in the two lowest-priced regions, whose
commodity charges differ by only about three per cent between each other (Ofgas,
1989). In France there are an increasing number of customers on monthly billing,
mostly through automatic bank payments, based on estimated annual consumption.
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9.3.3 Applied Research
Gas Metering is included in the research and development efforts ofGaz de France.
Vignette III
The meter for residential users, which has been limited to measuring the
quantities of gas delivered is now given new functions. To develop interactive
communication systems between Gaz de France and its customers, almost eighty
thousand intelligent Dialogaz meters were installed for customers at the end of
1996. The installation of 2,500 experimental Communicating Customer Interfaces
(ICCs) has also started in two distribution areas. Dialogaz, so named because it
evokes its purpose of communication and is fully electronic. Some of the new
Dialogaz functions are directly connected to measuring, such as the display of
consumption and its monetary value. Other functions bring in new services to the
consumer, such as safety, monitoring of the appliances and optimal energy
management. Features include a shut-off valve operated by the flow rate that can
be switched from a distance, a multi-functional display, remote meter reading,
and an output for telephone connection.
There is also an international co-operative effort by Gaz de France, Ruhrgas,
British Gas and Gasunie, together with other manufacturers, to launch a research
programme for ultrasonic flowmeters (see also section 8.3.3). Ultrasonic
flowmeters replace the diaphragm meter by measuring the flow of gas by
ultrasonic techniques. Also in the industrial market Gaz de France in
collaboration with CD Gaz, has perfected a very compact new device that
incorporates the functions of pressure reduction, regulation, metering, filtering
and safety. The first example of this equipment called PDIM was installed at
Eurodisney in 1991. During 1993, the 'variable throat nozzle' version of this
equipment obtained the authorisation to be used for a larger number. A second
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version the 'turbine' version - came out in 1993; since then, about fifteen
appliances have been installed and brought into service. The 'turbine' PDIM
provides the same advantages as its predecessor, with a traditional gas turbine
meter. The key achievement in distribution is the integrated multi-functional
pressure regulating station. The design of this equipment combines in one
appliance the functions of pressure reduction and flowmetering and the position
of the pressure regulator is used to determine the flow of gas after a computer has
taken into account the pressure and temperature value. One thus obtains a piece
of equipment cast in one piece, which is not very cumbersome, may be buried, and
therefore is well-adapted to the dense urban context. In addition, the computer is
easily integrated into a remote management system. Metering development is also
continuing in production where the operations involve techniques that are related
and sometimes combined. The principal research projects are related to
controlling multi-phase flows (gas-condensates-water), so that mixed effluent can
be sent to treatment units without previous separation. These projects deal with:
perfecting multi-phase flow models and programs; multi-phase flow metering;
and prevention and inhibition of hydrates by perfecting new dispersing additives.
(Source: Interviewee: Dominique Plumejeaud, ATG)
9.3.4 Standards and Protocols
The network metrology and equipment department of GdF models the comparative
performance of different metering techniques. The research and development division
also has facilities situated near Paris which is approved by the French Accreditation
Committee (COFRAC). Its work focuses on the safety and reliability of installations:
upstream of the meter (improvement of maintenance and network management) and
downstream (in particular the Dialogaz and Communicating Customer Interface, ICC,
projects). More generally the specifications for the harmonising ofmetering techniques
and increasing generic user requirements for gas metering have been set out by the
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CEN TC294 in document reference WG1/N65E. CEN TC294 is the technical
committee concerned with standardisation of gas metering in Europe.
The players in the French gas industry are multiplying their efforts in order to develop
and offer new services that rely on the innovative new technologies in home
automation and remote control facilities. The penetration of electronics in the
residential sector (home automation) is important for the natural gas consumer, whether
in the field of heating control and management, energy meters or safety. Of course, this
development in the gas trade can only be founded on an exemplary level of quality in
supplying natural gas, based on informing the customer, quality, metering, billing, and
advice about tariffs etc. An example of this is tenant-controlled central heating. This
combines the central production of heat and the individual control of comfort and
service charges. There are two versions, one which bills by sales of gas distributed (by
using individual meters), and one which bills by sales of heat (by using heat meters).
Vignette IV
As far as GdF is concerned, it does not wish to trouble its customers with the
hassles of meter reading. Faced with this demand, GdF is now putting in place
systems to read from a distance. With the integrated services of EdF-GdF,
potential savings can be made and a common architecture for gas and electricity
metering is being considered but there is a conflict of interest:
"EdF wish to develop a power line carrier technology to take advantage of the
integrated electricity network. GdF however do not wish to be tied into this
technology which may be expensive to develop and increase its dependency on its
electricity partner. A low power radio network may be the compromise solution."
(Source: Interviewee: Phillippe Vanbleu, EdF-GdF Services)
The integration of these systems of metering is expected to provide new services
for customers. This will involve better techniques in a number of areas. There will
be system efficiency through, temperature correction, prepayment, load
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management, system security and maintenance. It will improve customer service
through standardisation of tariffs, simplicity of billing and advice about rates.
This will add to the development of France's integrated digital
telecommunications network through systems such as teleswitching and
automatic meter reading as well as new technologies in home automation and
remote control facilities.
"The penetration of electronics in the residential sector (home automation) is
extremely interesting for GdF, whether it be in the field of heating control and
management, energy meters or safety."
(Source: Interviewee: Phillippe Vanbleu, EdF-GdF Services)
9.4 SUMMARY
As the market liberalisation policy of the European Commission is implemented across
the Continent, the French Government and parliament is under pressure to pass reforms
designed to curb GdF's potentially anti-competitive practices in its import,
transmission, distribution and supply businesses. This clearly conflicts with the Single
Buyer Procedure of the Mandil Report. The subsidiarity clauses in European
legislation should be enough to maintain GdF's near monopoly status in the medium
term. Despite this, Gaz de France may already be making moves behind the scenes to
steer the transfer of ownership into the private sector. There are reports, officially
denied, that GdF has discussed with the French oil company Elf Aquitaine to purchase
some of its capital. If other French companies are similarly attracted by such offers,
then GdF may be fully privatised. On the other hand, a stock exchange flotation as was
done with British Gas in the UK seems unlikely.
The resources of gas available to France are scarce and, with the exception of the
deposits in the South-West of the country, supplies have had to be imported at higher
cost or subject to the normal commercial market forces. As a result GdF has had three
191
main preoccupations: its precarious finances; to secure supplies from outside France;
and to find markets. The French energy market remains dominated by nuclear power
generation. As a result Gaz de France appears a relatively timid organisation in
comparison to its larger sister organisation EdF. One of the exceptions to this is in
metering where GdF have a considerable influence on investment on new
communication technology. The multi-utility relationship of EdF-GdF services is
interesting in that it is a legacy of an integrated strategic national energy policy rather
than market forces, as it is in the UK.
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CHAPTER 10
CASE STUDY No.5:
WATER IN THE UK
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Any location in The United Kingdom is less than 120 kilometres from the sea, which
means that compared to many countries, there are no long rivers. Also the geology does
not permit large amounts of underground storage of water nor does it provide natural
aquifers. This reliance on surface water, which accounts for seventy per cent of public
resources, represents one of the most significant constraints to water supply in the UK.
The demand for surface running water has put particular pressure on the environment.
These geographical factors proved of great importance to the development of the public
water supply during the time of industrialisation at the end of the nineteenth century.
This may have been the reason for the gradual progression from local to central
administration ofwater resources in the UK over the past century (Barraque, 1995).
The regulation of water in the United Kingdom has regional variations. In Northern
Ireland, management has traditionally rested in the centralised control of the Ministry
of Northern Ireland, situated in London. In Scotland, on the other hand, three publicly
owned water authorities manage water. This case study however, will consider
principally the regulatory system operating in England and Wales, since this has gone
through most radical change in the past twenty years and contains ninety per cent of the
UK population. A briefer discussion will be conducted on the regulation in Northern
Ireland and Scotland.
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10.2 INFRASTRUCTURE
10.2.1 A BriefHistory
The 1945 Water Act brought together previous water legislation in a waterworks code
and encouraged amalgamation of water companies. A Government survey 30 years
earlier had identified 2,160 water undertakings, including 786 Local Authorities. By
1963 there were 100 Water Boards, 50 Local Authorities and 29 privately owned
statutory companies. The 1973 Water Act consolidated these Boards into 10 multi¬
purpose Regional Water Authorities whose role was to plan and control all uses of
water in each river catchment area. They had regulatory responsibilities for water
conservation, controlling pollution of inland and tidal water, land drainage, flood
control and fisheries, as well as for water supply and sewerage. One of the major by¬
products of this regionalisation process was to enhance the role of Central Government
at the expense of the Local Government in the management of water (Barnett, 1996:
ch.6).
Then, the management, disencumbered of Local Government control, had the freedom
to build large reservoirs in the headwaters of the valleys, on a forecast of demand that
was very optimistic. Meanwhile there was little investment in the purification and
treatment plants, which made the water system in UK one of the oldest in the world. As
a result The Water Act (1983) changed the organisational structure in preparation for
modernisation, refurbishment and final privatisation in 1989 (Barnett, 1996; Barraque,
1995 and Kinnersley, 1994).
Vignette I
"There were several reasons for privatising the industry. The most significant was
that the water industry had seen considerable under-investment in the public
sector over the previous decades due to financial constraints. By privatising the
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industry, the Government hoped also to privatise the required investment
programme. Another perceived advantage of privatisation was that the water
companies would have the benefit of longer regulatory cycles and would not be
used as political pawns. Since 1989 it has become obvious that privatisation has
not addressed the major issues affecting the water industry. The following three
points explain why. First, national assets (the water industry) were passed with
little change to the private sector at the time of privatisation. Second, it is
essentially public expenditure on the water industry that has been privatised.
Third, pricing under Government ownership was effectively a water tax and all
costs were passed straight through to the consumer. In the private sector, water
charges remain directly related to costs in a similar way. It can also be seen that a
history of the administration of water resources in the United Kingdom has been
a slow progression and a weakening of local control. Local Authorities have a
relatively small role to play in the management ofwater resources unlike in other
parts ofEurope."
(Source: Interviewee: Bob Sheldon, UKAMRA)
10.2.2 Economic Regulation
The basic structure of the water industry in England and Wales today was laid out in
the Water Act of 1989 (subsequently superseded by the Water Industry Act of 1991)
which addresses economic regulation of the industry, and the Water Resources Act
1991, which deals with the Environment. Under this legislation the 10 Water Service
Companies (WSCs) created by the 1973 Water Act were appointed as water supply and
sewerage undertakings. Each company is a wholly owned subsidiary of a water holding
company, which is a public limited company (Hall, 1998; Barnett, 1996 and
Kinnersley, 1994).
In 1973 there were also 29 independent water-only companies (the statutory water
companies) which had no sewerage functions at all, but in total provided water to
around twenty-five per cent of the population of England and Wales. Since 1989, 12
water companies have been involved in mergers and one has been taken over by a
water and sewerage company. So there are now only 21 water-only companies. Water
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companies have also been active in creating multi-utilities." This has obvious
advantages for reducing common administration and metering costs (Hall, 1998).
Since privatisation in 1989 there has been a substantial amount of investment in the
national network of mains and water treatment and sewerage services. This has been
necessary because of comparative neglect over many years by successive
Governments, and to meet the EU directive covering urban wastewater treatment
(UWWTD). In order to fund this investment, much of the cost has had to be passed on
to customers (Barnett, 1996).
Ofwat (the Office of Water Services) is a non-ministerial Government department for
which the Director General (the regulator) has responsibility for the economic
regulation, and to a lesser extent the social provisions of the industry. The Director
General is appointed for a fixed term by the Secretary of State for the Environment.
Ofwat is not subject to direction about its judgements relating to the industry, but must
report annually to the Secretary of State. The private companies pay its budget, each
paying a proportion equivalent to its turnover. This accounts for £9 million per year.
Ofwat has primary duties both to the regulated companies and to their customers. For
the companies it should ensure that:
The functions of a water and sewage company are properly carried out in all areas of
England and Wales; and ensure that the companies can finance their functions.. For
customers, the regulator should ensure that no undue preference is shown and there is
no undue discrimination in the way companies fix and recover charges. Other aspects
of customers' interests are protected, including quality of service and benefits from the
sale of land transferred to the companies at privatisation or acquired since then. If a
company acts against the public interest by misusing its monopoly position and fails to
11
e.g. Hyder (Welsh Water / South Wales Electricity) and United Utilities (North West Water / Norweb).
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accept the suggestions of the regulator, the regulator may refer that company to the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC). To take account of customers' interests
there is also the independent Water Consumers' Council (WCC).
Since there is little or no direct competition in the water industry, the regulator has
introduced 'yardstick' or comparative competition. This compares the performances of
the regional water companies against each other. The economic regulation of
companies relies on the RPI-X format (although the X factor is known as a 'K'). The K
covers the whole company (water supply and treatment as well as sewerage) in a
system known as basket tariffing. Each water company has its own K that is made up
of two parts, an efficiency factor 'X' and a quality factor, 'Q'. The reason for this two-
part formula is first to stimulate inefficient water companies to improve their
performance and second it is a recognition of the large capital expenditure programmes
that the water companies are having to undergo over the first ten years after
privatisation. Without recognition of this K factor, no companies would be able to
invest sufficient amounts. The regulator has the option to review the K factors after five
years (Hall, 1998; Bamett, 1996 and Kinnersley, 1994).
In order to implement this 'yardstick' competition in the industry and to take account of
the different factors that affect each water supplier, the Department of the Environment
(DoE) conducted an efficiency review in 1989. This compared costs for each supplier
with the factors that affected those costs. From the findings of the review, the water
suppliers were each allocated cost reduction targets. This process is not flawless. There
is great difficulty in the water industry in defining unit costs accurately, and accounting
for regional demographical and geographical variation. The distinct regional pattern of
K factors is largely due to the UWWTD. Under this directive, certain levels of sewage
collection and treatment must be provided. So for example, water companies with long
stretches of coastline in relation to population, such as Southern Water, had to spend
particularly large amounts installing new and additional treatment facilities, so the K
factor is higher. As a consequence, the X factor is serving to reduce real prices, whilst
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the Q factor allows for necessary increases. Without the desegregation of the K factor
into its components, its composition would have been largely hidden from the public,
probably resulting in general criticism (Barnett, 1996).
Vignette II
Despite this there are still concerns that the RPI+K formula is not succeeding in
the water industry:
"The increasing prices have been due to a system of cost pass-through.
Investment in new capital projects can be passed through to the customers with
an economic rate of return. This has led to accusations that the WSCs have placed
more emphasis on capital projects such as new reservoirs, purification and
treatment plants boosting their capital value (and as a consequence their return
on that capital) rather than use revenue expenditure in fixing leaks and installing
meters."
(Source: Interviewee: Bob Sheldon, UKAMRA)
In saying this, initial estimates of required capital expenditure made at
privatisation have generally not been met. The water companies have made
abnormally large returns relative to other companies in the FT-SE since
privatisation. For example, North West Water (now merged with Norweb to form
United Utilities) has handed £180m back to customers and shareholders since
privatisation. This suggests that: either the investment plans were too ambitious
or; too little emphasis has been placed on demand side management or; water
companies were able to take advantage of generous K factors and enjoyed larger
returns on capital employed. In practice, all these factors had a part to play.
"As a vertically integrated public utility service, the water industry is faced with
few risks compared with many other industries. As a consequence, the average
stock price of water companies is generally not expected to outperform FT-SE
significantly. Efficiency improvements made since privatisation should produce
steady profits for a water company, but if the regulator has access to sufficient
information to regulate that company tightly, then persistent out-performance of
FT-SE would not be expected. It can therefore be concluded that the regulator's
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lack of perfect foresight has contributed to the strong performance in water
stocks."
(Source: Interviewee: John Heathcock, Schlumberger)
There have also been suggestions that direct punitive action may be required where
water companies fail to provide basic services. In the summer of 1995, the UK water
industry was the subject of considerable controversy resulting from the widespread and
prolonged water usage restrictions following months of low rainfall. Whilst hose pipe
bans were common, some areas, notably parts of Yorkshire, were required to use stand-
pipes as water supplies were brought in from other regions by tanker. The controversy
centred on the high level of leakages in the infrastructure of water companies, whilst
some companies continued to make significant profits.
A further criticism of the periodic review process is that water companies can 'window
dress' their accounts and investment strategy in the year before a periodic review, to
make their investment requirements appear larger than they actually are, thus getting
than a larger K factor in the review.
10.2.3 Environmental Regulation
One of the shortcomings of price capping as a means of regulation is that there is no
direct incentive for improving quality of the product or service. This has generally been
left to two external agencies The Environment Agency (EA) and The Drinking Water
Inspectorate (DWI) (Hall, 1998 and Barnett, 1996).
The Environment Agency's duties and powers relate to: flood defences; water
resources; pollution control; fisheries; conservation and recreation; and navigation. The
Environment Agency has responsibilities for all rivers, reservoirs, estuaries, coastal
water up to three miles from the shoreline (and for migratory fish up to six miles from
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the shoreline) and water stored naturally underground. By the terms of the Water
Resources Act, these are all 'controlled waters' and it is an offence to cause any
polluting matter to enter these waters (Barnett, 1996).
The Environment Agency has the power to decide whether water quality in any place
meets the required standards and if not, to determine the most effective way to bring
about an improvement. It also has the power to set and enforce necessary quality
standards of discharges to all types of watercourse. It will also take action against
unauthorised pollution discharges and constantly monitors water quality all over
England and Wales. The Agency is also concerned with the general management of
water resources, including resource planning and the licensing and regulation of
abstractions from both ground-water and surface water. It is also involved in a
programme to alleviate low flows on a number of rivers, and regulates fisheries by a
system of licences that helps build up and conserve stocks both on rivers and in coastal
areas. Within its watercourses remit it maintains over 1,000km of sea-defence works
and many thousands of kilometres of river embankments (Barnett, 1996).
The water companies must supply wholesome water according to standards laid down
in the Water Supply Regulations of 1989. The Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI; part
of the DoE) ensures that water companies comply with these statutory duties. Where
standards have not been met, water companies are forced to enter into legally binding
undertakings to bring about the necessary improvements, for example by installing
additional treatment facilities (Barnett, 1996).
Vignette III
"It is important for the quality regulators to beware of being more demanding
than current regulations require. Although it may ultimately be desirable for the
water companies to exceed the requirements of the UWWTD and other quality
directives, making such quality improvements can be extremely costly. The water
supply and sewerage companies therefore have to balance exceeding regulatory
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requirements with the costs of doing so. Similarly, the quality regulators must
take into account the economic costs of their proposals when setting timetables for
compliance with EU directives."
(Source: Interviewee: Ronnie Yellon, Anglian Water)
Pollution and water quality have become highly politicised, and sensitive issues.
Thus it is important for the various regulators to co-operate and balance the
relative importance of their objectives. The water companies have, in the main,
borne the cost of meeting pollution requirements because of the difficulty of
controlling sources of pollution. However, this puts the regulator in an extremely
awkward position:
"Quality and pollution requirements are largely defined without reference to
water companies' ability to pay. This difficulty is increased when it is the
combined impact of a number of third parties that causes the pollution, even
although individually they may be following agreed standards. For example, a
number of farmers may be using a number of fertilisers and pesticides which
independently caused little damage but when combined form a major pollution
hazard."
(Source: Interviewee: Ronnie Yellon, Anglian Water)
The strategy of 'polluter pays' then becomes untenable since it is unfair to charge
an individual who is following agreed guidelines. However, it is possible to enforce
it in the situation where an industrial firm is discharging effluent into a river.
Such firms might be forced to ensure that all effluent reaches a certain quality
standard, or be given a certain level of pollutants that they are legally allowed to
discharge.
10.2.4 Scotland
In Scotland the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for fishing and ground drainage.
The Scottish Secretary State for the Environment is responsible for the rules for the
preservation of water resources, for the quality of rivers and estuaries. Up until 1994
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The Scottish water supply and sewerage services were run by Local Government and
organised by regional and island councils. In November 1994, Scotland's water and
sewerage system was reorganised into three public water authorities, East, North and
West. The new authorities are expected to provide efficient, cost-effective delivery of
water and sewage services and to ensure that they meet water quality and
environmental standards. A separate body called the Scottish Water and Sewerage
Customers' Council was established to represent consumers' interests and monitor the
authorities' performance. The other bodies of importance in the Scottish water industry
are The River Purification Boards, which monitor the environment for pollution and
compile water resources information (Bamett, 1996).
10.2.5 Northern Ireland
The water industry in Northern Ireland is split into a headquarters group and four
operational divisions that are organised by geography. The headquarters group is
responsible for legislation and planning and the four divisions perform day-to-day
sewerage services. Water pollution is administered by the DoE's environment service,
and drainage and flood protection by the Department of Agriculture. It is expected that
the Northern Ireland water industry will be reorganised, depending on the success of
the recently elected devolved parliament (Bamett, 1996).
10.2.6 Competition
The water industry is the most naturally monopolistic of the four utilities discussed in
this thesis. The introduction of competition has been seen to be unlikely by both
regulators and the Government, and therefore regulation of the operating functions of
the industry is far more important than the development of new competitors. The main
problem for the regulator in promoting competition in the water industry is the massive
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(and sunk) costs involved in setting up efficient infrastructures. Very few companies
would be willing to take the associated risks. Although, it might be possible to
encourage competition to some extent by developing a national carriage network.
Water supply companies could then compete for business, through access to the
network in a manner similar to electricity supply companies. However, this scenario
would require extensive monitoring and metering of companies providing water to the
national network, because water, unlike electricity, can be of varying qualities.
Nonetheless, it is also possible for Water Service Companies (WSCs), whose
boundaries touch, to compete for customers on the borders, and this is being
encouraged (Ofwat, 1995). Nonetheless, it is very difficult to envisage a Third Party
Access market developing as in the electricity, gas and telecommunications industries.
10.3 METERING
10.3.1 Methods ofMetering
There are two classifications of meters in the water industry; operational and revenue
meters. Operational meters are situated at reservoirs, treatment plants, booster stations
and borehole stations. They measure the input and output of water to the distribution
systems. Those are generally magnetic flow meters and measure an accuracy to plus or
minus half a percent. The distribution system is split into demand areas and most
companies have a networking demand profile, which is mapped on to computer
systems. Different losses, throughput, pressures and demands can be input so that
accurate forecasting can be calculated. For example Severn Trent Water have
something like 800 demand areas covering 7,000 square miles, consisting of 8 million
customers, and they have 3 million properties.
Revenue meters are used in or around the customers' premises. In England and Wales
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there are around 22 million billed properties consisting of 20.3 million domestic
premises and 1.7 million non-domestic premises. Of the domestic premises 1.8 million
(ten per cent) are metered and 18.5 million are unmetered (ninety per cent). Of non-
domestic premises seventy-nine per cent are metered.
Figure 14: Trend in per Capita Consumption of Water in Germany and England &
Wales
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Figure 14 shows that the trend for water consumption in England and Wales is on the
increase, with metered consumption increasing by 3.9 per cent over the last five years
and unmetered consumption increasing by a staggering 13 per cent over the same
period. It is quite sobering to consider that per capita consumption in Germany has
decreased by 8 per cent over the same period. Recent research by Mid-Kent Water
confirmed that metering is effective in curbing consumption in households using hose
pipes and sprinklers, although the research suggested that reduction in consumption
was nowhere near as significant in homes with a lower rateable value (Utility Week,
1997).
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Table 9 shows water consumption (by volume and by percentage) in the UK. Public
water supply accounts for over fifty percent of daily consumption with uses by industry
and power generation making up most of the rest in almost equal measure. Table 10
also provides some further statistics on other characteristics of the UK water network
such as leakage and demographic profiles.
Table 9: Water Supply by Sector (1994/95)
Sector Millions of Litres Per Day Per Cent
Public Water Supply 16,735 52
Industry 7,090 22
Power Generation 7,969 25
Agriculture 402 1
Total 32,916 100
Source: Ofwat (1997a)
Table 10: Consumption Patterns in the UK (1994/95)
Per Capita Consumption (litres per household per day) 144
Leakage per Domestic Connection (litres per connection per day) 243
Length ofMains per Domestic Connection (meters per connection
for 10m Supply Pipe)
29
Length ofMains per Domestic Connection (meters per connection
for 5m Supply Pipe)
24
Approximate Population per Domestic Connection 2.5
Metered Households 10 Per Cent
Source: Ofwat (1997a)
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Vignette IV
The introduction of metering in the water industry faces a number of hurdles.
From the water company's point of view changing from a rateable charging form
of pricing to one that is done by metrology introduces a number of risks. The way
that price setting works is that the introduction of metering affects the volatility of
a company's income:
"We (the WSCs) consequently face greater risks with metering. For example the
regulator has to take this into account in the cost of capital when financial ratios
which set 'K' are being considered. If metering is roaring ahead faster than we
anticipated then our volatility (cash flow is going to vary) is going to be greater
than first thought."
(Source: Interviewee: Ronnie Yellon, Anglian Water)
Therefore in the periodic reviews done by Ofwat the regulator and the water
companies have to agree a target for the number of households paying by meter
by a certain date:
"For example in 1994 Anglian Water agreed the installation of 365,000 new
meters by 2000."
(Source: Interviewee: Keith Edwards, Anglian Water)
The other issue is the customers' perception of metering. The Labour party prior
to the 1997 election was on the whole anti-metering. Its concerns were about the
relationship between metering and public health:
"There is a knee jerk tendency that people associate metering with public health
issues because of the demand effect ofmetering."
(Source: Interviewee: Ronnie Yellon, Anglian Water)
Also there will always be winners and losers when any form of pricing mechanism is
changed. In the case of water, the changing of a flat fee based on rateable value to one
based on the amount of water consumed will have considerable demographic
differences. A consumer who is in a low rateable value area and has high water
consumption will fair worst, while customers in high rateable value areas with low
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consumption will fair best.
Figure 15 shows actual and projected water meter uptake in England and Wales up to
2001. The attitude and policy towards metering varies from company to company.
Anglian Water has the maximum penetration of the household market with thirty-three
per cent compared with Portsmouth which has a penetration of 0.1%. In the non-
households market, Chester has the highest penetration with ninety-four per cent and
Bristol the least with fifty-nine percent. The variation in policy depends on a number of
factors both spatially a temporally.
Figure 15: Actual and Projected Water Meter Uptake in England and Wales
Year
Source: Hall (1998)
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Vignette V
Anglian Water is geographically the largest of the ten Regional Water Service
Companies of England and Wales:
"The region stretches from the Humber to the Thames and to Oxfordshire in the
West."
(Source: Interviewee: Keith Edwards, Anglian Water)
It has therefore a critical size in that it can gain economies of scale, which cannot
be achieved by smaller companies like Portsmouth. Anglian is also situated in the
driest part of the UK and has a large proportion of arable farming land in its
territory. This makes the water supply liable to nitrate run-off resulting in high
treatment costs. This all means that in Anglian Water's territory, water is a more
valued resource than it would be in the North ofEngland orWales:
As a consequence "Anglian Water had 600,000 meters installed by 1998 and plan
to have 1,600,000 by 2014."
(Source: Interviewee: Keith Edwards, Anglian Water)
On the other hand, companies such as United Utilities (North West Water) and
Hyder (Welsh Water) have very little interest in installing meters.
There is also variation due to customer perceptions:
"We have seen over the last few years a change of perception of meters. Quite a
few companies are installing them but I think that there are 'flavours of the;. •.
month'. The emphasis is different depending on the shorter term agenda and I
would suggest that it is political rather than regulatory. For example we (the
WSCs) have now got agreed mandatory leakage targets, which are largely
untenable and not based on anything realistic. Simply picking out one piece of the
jigsaw and placing a target on it for political capital are the sorts of issues we have
been talking about."
(Source: Interviewee: Ronnie Yellon, Anglian Water)
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Yorkshire Water, with some 2 million customers, has probably had the most
political flack to deal with over the last few years. It was this company's chief
executive who during the 1995 drought, advised his customers that they could
bath in one bowlful of water while taking his baths at his mother's house in a
neighbouring water authority area. Yorkshire does not have the problems of
Anglian with respect to agricultural contamination and also has a more healthy
rainfall than many regions. Yet it does have with trouble over meeting demand,
and it is politically and environmentally unfeasible to build more reservoirs. The
only practical solution, Yorkshire Water argue, is to install meters to control
demand. It therefore has around about 400,000 (about twenty per cent) meters in
installed in domestic premises.
(Source: Interviewee: Alan Addy, Yorkshire Water)
Severn Trent Water (with domestic meter penetration around sixteen per cent),
like Anglian Water have a policy to meter everyone. To some extent Severn Trent
shares some of the same environmental issues as Anglian and as time goes on
more attractive packages are being derived to encourage customers to install a
meter. "Up to about two years ago people had to pay to get their meter in, now
that is not the case."
(Source: Interviewee: Bob Sheldon, UKAMRA)
Every company has different policies about what types of meters are installed. In
Anglian's case there are two types of meters that are fitted for domestic
customers:
"Around ninety-five per cent are standard mechanical manual read meters placed
outside the customer's property. The other five per cent are meters put in
internally. For all of the internal meters they have a pulsed output with some kind
of remote reading device. On the commercial and industrial side, most of the
meters are mechanical, although some are 'solid state' meters, depending on the
application. For example, some of the largest consumers have a telemetry
connection. In Anglian Water the top hundred industrial customers have a link to
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its telemetry system and Anglian provide them with a download of consumption
information for their benefit. We (Anglian) are looking to extend that to some of
our other customers on our industrial side because we see that as an important
service."
(Source: Interviewee: Steve Marjot, Anglian Water)
Throughout the UK a meter only measures the volume ofwater which is used. No
maximum demand or flowrates are measured. On the 'solid state' industrial
meters 15 minute consumption is recorded, "so they (the customer) get their
meter reading plus a consumption profile." At this moment there is no 'time-of-
use' component for domestic customers. Traditionally water meters have been
installed in pits in the ground. This was for ease of access and for legal reasons,
namely that the stop-cock was in the street and if it was installed in the customer's
house it would be attached to the customer's own water supply network. There is
now a trend towards installing internal meters throughout the water industry.
"This is a reflection of increased customer focus we (a WSC) now have as a
company. Customers want it internally or they want it accessible, either in a
garage or in the side of a house so there is a reason for doing this." This also
means that it is closer to an electricity or telephone line if the reading needs to be
downloaded automatically.
(Source: Interviewee: Steve Marjot, Anglian Water)
10.3.2 Pricing
In The Water Act 1989, it states that charges for water are prohibited with reference to
rateable value after 31st March 2000. Immediately Labour gained power it held a 'Water
Summit' (19th May 1997) where the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott announced
Labour's new policy on water:
"The Government will review the system for charging of water including future use of
rateable values and metering policy. The review will cover debt recovery arrangements
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(including disconnection) and the use of prepayment units." (Hall, 1998)
Despite this statement the UK Government still looks to water companies to develop
tariff structures that encourage the efficient use ofwater such as, rising block, seasonal,
summer surcharge, time of day, or maximum demand charges using marginal cost
pricing facilitated by metering technology. These principles are supported by Ofwat
who believe that customers' bills should broadly reflect the costs that the customer
imposes on the system (Ofwat, 1997b). Thus tariffs should be set with reference to the
continuing cost of augmenting supply. In order to do this the Director General believes
that metering is the fairest method, but Ofwat does not go as far as advocating universal
metering.
The pricing of water and sewerage services depends on a number of factors including:
whether it is drinking water; water for industry or; for agriculture etc. Independent of
what water is being used for, the pricing process is the same either by rateable value or
where there is a meter, by volume consumed. If metering is not used there is a flat fee,
which is proportional to the price of the valuation of the domestic property. Since
ninety per cent of domestic consumers do not have a meter they are charged in this
way. The Government and the regulator are keen to encourage alternative methods of
charging. Since 1990, when the domestic rating system ended, most water companies
have used meters as the method of charging newly built properties which have never
been assigned a rateable value.
Vignette VI
Metering is often regarded as the fairest way of charging each household for
water and sewerage services. The reason why meters are not used at present is
that the cost of installing them makes them uneconomic, except for new homes or
when water services to a household are being overhauled. Most commercial and
industrial customers are metered already, and all households can opt for a meter
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to be installed at their own expense. There is a standing charge to cover the fixed
costs and a price, which is proportional to the volume ofwater consumed. This is
applied to domestic consumers who have meters, and to most industrial
consumers. Many industrial companies also use water that is treated but not
drinkable. The cost is generally split about fifty/fifty between water supply and
wastewater. In 1994/95 the average bills for customers with meters were £96 for
drinking water and £102 for sewerage. There are also a number of rules that
water companies have to apply when they are setting their rates. One is to do with
what a water company can charge its customers which is known as 'the
differential'. This is a fixed relationship between the average tariff for a
measured, and the average tariff for an unmeasured customer. It is a tariff basket,
which ensures that companies are not discriminating unfairly between customers
who are metered and customers who are not metered.
(Source: Interviewee: Ronnie Yellon, Anglian Water)
Due to the low penetration of metering, it is now clear that rateable value charging will
not be abandoned in 2000. Two alternatives to metering are available, either a tariff for
a zone of habitation or a uniform levy for each source. Ofwat has left it to each
company to introduce its own system after consultation with their customers.
Nevertheless Ofwat has made it clear that it prefers the installation ofwater meters.
Vignette VII
The debate about the merits ofmetering within companies continues:
"I think in tariffing in the future there will be more segmentation e.g. more tariffs
based around lifestyle packages. I happen to think that the psychological contract
between the organisation and the customer is different under a metering
relationship. That means that you can develop a number of tariffing capabilities."
(Source: Interviewee: Ronnie Yellon, Anglian Water)
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10.3.3 Metering and the Environment
Since privatisation environmental factors have become a dominant feature. As a
response to the drought of 1995-96, The Department of the Environment published its
Water Resources and Supply, Agenda for Action. The report covered inputs from the
Government, The Environment Agency, Ofwat, the Regional Water Companies,
manufacturers and customers. It also recommended an extended introduction of
metering, the development of more sophisticated tariff structures, to further consider
customers' security of supply and to take every opportunity to use water wisely.
Since the 1995 drought some mandatory measures have been taken throughout England
and Wales. Everyone using a sprinkler watering system and/or who has a swimming
pool has to have a water meter installed. Supplementary levies, and even compulsory
metering, are operated in some areas for the use of hose pipes as well. There is also a
potential benefit (at presently unrealised) for separately metering hoses and sprinklers.
By definition hoses and sprinklers should incur no wastewater treatment costs if cost
reflective pricing is taken to its inevitable conclusion. On the other hand reducing the
cost of garden watering does not encourage the reduction in demand nor seems socially
desirable.
The key area is how you pay for the growth in the demand for water. The Department
of the Environment has promoted a methodology for paying for investment. That is to
say that all the balancing of supply and demand has to be on an optimised basis. The
Ofwat approach meanwhile is to say that you are very unlikely to get money for
investment on new capital resources until you have demonstrated that you have looked
at all the other elements in the operational mix (Ofwat, 1996).
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Vignette VIII
"Ofwat is currently very interested in the principle of long run marginal costing
but the practical reality today where you do not have sufficient metering
penetration it is a little bit like 'Alice in Wonderland' really."
(Source: Interviewee: Ronnie Yellon, Anglian Water)
The environment is more fundamental in water than in energy so a key player in
the water industry is the environmental regulator. Nevertheless, some WSCs feel
that the role that the Environment Agency plays is a rather ambiguous one. The
Environment Agency's raison d'etre is different to that of the water companies,
Ofwat and even the Drinking Water Inspectorate. The EA's purpose is to protect
the environment for everyone (recreation, wildlife etc.) often laid down in
European Rules. This infuriates some water company managers:
"In our research to find out what customers want we (the WSCs) try to produce a
balanced process, but we have a lot of obligations, which have nothing to do with
our customers' wishes decided for us by Brussels. There is a little bit of a political
deficit there."
(Source: Interviewee: Ronnie Yellon, Anglian Water)
Nevertheless when it comes to metering the Environmental Agency backs its
development particularly with regard to demand management and water conservation
issues.
10.3.4 The Social Implications ofWater Metering
A number of studies have been carried out to discover whether increased metering
penetration would endanger vulnerable customers (Ofwat, 1992 and The Utilities
Journal, 1998). It turns out that most socially vulnerable customers benefit from lower
bills if sensitive 'time of use' charging is imposed, compared to the present system
based on rateable value. Although, clearly some households with medical conditions
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such as renal dialysis and incontinence are adversely affected. So it is suggested that
cross-subsidies in water tariffs or the social security system would be needed protect
some customers.
Another social issue is the possibility of installing prepayment metering for water
consumption. This is widely used in the electricity and gas industries (see sections 6.3.6
and 8.3.4) but there are concerns about household hygiene if such devices are used in
water. Indeed the Water Consumers' Council (WCC) still have reservations over
widespread metering. It suggests that more money should be invested in water saving
appliances. For example, in the UK the average toilet flushes 9-13 litres compared to 3
litres in Singapore. Improvement in areas such as this, it is claimed by the WCC,
should take preference over metering.
10.3.5 The Management ofMeter Operations and Data Collection
The low level ofmeter penetration means that the concept of a meter operation and data
collection function is not yet 'up and running' in water as in electricity and gas (see
sections 6.3.4, 6.3.5 & 8.3.5).
There are two things that make communications in the water industry unique. Meters
are usually outside customers' premises in a hole in the ground and often they are some
distance from a power source for electronic communications. In addition, out of all the
utilities it is particularly water managers who see that data collection is not part of the
core business in water.
Vignette IX
"Obviously the electricity model is one of hiving off the meter reading process
from the core business and placing it for competitive tender. That does not
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happen in the water industry, partly because there are not enough metered
customers to make it a viable model at the moment. If there was universal
metering that would be a model that a regulator would consider and bring into
force by legislation. The feeling is that it may happen in the long term, but it is
unlikely within the next five to ten years, because there are not enough meters on
the ground."
(Source: Interviewee: Steve Marjot, Anglian Water)
Nevertheless water companies have certain advantages when it comes to meter
operation. Since they do not have a large meter operation function, they are
looking at meter operation and data collection with fresh eyes:
"You see they have nothing to lose, since metering penetration is so low there is
not a stranded assets problem. A lot comes down to the culture of the company
and what the company see themselves as. Someone like Yorkshire Water have just
gone out to tender for meter reading services. Other companies such as Severn
Trent Water have now contracted out ofmeter installation, pipe work and billing.
Then you have got other companies (WSCs) who take the view that there is no
way that they will out-source their metering services."
(Source: Interviewee: Craig Howarth, ABB Kent)
10.3.6 Electronic Metering and Communications
Electronic metering and automated communications systems are still in their infancy in
the water industry. During 1999 Anglian Water intend to install ten thousand
Automatic Meter Reading (AMR) modules using the 184MHz radio wave band. In this
plan there are two key technological partnerships. One is with the water metering
company ABB Kent. Although the initial meters being installed are purely mechanical,
at a cost of £18 a piece, Kent are in the process of developing a 'solid state' meter. The
second partnership is with the software company Logica. Logica is the developer of the
communications side of the AMR system. Most of the AMR devices use touch read
systems (see Section 12.4.2). In water meters all that is required is an inductive meter
so that batteries on the water meter are not needed. Another reading probe is placed up
against the inductive pad, and it supplies the power to the meter for the time that it is
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being read.
Vignette X
Components of Anglian Water's business case for the development, run in five
strands: service to customers; improved revenue management; competitive
advantage; demand management; and operations management. Also Anglian see
that many information technology systems such as the billing and customer
service, asset management, work management, tariffing, and distribution
automation systems need to interact with AMR. Anglian Water have forecast that
the AMR solution is thirty-seven per cent cheaper over a net present value of
twenty-five years.
(Source: Interviewee: Keith Edwards, Anglian Water)
In general, metering technology in water uses simple mechanical devices but there
is a 'solid state' meter on the market for domestic customers. A company called
Fusion, owned by Severn Trent Water has developed this and some water
companies are testing them. Fusion meters have a 'touch read' system called
Talisman and they are fitting those at a rate of about 3,000 a week. Hand-held
technology has been used successfully in Yorkshire for the past seven years and
has been based on Itron (a communications software company) equipment.
Currently the Talisman meter reading system from Fusion is one of the few
capable of 'touch' reading meters from multiple manufacturers while Ramar, in
Europe, has the largest share of the low power' radio-based Automatic Meter
Reading systems.
(Source: Interviewee: Bob Sheldon, UKAMRA)
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10.4 SUMMARY
There is very little prospect for a competitive market developing in water. Therefore the
decision to privatise the industry in 1989 was primarily a political one, namely, to
divert investment from the public to private sector. Price regulation by 'yardstick'
competition does present some buffer to monopolistic practices. However the major
concern regarding the regulation of the water industry in England and Wales is its
centralised nature and lack of local democratic accountability either in the economic,
social or environmental sphere.
Metering in water will continue to increase. There will be about 30 per cent penetration
in households and 95 per cent penetration of non-households in five years. The key
issues are fairness to customers over pricing, demand management and the
environment. The decision that cost reflective pricing should replace rates as the basis
for setting prices is crucial to the development of metering. Most of the pressure to
install metering comes from the economic and environmental lobbyists while consumer
committees are yet to be convinced of the merits of metering, over the installation of
water efficient appliances. It seems that some form of hybrid system based on
consumption for customers with meters and one on a flat fee for those without meters,
will continue for some time.
With respect to automation, the water. industry presents tremendous opportunities.
Since new meters are being installed, additional features can be developed at marginal
cost. Here there is an opportunity for multi-utility metering and even multimedia
linkups.
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CHAPTER 11
CASE STUDY No.6:
WATER IN FRANCE
11.1 INTRODUCTION
With 57 million inhabitants occupying over half a million square kilometres, France is
completely self sufficient in water resources. With high mountains, important
underground aquifers and long rivers, water plays a key role in the French economy.
Sixty per cent of the rain evaporates and the rest flows out in rivers. Of this, two thirds
flow out steadily and one third in floods. In effect, France has around 100km' per
annum of water that is largely at its disposal to cover the consumption needs for its
population. The circulation from neighbouring countries is relatively insignificant with
14km3 entering (chiefly the Rhone basin), and 16 km3 leaving, the French borders.
However, the volume obtained from Belgium is vital for the Artois-Picardy region.
These figures exclude the Rhine, which represents 30 km3. This resource is of little
importance to France but is essential for Germany and the Netherlands (Barraque,
1995: pp.111-112).
This rich resource has regional variations. In Brittany for example, the presence of
granitic rock types prevents underground storage, thus presenting problems associated
with soil erosion. By contrast, the Mediterranean regions are dry, while the South-West
requires extensive irrigation. There are also urban requirements, such as the Parisian
region that derives most of its water and sewerage needs from the Seine, which is a
relatively small river. It is therefore necessary to obtain supplies from neighbouring
river courses such as the Eure and the Loire. Thus, water conservation is an important
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factor. This case study will first consider the French water infrastructure and its
regulation. It will then go on to examine the role that metering technology plays in the
management of the industry.
11.2 INFRASTRUCTURE
11.2.1 Historical context
In France, the right for water is derived from Roman Law. In the Renaissance and the
epoque classique, water resources were split into four categories: closed water (lakes
and reservoirs); underground water resources; running water which was used for
commercial transport; and running water which was used for domestic and communal
consumption. After the industrialisation of the nineteenth century, laws enacted in 1898
and 1935 imposed tighter restrictions on the roles of each party in relation to the use
and disposal of water. The rights of different parties using water resources for different
means were defined. For example, industrial, transport and recreational uses were
recognised, and compensation for the infringement of others rights was developed. So
the notion that the polluter pays, is substituted in France by a notion of communal
solidarity administered by the State. In general, it is viewed that water is inappropriate
for private ownership, but the management is placed in private hands. This is not to
deny that there have been pressures on the system over the years. Evidence of this is
that further Laws were enacted in 1964 and 1992, and these have recognised the
increasing diversity of water usage and environmental needs. Water quality targets for
each watercourse have been developed and the co-ordination of the users of the water
systems has been introduced. The theme to this continued evolution is that water
resources are seen as a common heritage for the nation, and the power, if at all possible
for their maintenance, should be left in the hands of the local communities (Barraque,
1995).
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11.2.2 Regulation
France is a centralised democratic republic with a regional representation. In other
words, in principle the municipalities retain a lot of sovereignty, but at the same time
they have not always the means to carry out their economic or environmental plans.
This historical tension has resulted in both central and local management of water and
intermediate liaison between the ninety-five mainland departments. In another respect,
there is very good clarification of the notion of historic public service which permits
the delegation of the operation of these facilities to private companies thus introducing
the rigour of business methods and above all, supplying the expertise of water
engineers. This decentralisation is marked by a durability and security of supply, which
has a mixture of local accountability and private enterprise acting within the framework
of the State (Barraque, 1995).
The structure of the French water industry is somewhat complicated by a demographic
and geographic split between the management of water, namely the administrative
region and the drainage basin, both of which may cover different overlapping areas.
The day-to-day operations is the responsibility of the Local Authority while central co¬
ordination is carried out by the State under the direction of the Department of the
Environment. This department is responsible for the advising the regions about water
management such as conservation of aquatic life, water quality and pollution control, as
well as international co-operation and judicial affairs (Ofwat, 1997a; Barraque, 1995
and DTI, 1990).Under the direction of the Ministry of The Environment (DIREN) the
Services Regionaux d'Amenagement des Eaux (SRAE) are responsible for setting
minimum quality standards on wastewater, drinking water and bathing beaches.
Although responsible for setting standards they are not responsible for policing these
standards which is left to the DIREN itself. The system has the advantage of being
close to the ground in that it is administered at a local level but it tends to lack rigour
particularly in policing. For example, there are only 600 inspectors for 550,000 water
establishments of which only 150,000 are the responsibility of the Ministry of the
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Environment. The remainder are the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry (DRIRE)
and the Ministry of Agriculture. The Services d'Assistance Technique a l'Explotation
des Stations d'Epuration (SATESE) inspect the purification stations and this function
accounts for significant expertise employed by the State. Indeed the State has
subsidised a lot of the improvement in water purification in the past. But, since 1975
the State has taken less interest, insisting that the financing of projects should be
derived from the users of the facilities. Nevertheless the Fonds National Pour le
Development des Adductions d'Eau (FNDAE) is present to fund any non cost effective
projects, especially in rural areas. With the quality of water having been gradually
improved over the past twenty years particularly in the reduction of urban pollutants,
attention now has spread to pollutants caused by agro-fertilisers. Contamination of
ground water by these fertilisers is a significant problem in places like Brittany (DTI,
1990).
To oversee the environmental regulation of a drainage basin as a whole, VAgencies de
Bassins (AdB) were created in 1964. These groups recognise the need for some
administration on a geographical basis and work a non-coercive basis with the Local
Authorities. There are six authorities; Artois-Picardie, Sein-Normandie, Loire-
Bretagne, Rhin-Meuse, Rhone-Mediterranee-Corse and Adour-Garonne. They are
made up on a tripartite basis: consisting of users' representatives (Domestic, Industrial,
and Agriculture); Public Authorities; and the different levels of administration both
public and private. To supplement this, there is a President for each of L'Agencies de
Bassins who is appointed by the State. They are concerned with issues that affect the
entire water system and they adopt a five-year programme of action. They are neither
responsible for policing the system (like the environmental authority in the UK) nor
overseeing capital expenditure (as in some parts of Germany). In France these issues
are seen as responsibilities of the State. They are the administrative body that lies
between the Local Authorities and the State, and they co-ordinate the pollution
standards and decide on matters of water consumption and payment. In the traditional
French republican method of governing, the standards and rulings are arbitrated for.
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and legislated at, State level. The funding of the AdB is achieved through the collection
of a levy on the abstraction of water and the final price of water charged to domestic
and industrial users. On planning, the Agencies are required to devise programmes for
the best use of water resources, through a system of data collection, which includes
demographic as well as technical resource surveys. The Agencies advise communities
(of all sizes) on their proposals; but they are not responsible for the award of contracts,
this responsibility, which rests with the community or business on whose behalf the
work is being carried out (Barraque, 1995 and DTI, 1990).
Vignette I
The AdB actions are limited due to the lack of their legislative power. For
example, the needs of Electricite de France and the large amount of water
required in its nuclear and hydro-electric generation programme are outwith
their scope. The AdBs are therefore often subjugated by other interest groups
such as Industry or Agriculture who have direct links with the Government.
Below the AdBs are found the water supply and sewage treatment authorities.
These are the Local (i.e. municipal or departmental) Authorities, which normally
manage the water supply system on a day to day basis. This is usually done
directly, but some authorities will contract the management out to private
companies.
The procedure for deciding on new works involves both the Local Authorities and
the AdB. The Agency, on the advice from other bodies (such as those supervising
agriculture or housing) will consider the needs of a community within its area;
proposals are then discussed with the municipality. The mayor or municipal
committee, having taken independent advice, then decides if the work should go
ahead. This would then go out to tender by the municipality. Bids are considered
on a technical basis (subject to advice from the Agency, consultants and from the
other bodies mentioned above) and on a commercial basis, taking into account
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factors introduced by the client; these will normally include consideration of other
funds available.
(Sources: Interviewees: Jean Gasc, SLE; Lisette Provencher, SLE; Frank Texier,
CGE; Jean-Louis Ganion, CGE and Francos Paquet, CGE)
The most important development in legislation is the recognition in recent years of a
balance between economic and environmental uses and the emergence of an integrated
plan. The 1964 law recognised the need to act against pollution and impose quality
standards. With a law enacted by the French Parliament in 1976, the protection of
nature became a priority in that any economic development required a detailed
consideration of the environment. In 1984 there was a fishing law which considered the
migration of fish and the need of industry to take account of this. A further law enacted
in 1987 detailed the insurance requirements for natural catastrophes such as inundations
and floods. Finally after many years of preparation, the law in 1992 brought together
many of the themes developed over the past thirty years. It involved the amount of
water that could be extracted, the amount to be paid and whether it was for private or
communal use. It defined zones of autonomous purification and where purification has
to be carried out by a number of Local Authorities. It also tightened the guidelines for
prosecuting local mayors for illegal pollutants (Barraque, 1995).
11.2.3 The Public Municipalities and the Private Companies
In France, like nearly all countries in Europe, but unlike the UK, the local public
authority is responsible for water supply. The authorities are large in number and are
very small in size. It is these 36,400 communes who are responsible, or more
accurately the local councillors, who are responsible for water supply and waste
treatment in France. These originated from the old parish councils, 'societes de
citoyens', which were transformed into communes in 1793 after the Revolution. Of the
36,400 communes in 13,500 administration districts their water supply is autonomous,
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while the remainder are consolidated into around 2,000 inter-communal syndicates.
Many of the small municipalities cannot support the costs ofwater resources, therefore
they associate in syndicates or delegate to private companies. The latter have formed a
professional association, the Syndicate Professional des Distributeurs d'Eau (SPDE).
What usually happens is that each municipality associates in a syndicate and then the
syndicate delegates to a private company. Another reason for consolidating and
contracting out is technology. Small municipalities cannot afford to spend money on
research and development and relying on a private operator means that you are relying
on a strong engineering and business structure. Nonetheless the notion of local public
accountability is of prime importance in the French water industry. This contrasts with
the more centralised approach to the supply of gas and electricity (see chapters 7 and
9). Thus it is the communes themselves, not Central Government, who decide whether
to operate their own water authority or to subcontract private companies to operate their
facilities on their behalf (DTI, 1990).
One of the characteristics of the French water industry is the existence of large private
groups who invest in capital expenditure and manage and run the facilities on behalf of
the Local Authorities. The comparison with the rest of Europe is striking. Although the
major conurbations such as Paris, Lyons, Toulouse, Lille/Roubaix/Tourcoing all have
their own municipal supplies, around seventy per cent of water supply, and around
forty-seven per cent of sewage treatment in France is operated by private sector firms
(DTI, 1990).
Vignette II
"It is not a franchising out system of regulation," water company managers insist,
"we are a large subcontractor who supply many communes and syndicates. In
our mind it is not deregulation." The municipalities and syndicates create
committees containing different interest groups. Nevertheless one factor is of
prime importance and that is: "the municipality must have a balanced budget for
water."
(Source: Interviewee: Jean Gasc, SLE)
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For the seventy per cent of communes or syndicates who contract out their water
supply there are many forms of contract.
La concession is the full delegation of all work which includes operation and
capital investment ofwater supply and waste treatment. A long length of time, (a
contract covering twenty to thirty years) is usually needed to cover the repayment
of all the capital investment. At the end of the stipulated time period the capital
assets will be the property of the municipality:
"There are very few contracts like these in France, maybe only about three or
four."
(Source: Interviewee: Frank Texier, CGE)
The most common contract is Vaffermage. This is for a contract for about twelve
years. The private partner is responsible for supplying water to the customer and
in some cases wastewater treatment. Meanwhile the municipality has to pay for
any capital expenditure and the customers pay for these facilities out of their
Local Authority rates. Most affermage involve the private water company sending
and collecting bills directly to and from the customer. La jurance is a type of
affermage where the water bill is paid by the municipality to the private company.
La regie is the name given to the water authority where the facilities are run by
the municipality.
Some contracts are a mixture of the above:
"La regie intresse is an example of a contract in the Parisian region which is a
mixture of everything. In fact it is a cross between I'affirmage and la concession.
The difference is the financial instruments used in paying back investment in
capital projects and operation of the system."
(Source: Interviewee: Frank Texier, CGE)
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Table 11: Market Share ofWater Supply in France
Operator Per Cent
Compagnie Generale des Eaux 36
Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux 18
CISE-SAUR (Groupe Bouygues) 16
Total Operated in the Private Sector 70
Total Operated in the Public Sector 30
Source: DTI (1990)
Table 12: Market Share ofWater/Sewage Treatment in France
Operator Per Cent
Compagnie Generale des Eaux 22
Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux 16
CISE-SAUR (Groupe Bouygues) 9
Total Operated in the Private Sector 47
Total Operated in the Public Sector 53
Source: DTI (1990)
There has been a major rationalisation of the private water companies over the past ten
years. In 1990 there were five water companies, today there are three water companies
in France. Compagnie Generale des Eaux (CGE) is the largest, with around 36 per cent
of the water supply and 25 per cent of the water treatment market. The second is Suez-
Lyonnaise des Eaux (SLE) with around 18 per cent and 16 per cent of the supply and
sewerage market respectively. CISE-SAUR a subsidiary of Groupe Bouygues is the
third supplier with 16 per cent and 9 percent of the respective markets. Tables 11 and
12 show the relative market shares in water supply and wastewater treatment.
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Compagnie Generate des Eaux (CGE), is the ultimate multi-utility. As a group it
consists of over 2,000 consolidated subsidiaries, who all serve the needs of Local
Authorities. It is the biggest of its kind in the world. The group operates in eight
sectors, water and waste-water treatment, energy, waste management, passenger
transport, building and construction, urban and property development, communications
and health-care. Its subsidiary, Omnium de Traitements et de Valorisation (OTV),
designs, builds and operates water production and wastewater treatment plants both in
France and abroad. The group has four major subsidiaries in the UK, Three Valleys
Water Services pic (formed in 1991 by the merger of the Lee Valley, Colne Valley and
Rickmansworth water companies), North Surrey, Tendring Hundred and Folkestone
and District. CGE also have interests in the energy and communications sectors in the
UK (Barnett, 1996).
During the nineteen-nineties Lyonnaise des Eaux diversified like CGE into public
services. Lyonnaise des Eaux, formally a public limited water and environmental
services company, merged with the construction group Dumez in 1992 to form
Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez. This company then merged again with the Belgian public
service giant Suez, to form Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux (SLE). Lyonnaise has greater
representation abroad than CGE, with interests in Spain, the United States, the United
Kingdom, Italy, Germany and of course Belgium. It has stakes in over forty water
distribution companies, some fifteen water treatment companies and over 40
wastewater treatment companies. Lyonnaise des Eaux operates 15 regional centres in
France, and in the UK owns the Essex and Suffolk Water Company, North East Water,
and Northumbrian Water. SLE's other interests also include the supply of energy to the
municipalities of Grenoble, Monaco and Strasbourg (Barnett, 1996).
CISE-SAUR is the third distributor and has its major presence in the small rural
villages of the South-West of France. Groupe Bouygues, which is a public works
company, formed CISE-SAUR during the nineteen-nineties by combining a number of
the smaller water companies in France. Founded in 1933, SAUR (Societe
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d'Amenagement Urbain et Rural) joined the Bouygues Group in 1984 and in 1997
Bouygues and SAUR acquired an eighty per cent stake in CISE from Saint-Gobain.
SAUR's interests in the UK include Mid-Southern and South East Water (Barnett,
1996).
Table 13: French Interests in UK Water Companies
French Company UK Company Stake %
Compagnie Generale des Eaux Bristol 30
Folkestone & Dover 74
Mid Kent 20
North Surrey 99
South Staffordshire 30
Tendring Hundred 90
Three Valleys 100
Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux Essex & Suffolk 79
North East 80
Northumbrian Water 100
CISE-SAUR (Groupe Bouygues) Mid-Southern 100
South East 100
Source: Bamett (1996)
11.2.4 Environment
The water industry in France currently faces a number of environmental concerns.
Solving the problem of denitrification is expensive and not fully effective on a large
scale. In 1984 (the latest available report) analysis showed that whilst the number of
229
users taking water with more than 100 mg/1 of nitrates had been reduced, the number of
rural users affected by concentrations of between 50 mg/1 and 100 mg/1 was on the
increase (DTI, 1990).
The extent of micro-pollutants - oil deposits, organic and inorganic chemicals, heavy
metals etc. - found in some water courses is also high. Despite serious attempts by
industry to control waste, it does from time to time cause a serious hazard to water
supplies. Coastal water pollution also presents a problem to the French authorities; the
Ministry of the Environment favours land-based treatment of wastes or a pipeline
extension system (pumping waste into deeper water currents) to replace the present
widely used system, of pumping waste onto surface water too close to shore (DTI,
1990).
Perhaps the most significant environmental issue is the seemingly low level of sewage
treatment - which according to some figures averages, on a nation-wide basis, 34.5 per
cent. This figure can be somewhat explained by the feature that France is a more rural
population than some of its near neighbours. The low density in population also means
that France has the highest number of septic tanks in Europe and the highest number of
water treatment plants (more than 12,000). Some progress has been made on this with
the recent completion of wastewater treatment systems for the Mediterranean coastal
towns; but no statistical evidence is yet available to show that an improvement in a
traditionally bad area will significantly alter this percentage (Barraque, 1995).
It would seem that much remains to be done. Investment in equipment for the water
supply industry steadily fell during the nineteen-eighties when the proportion of the
water industry's share of public works has fallen from 19 per cent to 15 per cent. But
the introduction of European standards, the need to further extend the network of
sewage collection, and the need to replace ageing equipment (a large percentage of
installations were completed in the five years following the AdBs' creation in 1964) has
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resulted in increased investment during the nineteen-nineties (DTI, 1990).
11.3 METERING
11.3.1 Abstraction Charges
There are three classes of water meters in the supply chain in France. These are
production water meters, distribution water meters and the customers' water meters.
Water initially has to be abstracted from a source, which is usually an underground
aquifer or a reservoir. There are production water meters at this point and all suppliers
have to pay a levy for abstraction which goes to fund I'Agencies de Bassins. Once the
water is abstracted it goes through a water treatment plant, then into a storage tank
where distribution meters meter the water. The water is then supplied to the customers'
premises where it is again metered. Usually the meter position is outside the house. In
some instances there is one meter for one property, but often in France there is one
communal meter for a block of flats. In the latter case the bill is sent to the
administrator of the services to the flat who pays the account for all the residents. The
administrator then charges each individual their share (Ofwat, 1997a).
Most data about water demand are derived from the volumes abstracted, which all
water users of a basin have to declare to their AdB. Since the 1992 water law, all
ground water abstractions above 8 m3 per hour must be declared. Agencies check the
users' declarations through surveys and through site visits (meter reading). Funds and
personnel allocated to controls are however, very limited. In France, metering is
generalised at the property level, for industry and for drinking water. Abstraction data
that come from water utilities and industries are thus rather imprecise, while those
concerning farming are even less accurate. Many small farmers who irrigate have not
yet installed a meter, nor do they declare their water intakes.
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Vignette III
Abstraction charges, which help fund resource protection programmes, are
levied. Also, reducing leakage can reduce abstraction charges:
"There is a peculiarity in France for irrigation. In the past, farmers who sink
boreholes in their fields for the exploitation of water were not monitored. So the
AdBs now give a seventy-five percent grant to install metering to electronically
monitor this. There is also a strategy for the replacement of production water
meters every seven years. L'Agencies de Bassins want to have good water meters.
So if abstractors do not change these meters after seven years then they are liable
to a tax."
(Source: Interviewee: Francos Paquet, CGE)
11.3.2 Pricing
Since public supply is decentralised in France, both in terms of distribution units and in
terms of economic control, very few centralised data exist on water price structures and
levels, and on technical description of existing infrastructures (including level of
leakage). Sanitary control of water utilities is organised at the scale of ninety-five
French metropolitan departments (plus five departments overseas), by the field services
of the ministry of public health. So centralised data in that field are also rare. Data from
the Syndicate Professional des Distributeurs d'Eau (SPDE) are also not accessible to
researchers. Concerning public supplies (covering the remaining thirty per cent of the
population), the situation is even worse, since there are no national statistics available.
Some data about all undertakings (private and public) can be derived from the office of
the Ministry of Agriculture who manage les Fonds National Des Adductions d'Eaux
(FNDAE) tax. Through the collection of that tax, the ministry keeps a record on all the
public water supply undertakings in France (DTI, 1990).
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Table 14: Water Supply by Sector in France (1994)
Sector Millions of Litres Per
Day
Per Cent
Public Water Supply 16,249 15
Industry 10,833 19
Power Generation 70,723 63
Agriculture 13,619 12
Total 111,424 100
Source: Ofwat (1997a)
Table 15: Consumption Patterns in France (1994)
Per Capita Consumption (litres per household per day) 152
Leakage per Domestic Connection (litres per connection per day) 222
Length ofMains per Domestic Connection (meters per connection
for 10m supply pipe)
53
Length ofMains per Domestic Connection (meters per connection
for 5m supply pipe)
48
Approximate Population per Domestic Connection 4.4
Metered Households 99 Per Cent
Source: Ofwat (1997a)
FNDAE and SPDE statistics do not give a detailed breakdown of the volumes
abstracted by various categories of users served. They usually first distinguish between
raw water sales and drinking water sales. For drinking water sales, only two categories
of users are separated, customers using more than 6000 m3/year are called 'big
customers' (gros domestiques). 'Big customers' include large social housing buildings
(with many flats connected to one meter), which are residential users. Conversely,
domestic customers include small businesses, commercial activities, minor farming and
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individual users. The lack of more detailed data on water demand comes from the
commercial status of water suppliers. For instance, this status forbids them to sell
quantities of potable water at different prices to two users of a different type (i.e. an
industrial premises and a large condominium would get the same rebate if they are in
the same category of users). The suppliers have never yet felt the need to survey the
detailed demand of various types of users, and their national statistics separate only
'large' and 'small' users. There may be more precise data available here and there, but
they are not recorded at centralised levels. Tables 14 and 15 show water supply and
consumption patterns by sector.
Vignette IV
The French definition of 'domestic customers' is therefore very different from the
definition of 'residential customers' in UK analysis. This is a source bias for
international comparisons of factors influencing the 'domestic' component of
public utilities water demand. Another methodological issue is the importance of
secondary summer homes in France, some of which are rented or even owned by
foreigners. This does introduce a bias, since France is one of the first countries in
the world in terms of tourist attraction.
Almost all households are metered. Eighty-eight per cent of households (100 per
cent single family homes and 75 per cent flats) are metered individually. Domestic
meters have a lifespan of between fifteen and twenty years:
"A hundred years ago there were no water meters in France, then there was a
permanent flow-rate that was supplied. If you look at archaic water systems, it is
always the flow rate that was regulated, not the volume. It was supplied in
channels or pipes and divided up by splitters. This is still used in some
Mediterranean countries. This method was also used in England. A permanent
flow rate was supplied and there were regulating valves to fill tanks. But now that
we have public tanks it is not necessary to have tanks on the roof, but if you go to
Mauritania for example they still have tanks and of course they also do in the
UK."
(Source: Interview: Jean Gasc, SLE)
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The predominant metered charging structure is a standing charge plus a volumetric
charge. Alternatively there is a standing charge plus a flat fee for a given volume plus a
volumetric charge for the volume exceeding the quota (this applies to about fifty per
cent of undertakings). The type of volumetric charge is either a uniform rate or
decreasing block tariffs for households. The standing charge is between zero per cent
and ninety per cent of the total metered bills (DTI, 1990).
Vignette V
"There is usually a different fixed charge between different classes of customer
but the proportional price is the same. When the city accepts that a factory is of
significant importance for the area it may ask for a special price. There are
however exceptions, such as a golf courses who do not qualify for any reductions
because they are consuming a lot ofwater and usually during the summertime."
(Source: Interviewee: Jean Gasc, SLE)
Only about one per cent of meters can measure flow-rate, which can be
particularly useful when detecting leaks. Each municipality defines specifications
for water meters. In some cases however, there may be a contract with an
individual industrial customer that they have a maximum flow-rate, because if
they take too much at once there is a fall in pressure on the system. So if the
maximum flow-rate is exceeded the customer would have to pay penalties. Usually
these private contracts encompassed the municipal's contact with the private
operator. Maximum flow-rate has become less of an issue in France since demand
for water is decreasing, and investment could be postponed. If demand is
increasing as in the UK, the water company would like to know how different
customers are contributing to that demand so that they can be charged
accordingly. There is also an increasing incentive to reduce leakage since water is
becoming increasingly more expensive to treat. This may give further incentives to
the development of metering in the future.
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Sometimes the price of water is on a seasonal basis. For example, in some rural
towns where there are 3,000 inhabitants during the winter and 100,000 during the
summer, there may be a different price during the summer. The municipality
takes the final decision on whether there should be seasonal variation in tariffs:
"The town decides that the price will be different during the winter than the
summer, to make people living permanently in the town pay for investment for
people who are only there in the summertime is not right."
(Source: Interviewee: Jean Gasc, SLE)
"In some instances customers may have two connections, one for the household
and one for the garden. If a customer has only one connection they pay the same
price. But if there are two connections the customer will pay the same price for
water supply but the lawn sprinkler connection has no wastewater charge. Also in
special cases there are separate supplies for drinking and non-drinking water. For
example, Gibraltar has two separate supplies but in general in France this system
does not operate. In Paris, there used to be an industrial water network, which
came from the river Seine, and was used to clean the streets. That has now been
stopped because it is more expensive to have two separate treatment plants. Hose
pipe bans and drought orders are very rare. Drought orders hit non-potable
water for irrigation first."
(Source: Interviewee: Lisette Provencher, SLE)
Depending on the contract, the customer receives between one and four bills per
year. For very big customers it is one per month. There may also be monthly
readings for these large customers as well. The most common method of payment
for domestic customers is four bills per annum, two of which are based on
estimated readings. There are also flexible methods of payment, such as direct
debit and budget schemes etc.
For the moment, the majority ofmeters are read manually:
"People are experimenting with portable hand-held terminals, so they see if there
is a good correlation between the last meter reading and the next one. So the
water company can estimate the consumption by previous readings so that the
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number of times the meter requires to be read can be reduced. There are no
prepayment meters and it is difficult to cut someone off, since that would be
considered socially unacceptable in France. With respect to customers who are
unable to pay, the cases are discussed with the municipality and the social
security."
(Source: Interviewee: Francos Paquet, CGE)
The issue ofmetering in France is not the installation ofmeters, as it is in the UK. It is
the issue of using metering to best manage the water resources. So the relation between
metering and the environment is more of a financial one. If someone wants to use a lot
ofwater they will have to pay a lot, but there are no such restrictions in the UK.
11.3.3 Electronic Metering
Electronic metering in the French water industry is given a low priority. The problem
with electronic meters and automated meter reading in France is two things, the law
and the cost. At the moment the water industry is restricted to simple mechanical water
meters because there are no agreed standards. Or more precisely, there are agreed
standards for electronic metering but not for communications. This seems rather odd
from a British legal perspective which is based on the principle that if there are no
standards then there is nothing stopping entrepreneurs from developing a product that
will create a standard. The French however, see that standards must be firstly created
and enshrined in law before production can commence.
Vignette VI
"There is no point in starting production of an electronic meter if Itron (a
software company) come up with one standard, Schlumberger (a meter
manufacturer) another and Lyonnaise des Eaux yet another. So we need a
language of protocol standardised."
(Source: Interviewee: Francos Paquet, CGE)
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"Work is being carried out on a European level to develop these standards. Water
companies are working with Electricite de France and Gaz de France along with
other utilities throughout Europe. This work not only includes metering but other
areas of home and office automation. It is only when these European standards
are approved that all the old systems will begin to be replaced. The problem is
that every manufacturer is looking to create their own proprietary standard."
(Source: Interviewee: Jean Gasc, SLE)
These committees which are concerned with standards and protocols for
electronic metering are described in section 12.4.8.
This strategy of agreeing standards before starting production is diametrically
opposed to what is being seen in the UK and USA. In these countries, proprietary
standards develop through market mechanisms rather than political agreements.
The issue of the necessity of the secure flow of confidential information for each of
the utilities is cited as one major reason why common standards have to be agreed
before progress can be made. The following statement from a senior manager in a
large French water company sums up the mood in the French water industry:
"We have nothing to say until the standard is agreed. Although a standard is not
compulsory to develop electronic metering we believe that the standard will be so
easy to use that everyone will want to use it, and not a proprietary system. Itron
for example has a proprietary system and they are trying to make it the standard.
But of course, we are refusing to be any part of this."
(Source: Interviewee: Jean Gasc, SUE)
Despite this, electronic and automated systems are being tested, so as the companies
say: "we know, what we can do." Experiments are being tried with radio, and telephone
systems and electronic meters with can additional functions such as flow rates are being
trailed. Each project has to get approval from the Ministry of Communications, since
each country has regulations for modems and bandwidths. Also despite the reticence of
French companies to introduce proprietary standards software and low power radio,
companies such as Itron and Ramar have a strong presence in these projects.
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Vignette VII
Many managers in the French water industry also see a very strong economic
argument for not investing in water metering. This is particularly true for water
meters that do not have their own in-built power source:
"When an electronic logger is attached to a water meter it is very very expensive.
So for the moment for economic reasons it is better to wait a little time... To
summarise, there has been a lot of work done on the matter so the technology is
pretty well known. It is now recognised that the real barrier is cost because it is
typically very expensive."
(Source: Interviewee: Francos Paquet, CGE)
Thus at present it is only with large water consumers who are billed on a monthly
basis that automated electronic meter reading is deemed economically justifiable:
"We (a water company) have some niches where automated meter reading is
economical, for example we have some large customers in the centre of Paris who
need to be read once a month. But these are special cases."
(Source: Interviewee: Jean Gasc, SLE)
Another area where there is an apparent niche for electronic metering is in water
abstraction. Abstraction of water in France is illegal without a licence and any
abstraction must be closely monitored. There are two things. First, there is a very
powerful agricultural lobby in France and there is debate, both about the amount
of water that needs to be abstracted for agriculture, and the level of nitrates
deposited. This conflicts sharply with the water industry. Second, mechanical
water meters are liable to clogging with sand and farmers to avoid abstraction
charges often use this as an excuse. 'Solid state' electronic meters have no moving
parts so do not get clogged up and therefore are useful in reducing the illegal use
ofwater.
Another spur for remote meter reading that is peculiar to France is that most
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householders lock their gardens, making access to meters even more difficult than
in the UK. Also the concept of multi-utility supply is well established. Some regies
in France look after both gas and water so shared services like meter reading and
billing are pooled. This is also true in the private sector where all three
competitors (Compagnie Generale des Eaux Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux and
Groupe Bouygues) have telecommunications and energy supply arms.
(Sources: Interviewees: Jean Gasc, SLE; Lisette Provencher, SLE; Frank Texier,
CGE; Jean-Louis Ganion, CGE; Francos Paquet, CGE)
11.4 SUMMARY
The regulatory system for water in France has been an attempt to balance the needs of
small communities with the needs of large companies and the State. With respect to
pollution and the environment the AdBs act at an intermediate stage between the State
and the Local Authorities. The system is based on one of co-operation and negotiation,
rather than the 'polluter-pays' principle as in the UK. The principle of 'delegated
management' where a municipality's water operations are run by a private company has
stood the test of time. Nevertheless, it still remains unproven that publicly run networks
can operate at a lower price in practice. Despite this, the tendering system does
introduce some market rigour and the private companies provide both financial and
engineering expertise in the operation of water services otherwise unavailable to local
communities.
Most water companies in France do not see metering as being a priority issue. This is
chiefly because water metering is almost universal in customers' premises and it is seen
as too costly to upgrade to electronic meters. The only immediate application for 'solid
state' meters would seem to be in water abstraction where foreign bodies like sand
cause mechanical meters to clog. Another bottleneck is in the area of standards. The
French water industry is adamant that no automated metering and communications
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systems will be installed until standards and protocols have been agreed at political
level. For this reason entrepreneurship is inhibited.
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CHAPTER 12
CASE STUDY No.7:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE UK
12.1 INTRODUCTION
The telephone and the telegraph were both originally introduced in the UK by private
interests in the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1912 the General Post Office
(GPO) took over responsibility for the operation of telecommunications throughout the
United Kingdom, with the exception of only Kingston-upon-Hull, Portsmouth and the
Channel Islands. The GPO was also responsible for postal services and for the
overseeing of broadcasting. Telecommunications revenues were treated as part of the
general revenue of the State, along with the proceeds of taxation. Telecommunications
expenditures were met from moneys voted by Parliament, along with other
Government expenditures. GPO finances were legally separated from those of central
Government by the Post Office Act of 1961 (Harper, 1989).
The Post Office Act of 1969 created a nationalised corporation called The Post Office,
which assumed responsibility for posts and telecommunications and which published
an Annual Report and Accounts on the usual commercial lines. The Corporation was
wholly owned by the State, but was outside Government. Its staff were not civil
servants. The oversight of broadcasting also remained a Government responsibility
(Harper, 1989).
The British Telecommunications Act of 1981 enabled the Government to introduce
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competition in telecommunications. It also created two separate nationalised
corporations - The Post Office, responsible for posts, and British Telecommunications
(BT), responsible for telecommunications. Today, the telecommunications market in
the UK is the third largest in Europe, significantly smaller than that of Germany, but
not very far behind France. The UK has been in the vanguard of telecommunications
liberalisation for more than fifteen years and is the most competitive in Europe. This
chapter reviews these developments and considers how the changes have affected
electricity, gas and water metering (Woods, 1997 and Harper, 1989).
12.2 INFRASTRUCTURE
12.2.1 The Fixed Network
Following the Telecommunications Act of 1983, British Telecom (BT) was privatised
in three stages, with the Government offering three share tranches of 50 per cent
(1984), 20 per cent (1990) and 30 per cent (1993) to the public. The first tranche was at
that time the largest business privatisation offer ever made in any country (Harper,
1989).
The task of monitoring the new liberalised telecommunication market in the UK lies
with The Office of Telecommunications Licensing (Oftel). Established in 1983, it is
headed by the Director General of Telecommunications. Oftel's function is to oversee
and regulate the activities ofBT and its competitors. The effect of creating Oftel was to
separate the operation and regulatory functions, which BT had inherited, from its
predecessor.
Vignette I
It was argued that with relation to Central Government, internal efficiency and
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the interests of the users, telecommunications is best treated as a financially and
organisationally separated business activity. There were a number of reasons for
this. In the first place, the objectives and priorities of Central Government
structure are of their nature geared to the formulation and execution of public
policy. Telecommunications on the other hand, is essentially a service industry,
for which the first priority is efficiency in the conduct of technical operations. The
disposition of telecommunications income is also important. GPO revenue was
originally fed into the central finances of the State and GPO expenditures were
met from the same source. Charges were treated as a way of raising revenue like
taxation. The effect of such arrangements is to conceal the financial effectiveness
of the operations of the administration and to deny to it and its customers the
advantages of commercial operation, like ploughing back surpluses.
Also in an expanding telecommunications network, capital financing
arrangements are of crucial importance. Proper planning and development of
telecommunications is not impossible unless the enterprise has adequate and
predicable capital funding for several years head. The Central Government
finances of any State are inevitably subject to complex priorities, which frequently
change in the short term for political, macro-economic and other reasons. This
makes it unsatisfactory for telecommunications' investment to be treated as part
of these finances. Personnel management considerations were also important.
Whatever happens, Government personnel management has to deal with two
groups of staff with special needs and constraints. The first group are the highly
specialised staff who conduct the central activities of the State and support
Ministers. The second are the staff who carry out administrative processes like
collection of taxes and distribution of aid. If posts and telecommunications are
organised as part of a Central Government, Government too must cater for their
staff in its personnel practices. Unlike in France, telecommunications workers had
been classified as working for a Government-owned utility, and not as a
government department. As a result its personnel did not possess civil service
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status, so that it has been much easier for management to reduce staffing levels
quite severely over time.
(Sources: Interviewee: Stephen Pattenden, GPT and Harper, 1989)
This privatisation period almost precisely paralleled the liberalisation of the UK
telecommunications industry. The first stage of privatisation was started at virtually the
same time that Mercury Communications (A subsidiary of Cable & Wireless) was
licensed to become the company's only fixed link competitor. This was a revolutionary
step outside of the USA. This was sufficient for Mercury to complete its backbone
network in the late nineteen-eighties and become established in the market. The
duopoly was ended in 1992 and the regulatory powers were strengthened both to deal
with the more complex competitive environment that was about to develop and to place
restrictions upon BT's commercial freedom. The main elements were threefold
(Woods, 1997):
• BT was excluded from using its fixed network for the purpose of transmitting
entertainment material. This restriction applies until the year 2001 although,
vigorous attempts have been made by BT to have this date brought forward.
• The Government let it be known that fixed link licences would be issued to
.additional telecommunications operators. This .move allowed existing infrastructure
with way-leaves, such as the National Grid Company, Regional Electricity
Companies, British Rail (now Railtrack) and British Waterways, either to extend
their existing networks for public use, or to build new ones. It also allowed new
companies into the market to build their own (generally local) infrastructures.
• Finally regional cable TV licences were progressively offered for most of the
country. These operators ware also permitted to offer telephony services. Initially
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these were all to be cable based, but subsequent licences allowed the use of cable,
microwave or a mix of both transmission methods.
Vignette II
In most respects BT continues to be the British National telecommunications
carrier. The fixed network sector for telephony is very mature, and now all but a
few remote areas in Scotland are digitised. The company is responsible for more
than 90 per cent of the telephone call revenues, and for 95 per cent of domestic
call revenues, although the share of the international revenues is significantly
smaller, and on some important routes, even a minority. Certainly BT no longer
possess any de jure monopolies, but the combination of history and technological
factors has given it very many defacto ones, out ofwhich the one in the residential
and small business local loop is probably the most important of all. Cable
networks are also experiencing a very strong growth from a period that dates
from the 1992 legislation.
(Sources: Interviewees: Peter Walker, Oftel; Stephen Pattenden, GPT and
Harper, 1989)
There are however a number of restrictions to growth. The most important one is that
the market is already quite mature. This is not so much in the sense that future growth
will be thereby restrained, but rather the supplier structure is already developed with
relatively few players at the local or the wholesale or 'carrier's carrier' market. This
corresponds to Mansell's (1993) 'strategic' rather than 'idealistic' analysis of the market
(see section 4.3.3). Secondly the national telecommunications operator, BT, has by
now become quite a formidable competitor. It has been obliged to slim drastically, and
be much more marketing and business oriented. Furthermore the tight price capping
imposed upon the company for several years has greatly reduced competition directly
on price. Market entry for newcomers has as a result become quite costly, with a
considerable risk of failure unless a carefully considered marketing strategy is
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followed. For quite different reasons compared with almost all other European
countries, partnerships are generally the most appropriate entry route, not for
nationalistic reasons but because many existing suppliers see that they need some
complimentary assistance.
12.2.2 The Radio Environment
Table 16: The Mobile Communications Market in the UK
Operator Network
Type
Start Date Number of Subscribers, 000s
1994 1995 1996
Cellnet TACS-900 Jan 85 1540 2044 1797
Cellnet GSM Jan 94 20 256 883
Vodafone TACS-900 Jan 85 1520 1933 1580
Vodafone GSM Jul 92 118 400 1220
One-2-One DCS-1800 Sep 93 226 397 545
Orange DCS-1800 Apr 94 100 380 785
Source: Woods (1997)
Until 1997 the UK market for mobile cellular communications was the largest in
Europe when Italy overtook it. The UK has six mobile cellular networks, four ofwhich
are digital. In 1985 the approach adopted in the UK was to licence two locally owned
companies to operate the two analogue networks (TACS-900). These were Vodafone
(owned by Racal Communications) and Cellnet (owned by BT who has 60 per cent and
Securicor 40 per cent). This duopoly continued until the introduction of Mercury
Communications One-2-One service in 1993 and Hutchison Telecom's Orange
network in 1994. During this period Cellnet and Vodafone also began digital services.
The UK also had the largest number of paging subscribers in Europe until 1996, when
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'non-subscription calling party pays' services took off in Germany and France (Woods,
1997).
12.2.3 Network Services
Prestel was the first Videotext service, which was devised in Britain and is similar but
much less widespread to Teletel in France (see section 13.3.4). Prestel is run by a
division of BT but other interests provide the information on its computers. Prestel has
developed primarily as a business service. By mid 1988 Prestel had a total of 80,000
customers in Britain. It also had subscribers who reach it over the international
telephone network in over thirty countries. For example over 95 per cent of the
members of the Association of British Travel Agents have terminals of this kind which
they use to call up information about travel and hotel bookings (Harper, 1989).
Prestel can be seen as a pre-privatisation phenomenon where BT took responsibility of
being the network operator as well as the provider of value added services carried on its
network. Evidence is given later in the case study with MeterLink (see section 12.4.4)
which shows that BT is moving away from such a strategy and leaving the field open to
individual entrepreneurs using such media as the Internet.
12.2.4 Joint Ventures
An important spin off from telecommunications liberalisation in the UK is that
reciprocity with the key US market is generally accepted. Both BT and Mercury have
received advantageous interconnection arrangements with the American public
switched networks. In both cases this has been made possible mainly because the US
authorities accept that the British telecommunications market is largely open to their
own suppliers. At the same time by giving 'carrots' to a liberalised regime they
248
emphasise to the more recalcitrant countries in Europe some of the benefits that would
become available to them once they fall into the same line. This process rapidly turns
into a virtuous circle. The US remains the source of almost all the major developments
in both telecommunications and computing, especially software. The country also has
by far the world's most vibrant and resource rich investment capital regime. Whereas
Continental Europe has tended to rely excessively upon major investments being
undertaken by National Governments, either directly or indirectly, in the US the
privately owned financial system provides the bulk of the funding. Nonetheless it is
often assisted in basic research by a still very sizeable defence budget (Woods, 1997).
Vignette III
An important result of privatisation and deregulation is that a veritable flood of
foreign capital, mainly from the USA, has been arriving to take advantage of this
situation. This has been most obvious in the contraction of cable TV networks, as
well as to a much lesser extent, in the provision of services and even regional fixed
networks. Another closely related factor in the telecommunications business is
that the country's own one time three telecommunications national champions:
GEC, the former Plessey company, and STC (the latter was, however, always
foreign owned) were never particularly successful. As a result they never managed
to impose the same near stranglehold on the market for major hardware products
such as public switches, transmission systems and attached terminals, as existed
(and largely continues to exist) in France, Germany and Italy. Thus, local
suppliers remark that there is a contrasting down-side to this strategy. Powerful
US companies are ready and able to enter the UK market, where they can use
greater financial and technological capabilities to overwhelm local companies.
(Sources: Interviewees: Stephen Pattenden, GPT and Brian Bates, AMPY)
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12.2.5 Multi-Utilities
Developments in the telecommunications market are having an increasing effect on
Britain's electricity companies, several of which have set up subsidiaries to operate in
this potentially lucrative market. Energis is part of National Grid Holdings, two of
Ionica's shareholders are Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, ScottishPower
has a telecoms subsidiary and Hyder (South Wales Electricity and Welsh Water) has a
joint venture is with Cable Tel, a US cable television company. All of these companies
are in the process of establishing some form of network, mostly cable-based, although
in Ionica's case it is radio-based. In addition software companies are also showing
interest in the communications in the utility sector (Woods, 1997).
Vignette IV
Novell of the US, has a startling ambition: it wants to create a massive global
network by 2000. Its target is to have one billion network connections in place, at
the end of 1997 there were less than 50 million installed:
"Novell is working with the power utilities to turn their electricity networks into
data networks... What they want to do is to build intelligence into electrical
equipment so that the companies can have much more control over their whole
systems. They need to have enough to meet demand at peak times. You know
what happens when there is a football match on TV. At half-time, everyone goes
out and puts on the kettle for a cup of tea; electricity demand surges. But with
intelligent devices, the power companies could anticipate demand. They could
switch off other equipment in the home like the freezer or the central heating
system for short periods."
(Source: Interviewee: Stephen Pattenden, GPT)
12.3 TELEPHONY METERING
The general principle of charging in BT is that rental and call charges should be
distinct, and that each call should be charged according to its individual occupancy of
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the system. This is measured in terms of distance covered, the amount ofplant used and
the time duration for which it is in use. In accordance with these principles local-call
timing was introduced in Britain in 1958, and is nowadays taken for granted by
customers. Trunk calls have always been timed in the UK, as in all countries. In the
UK, BT inherited a notably unbalanced structure of tariffs. The long distance calls
tended to subsidise local calls. At the time of privatisation it was clear that the
imbalance needed to be rectified; but it was necessary to regulate the prices to be
charged by a private sector near-monopoly (Harper, 1989). This was carried out by the
RPI-X mechanism described in sections 4.4.4, 6.2.2, 8.2.3 and 10.2.2. Considerable
debate goes on about the appropriateness to this form of regulation based mainly on
price as well as ThirdParty Access charges to BT's competitors.
Call charges can be presented on customer bills in different ways, depending on the
technical arrangements for metering calls. On Stored Programmed Control (see section
4.3.3) exchanges it is possible to arrange this without significant extra engineering cost
and with BT itemised bills are now standard.
12.4 TELECOMMUNICATION IN ENERGY AND WATER METERING
12.4.1 The Role ofCommunications in Utility Metering
Telecommunications is becoming an increasingly important part of energy and water
utility metering. Some customers, particularly large industrial customers, and
residential customers with large loads, benefit from more sophisticated pricing
schemes. With 'real-time' pricing, prices vary from half hour to half hour, usually with
some advanced notice, as in the England and Wales Electricity Trading Pool. However,
the utility must have the capability to communicate with a large number of customers,
spread over a large geographical area in 'real-time', or close to it. And the utility's meter
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must be capable of switching from one price to another and to be able to record how
many kWhs or m' are consumed during each half hour, and at what price. The simple,
stand-alone mechanical meter or an unread meter with a clock and two or three
registers, will no longer suffice. The meter must have up to 48 registers (one for each
half hour) and should be capable of keeping track of time accurately. In addition, the
utility should have the facilities to update the prices daily and inform the customers in
advance if it expects to modify their load. To implement RTP on a large scale, the
utility company must not only upgrade its metering apparatus, but must also install a
communications network to get the pricing information to customers in near 'real-time'.
There are a number of competing carriers, for example: manual meter readers; the fixed
link networks of PSTN copper wire; broadband optic fibre; electrical mains-borne
signalling; as well as the non-fixed links of radio and satellite.
12.4.2 Manual Meter Reading Systems
Manual meter reading is by far the most common communication method with
metering in the UK. The only exception is large consumers of electricity where
communications links are mandatory. Despite this, there are efforts being made to
introduce some form of low cost communication automation into the process ofmanual
meter reading.
Inductive-Touchread technology, although not automatic, since it needs an operator to
use it, is often regarded as the starting system for automated communications systems.
With Inductive-Touchread technology, each of the digits in the meter has a wiper
system to register the nine digits together with the serial number. They are then wired
to a touch pad and inside the touch pad is a coil. Once powered up, an induced voltage
is produced, waking the meter up. Software then identifies the make ofmeter and then
it passes the serial data that is transported to the hand-held computer. The hand-held
device has also a glass fibre reading just in case the customer has a query. It is widely
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deployed in the water industry with over 12 million installed in the USA, Europe and
Australia. It has application to electricity and gas but these utilities have made only
small commitments to it, primarily in North America. Its key application is to solve
meter access problems being encountered today and being easily upgraded to full
automation in the future. It is a robust, proven technology that requires no battery in the
meters to run. Touchread can provide a fast economic return but does not provide two
way communications. Many new companies are developing new products in this area.
Itron for example, is a meter reading service company who sell hand held terminals as
well as the software, while Flag and CHIRPS are meter reading protocols which are
being developed in the UK (Woods, 1997).
12.4.3 Radio
Hand-held radio is seen by many as the emerging technology that offers the solution to
many meter reading problems. Like inductive reading, it does not provide a completely
automated solution until it is upgraded to vehicle, or preferably fixed network radio.
These systems are now using the established 184 MHz band and around 20,000 are
installed in the UK, mainly in pilot projects. There are some concerns over the
performance of these systems due to limitations imposed by band specifications.
However performance has been improving and the latest systems appear quite viable.
Hand-held radio offers a faster reading rate, an excellent solution to meter access and a
possible migration path for full two way communications. Nevertheless it is limited by
the expensive equipment costs, the lack of agreement on technical standards, the range
of the radio signals and battery life (Woods, 1997).
Reading meters from a moving vehicle is one of the most impressive means of reading
meters, known as 'drive-by' radio. Provided that the radio system is designed to
accommodate the movement of the reading equipment, very high reading rates of over
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3,000 per hour can be achieved. This of course would only apply to urban areas
(Woods, 1997).
An independent fixed radio network is regarded by some as the ideal solution to two-
way communications. Such systems are independent of other network operators such as
telephone companies and may be developed to meet specific needs. Cost remains high,
and constitutes the major barrier to entry to its widespread use. Despite this, a fixed
radio network has been used in the teleswitching of electricity heating appliances for
many years. Just as in the hand-held terminal arena, specialist service companies such
as Ramar are emerging in the private low power radio market (Woods, 1997).
Multi-utilities based on reading more than one meter per property, stand the best
chance of justifying these systems. United Utilities have created a company called
ENERGi and have announced that they are going to work with BCN (A
Bechtel/Cellnet Data Systems International Joint Venture) to provide a radio service to
all their meters right across their area.
The main competitor to Cellnet in fixed link radio is Vodafone's Paknet service, which
already reads some meters in the non-domestic market. Radio-Pads are installed with
each meter, and typically twenty-four hours worth of readings are collected per meter
overnight. Paknet is now used by every Regional Electricity Company in the UK, and
similar requirements in Gas and Water metering are fast emerging. MeterManage \s
Paknefs data communications service, which is tailored specifically for the needs of the
remote meter reading and telemetry applications. The flexibility of radio removes the
need to route telephone lines to remote equipment, and together with very competitive
charges, can mean substantial savings in communications costs.
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12.4.4 Publicly Switched Telephone Network
The fixed telephone network is the most popular medium for reading meters for large
utility customers in the UK. Dial outbound systems, where the utility initiates a call to
the remote meter, were the first type of telephone Automatic Meter Reading (AMR)
systems to be deployed. The technology is mature, costs are stable and data rates are
good for two-way applications. In many applications, a dedicated line cannot be
justified and so various methods are used to prevent the customer's phone ringing when
a reading is required. This, together with the need to maintain an accurate customer
telephone number list has led to inbound systems finding more favour. Dial outbound
is often used in hybrid systems where data is acquired from a remote data connector
(.British Standards Institute, 1998 and Southgate, 1998).
Dial inbound telephone systems, where the equipment at the remote site dials the utility
on a periodic basis, are gaining ground in the world. They share all the benefits of
outbound systems but have the advantage of no customer ringing, and no special
exchange equipment is required. Scheduling of calls can also be automatic and these
may be changed during the call-in period, ready for the next read cycle. Inbound
systems may be readily installed to share existing lines or extensions from private
exchanges. This, together with improvements in the provision of 'demand reads' using
Caller ID facilities, has made inbound technology the choice of many large utilities
world-wide. The only perceived disadvantage of telephone based systems is that the
utility becomes dependent on a third party network provider for delivery of its
management data. In practice it has been found that dedicated utility fixed link meter
reading technology has been difficult to develop and the regular telephony network is
sill being used (British Standards Institute, 1998 and Woods, 1997).
Vignette V
BT tried to launch its MeterLink telemetry service in 1995, after trials in 1994 with
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Schlumberger, Yorkshire Electricity and Yorkshire Water. However BT
withdrew MeterLink from service less than eighteen months after its commercial
introduction. This was due to a perceived lack of commercial demand for the
system in the present and immediate future. The MeterLink service was designed
to enable remote polling of meters in the home from a central system. The service
utilised a 'no ring call' facility to enable the meters to be read without causing the
telephone to ring, and without disturbing any outbound call.
Oftel has asked BT to retain the basic 'no ring call' facility so that it could be used
by other organisations such as independent service providers or utility companies.
Oftel at the time BT launched the MeterLink service, also "had concerns about the
need to provide the 'no ring call' element of the service as a separate unbundled
component." Nevertheless Oftel is aware that there are other communications
media such as radio, power line carrier and cable and "remain neutral" about
which system should be used. However, it does "have a preference for the use of
open standards" for any such systems, to enable "maximum competition in the
supply of services."
(Sources: Interviewee: Peter Walker, Oftel and Haddon, 1997)
Meanwhile, users and suppliers of the technology were up in arms. They claimed
that the withdrawal was "premature" and "may close the door on what is set to
become a far more widely used approach, particularly as companies seek
operating savings through shared meter reading." One meter manufacturer said:
"We don't really feel they've given the market a chance... The problem was that it
(MeterLink) was a store and forward system, in that BT collected the data and
passed it on to the utility. And nobody trusted BT not to use it over time. They
could then look at customers' profiles and 'cherry pick' those customers off the
Regional Electricity Companies."
(Sources: Interviewee: Bob Sheldon, UKAMRA and Haddon, 1997)
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There was also a feeling that BT was not costing its MeterLink service properly:
"The charges that BT were making, whether it was for gas, water or electricity
were just too high. So I think they priced themselves out."
(Source: Interviewee: Bob Sheldon, UKAMRA)
"The major problem that faces fixed link communication is access. There is a
problem that the meter may not be near a telephone point, and the cost of putting
in a wire to the telephone could kill the technology. That is why unless we get joint
utility metering it is difficult to see that going forward."
(Source: Interviewee: Stephen Holmes, EA Technology)
Nevertheless, businesses are developing in this arena using a mixture of
communications media. United Kingdom Data Collection Services, Cap Gemini and
Logica are key players in the development of communications in the competitive
electricity and gas markets.
12.4.5 Prepayment
Many see prepayment metering (see sections 6.3.6, 8.3.4 and 10.3.2) as a developing
market when it is used in combination with supermarket loyalty cards. At present in the
UK there are three major types of prepayment technologies (see table 17). The
magnetic strip token meter, which is like a supermarket loyalty card and is a one-way
form of communications from the infrastructure supplier to the meter. The key budget
meter uses a 'key' with a microprocessor on it. It has limited two way communications
facilities in that it can not only credit the meter but also provide limited tariff and credit
details if the infrastructure is configured correctly. This two way functionality is more
developed in the Telexus key meter which provides more flexible two-way
functionality. Finally, there is the smart card that provides two way functionality and is
overseen by the Smart Card Electricity Metering Association (SCEMA). The Quantum
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gas prepayment system uses smart card technology (see section 8.3.4).
Vending agents for prepayment meters include the utilities in-house shops, independent
agents, such as corner shops or 24-hour petrol stations or national chain outlets such as
Post Office Counters, Paypoint or De la Rue. The vending technologies either use
countertop sales or electronic points of sale for some of the more advanced smartcards
(Southgate, 1998).
Table 17: Prepayment Meter Populations in the UK
Type Electricity Gas
Key 1,533,200 -
(Telexus) 150,000
Token 1,760,650 500,000
Smartcard 267,000 700,000
Coin A Few -
Total 3,560,840 1,200,000
Source: Southgate (1998)
12.4.6 Power Line Carrier (PLC)
The attraction of power line carrier technology is that it covers every electricity supply
site. By using power from the electricity supply and modulation data, very high
communication rates back to a substation can be achieved. Deployments of this
technology have increased significantly in the USA in the last few years, and it remains
to be seen if this will be repeated in the UK. Much development has been done into
achieving low error rates allowing 'real-time' and two-way data transmission speeds
over 20,000 bits per second. PLC systems are favoured by many electricity utilities, as
258
they effectively already own the 'network'. This of course illustrates also the major
drawback of power line carrier technology in that it is not attractive to water or gas
companies who do not have a connection to the electricity network (British Standards
Institute, 1998).
Vignette VI
The fact the PLC is part of the electricity network raises a number of issues not
least about incremental versus radical change. A lot of what is happening in the
competitive world is incremental. Competing utility suppliers are not going to win
customers all in one electricity grid supply point. They are going to acquire them
in ones and twos. So the Regional Electricity Companies are in a strong position.
They control every LV mains into every household in the UK. Probably the
greatest exponent of this strategy is the consortium formed between NORWEB
and Nortel, the Canadian telecommunications company. They plan to provide
data to the Internet market (and ultimately voice telephony) at the local level:
"The magic of this technology is that it essentially brings the Internet into the
home, and on a flat tariff basis. It will be just the start of further wireless, Internet
and multimedia developments."
(Source: Interviewee: John Newbury, Open University)
The general feeling in the industry is suspicious towards the Norweb/Nortel
consortium:
"We will have to see. There are many people very circumspect about the claims
that are being made about that system."
(Source: Interviewee: John Newbury, Open University)
12.4.7 Cable TV (CATV) and Satellite
While cable appears to offer an ideal combination of very high data rates and access to
new services, it suffers from the limitation of not having universal coverage like
259
telephone systems using the PSTN or PLC. Conventional dial-inbound systems can be
deployed on CATV telephone connections but the use of the broad bandwidth fibre
optic connection appears to be unjustifiable at the moment (Woods, 1998).
Switching the argument on its head and taking it from the cable companies' point of
view, many feel that if they wish to obtain the widest coverage possible then a
collaboration with a utility may prove fruitful. Hyder's joint venture with Cable Tel
may be a case in point. Metering could be regarded as a value added service to home
entertainment. Since one of the major restrictions to the development of smart meters is
a costs issues the only way in which a two-way communication could develop would
be through such added value services. Shared line technology such as this, offer
significant benefits over many other types of network. The fact that the service is
shared by other utilities means that costs for each of the individual services can be
reduced. In addition, if more than one utility meter can be contacted from a device
sharing one line, thus costs would be reduced even further. Sharing a line allows
equipment to be installed in a very wide variety of situations and once configured
allows it to operate autonomously. So there are both cost and practical benefits of this
technology and it would not be difficult to see the costs reduce still further as
competition increases in the telecommunications sector. There are a number of
programmes that are looking into this concept of shared services. Home and Building
Electronic Systems (HEBS) is there to develop the communications associated for data
and information systems into the home. DYCE and ETHOS are projects where remote
signals are being sent out to control load. This has led to EHS version 1.3, which is the
latest European standard of compliance that instructs appliances such as washing
machines, cookers etc. Systems are being tested on signals using telephone, cable radio
and power line carrier technology.
Vignette VII
"The application of electronics and communications to the equipment located at
the customer/utility interface has dramatically increased the functionality of
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meters. The humble single function utility meter is undergoing a metamorphosis
to a customer electronic terminal. Added value services are not restricted to any
one party. Innovative suppliers will also provide the customer directly or
indirectly with services such as multimedia, automated home management and
entertainment technologies. As the 'meter' metamorphoses into a 'customer
terminal', communication is becoming the pivotal technology in facilitating the
information flow."
(Source: Interviewee: Stephen Holmes, EA Technology)
A key requirement when developing different technologies is integration. All of these
systems in use must operate together and provide common standards and protocols.
12.4.8 Standards and Protocols
Standards in metering and communications are defined at three levels. First, at the
international level there is the International Standards Organisation (ISO) which is the
world's governing body. Within the ISO there are then subcommittees dedicated to
particular utilities. The International Electrotechnical Commission, for instance, is the
subcommittee dedicated to electricity metering and communications. On a second level
there is the European governing bodies called CEN for fluid flow metering (including
gas and water) and CENELEC for electricity metering. Finally the are the UK bodies
such as the British Standards Institute (BSI) and the Codes ofPractice which define the
metering required for the Electricity Pool and the Network Code.
There are also standards being developed within the UK. Under BSI there is the
committee called PEL 205A which is low voltage mains signalling. There is also PEL
894, which is metering communications for gas and water. Both of these committees
along with all other EU countries, feed into the European commission (CEN and
CENELEC). So the GSM digital telephone standard was 'hammered out' in this way
through a series of committees in Europe. In parallel this there is IEC which has
associated communications committees at the United Nations level (.British Standards
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Institute, 1998).
These standards then require to interface with technology software being developed in
the competitive market. This is done by agreeing at National, European or International
level a piece of software or hardware which has been developed by a manufacturer. For
example, within Europe the DLMS (Distribution Line Messaging System) is being
developed. Within this system there are protocols that need to be developed and this is
generally done at the National level. The flag protocol, which was developed by the
meter manufacturers Ferranti and Landis & Gyr is a recognised international standard
(British Standards Institute, 1998).
In reality a number of protocol standards have developed at international level for
meter communications in Europe it is DLMS and the US equivalent is Tuker Tape.
There are also National sub-standards and protocols which are vying with each other
such as Flag (UK), Eurodis (France), Mbus (Germany). Each of these standards do
much the same thing with some form of variation. Below this are the UK standards that
are needed to comply with the Electricity Pool or the Network Code. In the case of the
Pool this is Code of Practice metering (see section 6.3.2) (British Standards Institute,
1998).
12.4.9 Information Management
Just as Electronic Point of Sale (EPOS) terminals provide supermarket management
with valuable information on customers' tastes, the meter can supply information to
public utilities. With the advance of information technology, customer data is
becoming one of the most powerful tools at a utility's disposal. As the utilities market
continues to evolve, detailed knowledge about the utility's customer is increasing. This
has seen the conversion of old customer accounting systems, purely designed for
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customer billing, into a marketing database.
Vignette VIII
This database management cannot be seen as a core function to supplying energy
and water:
Data management in the future will be carried out by organisations who will
trade the readings as a commodity rather than provide a service to the utility as it
is now. The reason for this is that the value of the data as a management tool
outweighs the price of a unit of utility service. Rather than use sub-contractors (or
out-sourcing firms) for meter-reading, specialised firms in the future will sell the
meter readings to the utilities just as they will sell it to other firms or any other
customer. So these firms will be related to the utilities in pure commercial ties
(rather than being part of the industry) and a new statutory ethical framework
will be required to cover area which the Data Protection Act (1984) could not have
foreseen.
(Source: Interviewee: Amatsia Kashti, Olive Domestic Metering Ltd)
The Data Protection Act (1984) does not concern itselfwith the data owner but the
data user. The data user is defined as follows:
"A person who holds data if: the data form part of a collection of data; and that
person controls the contents and use of that data; and the data are in a
processable form."
(Source: Interviewee: Philip Jones, Data Protection Registrar)
Therefore none owns the data but the data user determines what use/disclosure of
metering data occurs, unless there is another overriding legal obligation. In
addition, such information contained in personal data should be obtained and
processed fairly and lawfully.
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This legislation still leaves a lot of room for abuse, and time will tell whether
information obtained from utilities company databases will be used for other
purposes than billing customers.
One other important area of data management in the UK is data transfer, when
customers change supplier. Here the Network Code for gas (see section 8.2.5) and
Pooling and Settlement Agreement, as well as the Initial Settlement and Reconciliation
Agreement for electricity allow this to take place (see sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3). These
documents ensure that there are effective procedures in place for taking opening and
closing meter readings, when customers are switching supplier. They also manage the
compatibility of systems for transferring data in a competitive market, such as data
standardisation; and the best medium for rapid and efficient data transfer.
12.5 SUMMARY
The application of electronics and communications to the equipment located at the
customer/utility interface has dramatically increased its functionality. This major
advance has resulted in the humble, single-function electricity, gas or water meter,
based only on metrology undergoing a metamorphosis to an electronic customer
terminal. This new functionality has not yet been fully exploited. It is judged that when
genuine competition is effective, then a rapid exploitation of the new functionality will
take place and the word 'meter' may be dropped when referring to this new equipment.
"When historians of the future look back to this era," says John Roth, President and
Chief Executive of Nortel, "they'll see that the communications revolution was
signalled by a shift from the voice dominated global networks to networks dominated
by data. For more than a generation, data traffic has been growing ten times faster than
voice - more than 30 per cent per year, versus 3 per cent for voice. The volume of data
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traffic now exceeds voice traffic, and data will constitute nearly 80 per cent of all
network traffic by 2000." (Woodford, 1998)
There are three big waves: the growth of Internet protocol, the growth of broad band
widths for video on demand and there is the shift in the present utility infrastructure
where gas, water and telecommunications can be traded like financial products.
Metering information is just one telecommunications product that can be traded along
with television, home banking etc.
There is also a cautionary feeling that for the last fifteen years intelligent metering and
the intelligent home have always been five years in the future. There is a basic cost
element in the market that has yet to be overcome. Also standards have not been put in
place correctly, resulting in too many competing systems. The real snag is that there are
a whole number of things going into the home - security, utilities, energy management
but not one individual system pays for the gateway.
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CHAPTER 13
CASE STUDY No.8:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN FRANCE
13.1 INTRODUCTION
France is the second largest market for telecommunications in Europe, after that of
Germany. Unlike the energy utilities, which remain nationalised, the global impact of
telecommunications liberalisation is just beginning to take effect in France.
France Telecom (FT), the monopoly supplier, is well respected by its users. In several
surveys its customers appear to be the most satisfied in Europe (Woods, 1996),
although whether that is an accurate refection of the true situation, or one that is
coloured by a conservative national attitude, is arguable. Until July 1990, the company
was part of France's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications; for a number of years
it operated as an 'independent' but still State-owned monopoly, a move that has given it
considerable financial autonomy. In 1997 the French Government sold off a minority
of its shareholding, and on January 1st 1998 the French telecommunications network
was opened up to competition.
The strategy of France Telecom, which is France's eighth-biggest company, has
adapted in recent years to meet the challenges of Europe's slowly liberalising telecoms
market. It has entered into joint ventures, with Germany's Deutsche Bundespost
Telekom, and Sprint of the USA to provide global networked telecoms services for
multi-national companies. France Telecom's ambition to become a major player in the
global market for networked voice, data and video transmission has also led to ventures
with US West and Ameritech (USA), Britain's Energis, Mexico's Telmex and others.
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The company is also actively pursuing links with various European computer-services
firms, and has a 19.9 per cent stake in Thomson, the French consumer-electronics
group.
This case study will consider the changes that have occurred in France's telecoms
infrastructure over the past twenty years. It will outline the changing role of France
Telecom, as it tries to become a major player in the global telecommunications market,
and how it is reacting to competition within France. The digitisation of the French
network, and metering the increasing amount of data telephony will then be considered.
The chapter will conclude with an examination of the communications media used in
energy and water metering in France.
13.2 THE INFRASTRUCTURE
13.2.1 The Fixed Network
The European Union has been the prime mover in the tentative moves to deregulation
of the fixed telephony network in France (Voge, 1984: pp.248-251 & Vedel, 1997).
The combination of Directorates General (DG) IV (competition) and XIII
(telecommunications and advanced technologies) has for several years sponsored a
series of studies and reports on the benefits of liberalisation. This view was well spelled
out by the Commission in November 1994 when it stated :
"The competitiveness of European industry as a whole relies on the availability of
advanced business and communications services matching, in terms of (their) quality
and price, those of their competitors in more liberal economics, such as the US and
Japan." (Woods, 1996)
This policy has allowed the Commission to push through many of its directives under
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Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome (free trade within the Union). Nevertheless as far as
regulation is concerned this is an area where the principle of subsidiarity is likely to be
brought into force. A likely compromise is that the European Commission (EC) will
formulate the basic principles, leaving their administration to the member States. The
EC started the process of telecommunications industry liberalisation as long ago as
1984, with much of the debate concentrated on network harmonisation and
liberalisation of services. Following a wide-ranging debate, a resolution was adopted in
June 1993 to liberalise the provision of voice services by the beginning of 1998. Other
directives have been made in the liberalisation of the mobile, cable and satellite
communications markets. In addition to competition, policy directives have also been
passed on users' rights (Woods, 1996 & Vedel, 1997).
Vignette I
Although many people see the moves to deregulate the French
telecommunications industry as a political issue, a techno-economic argument has
also been advocated.
A comparison has been made between the telecommunication industry in the
nineteen-nineties and the airline industry in the nineteen-eighties. In the eighties,
the fortunes of the French national airline, Air France began to falter. Some of the
blame for the demise was placed on the deregulation of the airline industry in
other countries:
"If a passenger wished to fly from France to the USA rather than taking a direct
flight using Air France, the passenger would take a short connecting flight to the
UK and then get a cheap charter flight to the USA. The same principle applies in
telecommunications. If someone in France was wanting to phone or send a
message to the USA, they could bypass France Telecom's international service by
connecting to a competitor who could do it cheaper somewhere else within the
EU."
(Source: Interviewee: Nigel Orchard, Pilot Systems)
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Whatever the reasons are, this pressure towards deregulation has necessitated a major
shift in French Government policy towards commercial activities. France has for long
been a country in which Government takes a strong interest in business, known as
dirigisme (Szarka, 1992). Not only have many of the 'commanding heights of the
economy' long been under State control, a situation that has also received the approval
of the Conservative Governments, but several of them have been used as national
commercial agents of the Government. France Telecom has been one of the leading
instruments used by the Government in this manner.
The company's position was once likened by some unkind commentators as being
rather like a "State owned bank, that also happens to run the national
telecommunications service" (Woods, 1996). The most notable of its shareholdings has
been in Groupe Bull, flag ship of the French computer industry, and itself largely a
creature ofGovernment. It was founded during the late nineteen-seventies from a series
of smaller French companies, with the later addition of Honeywell's computer division.
Indeed France Telecom still holds a 14.34 per cent share in Groupe Bull (in early
September 1995), following a major privatisation process.
The French Government decided that France Telecom should be gradually privatised,
in September 1993. The company is one of twenty-nine State-owned organisations that
were selected by the new Conservative Government to be sold over a period of time, to
the private sector. This was done partly for reasons of political belief, although a strong
secondary motive was that the money was needed to offset a high budgetary deficit.
This overall process has not run at all smoothly. In 1994, seventy-five per cent of
France Telecom's workforce joined a token one day strike against the prospect of the
company being turned into a private operation. The personnel problem at France
Telecom is that more than ninety per cent of the workforce enjoys civil service status.
This makes it extremely difficult to terminate their employment. Furthermore the staff
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have very generous pension arrangements which their contributory payments do not
fully fund, while in many cases they receive automatic annual pay increments that are
awarded irrespective of their achievements. Indeed until relatively recently, many
employees won automatic promotion on the basis, not of their competence or
qualifications, but purely by their seniority. Following the strike, the chairman of FT
was summarily removed before the end of his term. His replacement however, lasted
little more than a week, apparently due to a major disagreement over the timing of the
privatisation. In both cases the reason was the same - the desire ofGovernment to avoid
upsetting the France Telecom work force, which is fearful about being put into the
private business sector (Woods, 1996).
Vignette II
Although turning the company into a State owned public corporation does not
necessarily affect any of these characteristics, there has been considerable
opposition to these plans:
"The unions fear that, as the first step towards eventual privatisation, this process
will in time lead to the severe erosion of their privileges and rights."
(Source: Interviewee: Christian Licoppe, France Telecom)
Much of France Telecom middle management is also known to be bitterly opposed to
privatisation, and the trade unions went on strike in May 1995 against such a move,
following an earlier strike, in 1994. Employees have seen from earlier occasions (such
as the disputes between Air France and the Government in 1994 and the lorry drivers
and the Government in 1997) that adamant opposition is profitable. Previous
experience is that the Government will almost certainly temporise and then buy their
agreement, even if in the long run it might not be deflected from its eventual aim.
The French administration appointed by Jacques Chirac, who was elected President in
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May 1995, contained a larger number of ministerial portfolios than before. The
objective was to give ministers tighter spheres of responsibility, and as a result be able
to reduce their reliance upon experts and - by implication - pressure groups within and
outwith Government. Consequently a new Ministry of Information Technology and
Post was formed, split off from the former Ministry of Industry, Post and
Telecommunications. This has control of new application areas such as multimedia,
and one important strength is that it gathers together responsibility for the whole
information processing and communications sectors, irrespective of the technologies
upon which they are based. Some grey areas although still remain. It is not known for
example, which ministry will oversee Groupe Bull, in which the Government still has a
majority holding if one includes the stake owned by France Telecom; or how the
direction of the creeping privatisation of France Telecom will be handled. Indeed in
this latter case the involvement of two ministries must be seen as a backward step.
Despite widespread doubt, Lionel Jospin's Socialist Government, which was elected in
June 1997 sold (as planned by the previous Gaullist Government) a minority of a
shareholding in France Telecom as scheduled. The partial privatisation of its national
telecommunications supplier by a Socialist Government seems to be the ultimate coup
de grace for the philosophy of deregulation. Nonetheless, French deregulation still has
a unique Gallic flavour:
Vignette III
Despite the French Government's reticence to European telecommunications
liberalisation, it is yet, ironically, the country that is near the forefront of second-
tier telecommunications liberalisers just behind the UK and Sweden:
"The explanation for this really lies in the fact that the country's rulers are
nothing if not pragmatic in their attitudes, and once it is appreciated that a
particular course of action is likely to be beneficial, then existing theory to the
contrary is likely to be jettisoned."
(Source: Interviewee: Nigel Orchard, Pilot Systems)
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In France, what are still rather early steps are being taken to build a number of
secondary companies to compete with France Telecom in the role of alternative
telecommunications operators. Nevertheless, French owned companies continue to be
strongly favoured in any competitive bids or awards for licences.
Most prominent of these is Compagnie Generale des Eaux (CGE), which is a company
more associated with water distribution, but in 1995 it established a key alliance in
telecommunications with RWE in Germany. The company has a 20 per cent stake in
Canal Plus, a French pay television channel, and through the British holding company,
General Mobile Communications Ltd, has acquired Talkland, a UK radio telephone
services distributor. It has also 85 per cent stake in Compagnie Generale de
Videocommunication, a cable television company. CGE has recently made a move into
the fixed telecommunications arena, purchasing a stake in French Railways' (SNCF)
communications network. Also CGE has created CEGETEL, its new
telecommunications subsidiary, to achieve its objective of becoming the second full-
service operator in the French telecoms market when it opened on January 1st 1998.
CGE are also active in international telecommunications through their subsidiary
CEGETEL, whose partners include British Telecom, who offer support to a fixed link
network. Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux (SLE), which is also in the water distribution
business, but is much more a general conglomerate, is also building a network of cable
TV licences, rather along the lines of CGE under the name Lyonnaise Cable. A third
independent privately owned contender is Groupe Bouygues, which is also a
conglomerate, although it is strongest, in the property and construction business.
Groupe Bouygues and Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux, had held exploratory talks over a
joint venture in Telecoms which eventually broke down (Whitehead, 1997b). One of
the problems was that Bouygues, through its control of the water company CISE-
SAUR, is one of Lyonnaise's main rivals in the water industry, although the two
companies are already working together in TPS, a digital television venture. Instead
Bouygues eventually formalised an alliance with Telecom Italia and Germany's Veba
0Utility Europe, 1998). Bouygues had been looking for a communications
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infrastructure partner since a rival bid from Compagnie Generale des Eaux beat its bid
for a stake in SNCF's communications network. But all the companies stress that they
are considering a number of alternatives to achieve their telecommunications goals.
One of these alternatives is undoubtedly Electricite de France (EdF). The French
Government is known to be pressurising EdF to enter the telecommunications fray. It
makes sense for EdF to move into telecoms since it already has around a thousand
kilometres of telecommunications network infrastructure that it can exploit. A law
passed in July 1997 grants EdF the right to offer public telephony services along with
SNCF, motorways and the Parisian transport company RATP. Although EdF's network
is small in comparison with SNCF which has 8,000km, it could be extended to
10,000km of fibre optic cable with an investment of £235 million (Whitehead, 1997a).
13.2.2 The Radio Environment
Although France Telecom's fixed telephony monopoly has remained, until recently,
more or less sacrosanct, the mobile cellular communications network was opened up
relatively early. France was one of the very few countries outside the Nordic countries
and the UK to licence a competitive analogue network operator. Societe Frani^aise de
Radiotelephone (SFR) who is owned by Compagnie Generale des Eaux, was licensed
to compete with the national carrier France Telecom. Unfortunately both companies
then established what came very close to being a de facto agreement that kept tariffs
high, with the result that France has lower mobile cellular subscriber market
penetration than any other industrialised country in Europe. In a further move, the
Government has since licensed a third competitor. Groupe Bouygues won the award to
operate a DCS-1800 digital-based licensed technology personal communications
network, and this went operational in early 1996. Groupe Bouygues planed to increase
cellular coverage from 28 per cent to 50 per cent by 1998, with 300,000 subscribers
against 125,000 in 1996 (Woods, 1996).
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13.2.3 The Telecommunications Suppliers and Joint Ventures
France Telecom has also started to dismantle its historically near-watertight coterie of
preferred suppliers. Admittedly it remains difficult for any non French supplier to gain
a significant presence in the country. Ericsson and Nortel (Northern Telecom) both
found the best approach was in close co-operation with Matra Communication, France
Telecom's second largest equipment supplier after Alcatel. Alcatel remains by far the
most persuasive influence on the hardware sector of the telecommunications market in
France but is beginning to come under strain from competitors. Indeed the company is
the largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer in the world (Szarka, 1992).
In general, French industry is weak in the information and communications technology
sector. In other high-technology areas such as the pharmaceutical industry and
electrical engineering, French imports and exports are near equilibrium, but in
information technology, the trade deficit is enormous. The deficit was 15 billion francs
in 1989, with a cumulative deficit for the decade of 60 billion francs (Szarka, 1992:
p.96). Despite the international success of French software firms such as Cap-Gemini-
Sogeti, who supply software systems to, amongst others, the electricity and gas
industry in the UK, no solution is in sight to make good the deficits. The history of the
French computer industry is uninspiring, being marked by a series of unsuccessful
State interventions punctuated by US take-overs of French firms.
International co-operation has also been a unique feature of French telecommunications
liberalisation with the Atlas and Phoenix alliances. Atlas with Deutsche Telekom, and
Phoenix with Deutsche Telekom and Sprint of the USA are key alliances that are
intended to underpin France Telecom's entire international strategy. The EU (for both
plans) and the US authorities (only for Phoenix) have expressed considerable
displeasure over the delays in the deregulatory process in France, and agreement to
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these alliances were only approved after both France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom
made several moves in the direction of liberalisation. France Telecom also has a
holding company, Cogecom, which controls most of the group's subsidiaries and
affiliates. (Woods, 1996).
13.2.4 'Les Grands Projects'
France Telecom, is regarded as being a French 'national champion' in a country where
organisations of this type are much respected. In France, Government influence on
telecommunications has generally been benign compared to the energy sector. France
Telecom has been encouraged to modernise what was until the late seventies a rather
antiquated national network. Two large schemes have been at the core of this strategy.
A 'telematics' network, called Teletel has put a terminal (Minitel) into a third of all
households (see Beme, 1997 for details), while Transpac has been the largest and most
successful national packet-switched network. When Teletel started in 1982 the service
provided access to business database services over the French domestic packet-
switching network (Transpac). This was significant, not least because the Transpac
network charged for calls on a basis independent of distance. An electronic directory
service for all customers began operations in Rennes, a major provincial centre, in early
1983. The basis of the Teletel system was that the terminals (Minitels) up until 1993
were distributed free to subscribers, whereas with Prestel (a similar service in the UK)
customers had to pay for theirs. There seems little doubt that this is among the reasons
why the Teletel service, unlike Prestel, has expanded in a dramatic way. By the end of
1987, almost 3 million Minitels had been distributed to subscribers, and the service is
extensively used by both residential and business customers for a variety of database
and messaging applications (Woods, 1996 and Szarka, 1992).
275
13.3 TELEPHONY METERING
France Telecom like its UK counterpart British Telecom has been digitising its
telecommunications network. Charges, which were once constrained by pulsed
metering, have been replaced by Stored Programmed Control (SPC), an operation
system which is controlled by computer software (see section 12.3). The development
of Teletel and Transpac has highlighted the difference between metering
telecommunications in the digital telematic environment.
Vignette IV
There are important differences between voice and non-voice traffic. Most voice
calls last a few minutes or more. Some non-voice transactions last only tens of
seconds. At the same time the speed of transmission for non-voice traffic can be
much faster:
"Tariffs for non-voice services should be based on the amount of transmitted
information measured as the product of time and transmission rate (bit rate), with
no allowance for distance. France Telecom's packet tariffs reflect similar
principles."
(Source: Interviewee: Christian Licoppe, France Telecom)
Another point arises directly from the nature of the hardware. In a processor
controlled digital exchange, a large part of the equipment is required only while
the call is being set up. This is the part concerned with receiving information from
the customer about the destination of the call processing it, and using it to set the
call up. Once this has been done, this part of the equipment can be released to set
up other calls. Only the part of the exchange concerned with maintaining the
conversation path stays in use throughout the call. In traditional charging, no
distinction is made between the two parts. But short calls occupy the setting-up
equipment for just as long a time as long calls:
"In this case, theory of equity would levy a similar charge for the setting-up
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process on all calls and differential charges for the transportation path according
to duration."
(Source: Interviewee: Christian Licoppe, France Telecom)
The next consideration involves another difference between voice and non-voice
traffic. Virtually all voice communications must of their nature be two-way
throughout the call. A good deal of non-voice traffic, on the other hand, is (and
possibly more could be) one-way for most of the time. Control signals may have to
be exchanged at the start and finish of data call, but on many of them the whole
flow is in one direction.
All charging arrangements require close study related to circumstances of
individual countries and their networks. In practice much of any engineering
development involved is likely to be done by suppliers, and patterns of charging
are likely to follow international models.
13.4 COMMUNICATIONS IN ENERGY AND WATER METERING
Now that France Telecom is no longer the monopoly supplier of telecommunication
services in France, its approach to value added services has changed. The price of the
competitive market means that it cannot play a key role in grand infrastructure projects
like for Teletel. Thus like British Telecom in the UK, France Telecom has very little
interest in investing in fixed link communications to energy and water metering unless
it pays a commercial return or it is supported by Government subsidy (as is the
development of a 'National Grid for Learning').12 As suggested in Section 12.4,
12 'The National Grid for Learning' is the term used for the policy in both France and the UK to connect
every education and library facility to the Internet to create an integrated digital network.
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metering of energy and water is just another value added network that can be provided
through numerous other telecommunications providers. Rather than France Telecom it
is Compagnie Generale des Eaux, Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux and Groupe Bouygues
who are already active in energy and water services and are inclined to develop this
technology. One obstacle for these multi-utility conglomerates is research and
development. Unlike France Telecom, EdF, and GdF, Generale des Eaux, Lyonnaise
des Eaux and Bouygues do not have large specialised research and development
divisions which have in the past been publicly subsidised. Being private companies, the
bottom line of their profit and loss account is the key factor, and not the altruistic
development of new technology, which is a major raison d'etre for the nationalised
industries. It is for this reason that EdF may be in the best position to produce a
solution to the communications problem in energy and water metering.
Vignette V
Remote communication technology has been used in the French electricity
industry for many years. Ripple Control is a one-way switching system, which is
used throughout many countries in Europe. A signal is sent along the low voltage
power line to switch on and off appliances at times of low and high demand. The
marginal costed pricing system for French electricity is dependent on this system
(see section 7.3.2). Unfortunately this is not a two-way system that can be used for
telephony. Electricite de France have considered developing this system into a
two-way power line carrier system along with Gaz de France in their shared
services division, EdF-GdF Services (see sections 7.1 and 9.1). It seems logical that
EdF should develop its mains electrical network to read both electricity and gas
metering, a cost that is shared by both companies. GdF however are not so
convinced. First the development of power line carrier means that GdF will be
dependent on EdF for communications purposes, which is not necessarily of
benefit to GdF. The second factor is cost. The cost of developing a power line
carrier, which is still not a proven technology, is vastly more expensive than using
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a low-power radio network.
(Sources: Interviewees: Paul Bongrain, EdF and Phillippe Vanbleu, EdF-GdF
Services)
The population density of France is low compared to that ofGermany, the Netherlands
and the UK. Yet it has one of the least well-developed radio wave cellular networks in
Europe. This can be accounted for by the dominance of France Telecom in the fixed
communications market and past restrictions on competition. So because of EdF's
monopoly of power line carrier and France Telecom's monopoly (and lack of interest),
radio waves are the medium of choice to read energy and water meters in France. The
mobile radio companies set up by Compagnie Generate des Eaux and Groupe
Bouygues seem best placed to take advantage of this. At the same time, there is a cross
utility link with there water and energy subsidiaries resulting in a similar multi-utility
phenomenon that is being displayed in the UK. Although metering companies such as
Itron and Ramar are aggressively operating in the French market there is an obstacle
with government policy particularly over protocols for transmission bandwidth.
Vignette VI
The one major bottleneck to the development of sophisticated metering in the
energy and water utilities in France is the lack of an agreement of common
communications protocols. This is seen as a distinct business opportunity in
countries with a more free market tradition such as the UK and the USA, whereas
as a general rule in France, standards and protocols must be agreed on a political
level before manufacturers produce them:
"We have to get approval from the ministry before we can carry on with the
project of automatic meter reading of energy and water. Every country has
regulations for modems just now, so everyone has to ask for an agreement when
the device is exported. We hope that in a short time we will have an agreed system
by the Ministry of Telecommunications."
(Source: Interviewee: Jean Gasc, SLE)
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Entrepreneurial companies such as Itron and Ramar are viewed with some
suspicion and they are expected to follow standards that are agreed at
Government and Inter-Governmental level. This is a view that is common to all
the French utilities interviewed in this study:
"Only one standard will be agreed. It will be agreed at the European technical
committee level who define standards in remote systems metering systems (CEN
for water and gas, CENELEC for electricity). In fact, it includes all
communications that have to be supplied in the home. You see the problem is that
if every manufacturer is looking to create their own proprietary standard this
causes immense confusion. So we are waiting for a new law from Brussels before
remote communication can be installed in energy and water meters in France."
(Source: Interviewee: Jean Gasc, SLE)
13.5 SUMMARY
The liberalisation of the French telecommunications sector has two themes. First, to
expand the French national telecom supplier France Telecom internationally by making
strategic alliances such as Deutsche Telekom (Germany), Sprint (USA) and Energis
(UK). This is similar to the trend that is happening in the airline industry where KLM
(the Netherlands) has ties with North West Airlines (USA) and Air UK (UK); and
British Airways (UK) has ties with American Airlines (USA) and Qantas (Australia).
Second, liberalisation is taking place in the domestic market but with a particularly
French bias. Franchises for mobile and cable networks are being sold exclusively to
French-owned multi-utilities including Compagnie Generate des Eaux, Suez-Lyonnaise
des Eaux and Groupe Bouygues.
With respect to the development of telephony in energy and water metering in France,
France Telecom is no longer the only service provider, so it will not invest in
telecommunications infrastructure for utility metering as it was able to do for Teletel.
Indeed Vedel (1997) suggests that this may signal an end to France's high tech
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Colbertism. The major competitors to France Telecom are emerging from companies
who have experience elsewhere in the utility sector, in particular Electricite de France,
SNCF, Generale des Eaux, Lyonnaise des Eaux and Bouygues. Any development of
electronic metering and communications is likely to be in a joint venture between these
companies, a meter manufacturer and a communications software company. The
tendency for French companies to build partnerships would suggest that Schlumberger
and Cap-Gemini would be the best placed to take on this role. Before progress on
sophisticated metering takes place however, French business is waiting for
Governmental approval for the development of metering communications technology.
The contrast between this policy and the one in the UK where de facto standards are
defined by market mechanisms, is striking.
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PART III
THE ANALYSIS
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CHAPTER 14
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN REGULATORY
DEVELOPMENT
14.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 3 of the thesis argued that technical, economic and social as well as many other
factors, play a role in regulation. For the purpose of simplification and clarity, three
regimes ofregulation were discussed. Austrian and Monetarist approaches represented
the market orientated theoretical frameworks. The socio-political was discussed within
the notion of The Paris or French School. Meanwhile the role of technical innovation
and regulation was introduced through the principle of the Techno-Economic
Paradigm. This latter mode of regulation was used to introduce the methods that are
being adopted in this study to analyse the effects of technological innovation on the
regulation of utility industries. In reality it is wrong to bound regulation into these
headings since the process of regulation involves the interweaving of these, and
additional factors. Moreover these factors may be subdivided so that many of the social
equality issues could be divided into, for instance, race, gender, age, or class
discrimination. This notion of the inability we have in bounding concepts and the
necessity to take pragmatic approaches to theory, is a constant theme of this work. For
the present, the approach adopted in this chapter is to examine how technical factors
affect the other components of regulation. In effect, to examine the role that innovation
in information technology has played in the changes described in the case studies in
Part II.
Section 4.4.6 discussed how Beesley and Littlechild (1992) argued that some functions,
such as electricity and gas supply, could no longer be considered as 'natural
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monopolies'. Further it was postulated that the reason for this is that information
technology has shifted the Techno-Economic Paradigm. A clue to the role that
information technology has played in the deregulation of public utilities can be found
in Freeman & Perez's (1988: pp.45-47) examination of the taxonomies of innovations.
In Freeman & Perez's analysis there is a distinction between (i) incremental innovation;
(ii) radical innovation; (iii) new technology systems', and (iv) changes in the Techno-
Economic Paradigm. This theme will be used in an attempt to interpret the changes in
the regulation in the public utilities over the past twenty years in the UK and France. In
order to make the theoretical base more appropriate to public utilities the analysis will
also consider Saehney's 'highway' heuristic (see section 5.3.1) which presents the
stages of infrastructure development of the public telephone network. Although
Saehney's study is restricted to transport utilities, it will be used as a starting point for a
broader model for infrastructure development in both energy and transport utilities.
The structure of this chapter combines the cases studies examined in Part II together
with the literature reviewed in Part I to compare and contrast the influence that
information technology and regulation has had in the development of the
telecommunications, electricity, gas and water industries in the UK and France. In the
conclusion there is discussion about whether technological explanations alone are
enough to explain the revolution in public utility management and if the Techno-
Economic Paradigm is an effective framework to analyse these changes.
14.2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Both France and the UK are now in the process of restructuring their
telecommunications network. Britain began in 1983 with the Telecommunications Act
while France started some ten years later in 1993. Although this trend towards both
privatisation and deregulation has political motives founded in creating a single
European market, this does not answer the question: why has deregulation happened in
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the telecommunications industry in France while it has not yet occurred in other public
utilities?
Saehney (1992), in his study of the stages of infrastructure development of the public
telephone network, refers to telecommunications as the 'highway' of the information
age. Significantly he also highlights the development of digital networking and fibre
optic transmission media to underscore its social and economic importance. The
analogy of a relatively simple metaphor the 'highway' is used as a heuristic device for
model construction. It is argued that the experience with transportation (railways,
motorways, and airways) technologies can be used to develop an abstract model for
understanding the growth pattern for emerging telecommunications technologies. In
section 13.2.1 the restructuring of the global telecommunications network was
compared to the restructuring of airline travel. Just as airlines have developed
partnerships or even have amalgamated (e.g. KLM, North West and Air UK), over the
last few years national telecommunications networks are making strategic alliances
(e.g. France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Sprint and Energis), in the ever-increasing
international telecommunications market.
In the case of telecommunications, the interconnections or the 'system of relationships'
between elements are more important than the constant elements themselves. This
'system of relationships' is greatly influenced by social, economic and cultural factors.
For example, the increase of international data rather than voice traffic, has a social and
economic impact. This socio-technical system has given birth on both sides of the
English Channel, to Government initiatives that aim to put an Internet connection in
every school and library. This grand project or 'National Grid for Learning', as it is
dubbed, is a relatively new concept (in modern times at least) in the UK, but is well
established in France. Teletel is such a grand system and was developed in the
nineteen-eighties with joint industry and business co-operation with the aim to enhance
the telecommunications infrastructure. The implication of this type of investment is that
the actual placement of the network on the geographical space is an artefact of social
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design as well as engineering and cost considerations. In other words, such concepts as
teleworking can just as easily be achieved in a distributed environment such as the
home as in a centralised office environment. This means that the network structures of
the infrastructure technologies grow in the socio-cultural milieu of the larger society.
Different societies are likely to influence the development of the infrastructure
technologies in different ways. Some may focus on fixed line networks while others
may use radio communication. However, within the socio-economic system, the
organising principles for the 'system of relationships' even if different infrastructure
technologies are used are likely to be the same. Thus common ground rules can be
developed which can map the technology and infrastructure change in formal
theoretical frameworks.13 Issues like the development of uniform operating procedures
and the adoption of standardised technology then become important on a European and
world-wide scale.
The Systems Theory framework used by Thomas Hughes in Networks ofPower (1983)
described the formation of new electricity networks up to 1930. This differs from the
systems being described in telecommunications today where we are witnessing a shift
from one mature infrastructure to another. In other words, there does seem to be a
paradigm shift in both the way the industry is structured and how people are using the
technology. But within this shift in the regime of regulation differences still persist. In
France, priorities for telecommunications franchises have been overtly given to French
owned companies. EdF and SNCF with their infrastructure of cables and lines have
been encouraged to enter the telecommunications market. Moreover the three French-
based multi-utilities, Compagnie Generale des Eaux, Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux, and
Groupe Bouygues have been very active in the developing telecommunications market.
In the UK, less emphasis is placed on the national identity and competing companies,
which has meant that companies from the USA, Germany and France play increasing
13 Such as Sociotechnical Constituencies, Techno-Economic Networks and Evolutionary Theory, see
chapters 15 and 16
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roles. So the French model for privatisation and deregulation has moved in line with
that of the UK. Also, the UK has adopted a more French approach to the infrastructure
development since the election of the Labour Government in May 1989. The
converging of telecommunications infrastructure polices signifies a harmonisation of
telecommunications infrastructures within the EU. Nonetheless it is difficult to argue
that EU harmonisation legislation alone has prompted this change since this can be also
a global phenomenon. The conclusion is therefore that the technology development has
a major role in this change, and information technology is indeed changing the regime
of regulation in a similar way as described by the Techno-Economic Paradigm in the
telecommunications sector.
14.3 ELECTRICITY
In many respects, prior to 1989 the management of the electricity infrastructure in
France and the UK were similar. Early development prior to 1945 was through a
mixture of private and municipal electricity companies. Consumption was concentrated
in areas of urban conurbation. Generation meanwhile was by coal-fired power stations
associated with these urban networks. With nationalisation and rural electrification
policies, infrastructure characteristics began to diverge in both countries.
The first reason for this was the differing geopolitical stances of France and the UK.
France, having a much lower density of population than the United Kingdom has
therefore a larger distribution and transmission infrastructure. France is also much more
poorly endowed with indigenous energy resources, while the UK is self reliant with an
impressive mix of energy including oil, gas and coal. Both were also in the forefront of
the development of the nuclear power industry. However, it is France who has probably
more than any country in the world staked its future in this technology. This form of
energy accounts for some 80 per cent of French power production compared to 20 per
cent in the UK. The reasons for this division in policies are clear. France, fearing the
287
reliance on imported oil, gas and coal made a conscious decision to invest in nuclear
power and today is not only self sufficient in electricity, but is a major exporter to the
rest ofEurope.
Since 1945 the mode of governance in both countries was publicly owned and
operated. This meant that economic, social and technical considerations could be
accounted for in an integrated fashion. This was vital to the development of the nuclear
and hydro-electric industries as well as to rural electrification in each country. At the
same time, demand for electricity was steadily increasing as a result of economic
growth. The development of the electricity infrastructure had a number of unique
features. Electricity has many features of a natural monopoly. Generation was seen to
be dependent on strategically important fuels and could not be left to the market, viz.
the French nuclear policy. In transmission and distribution it would be too costly to
install two or more competing electricity supplies into a single consumer's premises.
Also since there was no market in generation and transportation, it was difficult to
imagine a market for supply. As a result, infrastructure development was done in an
integrated way. This meant that the State-owned utilities could develop a pricing
mechanism such that an area of the network that was more expensive to supply, such as
rural areas, could be subsided by areas where it was less costly to supply. In addition,
the nature of electricity is such that it is very difficult and expensive to store once it has
been generated and this has meant that as far as possible supply should match
consumption. This led to a form of pricing based on marginal cost, which relied on a
vertically integrated network infrastructure.
In summary, prior to 1989 the electricity infrastructure in both the UK and France was
built on the post-war geopolitical canvas in which the nation State aspired to provide all
its citizens with a safe and secure electricity supply at equal price. This meant that each
State was responsible for ensuring that it had enough fuel to power its country's
economy and maintain its social structure.
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In the eighties the changing geopolitical, economic and technical environment meant
that integrated network framework either had to adapt or be restructured. Two major
factors have been responsible for this. First, the role of the French and the UK Nation-
State has been subsumed in a greater entity, namely the European Union. One of the
effects of this is to tear open many of the trade barriers between these countries and the
rest ofEurope. In the electricity industry this has come as a shock to France. France has
expended considerable investment in nuclear power, tailoring it to the needs of France
rather than the European Union. Thus the prospect of a free European power market is
not relished by the French. Second and possibly even more important is the
development of information technology. Modern communications and data processing
facilities have enhanced the prospect of a competitive market. The England and Wales
Pooling and Settlement System is an example of this. This has in turn, delivered the
prospect of competition in electricity supply. The UK has been able to implement these
policies not only because of political will but also, unlike France because it has a
plentiful supply of fuels and did not commit itself fully to nuclear power in the
nineteen-seventies. The prospect of introducing such a system in France is clear. The
monopoly of EdF in France would be shattered, the nuclear programme would be
threatened and the position of the French State in Europe would be compromised.
Thus the role of technology, and in particular information technology, in the process, is
being acted out in combination with these other constraints (geopolitical, social and
economic). Nonetheless, it is allowing a combination of interrelated product, process,
technical, organisational and managerial innovations to take place. These changes have
taken distinctly different forms due to the differing socio-political contexts in the UK
and France. In the UK, information technology has facilitated the development of
competitive trading, while in France the same technology has been used to make the
vertically integrated nationalised structure more efficient (through increasing load
factor).
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Transactions are now made on a global basis twenty-four hours in a day and at the
speed of light through a fibre optic cable. This has not only had considerable influence
on the financial services and retail industries but also the energy utilities. The England
and Wales Pooling and Settlement System in electricity could be described as change
of the technology system (Freeman & Perez 1988, pp.46-47). In order to make this
change there has been radical innovations on how the technology has been used to
implement the trading arrangements in electricity. For example, all 'over lOOkW'
customers require to have a meter that can record demand on a half-hourly basis, and a
communications devices which can down-load the information to a settlement system.
Also computer systems require to record the smooth transition of customers who wish
to change supplier. Below this layer there are further incremental innovations that can
only be arrived at through iterative trial and error mechanisms operating in the new
system. Thus after ten years of operation, the England and Wales Pooling and
Settlement System is continually undergoing reviews to consider these incremental
changes.
In the French system the Techno-Economic Paradigm has been approached from a
production standpoint. So rather than changing the structure of industry, managerial
and operational innovations have been considered in EdF and GdF. In this regime of
regulation, the changes in the technology system are more concerned with making the
methods of production more efficient rather than changing the methods of trading. In
electricity and gas the focus is therefore in making the energy supply better match
energy demand; and with electricity also the development of'time-of-use' tariffs using
sophisticated metering. Incremental innovations, are important here particularly for
demand side management. EdF for example has significantly broadened its tariff
structures in order to reflect EdF's generating costs. So rather than changing technology
system by radical innovations, incremental innovations have been used to make the
incumbent system of regulation more robust. For example, since 1981 EdF has
broadened its tariff range and now has over twenty different forms of 'time-of-use'
pricing. These incremental innovations have developed in a format that is closer to
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'learning by doing' in a more iterative process than the radical process that has occurred
in the UK.
'Real-time' pricing has also been introduced to compensate for uncertainties affecting
the electricity market in both the UK and French systems, but by means of two very
different mechanisms. In the UK it is by means of a 'spot market', while in France it has
been through three 'real-time' tariff options. Thus it would be expected that in future
pricing and as a consequence, metering will develop in differing ways to reflect the
differing infrastructure systems.
Superficially the telecommunications industry and the electricity industries are similar.
They both involve transportation networks carrying electrons (albeit at vastly different
voltages and currents). Nevertheless there are significant differences, the major one of
which is that the electricity industry not only involves the transportation of power, but
also its generation. The fact that every light bulb or every microprocessor has to trace
its origin back to a power source is significant, while in telecommunications this is not
the case. This issue has led to two very different models for the electricity industry.
These two forms of regulation are the Third Party Access model and the Single Buyer
Procedure (see section 7.2.3). Both are essentially incompatible but are made possible
by subsidiarity clauses in the European Law. Neither however, should be seen as right
or wrong. Third Party Access has been made possible by a number of factors including
choice of fuel, belief in the rigours of competition, the decline of electricity as a
strategic resource and the result of a mature electricity infrastructure. The reason France
has not adopted such a model, are twofold. One is its reliance on nuclear power and the
other is its suspicion of the unfettered market. The French nuclear commitment is the
most significant reason why the French electricity industry will not be fully deregulated
in the foreseeable future. However it is the French view of deregulation which is most
important. It is not that the French are politically against privatisation and deregulation.
The mission of French style regulation is to include policy duties, such as contributing
to territorial development and/or national energy independence within the remit of their
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public utilities.
Thus the heuristic 'highway' device which holds for telecommunications is not
appropriate when applied to electricity, due to its inherent generation component. Also,
since the separation of the generation and supply components depends on geopolitical
circumstances this is difficult to achieve on a global scale since different countries such
as France and the UK have different social and geographical characteristics. This has in
turn resulted in differing approaches adopted to produce electricity in each of these
countries.
14.4 GAS
The aspiration to be independent in energy supply has also hampered the development
of the gas industry in France. In the country's policy of developing an independent
electricity supply, priority has been placed on electricity generation and consumption
rather than gas. As a consequence, Gaz de France appears, until recently, to have been a
relatively low profile organisation compared to its United Kingdom counterpart British
Gas. In its relationships with EdF, GdF has also been defensive. This again contrasts
with the relationships characterising the gas and electricity industries in the United
Kingdom where in many areas gas has been the fuel of preference (particularly for
heating). The difference is explicable in terms of the profitability of the two industries
in the two countries and their access to supplies. British Gas had access to low-cost
supplies of natural gas, which as a monopsony buyer it was able to purchase at a low
price; this fortunate circumstance allied to the vast volumes of gas available, permitted
the industry to penetrate many markets rapidly and easily. In contrast, the resources
available to GdF built up more slowly, with the exception of the deposits in Aquitaine.
Supplies from Algeria and the Netherlands were at a higher cost and subject to the
normal commercial market forces. As a result GdF has had three main preoccupations:
its precarious finances; to secure supplies from outside France; and to find markets.
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Prior to 1986, British Gas was in a very enviable position. It not only had a monopoly
of the transmission, distribution and supply of gas to the United Kingdom, it had a
monopsony of purchases of gas from the North Sea. The supply from the North Sea
was cheap and plentiful. The investments made in the seventies by the nationalised
British gas industry to convert to natural gas and expand the pipeline network, were
triumphs of the publicly owned monopoly form of regulation. By contrast, electricity in
the UK was suffering from supply problems. Its reliance on coal meant that it suffered
from high fuel costs and was subject to trade unions' action, which dogged the British
coal industry during the seventies and early eighties. Its nuclear power construction
programme, although technically innovative, was expensive and only exacerbated the
gap between electricity and gas prices. The story of the nationalised French gas
industry during the same period could not be more different to the UK experience. A
largely similar regulatory framework produced a network that suffered from under
investment and trading restriction with respect to electricity, since it did not conform to
France's policy of independence in fuel.
Both the geopolitical and technical circumstances have changed over the past twenty
years. The cold war is now over and Trans-European gas networks have been
constructed, allowing freer trading of gas. The fear of another energy crisis has receded
and the policies of independence in energy, which have been pursued since the oil
shocks of the seventies, seem less credible. Competition in the production of natural
gas has also been liberalised as a response to both the abundance of resources and
relaxation of the political climate. Restrictions such as the British Gas' monopsony,
which ran counter to the EU's policies on free trade, have been abolished. Advances in
information technology have also created a supply market for gas. The Network Code,
for the trading gas and the development of Third Party Access has been a radical
innovation that has ensued, and it has been extremely destructive to BG as a company.
It has had to restructure its operations. Transmission and distribution are now seen as
monopolies run by a private company under regulation. Production and supply are
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meanwhile seen as competitive and regulated by the market. Despite this, problems still
require to be resolved. A market for gas inevitably means consumers will pay different
prices for their gas. This is a consequence of the differing costs of supplying different
consumers, and leads to the phenomenon called 'cherry picking' of profitable customers
by new entrants into the market. This will undoubtedly prove politically unacceptable if
underprivileged members of society are further encumbered by more expensive gas
bills than the average. Nonetheless, some form of social levy on gas prices can easily
iron out these inadequacies. Indeed customer information and billing systems that are
now being developed incorporate spare data fields for such legislation.
While the UK has been introducing this new technology system, France has almost
stood still with respect to deregulation of its gas industry. It seems logical that industry
should evolve to changing technological and social needs, but France's catatonic state
towards deregulation in the gas industry can be explained by its indigenous energy
policy. It would seem on the face of it that GdF's position could conceivably be
improved by deregulation. Most importantly, it would be able to step out of the shadow
of its larger electrical sister EdF. Nevertheless it would be wrong to assume that GdF
does not continue to benefit from the status quo. GdF can use its dominant position in
France as a springboard into the gas industries abroad. Its monopoly position in France
makes it a strong force when brokering gas contracts, financing joint ventures, and
developing new infrastructure in various parts of the world. This would indeed be seen
to be the major loss to the UK deregulation of the gas industry. The power and prestige
of BG as an international player has been inhibited by its need to focus on the UK
market. Also like EdF it looks at incremental innovations to increase its production
efficiency such as the development of cryogenic technologies, so that gas can be stored
for times ofpeak demand.
British Gas serves as a good case study to observe the effect that deregulation has on a
publicly run utility. Once it is truly reconciled to the changing technological
environment and realises that only its pipeline network is still a natural monopoly,
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progress in the management of a utility can take place. BG should be a salutary lesson
to GdF and EdF. The privileges that these companies have, lies in the considerable
achievement in network infrastructure gained during the fifties, sixties and seventies.
Now that the infrastructure is in place and Third Party Access is technically feasible,
the only factor inhibiting the introduction of such a system in gas and electricity is
France's nuclear programme. Thus the key factors affecting the gas industry in both
France and the UK, have been supply side factors.
The story of the gas industries in the UK and France somewhat mirrors that of
electricity. The UK has focused on using information technology to develop new
competitive trading mechanisms. At the same time, GdF has focused on developing
secure supplies of gas. The gas case studies also highlight the importance of indigenous
gas resources.
14.5 WATER
When it comes to water, the principle of natural resources come even more sharply into
focus. Water resources depend on rainfall, the size of the water catchment area, as well
as socio-cultural attitudes towards pricing and metering. Since water bills up until
recently have been paid through local taxation and never metered in the UK, it has
come to be seen as an almost limitless free resource. Recent droughts in England and
Wales, and regulations to increase the quality ofwaste disposal and the associated price
increases, have been a shock to the water consuming public. This need for investment
in the water system has been introduced along with privatisation, using the models that
were used for the telecommunications and energy utilities in the UK. Significantly
however, there is no prospect of competition developing in the water industry. Thus,
this privatisation has taken place due to ideological and political reasons, rather than
any technological imperative as in the telecommunications and energy industries. This
means that the UK Government has shifted the expenditure from the public to the
295
private sector. What is more worrying is that the industry has been left with a form of
regulation that lacks both competition and democratic accountability.
Local democratic accountability is the feature that is most cherished by the water
industry in France. The system of 'delegated management' where water operation is
conducted by private companies is closest to the 'franchised out' system of regulation
described in section 4.4.5. It is ironic that the French allow, arguably, the most
important public resource to be run by the private sector, considering its aversion to the
idea in gas and electricity. One vital ingredient still remains, and that is that the water
facilities are still owned by the Local Authorities on behalf of the public. This means
that ultimate responsibility for water lies with locally elected mayors. This is
undoubtedly an alternative regulatory model to the models of deregulation found in the
UK and has stood the test of time, remaining relatively unchanged over the past twenty
years.
It is the British who look rather flat footed and ideologically inflexible when it comes
to the water industry. Water reform in the UK, rather than being a pioneering exercise
has been somewhat of a catching-up exercise on its European neighbours. Although
many other of the privatisations were driven by the need for the Government to raise
capital, water also required a massive amount of investment to reach EU standards.
Since the Government was unwilling to pay for this out of tax rises, it relied on the
increased water bills of the private companies to achieve the same thing. Water
companies were prime examples of public monopolies being transformed in to private
monopolies. In other words privatisation of the UK water industry had little, if
anything, to do with technology or competition.
In short, water privatisation in the UK was politically driven. The uncertainty of the
method of regulating the water industry is bome out by the fact that it has only been
able to be introduced in England and Wales. The water industry in Scotland still is (and
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is likely to remain) in public hands. Also unlike the changes that have occurred in the
telecoms, gas and electricity industries information technology has played a minor role
in the regulatory process. On the production side, there has been little attempt in the
past to conserve water in the UK. The low penetration of metering in the domestic
sector has meant 'time-of-use' pricing, involving sophisticated telecommunications
technology has been limited to only a few very large customers. In France, where water
is a much more valued resource, metering has been almost universal for a hundred
years, and 'time-of-use' pricing is practised, although the impact of information
technology has also been minimal. Two reasons account for this. It is seen as a very
costly exercise to attach communication devices to water meters and no communication
protocols have been granted by the French Government. It is the multi-utilities who
hold the key. They have the potential economies of scale and scope to take advantage
of innovative information technology. If the benefits of the multi-utility phenomenon
are to be realised, innovations in the billing, metering, and demand management
functions aimed at reducing costs and improving customer service will be crucial.
14.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter has reviewed the eight case studies of telecommunications, energy and
water utilities in France and the UK presented in Part II. It has concluded that no one
theoretical framework of regulation or technological innovation is sufficient to describe
the activities in the public utility sector. Despite this, some differentiation between
theories can be made.
The policies towards telecommunications in both France and the UK have converged
and the old national monopolies have made strategic alliances, to compete in the
international market. This has also meant that both countries have opened up their
domestic market to Third Party Access. Nonetheless, the flavour of the deregulation is
somewhat different in each country. Thus strong evidence has been presented to
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conclude that this deregulation has been facilitated by the development of information
technology. The Saehney (1992), model of infrastructure development of the public
telephone network holds, and similar models referring to the 'highway' heuristic are
useful. Indeed, in the telecommunications sector there has been a shift in the Techno-
Economic Paradigm.
The 'highway' model and the Techno-Economic Paradigm are less convincing when
considering the electricity and gas industries. Since the supply of energy requires some
form of production function, which is absent in telecommunications, the management
of the energy utilities is more open to political manipulation. Thus it is concluded that
the Saehney (1992), model for infrastructure change does not hold for infrastructure
model that intrinsically involves a production function. Within the electricity and gas
industries, positions have diverged over the past fifteen years, between the UK and
France. The root of the divergence comes from the fact that France is poorly endowed
with indigenous energy resources while the UK is well endowed. This led to energy
policies that are singularly French (the Single Buyer Procedure) and ones that are
promoted by the UK (Third Party Access), which are almost diametrically opposed. It
is also argued that this is not an ideological debate but a pragmatic one. Since the
French Nation has invested in a massive amount of effort and resources in developing
its nuclear industry, and is almost totally reliant on its supply of gas from external
sources, leaves it vulnerable to deregulation. In contrast, the UK's abundance of oil and
natural gas gives the ideal opportunity for the development of Third Party Access. It is
also argued that information technology has been shaped differently in each of these
countries in response to their socio-political needs. In France the technology has
focused on incremental innovations which have involved the development of
sophisticated metering and tariffs to make the consumption more reflect the cost of
supply. In the UK radical innovations have resulted in competitive trading systems
such as The England and Wales Pooling and Settlement (electricity) system and the
Network Code (gas). This in turn has introduced a new technology system into
electricity and gas, changing the social fabric of public utilities in the UK.
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In contrast to the other case studies that impact of the information technology
revolution has so far been minimal in water. Third Party Access is not a practical
option, and therefore trading mechanisms cannot be developed. With respect to
resource management, there are opportunities which to date have not been fully
realised. In the UK the low penetration of water metering in domestic premises means
that the potential of cost reflective pricing remains unused. In France where metering is
universal, the cost of installing sophisticated communications modules is seen as
prohibitively expensive. This, together with the fact that communications standards in
metering have yet to be agreed, means that the information revolution has yet to arrive
in the water industry. Nevertheless the trend towards the creation of multi-utilities is a
notable feature in both countries. In theory multiple utilities have the ability to pool the
costs of administration (including information technology over a number of utility
functions).
Thus it can be concluded that the information and telecommunications industry has
played a key role in the regulatory change in public utilities over the past twenty years.
Yet the contribution that information technology has made varies between different
public utilities. Advances in computing and data processing have had a significant
impact in the restructuring of telecommunications, from nationalised public utilities to
privately-owned multi-national companies. It is therefore concluded that the 'highway'
model can be a useful heuristic device to track this change. However, in the gas and
electricity industries models like the Techno-Economic Paradigm begin to break down.
There has been a change in the technological system within electricity and gas in the
UK, with the privatisation of these industries and the introduction of Third Party
Access. Information technology in this case is used to develop trading systems to
introduce competition. France on the other hand, has used the technology to make its
production more efficient by the use of integrated resource planning in order to
preserve the nationalised and vertically integrated structure. Thus in the energy utilities,
information technology has been overtly shaped to achieve two different sociotechnical
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ends. Meanwhile the impact of information technology in the water industry has been
less striking. The regime of regulation in France has remained unchanged while the
privatisations that have occurred in England and Wales have more to do with political
and economic ideologies than technological factors. An attempt is made to map the
dynamics of these technological and systems changes using the frameworks of
Sociotechnical Constituencies, Techno-Economic Networks and Evolutionary Theory
(see sections 5.3.2, 5.3.3 and 5.3.4) in chapters 15 and 16. This will give further insight
into the textural changes that are causing technical and regulatory changes in the public
utilities of both the UK and France.
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CHAPTER 15
METERING TECHNOLOGY IN UK AND FRENCH UTILITIES
15.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter considered the role that information technology played on the
development of public utility regulation. It was concluded that although the Techno-
Economic Paradigm was of significant importance in telecommunications, the role that
information technology played in energy (gas and electricity) and water regulation, was
more complex. This chapter further explores this relationship by considering the
development of metering and telephony in the electricity, gas and water industries.
Chapter 4 described the role that metering plays in the regulation of public utilities. The
purpose of this chapter is to analyse the development ofmetering technology in light of
the evidence presented in the preceding case studies (chapters 6 to 13). In other words
how the infrastructure system (regime of regulation) has been embedded on the
artefacts (meters). The chapter goes on to analyse this development by using
Sociotechnical Constituencies and Evolutionary Theory (described in chapter 5) and
concludes by an appraisal of the suitability of frameworks for describing and
explaining metering innovation and makes some recommendations on metering policy.
15.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF METERING
15.2.1 Increasing Load Factor
The maximisation of Load Factor is one of the most crucial drivers to technological
innovation in the electricity and gas industries in France. Each industry however solves
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the management of this issue in differing ways. Gaz de France has focused in on gas
storage techniques such as liquefied natural gas for peak shaving and underground
storage for seasonal demand. The role of metering in the French gas industry therefore
has progressed little in use from a metrological device used to charge customers. This is
not to say that the electronic and ultrasonic meters (see section 9.3.3) are not
technological advances but they have been driven by a need for better measurement
rather than any system management properties. The role that metering plays in the
management of the French electricity infrastructure is considerably more important.
France has pioneered the use of 'time-of-use' pricing which has been supported by
innovative metering technology. Section 7.3.2 described the numerous tariffs employed
by Electricite de France in this policy of system management. Thus the development of
metering technology in the French electricity network has been directly used to make
the production function (electricity generation) more efficient. Moreover this policy is
most effective when it is applied to a vertically integrated monopoly such as EdF. So
the role that metering technology has in the French electricity industry is two fold. The
direct consequence is to maximise load factor but in doing this it also strengthens EdF's
monopoly powers.
15.2.2 Liberalisation of the Energy Market
The UK gas industry prior to 1986 and the UK electricity industry prior to 1990 were
vertically integrated (see chapters 6 and 8). Time-of-use' pricing and appliance
switching were seen as prime movers, in increasing efficiency through flattening the
load profile. The subsequent unbundling of these industries in the UK has shifted the
role of metering technology from maximising load factor to one that has facilitated
deregulation. So, the parts of metering technology that help to develop competition
have been stimulated by the process. Mandatory Code of Practice 3 & 5 metering,
which has incorporated in it a communication medium and half hourly recording, has
made 'real-time' pricing possible in the 'over lOOkW' market. This is an example of
where a regulator imposed a technological solution on an industry. By contrast,
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technologies that thrived in the integrated environment have not fared so well. 'Time-
of-use' pricing, technologies such as teleswitching and the associated communications
media have been considerably inhibited. This inhibition of the technology has been
intensified by two factors in recent years; the decision to opt for profiling in the 'under
100kW' market, and the opening up of the meter operations and data collection market
to competition.
To summarise, the use of profiles for full market liberalisation in 1998, has meant
considerable developments in customer information systems but has left metering
technology unchanged in domestic premises. Nonetheless, some optimism still remains
that when the competitive environment becomes bedded down and more Code of
Practice 6 and 7 new meters will be installed (with their added functionality in
recording aggregated demand data). For example, an electricity supplier may wish to
use 'time-of-use' and even teleswitch technologies, in some form of energy portfolio
management project in the future.
15.2.3 Abolishing Rateable Value Charging in Water
In England and Wales the water industry's move away from rateable value charging in
the year 2000 (see section 10.3.2) is a tangible sign of a change from treating water
supply as a social good to an economic good. This effort to develop a more cost
reflective price structure has obvious advantages in producing a more efficient use of
water. Conversely there is a social cost. Customers with large families in low rateable
value houses are likely to gain least from this system. At present the argument for all
domestic customers to be metered has not been won.
In view of the fact that water companies are supplying drinking water it is not
surprising that water companies are subject to environmental and quality regulation.
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Moreover recently increased domestic consumption combined with recent years of
lower than average rainfall and EU directives on water quality, have placed leakage and
water conservation as a high priority in certain parts of England and Wales. Universal
metering is argued to be a solution to this. This is the ace that the water metering
industry holds and this card is played by environmental as well as economic lobbyists.
The argument is that it will be more costly and damaging to the environment to build
new reservoirs, treatment and sewerage plants than to install meters to control
customers' demand. It is these environmental and economic dimensions which mean
that the water industry has the greatest scope for technological innovation in metering
over the next few years.
Water companies who have already a major programme of new meter installation, are
in an ideal position to install additional features and modules to their meters at a
marginal cost. Moreover, the uncertainty caused in the energy utilities by metering
liberalisation has left water companies relatively unaffected due to their relatively low
penetration of domestic metering. Thus it is the needs of the water industry combined
with the multi-utilities or horizontal integration of specialised companies dedicated to
meter operations and data collection, which may provide a spur to such functions as
automatic meter reading.
15.2.4 Prepayment Metering
Prepayment metering is a popular method of paying for utility products in the UK (see
sections 6.3.6, 8.3.4, and 10.3.2). The present method ofprepayment by a card or key is
a primitive form of two-way communication in that a customer has physically to buy a
prepayment card before consuming the product. Here there seems to be some form of
scope (which at the moment is not clearly articulated) for future automation of this
process, using either a fixed link or particularly a radio communications infrastructure.
In contrast to the UK, France has very few customers who pay by means of
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prepayment. Since the utility assets are all publicly owned (in water the assets are
municipally owned but the operation is often delegated to private companies), payment
is seen more as a social, rather than an economic issue.
15.2.5 Liberalisation ofMeter Operations
Sections 6.3.4 and 8.3.5 described the plans afoot to deregulate electricity and gas
meter operations in the UK. Meter operations in the electricity industry, which includes
meter ownership, meter installation and meter maintenance has been progressively
deregulated since 1989. Plans for the liberalisation of meter operation in the UK gas
market are a little further behind, but Ofgas has clear intentions to liberalise this market
in the not too distant future. The uncertainty caused by the deregulation of meter
operations has been a major inhibitor in the development of sophisticated metering and
communications technologies. The uncertainty caused by the opening of these markets
has caused under-investment and stagnation. This is a clear example of where a lack of
regulatory vision is actually inhibiting innovation. The issue centres around the fact that
if a company loses its franchise for meter operation it will be left with stranded
metering assets. The regulator therefore requires to look very carefully at the issue of
meter ownership. Particularly different forms of contracts where the meters may be
owned by one party and then leased to the meter operator are required to be considered.
Alternatively, the regulator may consider separate regulation for meter ownership,
meter installation and meter maintenance in a similar fashion as the rail industry in the
UK.
15.2.6 Liberalisation ofData Collection
In addition to the liberalisation of meter operation the electricity and gas regulators
have installed or will soon install, competition in the data collection function. The data
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collection function consists of collecting raw data and giving it to a settlement
administrator so that it can then be presented in a format that is usable for the
distribution and the supply functions. In the gas industry this function is entirely
deregulated and is no longer being carried out by the monopoly distributor of gas in the
UK, TransCo. In the 'over lOOkW' electricity market this function has been conducted
by United Kingdom Data Collection Services (UKDCS), a company owned largely by
the 12 English RECs since 1994. In 2000, UKDCS' franchise for data collection in the
'over 1 OOkW' market, comes up for renewal and the data collection for all customers is
put on a competitive footing. The prognosis for technological innovation in data
collection is a lot more optimistic than for meter operation. There seems to be a number
of interested parties who wish to read meters, such as AccuRead and Northern
Metering Services. But there are two noticeable features. The companies entering the
market tend to be subsidiaries of RECs or joint ventures as in the case with AccuRead
(British Gas and Group 4). The other trend is the tendency to use low technology
solutions. Companies are finding it cheaper to use pedestrian meter readers rather than
electronic media. In the one instance where electronic media is being used, namely
UKDCS, in the over lOOkW market in electricity, the situation is reversed. This is due
to the fact that the technical specifications of half hourly electronic meters and
communications were defined before deregulation. It is difficult to imagine anyone
with either the financial capital or technical experience challenging their monopoly,
unless some form of regulatory intervention is contemplated. Nevertheless joint
ventures and strategic alliances, particularly with information technology and cable
companies, may overcome barriers to enter into the market once the system has bedded
down. Multi-utilities are an obvious example of this trend in the UK. It is also
significant that EdF and GdF have always had joint data collection facilities (EdF-GdF
Services).
15.2.7 Data Security
Another issue in the area of data collection, which needs close regulatory scrutiny, is
306
data protection (see section 12.4.9). It could be conceived that data collectors will trade
with the readings as a commodity in addition to providing a service to the utility, as is
the case now. In the UK the general rule of thumb is that customers should agree to
information on their utility consumption being used for other purposes such as direct
marketing. The increased quantity and accessibility of utility load profiles may
contribute to an actual hostility to automatic meter reading amongst domestic
customers. It is noteworthy here that metering of telephony which is carried out
centrally on telephone exchanges and not at the home, is now a highly automated
process. Using integrated digital networks and stored electronically programmed
controlled exchanges systems, each call can be very closely monitored as to its duration
and location. This of course has benefit to the telephone operator in producing a better
service for the customer, but also provides more information about the customer,
without the customer's consent! The fact that energy and water meters are in or around
the customers' premises, effectively gives them a veto on what information they are
willing to provide the supplier. The public's awareness of this intrusion into privacy
may make the implementation of AMR in the energy and water utilities socially
difficult.
15.2.8 The Environment
The natural environment has begun to play a bigger role in public utility management
over the past few years (see sections 6.2.3, 7.2.1, 9.2.4, 10.2.3 and 11.2.4). One
important way in which environmental regulation differs from economic regulation is
in the role and influence of much wider political communities than the Nation-State.
Take electricity generation for example. At the widest level, the Framework
Convention on Climate Change is negotiated globally (e.g. the Kyoto Summit of 1997).
Then the basis for discharge authorisations at individual plants have been settled via the
European Union, and National Governments retain some control over the determination
of national targets.
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If the environment is of increasing importance in the energy market, it is crucial in the
water sector. Evidence of this is that the water industries in both countries have
independent environmental regulators. Laws enacted in 1964 (creating l'Agencies de
Bassins) and in 1992 in France have recognised the increasing diversity ofwater usage
and environmental needs. Meanwhile in the UK, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of
Pollution (HMIP) was created in 1987, and in 1989 when the water industry in England
and Wales was privatised, the National Rivers Authority (NRA), the environmental
regulator, was formed. Also laws implementing international pollution control systems
were embodied legislatively in the 1990 Environmental Protection Act. Finally in 1995
a new Environmental Act led to further integration in environmental policy by
amalgamating HIMP functions with those of waste regulation authorities and the NRA
in the single new Environment Agency, which came into existence in August 1995. At
the level of the European Union, an Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control
Directive was agreed in 1995, stressing the importance of integrated approaches in
somewhat similar fashion to the UK's legislation. The Environmental Agency considers
that the installation ofmetering plays a crucial role in the management of future water
resources in the UK. Demand management is being encouraged to defer capital
expenditure on costly production and treatment facilities. As a result, UK water
companies are facing regulatory pressures to install water meters free to customers. The
contrast with France, where every water supply has been metered for many years could
not be more striking. This difference in metering policy highlights a cultural difference,
in that water has been a much more valued resource than in the UK. The cultural
difference in turn stems from the differing geographical and physical constraints that
apply to both water networks. Most French water supplies are obtained from
underground aquifers and many of the drainage basins such as the Loire, the Rhone and
the Rhine are many hundreds of miles long. In the UK however since the drainage
basins are relatively short much of the water supply comes from drainage run-off rather
than underground aquifers. This means that the UK system is liable to summer
droughts since water supply is loosely related to rainfall. This situation is aggravated by
the lack ofmetering in the UK. Another effect of the nature of the UK water network is
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that it does not have a history of water recycling. There is no town or city less than
200km from the sea, and the sea has often been used as a dumping site in preference to
recycling. In recent years the UK has had to comply with EU water quality standards
and can no longer undertake such a practice. This, along with other environmental
improvements, has meant that water prices have increased sharply during the nineteen-
nineties. In turn, water is now beginning to be seen as a resource to be managed, and
the development of metering is playing a key role in the management of this water
resource.
15.2.9 Telephony in Metering Energy and Water Utilities
Some form of electronic communications link is required when 'real-time' pricing or
'time-of-use' pricing is being considered. The incumbent media of fixed telephony and
radio are by far the most dominant in this area and will remain so in the immediate
future (see sections 12.4 and 13.4). The lack of any communications need in Code of
Practice 6 metering (see section 6.3.3) has effectively killed off any requirement for a
communications media in the UK domestic electricity and gas market in the short term.
Pedestrian meter readers will remain the core collection media, albeit with the help of
hand-held terminals with optical or touch reading and perhaps some radio component.
Power line carrier (see section 12.4.6) has the advantage that most utility consumers
have an electricity supply, but distribution and transmission of electricity remains a
monopoly business. This causes a dilemma for water and gas companies wishing to use
power line carrier technology. This was clearly illustrated in sections 7.3.1, and 9.3.4,
with EdF-GdF Services. EdF wishes to develop power line carrier technology not only
to fully utilise pricing but also to provide value added services such as telephony
facilities. GdF on the other hand sees less scope for 'time-of-use' pricing in gas and
does not want to be tied into EdF for its communications.
Looking some way into the future, the ultimate may involve a wide band facility such
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as cable into the home and office and carried by entertainment companies as an added
extra to their entertainment or Internet facilities. They could provide meter operations
and data collection facilities. With this there may also be scope for a power line carrier
within customers' premises, carrying out automatic switching and measuring appliance
consumption. The use of power line carrier on the higher voltage electricity network
has yet to be shown to be able to compete with copper wire and cable in such facilities
as the Internet, as has recently been claimed. Nevertheless there is significant scope for
increased use of this technology, particularly electricity in 'time-of-use' pricing,
crediting prepayment customers and AMR. Whether this will become either
economically viable or socially desirable only time will tell.
One thing is clear, metering now has less to do with metrology and more to do with the
information technology business. This provides a strategic opportunity that has yet to
be exploited. On the one hand, the local public utility suppliers at present have access
to every household, office and factory. But at present, most domestic customers are
unwilling to pay a premium for the metering and communications devices to provide,
AMR, appliance switching and other added value services open to them. Meanwhile,
there are cable and satellite companies desperate to obtain access to domestic premises
for multimedia purposes. There is a clear synergy between these two aims, but France
and the UK are approaching this in different ways.
Section 13.2.1 described how telecommunications franchises in France are almost
exclusively being sold to companies who already have a presence on public utility
management such as EdF, Compagnie Generale des Eaux, Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux
and Groupe Bouygues. In the UK, foreign multi-nationals with little interest in
metering communications dominate the market. This is not to say that metering is not
being considered. ScottishPower, Hyder and United Utilities (and others) have already
a multi-utility business and have connections with the information technology suppliers
(see section 12.2.5).
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15.2.10 Standards and Protocols
A key to the development of the market will be standardisation. There are two extreme
approaches to the development of technology standards and protocols. There is the 'top
down' approach where standards are defined by Governments or regulators in legal
statutes. An example of this first type of standard is the airline ticket. Every airline
ticket throughout the world has the same structure and format, which is a de jure
standard, agreed upon by an international commission. The second form is the 'bottom
up' approach where a technology becomes a de facto standard through market
mechanisms. In this case a company may patent a technology to ensure that it has the
sole rights to the technology. An example of this is Microsoft's operating systems for
personal computers. Microsoft through its DOS and Windows operating systems have
ninety percent of the personal computer market. There is a down-side to this method of
developing standards, in that the holder of the patent of the technology, such as
Microsoft, wields immense market power, and as a result is facing challenges to its
monopoly power in court.
In the development of metering technology in public utilities, the whole spectrum of
standards formation is evident. On one side of the spectrum there are the international
and national standards commissions. At the international level there is the IEC, at the
European Level there is CEN and CENELEC, and at the national level there is the
Electricity Pool and the Network Code in gas. At the other end of the scale there are the
entrepreneurs such as Ramar and Itron who are developing new metering and
communications systems. In the middle are the multi-national meter manufacturers and
the utilities themselves who wield the great market power. The role that these large
companies have is crucial. On the one hand, they want to influence the national and
international committees on standards and at the same time they do not want to lose
their market power to the new entrants. The classic example of the latter in the software
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industry is IBM's relationship with Microsoft. In the late nineteen-seventies IBM
contracted Microsoft to develop a personal computer operating system and in effect
handed over the monopoly rights to that market. Established meter manufacturers and
utilities are vigilant that this does not happen in the developing metering market.
There has to be a mutually beneficial system developed between entrepreneurship, the
meter manufacturers, the utilities and international standards organisations (CEN,
CENELEC and IEC). Each of these parties has its own interests at stake and an
entrepreneur must have space, time and financial rewards to develop new products,
while regulatory supervision should ensure that everyone is working to common
protocols. This is not an easy task and may possibly be addressed if an overt interest in
technology R&D is considered within the regulatory process.
15.3 ANALYSING THE DEVELOPMENT OF METERING TECHNOLOGY IN
UTILITIES
15.3.1 The Role ofTheory
With the analysis of metering technology completed, it is now possible to consider a
generalised analytical mechanism which may explain its development, and help guide
policy in the future. This thesis argues that this requires multi-disciplinary input.
Systems Theory (see section 5.3.1) describes how an individual piece of technology can
only be viewed properly when considering the system as a whole. Further, the case
studies show that the full understanding of metering could be further clarified by
considering the cultural, geographical or demographical contexts. The case studies also
describe how metering over the past twenty years has been changing from a
metrological device to a customer service interface. To fully grasp the implications of
this change in technology, a reappraisal must therefore be made of the whole system
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and in particular the dynamics that have caused this change. In order to do this,
Sociotechnical Constituencies are used, since as argued in chapter 5, that this
framework is most suitable when considering the changing shape of a particular
technology as a result of system changes. Also the suitability of Evolutionary Theory
will be considered when evaluating the issue of metering development in the energy
and water utilities.
15.3.2 Sociotechnical Constituencies
Section 5.3.2 described how technological development can be described as a
dynamically changing system that aligns together in a Sociotechnical Constituency.
Figures 16 to 21 describe such a Sociotechnical Constituency for each of the case
studies. The concept of 'diamond of alignment' is used to illustrate the multiple
dimensions involved in shaping inter-organisational contexts of metering development.
The focus (centre) of the diamond is metering technology and its associated
constituency. The shaded areas (I) and (II) represent the sociotechnical nature in that
they are the dominant features of the constituency (I) and the technology (II). The
various dimensions of the 'diamond' are then represented; 'the strategic' (1), 'the market'
(2), 'the social' (3), 'the environmental' (4). The analysis differs from Molina's in one
significant way in that the sizes of each portion or constituency of the diamond differ in
magnitude. The sizes are proportionate to the importance that each constituency plays
in the whole system. In this way, a conception of the factors that are shaping the
development of metering in the electricity, gas and water industries can be developed.
Thus a qualitative judgement can be made on the relative importance of market, social
and environmental influences in the shaping ofmetering technology.
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Figure 16: The Diamond ofAlignment for Electricity Metering in the UK
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The dominant feature of the constituency for UK electricity metering (figure 16) is the
introduction competition and privatisation of the electricity industry (I). In order to do
this; immature electronic metering technology is replacing mature electro-mechanical
metering (II). Constituency 1, which represents national and strategic governance, has
largely been handed over to the market. Constituency 2 shows that the competitive or
market forces portion of the diamond predominates, indicating that metering
technology is primarily being developed to satisfy this constituent of the UK electricity
industry. Constituency 3 indicates that social provisions are expected to be provided by
the State rather than by the utility. Also the widespread introduction of prepayment
metering is seen as an alternative to customer disconnections. Constituency 4
representing the environmental driver is relatively small but is certainly discernible due
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to emissions constraints. The Non Fossil Fuel Levy (directed at generation) is evidence
of this.
Figure 17: The Diamond ofAlignment for Electricity Metering in France
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The dominant feature of the constituency for electricity metering in France (figure 17)
is to optimise the load profile (I). In order to do this an immature electronic metering
technology is replacing a mature electro-mechanical metering (II). The large size of
Constituency 1 signifies that national and strategic governance is paramount in order to
maintain a strong French electricity industry. Constituency 2 shows that since the
industry is a vertically integrated nationalised monopoly, there is very little scope for
the discipline of market forces. Constituency 3 represents that social provisions are
expected to be provided by the public utility as a function of the State. Constituency 4
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represents the environmental driver, which is founded in a policy for integrated
resource planning through marginal cost pricing.
Figure 18: The Diamond ofAlignment for Gas Metering in the UK
The dominant feature of the constituency for UK gas metering (figure 18) is to
introduce competition and privatise the gas industry (I). In order to do this an immature
ultrasonic metering technology is replacing mature gas membrane metering (II).
Constituency 1, representing national and strategic governance, has largely been
handed over to the market in which large indigenous resources of natural gas have
played an important role. Constituency 2 shows that the competitive or market forces'
portion of the diamond predominates, indicating that metering technology is primarily
being developed to satisfy this constituent, as in the UK electricity industry.
Constituency 3 indicates that the social provisions are expected to be provided by the
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State rather than the utility. Social provisions are however addressed, to some extent,
through customer service standards. There is also widespread introduction of
prepayment metering. Constituency 4 represents the role that the natural gas industry
has played in reducing NOx and SOx emissions, but with the adoption of combined
cycle gas turbine generation technology rather than integrated resource planning.
Figure 19: The Diamond ofAlignment for Gas Metering in France
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The dominant feature of the gas metering constituency in France (figure 19) is to
maintain a constant supply of gas from abroad and optimise the load profile (I). In
order to do this; an immature ultrasonic metering technology is replacing mature gas
membrane metering (II). Constituency 1 shows that national and strategic governance
is paramount since Gaz de France is seen as an international distributor and supplier of
gas. Constituency 2 shows that since the industry is a vertically integrated nationalised
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monopoly, there is very little scope for the discipline of market forces. Constituency 3
indicates that social provisions are expected to be provided by the public utility as a
function of the State. Constituency 4 shows that environmental factors are promoted by
such initiatives as natural gas vehicles in collaboration with Local Authorities.
Figure 20: The Diamond of Alignment for Water Metering in the UK
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The dominant feature of the UK water metering constituency (figure 20) is to privatise
the water industry (I). Until 1989 metering was rare in domestic customers' premises.
Mechanical and electronic metering is gradually being introduced in England and
Wales (II). Constituency 1 representing national and strategic governance, has been
given little priority, which means there has been a loss of local democratic input.
Constituency 2 shows that market discipline is only achieved through regulatory price
controls and 'yardstick' regulation. Constituency 3 indicates that social provisions are
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expected to be provided by the State rather than the utility. This provision however falls
short of compulsory universal metering. Constituency 4 representing environmental
driver is very strong in water. Metering is crucial for the introduction of cost reflective
pricing and conservation. This has become very important as a result of increasing
demand and recent droughts.
Figure 21: The Diamond of Alignment for Water Metering in France
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The dominant feature of the water metering constituency in France (figure 21) is to
maintain an efficient water industry in France and promote French water companies
abroad (I). Mechanical and electronic metering is competing with immature electronic
metering and communications (II). Constituency 1 shows that a local democratic input
is a very important component of the governance of the water industry. Constituency 2
shows that market discipline is directed, in many cases, to delegating the operations to
private companies. Constituency 3 indicates that social provisions are expected to be
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provided by the State rather than the utility. Constituency 4 representing the
environmental driver is very strong in water. The promotion of more 'time-of-use'
tariffing is restricted by the lack of agreed standards for electronic metering and
communications.
Figure 22: A summary of The Sociotechnical Constituencies to the Analysis of
Metering in Public Utilities in France and the UK, consolidating Figures 16 to 21 in
One Diagram
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Although Sociotechnical Constituencies provide an excellent framework to describe the
social and technical interactions ofmetering development in public utilities (see figure
22 for a summary diagram), it does not provide a dynamic perspective in time. In
addition, the definition of Sociotechnical Constituents restricts the analysis to only the
social and the technical. It is argued unjustified either to describe the whole mechanism
as socio-technical or to limit oneself to the socio-technical. This becomes apparent
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when the role of physical geography is considered. The lack of indigenous fossil fuels
in France and the plentiful resources in the UK has had profound and differing
implications for energy supply in both these countries. Similarly the fact that France
has a series of large rivers while the UK does not, has implications in the water supply
of these countries. These phenomena can in no way be described as social constituents
but in turn they have socio-technical implications. Thus to describe the physical
constraints of each of the industries as a Sociotechnical Constituent is incomplete. The
lack of rainfall or the difficulty in storing electricity compared with gas or water is
difficult to describe in a framework that is restricted only to social mechanisms.
Finally the role of 'interpretative flexibility' leading to the diamonds of alignment
outlined in this section and the eventual 'closure' of the technology requires more than
acts of social negotiation. They require the implementation of standards and protocols
that are codified in rules varying from international agreements, national legislation and
industrial procedures of best practice. It is only when the constituency is aligned in
such a way that technology in itself becomes reproducible.
15.3.3 An Evolutionary Explanation for Metering Development
An alternative, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, form of analysing technological
development can bee seen through the eyes ofEvolutionary Theory which is described
in section 5.3.4. Evolutionary Theory, incorporating the notions of technological
variation and selection mechanisms involving environmental and economic as well as
Sociotechnical Constituents, is a second possible way of modelling the technological
process. The interaction between these variables and selectors can be equated to the
interpretative flexibility. The notion of retention and reproduction, which is the key to
Evolutionary Theory, is represented by codified standards such as patents, protocols
and recommendations. A proposed methodology is shown in figures 23 to 29. It has
two significant differences from Sociotechnical Constituencies. It sets out to explain
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rather than describe the process of metering innovation, and it is a process that is
independent of the social dimension. The variations in metering technology are
represented by the metering and communications artefacts and processes. The selection
mechanism is the application to which the technology can be applied. This leads to
various prototypes. The prototypes are then crystallised in patents and standards that
can be reproduced by manufacturers. Importantly, although the diagrams are linear this
process should not be seen as linear. As described in section 5.2.1 the process of
innovation and diffusion is an interactive one, and intrinsically these mechanisms tend
to blend into one another in which processes like 'learning by doing' and vicarious trials
are important.
Figure 23: A Representation of the Evolution of Electricity Metering in the 'Over
1 OOkW' market in the UK
The variations in electricity metering technology in the 'over lOOkW' market are the
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different forms of metering technology used for metrology and communication are
shown in the first column of figure 23. This includes such items as consumption,
pricing mechanisms, distribution management, different forms of communication
systems and value added services such as automatic meter reading. The selection
mechanism involves the application of the variables to new competitive regulatory
environments, improved customer service and physical infrastructure constraints, such
as plentiful supplies of gas for electricity generation. This has produced new metering
prototypes which are tested and then retained in standards and protocols such as the
patents derived from software companies (such as UKDCS), Code of Practice 3 and 5
metering and metering data communications standards for fixed link and radio
communications. These patents standards and protocols can be reproduced so that the
cycle ofmetering evolution can begin again.
The variations in metering technology are much the same as in the 'over lOOkW'
market (figure 23) as with the 'under lOOkW' market (figure 24) with one addition in
the form of prepayment meters. Out of all these variations prepayment meters and
electro-mechanical meters that read consumption only, utilising pedestrian meter
reading, has been selected. The selection mechanism has also involved cost constraints
in that it is too costly to install electronic metering in domestic premises. This has
meant that although there are electronic prototypes, the form of metering that is
retained as standard is electro-mechanical. This has been as a result of adopting
profiling as a means of competition and methods of prepayment. Again, these patents
standards and protocols are written down in rules and regulations so that they can be
reproduced for a future generation ofmetering.
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Figure 24: A Representation of the Evolution of Electricity Metering in the 'Under
lOOkW' Market in the UK
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The variations for electricity metering technology in France (figure 25) are again much
the same as in figures 23 and 24. Out of all these variations, 'time-of-use' metering has
evolved as the predominant form of metering. The selection mechanism has involved
the need to optimise the load profile through universal supply at equal cost. The form
of management for pricing is retained in standards and patents which are agreed with
the French Government. These patents and pricing regimes are then published, but
EdF's monopoly ensures that it can dictate standards on a national level. The published
prices are then reproduced or revised (or evolve) on a periodic basis.
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Figure 25: A Representation of the Evolution ofElectricity Metering in France
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The variations in metering technology are much less extensive in the gas industry in the
UK (figure 26) than in the electricity industry (figures 23, 24 and 25). Nonetheless they
cover the same areas as metrology, customer service, distribution management and
communications mechanisms. Out of all these variations the only developments have
been in prepayment metering, in particular the Quantum meter, and to a lesser extent in
ultrasonic metering. The selection mechanism for the Quantum meter has been the need
to reduce disconnections. However, the fact that British Gas may soon lose their
monopoly in meter operation means that the retention and reproduction mechanisms
are very far from certain. If BG loses it monopoly for meter operation competitive
forces may mean that the Quantum meter does not survive.
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Figure 26: A Representation of the Evolution ofGas Metering in the UK
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The variations in gas metering technology in France (figure 27) are much the same as
in the case of the UK (figure 26). On this occasion the selection mechanism does not
consist of a competitive environment. Therefore Gaz de France, through their
monopoly can create retain and reproduce de jure standards in such technology as
ultrasonic metering and thus can dictate, to some extent, the evolutionary process.
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Figure 27: A Representation of the Evolution of Gas Metering in France
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The variations in metering technology in the UK water industry (figure 28) involve:
consumption by volume or demand by flowrate; pricing; distribution management;
leakage and demand management. On this occasion the selection mechanism does not
consist of a competitive environment although infrastructure investment is a key factor.
The industry consists of an economic regulator who wishes to see cost reflective
pricing and an environmental regulator who wishes to see water conservation. On the
other hand, consumer groups are largely hostile to metering. The final form that
metering will take is uncertain. The retention mechanism involves legislation which
encourages metering, patents on new electronic meters and new communications
protocols such as DLMS, Flag and CHIRPS.
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Figure 28: A Representation of the Evolution ofWater Metering in the UK
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The variations in metering technology in the French water industry (figure 29) involve
much the same as in the UK (figure 28) but one important factor is different. In France
there is almost universal water metering. Since there is no stimulus to install new
metering, much of the selection mechanism depends on the wishes of the Local
Authorities and private water companies. Thus there is little stimulus for the evolution
of water metering in France. The retention mechanism is therefore far from certain.
These prototypes have yet to be developed, and standards have yet to be agreed. This
means that the reproduction of 'solid state' water meters cannot take place.
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Figure 29: A Representation of the Evolution ofWater Metering in France
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The key features of this evolutionary description of the metering technology system are
three fold. Although the system is bounded its variables and selectors can be added or
subtracted depending on the dynamics of the system. That is to say although a number
of variables and selectors have been highlighted, this is not to say, that other selectors
and variables are not involved in the process. In addition the variable and selectors will
vary in importance in both time and space with new factors entering and others
disappearing. For example, environmental legislation has grown in importance over the
past twenty years. Similarly, new innovations in microprocessor and communications
technology are introducing a distinct new dynamic not only for metering technology
but for system infrastructure as a whole. Finally this is an interactive process where
variables are influencing the shape of selectors and selectors are influencing the shape
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of variables.
15.4 METERING POLICY
With the illumination of the issue of metering technology that the Sociotechnical
Constituencies and evolutionary approaches provide, some judgements can now be
made on metering policy. Sociotechnical Constituencies show that technology
development is not a product of one process but many. Thus the policy of the UK
Government on the creation of a market in electricity and gas, has resulted in a
metering technology which is geared primarily for trading needs. Similarly the French
Government's policy of independence on energy resources has resulted in metering
which is specialised to optimise the load profile. Another important feature that is also
revealed, is the role that metering has placed in achieving certain political and
economic goals. In the UK, it has been used to introduce competitive trading
arrangements, while in France it has been a key factor in maintaining the integrated
monopoly status. An evolutionary approach introduces a time dynamic to the analysis
ofmetering development and provides an explanatory mechanism for the events taking
place. Moreover, evolution provides a less overtly social analysis where the variables
can be random, socially constructed or 'naturally' occurring. The analysis also shows
that metering technology can be used for socio-political ends when its development
involves a complex mixture of random, natural and social circumstances. Constructive
Technology Assessment (see section 5.3.4) is a promising methodology in which the
regulation of metering technology can account for both consumers' and producers'
interests. Take for example the development of water metering policy in the UK. It is
clear that both the economic regulator (Ofwat) and the environmental regulator (the
Environment Agency) would like meters installed in all households. Yet this is
opposed by consumers' committees who argue that water saving devices should be
installed first before metering is considered. Any policy on water metering should take
into account all these constituents.
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15.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has described the development of metering technology in the French and
UK electricity, gas and water utilities. In concurrence with Systems Theory, it is viewed
that innovation in metering can only be understood as a component of the network
infrastructure as a whole. It has also been discovered that the role of metering in the
network infrastructure of public utilities is undergoing a process of change. It is
changing from a metrological device to measure the quantity or quality of the product
to an active customer interface. This change has been chiefly brought about by the
revolution in microprocessor technology. It is therefore concluded that since a
component technology such as metering is changing, then the infrastructure around that
technology must be either driving, or responding to, the innovation. An analysis of this
regulatory change is made in the next chapter.
Sociotechnical Constituency and evolutionary approaches were used to describe the
constituent elements involved in this change, and how they have resulted in different
technological and infrastructure solutions for metering technology. It was shown that
the differing Sociotechnical Constituents across utilities and between countries proved
to be powerful drivers to differing 'interpretative flexibilities' between the sectors
studied. In this way a description of metering technology could be carried out and a
comparison made between industrial sectors. Evolutionary Theory on the other hand
explained how standards codified in patents, protocols and legislation were powerful
mechanisms of technological crystallisation and system closure. Thus it is by these
mechanisms that a particular meter or artefact can be reproduced on a large scale.
Evolution also presents a time dynamic and opens up the analysis to non-social as well
as social constituents. In this way the Sociotechnical Constituents became selectors
incorporating random and non-social events.
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It is not suggested that any one of the concepts discussed in this analysis alone can
describe the process of change occurring in utility metering. Each approach is better at
describing different aspects of the system. Systems Theory is useful, predominately
when describing the role of metering technology within a large infrastructure.
Sociotechnical Constituencies highlight the forces that drive change in the
technological and infrastructure system. Finally, Evolutionary Theory can provide a
wider dynamic that incorporates the role of time in the process that can be used in a
descriptive analysis, and as a tool to aid technology policy. The validity of this
pragmatic and eclectic approach to the use of theoretical frameworks is justified in
section 17.2.
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CHAPTER 16
REGULATION IN UK AND FRENCH UTILITIES
16.1 INTRODUCTION
It is now appropriate to begin the analysis of the impact of this research on regulatory
policy. Section 4.4.1 discussed the various forms of the Principal-Agent model for the
regulation of public utilities. The case studies have provided empirical evidence of the
ways that the Principal-Agent model is structured for public utilities in France and the
UK. Chapter 14 concluded that information technology has, to varying degrees,
influenced changes or modifications in the regime of regulation, while chapter 15
examined ways of conceptualising a change in metering and communications
technology. This chapter will now discuss further the modes of regulation explored in
the case studies and how they have changed over the past twenty years under the
influence of various actors. As in the previous chapter, methods of analysing this
change will be presented, and recommendations will be made, on future regulation
policy. On this occasion Techno-Economic Networks and Evolutionary Theory are used
in an attempt to describe and explain the change in the regulatory process.
16.2 MODES OF REGULATION
16.2.1 Deregulation
The argument for deregulation rests on the notion that the gains from scale economies
and price or profit control are small in relation to the inefficiencies of regulation. In
other words, the logical and empirical foundations of common carrier and public utility
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regulation are too shaky to support its existence. A number of deregulatory alternatives
were considered in section 4.4.6, namely; unregulated monopoly, self-regulation and
pseudo-competition. Pseudo-competition perhaps best describes the situation currently
existing in the UK and French telecommunications, following the divestiture of British
Telecom (total) and France Telecom (partial) by their respective Governments. Here
apparent competition and regulation exist simultaneously. Monopolies still exist, with
first mover advantages arising from sunk investment. Therefore some incentives by
means of regulation or subsidy are needed to promote entry. So active regulation is
required to encourage competitors to enter the market. British Telecom for example,
has been prevented from competing in the home entertainment market until such time
as the cable companies have a sufficient market share so that they can compete with
BT. Competition is also being introduced in France where EdF and SNCF are being
encouraged to use their networks for telephony. Another indication that there is only
pseudo-competition is that British Telecom and France Telecom are still de facto
monopolies subject to regulation. For instance, BT's prices and customer service
standards are set by the independent regulator Oftel. The Governments of the two
countries also still take an interest in the social impact of the telecommunications
infrastructure development. Evidence for this is that the 'National Grid for Learning'
which aims to have every school and library connected to the Internet. Despite all these
outside controls however, competition is developing in France and the UK. The reasons
for this are complex, but in Chapter 14 it is suggested that the development of
information technology is a major contributor to the process.
16.2.2 Third Party Access
Third Party Access used in the electricity and gas transportation sectors in the UK (see
chapters 6 and 8) can be seen as an intermediate stage between deregulation (see
section, 4.4.6) and the regulation of private monopolies (see sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4). It
involves competition or pseudo-competition in the production and supply components,
combined with the Principal-Agent model for the monopolistic transportation
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component. In the UK the Principal is a semi-autonomous economic regulator (Offer
or Ofgas) while the Agents are privately owned monopolies. In this system, a gas or
electricity supplier will pay the transportation companies (the Regional Electricity
Companies for electricity and TransCo for Gas) and a fee for the use of their
transportation system. In turn, the supplier adds this cost to the production and
administration costs, and charges the customer. The monopoly transportation
companies are regulated by means of a price cap (RPI-X) imposed by the regulators.
16.2.3 Single Buyer Procedure
With the Single Buyer Procedure, one company is responsible for buying all the
electricity and gas requirements over a particular franchised area. Chapters 7 and 9
described that this system operates in France where Electricite de France and Gaz de
France are responsible for buying all the respective electricity and gas for France. So
this develops an inter-country trading market, rather than an intra-country trading
market as in the UK. The Single Buyer Procedure can be seen as a modification of the
public enterprise form of regulation described in section 4.4.2. Under pressure from the
EU to liberalise its energy market, France has been forced to reconsider its energy
supply policy. The result was the adoption of both the Single Buyer Procedure (to
satisfy France) and the Third Party Access system in European Law.
16.2.4 The Delegated Management Model
The 'franchising out' or 'delegated management' model described in chapter 11 is used
for about seventy per cent of the water supplies in France. In this form of regulation,
administration, and in some cases the capital expenditure of publicly-owned municipal
water supplies are delegated to private companies on a competitive tendering basis.
This introduces a market element into water supply while leaving the ownership of it in
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the hands of the local municipalities. This is a half-way house between public and
private administration that provides some sort of competitive discipline. In addition to
Local Authority regulation, there is also regional and national regulation of water in
particular, with respect to the environment. This is administered through I'Agencies de
Bassins (AdB) and the Ministry of the Environment.
16.2.5 The Regulation ofPrivate Monopolies
The regulation of private monopolies applies to the water industry in England and
Wales (see chapter 10). A public owned and operated monopoly owns and runs the
water supply and treatment facilities for a designated area. It is similar to Third Party
Access in that it is regulated by means of a price cap (in this case RPI+K). But, unlike
the gas and electricity industries, there is no integrated 'National Grid' for water. Thus
Third Party Access cannot operate. Thus an economic regulator (Ofwat) who has a
number of duties including setting price controls and evaluating customer service
standards regulates the industry. The regulatory controls are set by a form of 'yardstick'
regulation where the performance of regional monopolies are compared in a league
table format. The water industry in the UK is also controlled by The Environmental
Agency, which has duties similar to the AdBs in France.
16.3 ANALYSING CHANGES IN THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES
16.3.1 The Role ofTheory
As with the last chapter, Systems Theory is again used as a suitable starting point to
consider the regulatory process. Thomas Hughes describes the development of the
electricity power network as a 'seamless web' where individual artefacts are part of an
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interweaving sociotechnical system. Hughes' form of Systems Theory is therefore
helpful in describing how information technology can fit into the system as a whole.
Where Systems Theory is less helpful, is in the role of information technology as a
dynamic for change from one regulatory system to another. Chapter 5 described how
Techno-Economic Networks, Sociotechnical Constituencies, and Evolutionary Theory
can address such system change. When relating this to regulatory change, the case
studies have shown that technology is only one of many components in the regulatory
system. This analysis then differs from the analysis of metering development in chapter
15 in that it is focusing on the regulatory system as a whole, rather than metering
specifically. For this reason it is inappropriate to use the techno-centric technique of
Sociotechnical Constituencies to describe regulatory change. In this sense, it is found
that the more neutral vocabulary of Techno-Economic Networks and evolutionary
theory proved to be more fruitful in the analytical process.
16.3.2 Techno-Economic Networks
The act of change of a regulatory system stems from numerous interactions between
diverse actors and intermediaries, both human and non-human, acting upon a relatively
rigid system. An actor can be seen as a component of a Techno-Economic Network
whereas an intermediary can be described as an actor which, is a contributory factor, in
the change from one Techno-Economic Network to another. The exploration of case
studies highlighted a number of these actors. Chapter 14 then argued that information
technology was the prime mover in the deregulation of the telecommunications
industry in both France and the UK. But the analysis also suggested that in the gas and
electricity utilities, information technology played a lesser role in that it was reduced to
only a facilitator in the change. In other words information technology along with
geopolitical and sociological factors were major factors to the innovations and system
changes occurring in these industries. By contrast the information technology
revolution had hardly touched the water industry which had more important drivers
such as environmental factors affecting it. The notion of a Techno-Economic Network
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has been found to be useful as a tool for the analysis of the outcome of a system which
is constructed from a number of actors. Moreover with this approach one can analyse
the interactions of metering technology as well as other social and non-social actors
with the regulatory system.
Figure 30: A Techno-Economic Network Depicting Deregulation in the UK
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The deregulation process that has occurred in the UK (see figure 30) has been
dependent on a number of intermediaries. A major one has been the rise to political
prominence of people who believe that market devices and entrepreneurial profit are
preferable to neo-classical welfare economics. They envisage that the sole role for
Government is to correct for issues not addressed by the market system such as social
equality and imperfect competition (see section 3.2). Another feature of deregulation
and Third Party Access (see also figure 31) has been the necessity to build a large
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information technology infrastructure. In the UK electricity industry the Pooling and
Settlement System for customers over lOOkW and the Initial Settlement and
Reconciliation Agent (for customers under lOOkW) allow competitive trading in the
generation and supply markets. This would be inconceivable without new systems of
electronic data interchange. Similarly the Network Code in the UK gas industry has
also allowed competitive trading. Thus, one of the notable features in the deregulatory
process has been the investment in information to allow trading to take place. This in
turn is changing the traditional role that metering has had as a metrological device and
converting it into a customer service interface (see section 12.4.7). Thus Techno-
Economic Network (A) which was a vertically integrated publicly owned and operated
monopoly, and which used metering to maximise load factor, has been transformed
into two new Techno-Economic Networks. The network changing from a rectangle to
an oval shape in figure 30 depicts this change. Techno-Economic Network 'B',
represents the electricity supply market under lOOkW and the gas supply market in the
UK. These supply markets have been unbundled from the transportation and
production functions and are now privately owned and are (or soon will be) open to
competition. Yet the 'under lOOkW' market old metering technology is still being used.
Electro-mechanical meters, which were being used under the old regime, have not yet
adapted to the new system. This indicates that the Techno-Economic Network has yet to
take over the process of irreversibleisation. In other words it is still immature and
unstable. Techno-Economic Network 'C' however is much more stable. This represents
the electricity market over lOOkW in the UK. Here metering and communications
technology has adapted to the new regime and features such as 'real-time' pricing,
automated meter reading and load management have become a reality.
In the distribution and transmission functions of the gas and electricity industry in the
UK, Third Party Access has been introduced (Techno-Economic Network 'D' in figure
31). The intermediaries in this case, as depicted in figure 30, have been a belief in
private sector management. However in contrast to figure 30, these functions are still
natural monopolies, and a form of price regulation (RPI-X) has been introduced. Again
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information technology has played a crucial role in the ability to transfer customers
from one supplier/shipper to another and calculate 'use-of-system' charges in order to
allow competition to develop in the energy supply and electricity generation markets.
The role ofmetering is at the centre of this process in the settlement arrangements that
administer the Third Party Access process. Again the changing 'shape' of the network
and the role that metering plays is depicted by the differing shapes in the diagram.
Figure 31: A Techno-Economic Network Depicting the Introduction of Third Party
Access in the UK
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As with the electricity and gas networks in the UK, the energy infrastructure in France
was (and still is) a publicly owned and operated vertically integrated infrastructure
where metering is used to maximise load factor (Techno-Economic Network 'A' in
figure 32). But in contrast to the UK this network structure has been largely retained
but remoulded into the Single Buyer Procedure through a process of 'modernisation'
and 'mobilisation' (see section 7.2.7). This has resulted in the infrastructure closing
round Techno-Economic Network (E) in figure 32. The intermediaries in this process
have mainly been political. A key actor has been the French State. France has a
reputation of being a dirigiste State, in that it is more interventionist and protectionist
of its industry than the UK. Its poverty in natural resources has meant that France was
Gas and Electricity Distribution
and Transmission in the UK
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exposed to the full brunt of the oil crisis in the nineteen-seventies. This, and the close
association between the State and industry, were the major reasons for investing in
nuclear generation technology at that time. This policy has meant that France is now
self sufficient in, and is indeed a net exporter, of electricity. As a consequence the
country is now very insulated against external fluctuations in energy price. On the
down side, the country's energy policy is committed to one form of technology, namely
nuclear power. This has clear implications for regulation of energy policy in France. If
the French Government allows Third Party Access to its network to a competitive
generation and supply market like the UK, the whole of the French energy policy
would be compromised. Thus there is a belief that public sector management of energy
resources is best. In this belief, the fact that France wishes to have independence in
energy resources and metering technology is being used to maximise the efficiency of
the vertically integrated system through flexible pricing and increased customer
service. The fact that Third Party Access is being introduced in many other countries in
the European Union suggests that this infrastructure may undergo some further
changes.
Figure 32: A Techno-Economic Network Depicting the Introduction of the Single Buyer
Procedure in France
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The Single Buyer Procedure has also implications in technological development. Since
the Single Buyer Procedure is in some respects an attempt by the French Government
to protect its electricity generation interests, greater emphasis is being placed on
making these generation assets more efficient. Over the years EdF has been developing
ever more sophisticated 'time-of-use' tariffs by means ofmains-borne ripple control. In
addition, two-way switching and 'real-time' pricing is gradually being introduced. This
has meant that metering is being used to optimise the load profile and develop more
flexible customer service. In figure 32 this is depicted by a change of shape of the
metering part of the Techno-Economic Network.
Figure 33: A Techno-Economic Network Depicting the Maintenance of the Delegated
Management Model with Respect to Water in France
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In the French water industry, the principle of delegated management has operated and
has continued to operate over the last twenty years with little change. This is partly
testament to the success and durability of this type of regulatory system, but it is also
evidence that the development of information technology and metering (unlike the
electricity and gas industries) has little effect on the regulatory process. In figure 33 this
is depicted by the shape of the Techno-Economic Network remaining the same over the
twenty years of study. Also, the AdBs and the Ministry of the Environment mean that
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within the regulatory process there are active trade-offs between local political forces,
private sector economic forces, regional environmental forces and national strategic
forces. It is a form of regulation that has proved successful for many years and it is
significant that this form of administration has not come under any pressure from the
regime where private companies are regulated which has developed in the UK.
Figure 34: A Techno-Economic Network Depicting the Transformation of Public
Monopolies into Private Monopolies in the UK with Aspect to Water
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Political intermediaries rather than any technical considerations have dominated the
regulation of water in the UK (this is depicted in figure 34). The major intermediary
has been desire to separate the investment required for refurbishment of the water
industry from the exchequer. Nonetheless metering has played an important role in the
transformation of a publicly owned and operated monopoly structure (G) to a privately
owned monopoly structure (H). The introduction of metering is allowing the
introduction of more flexible pricing and customer services. There has been a massive
refurbishment and development of the water supply and sewerage infrastructure since
privatisation in 1989. This have been needed to maintain the UK's decaying water
supply network which has suffered considerable under-investment when it was held in
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public hands and to meet EU standards. These improvements have caused price
increases greater than inflation since privatisation, but should not be attributed to any
fundamental flaw in the regulatory system.
Just as with the analysis of the development of metering technology in Chapter 15
using Sociotechnical Constituencies a number of similar problems occur with Techno-
Economic Networks. The first is the bounding problem in defining each of the actors or
intermediaries. The concept of a system is that one actor or intermediary is distinct
from another and its relative importance on the network as a whole has a value
judgement. This value judgement has been generated from empirical case study
analysis derived from archival texts and interview transcripts prescribed in Actor-
Network methodology. As described in section 5.3.3 it is not sufficient to return to texts
whether it is published articles or interview transcriptions to obtain a theory repeatable
by experiment. Neither can tacit components to individuals competencies nor their
beliefs be unravelled using this form ofActor-Network Theory. Also by definition this
is the analysis of a snapshot at a specific time and although useful in defining the
drivers in the system, is of little help in tracing the development of a regulatory
environment.
16.3.3 An Evolutionary Explanation for Regulatory Development
Another way of approaching the principles of regulatory change is studying it by means
Evolutionary Theory as described in sections 5.3.4 and 15.3.3. In the case of regulation,
the variation needed for an evolutionary framework can be found in the different forms
of regulatory regimes described in sections 4.4 and 16.2. The selectors meanwhile are
such factors as the state of technological knowledge, political belief systems and
natural physical constraints. A mechanism of retention and reproduction can be found
in codified rules such as legal statues, for instance Acts of Parliament, patents, etc.
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Figure 35: An Evolutionary Analysis Depicting Deregulation in the UK
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For a deregulatory framework to evolve, the variations (first column in figure 35) in the
regulatory systems, which are represented by the regulatory frameworks presented in
section 4.4, must undergo a selection process. The selection mechanisms in the case of
the deregulation mode are similar to the intermediaries in Techno-Economic Networks.
For example, the belief that market and entrepreneurial skills are more desirable than
bureaucratic Government control, has been a major factor in the selection process. Also
the advances in information technology have facilitated the implementation of
deregulation in the gas and electricity supply industries in the UK. The retention of this
system are by means of Acts of Parliament such as the Gas Act (1986) and the
Electricity Act of 1989 as well as technological artefacts, such as metering, which are
defined in codes ofpractices.
There has also been a growing body of consensus of the inability of Government to
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acquire the knowledge necessary to improve upon the market. This contrasted with the
paternalist view that dominated the nationalised utilities, where the hope was that a
group of right-thinking and disinterested people would run undertakings in the public
interest, of which they were supposed to be the arbiters. Rather it is argued market
forces should play a much greater role. This is evidence of an evolving process relying
on both social and non-social events which is suitable for an evolutionary framework.
Nonetheless figure 35 indicates that this form of regulation has been somewhat
'captured' by groups who believe in this ideology.
Figure 36: An Evolutionary Analysis Depicting the Introduction of Third Party Access
in the UK
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An evolutionary approach to the development of Third Party Access in the UK
(depicted in figure 36) is very similar to that of the model for deregulation. The only
difference is the 'natural monopoly' nature of the gas and electricity transportation
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infrastructures in the UK. Therefore instead for deregulation there is a form of
'yardstick' regulation based on price control (RPI-X). Again this is retained in the
various acts of parliament. It is also worth emphasising that the UK system of
deregulation has been reproduced in a number of other countries (but not in France)
although with significant variations. This is evidence that once these regulations are
imposed they can be reproduced in slightly different forms, depending on the countries'
physical and cultural needs.
The major area of criticism comes from three areas; the privatisation process, the
ownership of the private companies and the capture of the regulatory process by an
economic orientated regulator. In many other European countries, for example Norway,
Sweden and Finland deregulation of their network infrastructures have been
accomplished without privatising their assets. Indeed deregulation accompanied by
privatisation is a peculiarly British phenomenon. It is one cynical interpretation that the
UK Government wished to privatise their utility infrastructures not for any sound
economic reasons but in order to release capital for the Government of the day. Even if
this is not strictly true it has exposed this UK form of regulation to serious criticism.
The first is that the assets were sold off at knock-down values, and the initial price
controls were too slack over the first few years after privatisation. As a result, the UK
utilities made excess profits and incumbent senior management (coined 'fat cats' by the
UK press) walked off with windfall share option schemes. To be fair to the
Government, it is a difficult process to value the assets of a utility and since this was
the first time privatisations on such a scale had taken place, it still remains a
considerable achievement.
One of the other issues that was pioneered in the UK was the regulatory mechanism
that was based on caps on price, rather than a cap on rate of return. Rate of return
regulation had been used in the USA for many years, but many UK economists
recognised this as a suboptimal mechanism. Rate of return regulation allows a utility to
set its tariffs on a 'cost plus' basis. This causes an inefficiency in that a utility can claw
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back all its expenditure through the regulatory processes. Similarly any efficiency gain
and increased profits, made through innovation, has to be handed back. Thus,
proponents of price regulation claim that this discourages the incentive to innovate. On
the other hand, regulating companies on price alone encourages the regulated firm to
cut costs. Inevitably one of the first costs to be cut will be research and development. In
essence this is a microcosm of the market pull versus technology push dilemma. Just as
neither market pull nor technology push fully describe the innovative process, neither
price nor profit regulation alone are sufficient to administer the regulatory process. This
has now been generally recognised, and although the UK form of regulation is still
founded on price, there are incentives in the regulatory formulae to invest in factors
other than financial gain. For example every gas and electricity customer in the UK
pays a one pound annual levy towards energy efficiency which is known as the Non
Fossil Fuel Levy. This as well as the free installation of meters in the water industry,
are instances where technology is being given a pull in the market environment of price
control regulation. In addition as a direct result of Third Party Access and the change
from coal to gas-fired generation, the UK has met its C02, S02, and NOx
environmental emission limits. At the same time the UK deep mined coal industry has
almost been destroyed, contributing to immense sociological change in the UK. This is
an example of the 'tar baby effect' described in section 3.2.
The Single Buyer Procedure (see figure 37) illustrates how a public utility can develop
in a different way, depending on the selection regime in the country. France is unevenly
endowed with natural resources. Though rich in agricultural products, it is poor in raw
materials such as oil, coal and gas. Also due to France's large nuclear commitment (see
chapters 7 and 9 as well as figure 32) the Third Party Access model jeopardises the
countries economic and strategic health. This has resulted in legislation maintaining
EdF's and GdF's monopolies. The French Government's implementation of the Single
Buyer Procedure has meant that metering technology has been used to maximise the
output of the existing vertically integrated network.
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Figure 37: An Evolutionary Analysis Depicting the Introduction of the Single Buyer
Procedure in France
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The Single Buyer Procedure (figure 37) on the other hand, allows France to continue is
commitment to social mechanisms in the market and the maintenance of trade unions'
influence in utility management. However the greatest concern is the role that EdF and
GdF play within the regulation process. It has been described as a 'State within a State'.
In other words the regulatory process has been 'captured' by EdF and GdF and in a
bureaucratic and ideologically fossilised framework. Thus EdF has been described as
'Kafkaesque' and 'inhuman' a label which will have to be shaken off, if their privilege
status is maintained. Thus, It will be increasingly difficult for the French Government
to maintain EdF's and GdF's monopolies if Third Party Access continues to be a
success.
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Figure 38: An Evolutionary Analysis Depicting the Maintenance of the Delegated
Management Model in France
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The water industry in France is evidence of a relatively stable regulatory system that
has evolved little in the past twenty years (see figure 38). Little in the selection
environment, either on the political, social, economic or technical scene, has affected its
administration. The only area of development is in the sphere of the environment,
which has not caused a major restructure. This increase in interest in the area of the
environmental regulation in France is signified by the legislation in 1992.
The stability of this regulatory framework is testimony to the 'delegated management'
form of regulation. In contrast to the other form of regulation discussed, there is no
discernible 'regulatory capture'. Nonetheless the Government still plays a significant
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role, and the lack of agreement on metering and communications standards (see section
13.4) is inhibiting technological development.
Figure 39: An Evolutionary Analysis Depicting the Transformation of Public
Monopolies into Private Monopolies in the UK.
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Unlike the system in France the UK system of water regulation has evolved
considerably over the past twenty years (depicted in figure 39). This has been caused
by political selectors in that the system of liberalisation that has occurred in other
utilities and has also been applied to water. However with respect to water, the result is
somewhat different in that there is neither competition in production and supply nor
Third Party Access. On the technological side, metering technology is helping to
develop a more cost reflective system.
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The same criticisms to that of the electricity and gas transportation businesses apply to
this form of regulation in water (see figure 36). It is therefore susceptible to capture, by
industry, the 'fat cats' and regulatory ideologies. There is however one other problem
with the direct privatisation of public to private monopolies, and that is democratic
accountability. When the public owns a utility, it is nominally responsible to the
democratically elected Government of the day. Moreover, in a competitive market, if
customers are dissatisfied, they can move to another company for their custom. In a
private monopoly, there is neither of these regulatory balancing mechanisms. Power is
placed in an independent regulator (albeit appointed by the Government). But the
question is who regulates the regulator?
16.4 REGULATION POLICY
Techno-Economic Networks and Evolutionary Theory can now be used to illuminate
policy decisions in regulation. The most significant is that the primary duty of
regulation should be the protection of the interests of customers by statutory guidance
on social, environmental and technical matters, as well as economic issues. The role of
technology is crucial. The unbundling of production transportation and supply
functions should be considered only if it is technologically feasible, namely in
electricity and gas supply as well as electricity generation. Although price regulation
(RPI-X) is useful in preventing monopoly excesses, it is unclear whether privatisation
is. necessary. Regulation should to be devolved to local level as much as possible. This
varies from subsidiarity clauses in European legislation to local democratic input. Thus
in France with its large nuclear commitment it would clearly be very disruptive, even
catastrophic, for the European Union to impose Third Party Access. On the other hand
the Single Buyer Procedure should not allow France to benefit disproportionately from
its controversial nuclear programme. Thus regulation is also a temporally dependent
phenomenon, meaning that a regime of regulation that is suitable in one era may not be
suitable in another era. This dimension should also have a democratic component in
which all stakeholders should have a say, whether it be through public ownership or
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delegated management as in the French water industry or strong consumers'
committees to regulate the nominated private Agent.
The size of the nominated Agent is another important factor. It should be large enough
to take advantages of economies of scale as the RECs in England and Wales, but
should not be so large as to wield monopoly power. Where natural monopolies do
exist, as in the water industry and power distribution some form of synthetic
competition should be sought. Two forms have been analysed during the course of this
thesis. 'Yardstick' competition combined with price regulation is popularly used in the
UK utilities, while franchised out delegated management has proved successful in the
French water industry. The 'delegated management' mechanism has a number of
advantages. The tendering system introduces competitive pressures, the private
operation installs a rigorous market discipline and public municipal ownership provides
a democratic accountability. The fact that this mechanism has stood the test of time and
remains relatively unchallenged is testament to its success. A 'yardstick' form of
regulation has also operated for many years, particularly in the USA, and has come
under more critical scrutiny. Concerns have been expressed on the method of
regulation, particularly whether it should be price or profit regulation or a mixture of
both. In the UK the major form of regulation continues to be the regulation of prices,
but windfall profits caused by the manipulation of the regulatory mechanism need to be
addressed. Other concerns have been expressed about the effectiveness of the
'yardstick' mechanism. This type of performance monitoring, or benchmarking, is used
in the regulation of the RECs and Water Service Companies in the UK where their
standards of performance are published in league tables. The theory is that the company
at the foot of the table should have an incentive to improve its performance. In the case
of the England and Wales Pool, comparison with other electricity trading systems or
even the trading of other commodities such as oil and gas may be fruitful in assessing
its efficiency. One note of caution for 'yardstick' monitoring is that it is often difficult to
measure. For example due to sociological, or for geographical reasons, comparisons
between different monopoly areas may be difficult. This issue in benchmarking is
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known as trying to 'compare apples with oranges'. The 'comparing apples with oranges'
issue becomes even more apparent when inter industry comparisons are made, between
for example, the electricity and gas industry. But above all, probably one of the most
controversial areas in 'yardstick' regulation is 'who regulates the regulator?'.
With 'franchised out', or 'delegated management' type of regulatory system where the
Principal is publicly owned, the regulation of the Principal is a relatively straight
forward process. It should be democratically accountable and should have some degree
of local or municipal representation. When the form of regulation is publicly owned
and operated or privately owned and regulated, the role of the Principal becomes a
little more problematic. The publicly owned and operated method will be discussed
first. This form of regulation shares features of self regulation in that the Principal and
the Agent are one and the same. When the industry is publicly owned and operated, in
theory the companies should be regulated by democratic accountability. As it has been
explained in Chapter 3 and shown in the examples of the nationalised industries
described in the case studies, this method of regulation is open to both bureaucratic
torpor and capture by bodies such as trade unions, and wider Government goals such as
national security. It is for these reasons that when the Principal is a large national
Government entity it is now viewed to be undesirable. This is not to say that
Government representation is not crucial but that there should be wide representation at
local as well as national level. It is also important that the Principal should express the
widest range of interests. One of the major themes of this thesis is founded on is the
notion that regulation is a multi-faceted process and has particularly tried to. explore the
role that technology has played in this process. The greatest danger to regulation is
when the process is captured by one particular interest group. One of the ways to
ensure that this does not take place is by democratic accountability of the regulators. In
saying this, each of the interest groups and each industry should be fairly represented.
Recent proposals by the UK Government go some way to address these issues, stating
that utility regulators should have clear social and environmental obligations as well as
economic ones. There has also been recommendations to combine of Offer and Ofgas
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which is also a step forward in gaining more industry-wide co-operation. This goes at
least some of the way to addressing the issue of 'who regulates the regulator?' but does
not fully acknowledge the role that technological innovation has played in the
regulatory process.
Figure 40: Proposed Regulatory Structure
Figure 40 shows a proposed structure for regulatory and technology policy in public
utilities. In effect, it is suggested that each country or district and each industry, should
have a bespoke regulatory policy which feeds into separate regulators (or Principals)
covering economic, social, technological and environmental policy. The notion of
Constructive Technology Assessment could play a role here where separate specialist
regulators then feed into executive Government level. Thus sociotechnical change is
overtly coupled with Governance and regulators are seen more as facilitators advising
on, rather than prescribing, policy. As far as the Agent is concerned, it is argued that the
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case of private over public sector ownership is still unproven. It is however considered
that some market discipline is necessary, either by delegated management or full
privatisation, to ensure that the Agent does not 'capture' policy.
16.5 CONCLUSION
The uses of the principles of Techno-Economic Networks and Evolutionary Theory
described in this chapter have proved to be useful analytical devices. They talk of
regulation as a multi-functional process and provide a framework for comparative
analysis between regulatory regimes. They also provide differing perspectives to the
analysis. Techno-Economic Networks are bounded by their actors, and describe
regulation as an overtly social phenomenon. In other words the actors have been
brought together in conscious and deliberate process to describe the dynamics of
regulatory change. Evolution on the other hand, sees the social process as just one of
many selectors in a random conscious and unconscious process which also include
physical constraints such as rainfall, oil and gas reserves and so on. It is therefore
concluded that both evolutionary frameworks and Techno-Economic Networks are
useful as explanatory tools for different aspects of regulatory change. The evolutionary
approach adopted in this study also was able to highlight the 'capture' mechanism in
regulatory process. This was shown to be a significant factor in all the forms of
regulation with the exception of the 'delegated management' model.
Also the analytical mechanisms provide recommendations for regulatory policy. It is
recommended that independent regulators should be set up not primarily on industry
lines like Offer, Ofgas, Oftel and Ofwat but on economic, sociological, environmental
and technical disciplinary lines, in the format described in figure 40. There is a
precedent in this in the water industries in France and the UK, both of which have
separate regulators for economics and the environment. Within these bodies there
would be a function that addresses individual industrial needs. There also needs to be
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considerable democratic representation at local, regional, national and international
level. But it is important that these regulatory bodies should be run by independent
experts in their own disciplinary field. These should then feed into ministries at
Government level where local people are well represented. In this way, regulation can
be seen to be run for the people and accountable to the people.
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CHAPTER 17
CONCLUSIONS
17.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis has studied the interrelation of technology and regulation in public utilities.
In order to do this it was argued that the construction of 'theory' was the simplest and
clearest way of creating a framework for the analysis. It was also found that different
'theories' with different (and starkly contrasting) philosophical foundations provided
different insights into to innovation and regulatory process. The solution adopted in this
research is a pragmatic one. No one theoretical framework presented in the literature
review adequately described the phenomena explored in this study. Neither was a new
theoretical framework developed during the course of the research nor was there an
attempt to unify the competing approaches. Rather it was found that each of the
frameworks was useful at describing certain aspects of the process of innovation and
regulation. This in turn was used to appraise the validity of each of the theoretical
approaches and to provide a richness to the analysis. Each theory also provided a
common frame of reference in which analysts are able to discuss technological
innovation and regulatory development. Moreover the analysis was not only used in a
descriptive form but also as a prescriptive tool which could be used to guide policy
making. In this way policy recommendations were made with respect to technology
and regulatory development.
In order to define the parameters of the research within manageable proportions the
thesis considered the case of the development of metering and communications
technology in public utilities in France and the United Kingdom over the past twenty
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years. To obtain as much validity as possible, a multiple case study methodology was
adopted using an 'emergent grounded' approach. In effect, this meant the research was
conducted within the bounds of the theoretical frameworks presented in Part I.
Nonetheless, the case studies explored in Part II were conducted without any reference
to one particular framework, in an attempt to see if either a theory would 'emerge', or
whether one theoretical approach was more suitable than another for explaining the
phenomena explored. This is not to say that the case study descriptions were not
impartial, and indeed this is entirely consistent on the holistic research design that
included participative as well as an analytical components. Part III then evaluated the
technological and regulatory frameworks presented in Part I in order to develop a
descriptive analysis and explanations for the events explored in the case studies (Part
II).
17.2 FINDINGS
Chapter 14 evaluated the Techno-Economic Paradigm as an explanation for the
changes occurring in public utilities. It was concluded that within the
telecommunications industry the Techno-Economic Paradigm was indeed a useful
concept. Yet it became less convincing if the concept was applied to other industrial
sectors. For example, in the telecommunications industry the advance in information
technology has played a significant role in regulatory change, while in the electricity
and gas industries information technology only acts as a more minor facilitator for
change. Moreover, information technology has had very little effect to date on the
regulatory development in the water industry. In order to describe the specific nature of
technological change the development of metering technology was considered. So in
chapter 15 the focus of analysis was directed to a more meso scale in the evaluation of
the development ofmetering and communications.
Systems Theory was used as a starting point in chapter 15. It was able to describe
359
metering as part of a larger infrastructure and highlighted that the technology could not
be understood unless it was seen as part of the system as a whole. Also it was found
that with the advent ofmicroelectronics and advanced communications, mechanisms in
the energy and water utilities is changing the meter's role from a metrological device to
a customer service interface. Moreover the repercussions of this change, although yet to
be fully realised, were more marked in electricity than they were in gas and water. It
followed that if the metering technology was changing, the system as a whole must be
changing as well. It was also found that although Systems Theory as described by
Hughes (1982) was useful at developing a framework for system development, it had
less to say on change occurring in a mature network infrastructure. It was found that the
'highway' model proposed by Saehney (1992) was suitable for describing changes in
the telecommunications networks but had little relevance to energy and water utilities
which contained an additional production component to the network infrastructure.
Therefore, Sociotechnical Constituents and Evolutionary Theory were argued to be
further useful concepts in describing and explaining the development ofmetering in the
electricity, gas and water industries.
Here there were notable differences in metering development, not only between utilities
but also between France and the UK. By studying the process through a modified form
of Molina's (1996) 'diamond of alignment', Sociotechnical Constituencies showed that
the developing technology was a result of a socio-cultural milieu. In France for
instance, the electricity and gas industries were dominated by the need to supply a
secure and independent source of energy, and metering was developing to maximise
the load factor. In the UK meanwhile, metering was developing to allow the
introduction of competition in the energy supply sector. In water on the other hand
metering was beginning to be installed in the UK (specifically England and Wales) due
to changing pricing regimes and environmental factors. While Sociotechnical
Constituents were used as an analytical tool to describe metering development,
Evolutionary Theory was found useful in explaining metering development. In this
mode of thought, selectors both human and non human were responsible for 'choosing'
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certain forms of metering technology best suited to the regulatory environment. The
specification for these technologies was then retained in legal statutes ranging from
patents, codes of practice and inter-Governmental standards. Meter and software
manufacturers then reproduced the technology so that the selection process could start
all over again. So while Sociotechnical Constituencies provided a description for
metering development, evolution provided a possible mechanism for metering
development. In this way a more rounded picture of the development process was
achieved.
Chapter 16 then turned its attention to the development of the system of regulation over
the past twenty years in France and the UK. Again Systems Theory was used as the
starting point and it was concluded that Techno-Economic Networks were the more
suitable frameworks to describe regulatory development, than the more techno-centric
approach Sociotechnical Constituents. Thus Techno-Economic Networks were used in
describing the change in the regulatory process in a more socio-centric way. Techno-
Economic Networks described how metering technology had been used as one ofmany
actors and intermediaries to maintain the vertically integrated structure of the gas and
electricity industries in France. At the same time metering technology was facilitating
the deregulation process and the privatisation of public sector assets in the UK. Again
while Techno-Economic Networks described the process, Evolutionary Theory was
explored as a mechanism for change. In this case, the variables were considered to be
the various modes of regulation described in the literature review. The selection
mechanisms included such factors as political beliefs, the state of technological
development (including metering) and social equality. These asymmetries in the
regulatory environment can then be balanced by mechanisms such as Constructive
Technology Assessment. These rules are then retained in Acts of Parliament, which then
provided a basis for future developments in regulatory policy.
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17.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR METERING AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
These findings, the clearest of which is that there is neither a correct policy nor a
correct blueprint for technology and regulatory policy, have significant implications for
policy makers. Policy is dependent on both spatial and temporal factors. A policy that
is right for the electricity industry in the UK may not be right for the water industry in
the UK or the electricity industry in France. This can be illustrated by the fact that
during the nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties both the UK and France followed a
similar policy of publicly owned and operated utility networks which created the
interconnected gas and electricity networks of today. Today however, now that the
infrastructure is complete, new pressures such as innovations in information
technology, are causing changes in the structure. These structures may also vary from
country to country, not only for socio-cultural reasons but also because of geographical
constraints. The fact that France is poorly endowed with indigenous sources of energy
means that it has adopted different technological and regulatory policies from the UK.
Similarly France is over twice the size of the UK with roughly the same population
size. This low population density has implications for the operations, not only of water
but also energy supply.
Sections 15.4 and 16.4 proposed some policy measures to take account of the variations
in time and space. The major thrust of these is that the advisory process should not be
vested in one party but spread amongst, many interested parties varying among
academic, industrial and consumer groups. Another important feature of this, structure
is that final executive power should not reside in regulatory authorities. It is crucial that
their role should be advisory rather than executory. Rather executive power should, as
far as possible, lie with the democratically elected Government at district or national
level. This allows the regulatory process to be tailored to balance such factors geo-
cultural circumstances and technological development. It is also important that
regulation should not be seen as a static process and will evolve over time with along
with the development of knowledge and process of democratic change.
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17.4 FURTHER RESEARCH
The theoretical frameworks described in this thesis provide a structure for an applied
methodology which could prove useful in deciding different aspects of regulatory and
technology policy. Sociotechnical Constituents and Techno-Economic Networks are
useful methods of describing the status of a particular technology or regulatory
environment. The results of such analysis can then be applied in an evolutionary
framework to appraise the future of an individual technology or regulatory regime over
time. This could be of use to both companies who wish to invest in public industry
infrastructure, and Governments who wish to overhaul their utility management, to
adapt to evolving technological and social needs. In order to evaluate this methodology,
further trials with public sector and private sector clients will be required.
Further work is also suggested on the theoretical foundations of the application of
Evolutionary Theory to the social sciences. Attention needs to be paid to the variation,
selection and retention/reproduction mechanism of Evolutionary Theory. This thesis
has restricted itself to larger-scale (macro and meso) social, economic and technical
evolution. To draw an analogy with the biological sciences, this study is viewing the
evolutionary process at the phenotypic and environmental level rather than the
molecular level. To unravel the micro processes in technological and regulatory
evolution may prove difficult. The key will be to describe a codified replication
mechanism like DNA in biological evolution. It was suggested sections 15.3.3 and
16.3.3 that codified rules such as patents and legal statutes might play a role. This may
also be extended to tacit rules such as social taboos. Also during the course of the thesis
it has been argued that metering cannot be understood unless it is seen as a component
of a larger infrastructure system. Thus understanding of the relationship between the
artefact and its surrounding environment will also be a key to unravelling the dynamics
involved in an evolutionary approach.
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The final area of future research is in the development of regulatory studies and
technology studies, as academic disciplines in their own right. A major theme of this
thesis is the interdisciplinary nature of technology and regulation. It is also concluded
that the most valuable work on technology and regulation occurs within the disciplines
of economics, sociology and political science. A missing ingredient is often the fact
that the study of technology is not cross-disciplinary. Therefore further work is required
of a collaborative nature between academics from varying backgrounds. The aim of
this work would be to compare and contrast approaches in a spirit of co-operation,
respect and mutual fulfilment.
THE END
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ABBREVIATIONS
ABB Kent: ABB Kent Meters Ltd
AdB: L'Agencies de Bassins
AGB: Audit of Great Britain
AGR: Advance Gas-Cooled Reactor
AMPY: An Electronic Meter Manufacturer
AMR: Automatic Meter Reading
ATG: l'Association Technique de l'Industrie du Gaz en France
BG: British Gas pic
BGC: British Gas Corporation
bps: Bits Per Second
BS: British Standard
BSI: British Standards Institute
BT: British Telecom
CALMS: A No-Ring-Trunk Dialling Technology
CATV: Cable TV
CCGT: Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
CD Gaz: An Ancillary Gas Company
CEA: Central Electricity Authority
CEA Commissariat a 1' Energy
CEGB: Central Electricity Generating Board
CEN: European Electronic Metering Standardisation Committee for Fluid Flow
Meters (Gas & Water)
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CENELEC: European Electronic Metering Standardisation Committee for Electricity
Metering
CETIAT: Technical Centre for Ventilation and Heating (France)
CfD: Contract for Difference
CFM: Compagnie Frantjaise du Methane
CGE: Compagnie Generale des Eaux
CGT: Federation de l'Eclairage
CMSG: Ofgas' Competitive Metering Steering Group
CNRS National Centre for Scientific Research
CNET Centre for the Study ofTelecommunications
COFRAC: French Accreditation Committee
CORGI: Council ofRegistered Gas Installers
CSI: Le Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation de l'Ecole Nationale Superieure des
Mines de Paris
DA/DSM: Distribution Automation/Demand Side Management
DDR: Diagnostic Data Reader
DGES: The Director General ofElectricity Supply (UK)
DGGS: The Director General ofGas Supply (UK)
DIREN: Ministry of The Environment (France)
DLMS: Distribution Line Messaging System
DoE: Department of the Environment (UK)
DRIRE: Ministry of Industry (France)
DTI: Department ofTrade and Industry (UK)
DWI: The Drinking Water Inspectorate (UK)
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EA: The Environment Agency (UK)
EC: European Commission
EdF: Electricite de France
EDI: Electronic Data Interchange
EDDI: E6 Diagnostic Data Interface
EGF: Electricite-Gaz de France
EJP: Peak Day Demand-Reduction Option
ESIS: The Electricity Settlement System (UK)
EPOR: Empirical Programme ofRelativism
EPOS: Electronic Point of Sale
ESRC: Economic and Social Research Council (UK)
EU: European Union
FFL: Fossil Fuel Levy
FNDAE: Fonds National Pour le Development des Adductions d'Eau
FT: France Telecom
FT-SE: Financial Times Share Index
GCC: The Gas Consumers' Council (UK)
GEC: General Electric Company
GdF: Gaz de France
GPO: General Post Office (UK)
GPT: A Telecommunications Manufacturer
GSP: Grid Supply Point
GW: Gigawatts
HEBS: Home and Building Electronic Systems
HMIP: Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (UK)
ICC: Communicating Customer Interface
IEC: International Electrotechnical Commission
IGE: Institution ofGas Engineers (UK)
IPA: Ian Pope Associates
ISO: International Standards Organisation
IT: Information Technology
kV: Kilovolts
kW: Kilowatts
LCD: Liquid Crystal Display
LDZ: Local Distribution Zones
LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas
LPG: Liquefied Petroleum Gases (Usually Butane or Propane)
LRMC: Long-Run Marginal Cost
LV: Low Voltage
MHz: Megahertz
MMC: Monopolies and Mergers Commission (UK)
MMS: Manufacturing Message Specification
MW: Megawatts
mW: Milliwatts
NGC: The National Grid Company
NOSHEB: The North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board
NP: National Power
NRA: National Rivers Authority (UK)
NTS: National Transmission System
Ofgas: Office ofGas Supply (UK)
Offer: The Office of Electricity Regulation (UK)
OFT: Office of Fair Trading (UK)
Oftel: Office ofTelecommunications Ficensing (UK)
Ofwat: Office ofWater Services (UK)
OTV: Omnium de Traitements et de Valorisation
PC: Personal Computer
PES: Public Electricity Supplier
PG: PowerGen
PLAN: Power Line Automation Network
PLC: Power Line Carrier
PPM: Prepayment Meters
PSTN: Publicly Switched Telephone Network
PWR: Pressured Water Reactor
RAP: Regie Autonome des Petroles
RATP: Parisian Transport Company
REC: Regional Electricity Company
RTP: 'Real-Time' Pricing
SATESE: Services d'Assistance Technique a l'Explotation des Stations d'Epuration
SCEMA: Smart Card Electricity Metering Association
SCOT: Social Construction ofTechnology
SFR: Societe Fran?aise de Radiotelephone
SLE: Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux
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SNCF: Societe Nationale de Chemin de Fer (French National Railways)
SNGSO: Societe Nationale des Gaz du Sud-Ouest
SNPA: Societe Nationale des Petroles d'Aquitaine (later called ElfAquitaine)
SPC: Stored Programmed Control
SPDE: Syndicate Professional des Distributeurs d'Eau
SPEGNN: Syndicat Professionel des Enterprises non Nationalises
SRAE: Services Regionaux d'Amenagement des Eaux
SRMC: Short-Run Marginal Cost
SSA: Pool Settlement System Administrator
SSEB: The South of Scotland Electricity Board
SYS: Seven Year Statement
TC: Technical Committee
TICGN: Taxe Interieure a la Consommation du Gaz Naturel
TOU: 'Time ofUse'
UKAMRA: The United Kingdom Automatic Meter Reading Association
UKDCS: United Kingdom Data Collection Services
UTPC: Universal TariffProcessing Concept
UWWTD: EU Directive Covering Urban Wastewater Treatment
V: Volts
W: Watts
WCC: Water Consumers' Council
WSC: Water Service Company
X-25: A Telecommunications Protocol
